Integrating Drones Isn’t Intuitive:
Practical Ways to Build this Critical Capability
By LTC Reed Markham
Article published in the Fall 2024 Issue of the infantry journal
Read Time: < 13 mins
Above, Soldiers in the 2nd Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment employ a commercial off-the-shelf quadcopter during a training exercise. (Photos courtesy of author)
Flying robots that identify their enemy, drop
grenades, bring fires, or suicide themselves to
destroy armored vehicles are commonplace in
the Russia-Ukraine War. Drones have not only dramatically
shaped that war, but they have also been used by
Hamas to set conditions for their terror attacks on 7 October
2023, the Azerbaijan military to change the balance in the
Nagorno-Karabakh War, and Iranian proxies in their attacks
on U.S. naval and ground forces.1-3 I pondered all of this as
I watched firsthand one “battlefield” where drones were not
having any impact — my battalion’s platoon live fires. This
distressing fact was made apparent when the fourth straight
platoon’s small unmanned aerial system (sUAS), a minihelicopter
called a Black Hornet, shakily lifted off, raised 10
feet in the air, and then smashed into the ground. It became
even more clear when the second unit in a row reported that
its company-level UAS system, a Raven, was unable to fly
because of missing parts, an inexperienced operator, not
having the restricted operating zone (ROZ) activated at the
right time, or some combination of those factors. This was the moment that I fully understood that we had a problem
and needed a new approach to integrating this critical asset
into how we fight.
To frame the problem appropriately, I did not assess that
our battalion was the anomaly in struggling to integrate
drones. We have a great unit that is fortunate in the quality of
its past and current officers and NCOs. However, something
was stopping us from saturating the battlefield with sensors
as the current and future battlefields demand.4 So, what was
the problem? Turns out there were many, and some we could
affect, some we could not. We can’t control the number and
type of UAS we are fielded — just as you use the night vision
devices, shoot the weapons, and wear the body armor you
are fielded. Many factors we could affect, however, and that
is where we focused our energies. Our leaders struggled to
visualize drone employment, our operators weren’t experienced, and our training and resourcing
systems didn’t support the effort. During
our quest to flood the zone with drones
and radically increase our warfighting
ability, I identified three key areas that
demanded improvement: We needed
to train and certify our leaders, provide
hours and hours of flying repetitions and
simple objectives for our operators, and
integrate UAS into the battalion-level
training and maintenance management
systems.
Visualizing the Battle
If you close your eyes, can you visualize swarms of drones
in front of your forces conducting reconnaissance of routes,
various positions, obstacles, and the enemy to identify their
command-and-control locations, indirect fire assets, and antitank/
machine-gun positions? Picture fire supporters making
micro adjustments to their pre-planned targets before massing
fires to overwhelm and destroy the enemy... or assault
leaders and sappers pinpointing the location of the breach
and the positions they will bound their elements to preserve
their forces and close with and destroy the enemy. How about
drone operators identifying a remaining enemy machine-gun
position in a trench, dropping a 40mm round on it, and then
reporting that key condition is met before the assault element
advances? Lastly, visualize immediately after the attack,
when transitioning to the defense, rapidly sending drones
along the most likely avenues of the enemy’s counterattack
to enable indirect fires to disrupt and the now-rightfully placed
antitank weapons and machine guns to destroy. Can you see
the battle that way?
Well, I couldn’t, nor could most of our leaders. We had to
start with casting a shared — and easily understood — battlefield
vision for the leaders in the battalion. Every element in
the battalion would use drones: rifle, heavy weapons, scout,
mortar, and distribution platoons as well as all command
posts. Our drones would:
1. Recon our routes, positions, obstacles, and the
enemy;
2. Deceive and disrupt the enemy;
3. Integrate fires and drop munitions; and
4. Secure our forces.
Current UAS Training Resources
The Army has some helpful doctrine to direct the training
and employment of drones. One source we used to determine
offensive uses of drones was the Army’s counter-UAS
doctrine, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-01.81, which
was very helpful in defining missions, UAS groups, and the
basic logic of their use.5 However, not all the doctrine has
kept up with the advances since the Russians escalated their
attack deeper into Ukraine. My assessment is that Training
Circular (TC) 3-04.62, Small Unmanned Aircraft System
Aircrew Training Program, written in 2013, was developed
for the fixed-wing sUAS (Raven), and the requirements for operator and program training, tracking,
and currency seem too stringent
and slow to keep up with the current
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) quadcopter
variants.6
There are some helpful existing
training and program-tracking systems.
Ensuring operators use drones inside a
ROZ and are trained on basic employment
through the online basic unmanned
qualification course is critical.7 We also
logged operators’ flight hours inside the
sUAS manager to identify future master trainer candidates
and help us track our proficiency. However, to make tangible
gains in the employment of UAS in collective training, live
fire, and situational tactical exercises, we needed to ensure
we did not overdo UAS programming at the expense of actual
combat capability. Fighting with drones is vitally important
now; we cannot afford to overcontrol it to mitigate risk at the
expense of real implementation.
Once we understood our current situation, envisioned
future, and resources available, it was time to act and build a
real, lethal, and lasting drone capability.
Fighting with drones
is vitally important
now; we cannot
afford to overcontrol
it to mitigate risk at
the expense of real
implementation.
Training Leaders
We had to train our company- and platoon-level leaders
on the new vision of the battlefield. Our platoon leaders and
sergeants balance many things early in the Army. Integrating
and synchronizing the foundations of a rifle platoon, its
machine guns, anti-tank systems, rifle squads, and external
mortars is challenging enough. Now they must rapidly learn
to employ the awesome, but complicated, integrated tactical
network (ITN) to populate their position location information
and receive, make, and rapidly disseminate digital graphics
on their end user device through the android team awareness
kit (ATAK). Our digital fires systems also allow quick
integration of artillery and adjacent unit mortars into their
operations. Throw drones on top and even our most talented
young officers and NCOs will struggle without deliberate
training.
To train our platoon-level leaders, we found that starting
with a white board to sketch out the drone battlefield vision
helped them share that understanding. Giving them simple
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) was important.
For example, treat the UAS operator as a member of the
platoon headquarters element, same as their radio-telephone
operator (RTO), forward observer (FO), and medic. That way
the operator can move back and forth between the platoon
leader and platoon sergeant based on aspects of the operation
while maintaining the right leader oversight of the drone
employment. Lastly, we trained our leaders by providing a
mental model of when to employ the drone and how that
fits within the normal stages of executing an operation (for
example, at the objective rally point, before reaching the
assault position, immediately after reaching the limit of the
advance of the attack, etc.).
Our Army is great at integrating and echeloning indirect fires.
Fire supporters and our maneuver leaders are trained on this critical task through
fire support team certifications, call-for-fire trainers, collective training,
and fire support coordination exercises. Based on the depth of knowledge of the mental
model of echeloning fires, we trained our leaders to integrate UAS using the same structure.
Doing so during planning and rehearsals was critical to ensuring UAS were built
into indirect fires planning as a tool for observers to initiate the various artillery a
nd mortars.
During the planning phase, our leaders identified the right locations to
launch the various drones. For example, drones such as Skydios and DJI Maviks
can be launched from 2-3 kilometers away, fly a deceptive route, and conduct
their recon mission, all while the platoon is still moving towards the objective
to then receive the drone at a different landing location. Once closer to the
enemy, the platoon can fly its Soldier Borne Sensor (SBS) Black Hornet using
the quick “periscope” method of rising above the tree line to gain a final
assessment of the enemy while our forces remain behind cover. Finally, before
or during the assault, DJI Maviks or Skydios with fabricated munition droppers
attached can execute precision attacks on enemy fighting positions or trenches
where direct fire weapons struggle to achieve lethal effects. Simple engagement
criteria to operators enables initiative (for example, find antennas or machine
guns and kill them). Once our leaders visualized drone integration into the
battle using the model of echeloning fires, we were able to effectively account
for them during planning and execution.
Platoon headquarters elements consisting of a platoon-level leader, radio-telephone operator, forward observer, and unmanned aerial system operator work together to command and control the platoon.
Training Expert Operators
Nearly 2,500 years ago, Archilochus was probably not talking specifically about
flying robots to recon and drop bombs on the enemy, but his words hold true: “We don’t
rise to the level of our expectations, we fall to the level of our training.”
Leaders understanding how to employ drones is not enough without trained, confident,
and knowledgeable UAS operators. Repetition, repetition, repetition — it’s the key in
bowling, shooting a basket, running a maintenance meeting, crewing a machine gun, and yes, flying drones.
You probably heard, as I did, that our Soldiers, especially the gamers, will instinctively
pick up the flying of these drones. I found that 100-percent false. As with anything,
time varies by Soldier, but our rough estimate is operators need to fly around 10 hours
to not be a liability in the operation and around 15 hours before they seamlessly
integrate the UAS into the platoon’s operation. Adding a ROZ in every event and creating
frequent flying opportunities for our operators were both critical to building their experience and confidence.
Figure 1 — Echeloning the Employment of Indirect Fire, UAS, Anti-Tank, and Air Assets
Just as we needed a shared vision for employment by leaders, the same was true for our operators.
Creating plain speak — jargon and acronym free — training objectives and rules for our Soldiers
provided them a knowable training path (see Figure 3). For example, placing the drone into operation,
developing a simple flight path, and using identifiable terrain features to quickly deconflict
air space with other drones gave tangible actions for our operators. This also helped reinforce
proper use by leaders. As in most of our war-fighting training, hands-on training using simple
guides was more effective than the hours of an online basic unmanned qualification course or
in-person classroom instruction using PowerPoint.
Figure 2 — Example Exercise with COTS Drones Employing Reconnaissance and Precision Attack Capabilities
Manning a machine gun or a tank is a team sport; the same applies for launching robots into the sky.
Instilling the crew mentality to the employment and recovery of UAS assisted in the speed, safety,
and the preservation of our systems. We learned this lesson the hard way after numerous failures
or too slow launches, and worse, breaking hard-to-replace antennas as a flustered operator yanked
a $12,000 drone out of his assault pack. Integrating the platoon’s RTO, FO, and medic into the UAS
“crew” helped decrease launch and recovery time and led to more effective tactical transport of
the systems. There were also hard-to-quantify advantages to getting more Soldiers involved in
drone employment that led to smoother integration.
Figure 3 — Plain Speak UAS Operator Training Guidance and Rules
Building UAS Enabling Systems
Systematizing an activity helps to weight the effort appropriately. We found adding drone employment
to our battalion training resource meeting made an outsized impact. When our drones were just
another system sitting in a tough box dependent on the individualized efforts of the high-speed
operator or innovative leader, we had sporadic successful employment. Once we added the issuing
of UAS and requesting of a ROZ as critical items for each training event — the same as ammunition
and land — we were able to increase training opportunities. Events that were not normally viewed as times to integrate UAS, such as crew
qualification and land navigation, became occasions for
operator repetitions and TTP development. Adding our drone
status to our maintenance meeting was also key to forcing
us to work through how to repair or coordinate replacement
of non-standard equipment. Deliberate recovery operations
with company drone status reporting allowed us to better see
ourselves and get broken systems fixed. What we track and
report on is how we prioritize efforts, and we were unable to
weight this effort effectively until we integrated UAS into the
battalion’s core systems.
COTS drones, although easier to use than the Raven or Puma, require expert operators to rapidly employ in tactical situations.
Recommendations
• Battalion leader development programs account for training
platoon-level leaders on how to employ sUAS, similar to
how we train our leaders to integrate fires.
• Battalion training resource systems establish ROZs at
every training event, pool the sUAS in the unit, and ensure
their maintenance status and allocation to every unit’s training.
• Leaders, all of them, fly drones, not because they have
to become experts, but understanding the basic employment
allows more effective integration, similar to how every fighting
leader can employ all the weapons assigned to his or her unit.
• Companies build a bench of trained UAS operators (we
have a minimum of eight per company). This allows continuity,
spreads the knowledge of employment throughout the
ranks, and drives innovation as the incredible creativity of our
Soldiers is identified and unleashed.
• Every unit trains with sUAS — we do not recommend
consolidating the systems with the scout platoon as that risks
their integration into every aspect of a unit.
• sUAS is fought as a crew (not necessarily Soldiers’ primary or only duty); we have an assigned primary duty
UAS operator supported by the RTO, FO, and/or medic at
our company and platoon headquarters.
Drones are not just the future of warfare; they are the present.
Unlike the Ukrainians, we do not have the stimulus that
drives battlefield innovation from the level of violence and
desperation existing in war. We cannot afford to wait until that
happens to develop the training and employment techniques
with this vital new asset. Our Army will not use drones exactly
the way others are employing them. Many units employing
UAS in many ways will create an environment where the
most practical and effective uses flourish. There are more
obstacles to employing UAS; however, training leaders to
understand how and when to employ them, building expertise
with operators, and adjusting existing systems to maintain
and resource our UAS efficiently are ways to integrate this
critical asset into a unit. I am certain there are more and look
forward to learning better ways to do so!
Drones are not just the future of warfare;
they are the present... Our Army will not
use drones exactly the way others are
employing them. Many units employing
UAS in many ways will create an
environment where the most practical
and effective uses flourish.
Soldiers in 2-506 IN employ a drone in a crew manner at night.
Notes
1. Eado Hecht, “Drones in the Nagorno-Karabakh War: Analyzing
the Data,” Military Strategy Magazine 7/4 (Winter 2022), https://www.
militarystrategymagazine.com/article/drones-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-waranalyzing-
the-data/.
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2. Mia Jankowicz, “How Hamas Likely Used Rudimentary Drones to ‘Blind
and Deafen’ Israel’s Border and Pave the Way for its Onslaught,” Business
Insider, 10 October 2023, //www.businessinsider.com/hamas-dronestake-
out-comms-towers-ambush-israel-2023-10.
3. Rodney Barton, “The Use of Drones in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,”
Australian Defence Business Review, 24 May 2021, https://defense.info/
air-power-dynamics/2021/06/the-use-of-drones-in-the-nagorno-karabakhconflict/.
4. GEN James Rainey and LTG Laura Potter, “Delivering the Army of 2030,”
War on the Rocks, 6 August 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/08/
delivering-the-army-of-2030/.
5. Army Techniques Publication 3-01.81, Counter-Unmanned Aircraft
System (C-UAS), August 2023, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/
DR_a/ARN38994-ATP_3-01.81-000-WEB-1.pdf.
6. Training Circular 3-04.62, Small Unmanned Aircraft System Aircrew
Training Program, August 2013, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/
DR_a/pdf/web/tc3_04x62.pdf.
7. U.D. Defense, SUASMAN, retrieved from Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Manager, https://suasman.sofapps.net/Site/Home.
Author
LTC Reed Markham is an active-duty Army officer since 2005 who
has led and trained Soldiers from the platoon through battalion level. LTC
Markham is currently in command of 2nd Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment,
3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort
Campbell, KY.
1LT Jonathan Dow is the 2-506 IN battalion editor and greatly contributed
to this article.