Steel Meets Sustainment

Key Takeaways from the 12-Day War

By CPT Ben Kusinski

Article published on: March 15, 2026 in the Spring 2026 issue of Armor

Read Time: < 13 mins

Photo by Author

“The rapid employment of advancement and innovation of our capabilities is critical to mission accomplishment and sustainment. Technology is constantly changing and evolving, as are our adversaries. We must continue to drive the integration of today’s cutting-edge technology for large scale combat operations.”1

As tensions escalated between Israel and Iran in early June 2025, U.S. forces within the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AoR) transitioned from a period of sustained preparation to rapid execution during the ensuing 12-Day War. Serving as a Battle Captain with 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command (3rd ESC) – the operational command post for 1st Theater Sustainment Command (1TSC) – I directly observed strategic-level decision making that significantly influenced the conflict’s outcome. Although characterized by ballistic missile exchanges and precision air strikes, this conflict yielded critical lessons applicable to ground forces conducting large scale combat operations (LSCO), particularly regarding sustainment operations and the challenges of rapid force projection.

Key Lessons Learned

The 3 D’s- Displacement, Dispersal, and Decentralization: Continuously jumping command nodes, personnel, and equipment at all echelons ensures that adversaries cannot effectively target key assets.

Drone Threat Mitigation: Precision guided munitions, one way attack unmanned aerial systems (OWAUAS), and small drones are the most prevalent threats to our modern-day forces.

Predictive Sustainment and Logistical Resilience: Data-driven insights, such as using predictive analytics to forecast consumption rates, are incredibly important when prepositioning critical stocks. During the 12-Day War, rapid consumption rates of munitions and specific vehicle components quickly strained these supplies. Sustainment units at all levels need to plan for rapid replenishment and alternative sourcing.

Units Must have the Maintenance Capacity to Fight Forward: The high operational tempo exposed limitations in forward maintenance capacity. Leaders on the ground need to ensure soldiers have familiarity with maintenance procedures.

Command & Control (C2) in Contested Environments: Leaders must empower subordinate teams by providing clear, concise intent and guidance. Communications exercises and rehearsals are imperative prior to execution.

These insights underscore the enduring importance of agile sustainment frameworks in expeditionary warfare. They highlight how Armor Officers—traditionally focused on direct combat—can amplify combat power by mastering theater-scale logistics complexities. As mounted warfare experts, Armor Officers understand better than most the importance of sustainment operations in LSCO. By applying these lessons learned during the 12-Day War, we can ensure our armored force remains agile and lethal in contested environments.

The 3 D’s- Displacement, Dispersal, and Decentralization

When the strategic withdrawal from Afghanistan occurred in 2021, remaining forces within USCENTCOM transitioned to a defensive posture. The US-CENTCOM landscape of 2025 is one completely different than the one that veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars know. The focus of U.S. forces in the Middle East has slowly transitioned from counterterrorism to one of competition against potential adversaries such as Iran, China, and Russia. As operations have shifted from offensive to defensive in nature, U.S. forces have consolidated at several large bases, compared to the small forward operating bases and outposts prior to 2021.

Over time, these large bases such as Camps Arifjan and Buehring, have evolved into thriving sustainment hubs, providing critical support to the theater. However, this has also made these locations easy targets. With Iranian proxies conducting regular surveillance of U.S. forces and Iranian ballistic missiles becoming a realistic threat in the months leading up to the 12-Day War, soldiers and leaders proactively took steps to enhance preparedness by hardening bunkers and executing command post jump plan rehearsals.

“Sustainers must be agile, adaptive, and always ready to deliver combat power at the point of need, which is always rapidly evolving in large scale combat operations. We must ensure our mindset, precision, and purpose align with the mission.”1

As GEN (R) David Perkins, 15th Commander of United States Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC), highlighted in the 2014 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, Win in a Complex World, “The key to a Strategic Win is to present the enemy with multiple dilemmas. To compel enemy actions requires putting something of value to them at risk. Army forces allow joint force commanders to dictate the terms of operations and render enemies incapable of responding effectively.” While command posts were displacing to alternate, contingency, and emergency locations, the Joint Logistics Enterprise and sister services simultaneously dispersed key equipment away from highly visible and easily targeted areas. By displacing personnel, dispersing equipment, decentralizing command and control, and conducting expeditious sustainment of forces, 1TSC was able to expand the United States Army Central (ARCENT) footprint. This provided senior leaders with options while rendering the Iranians unsuccessful in strikes against its high value target list as demonstrated by no casualties and minimal damage to infrastructure on Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar.

Figure 1. An M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank assigned to 3rd Squadron, 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Task Force Reaper, participates in a joint live fire training exercise as part of BRIGHT STAR 25, Mohamed Naguib Military Base, Sept. 7, 2025. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Grace Nechanicky)

C2 in Contested Environments

Pre-war (C2) architecture mostly consisted of static command posts, either in hardened buildings or improved tents. With an uncontested environment in most of the Arabian Peninsula for several years, units down to the company level have easily been able to swiftly establish Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPR) and Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPR) capabilities. The 12-Day War reinforced the notion that commanders must become comfortable fighting with degraded communication systems and must routinely conduct effective training, such as communication exercises (COM-MEX), to be prepared for C2 in contested environments.

Prior to the start of the 12-Day War, ARCENT conducted a COMMEX with 1TSC, Task Force Spartan, and other subordinate units. This COMMEX, planned and executed in response to the escalating tensions between Israel and Iran, exposed vulnerabilities in theater-level primary, alternate, contingency and emergency (PACE) plans. Operations Centers and Battle Desks had multiple forms of communication (such as NIPR, SIPR, Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P), or Distributed Tactical Communication Systems (DTICs)/Iridium phones), but the soldiers on duty were not familiar with the equipment. After action review (AAR) comments showed that even within G/S6 sections, soldiers relied on a few subject matter experts to establish communication, resulting in single points of failure. For any type of rehearsal to be effectively conducted, clear and concise guidance must be given, and key leaders must have buy-in or be present. Without these, the result will inevitably be a “check the box” rehearsal rather than a true test of a unit’s capabilities. Deliberate AARs of this COMMEX reinforced that company-level training on proper usage of communications equipment is paramount. At critical moments during the 12-Day War, brigade and battalion command posts were unable to effectively communicate to their companies over secured channels due to simple mistakes that soldiers at the lowest level were making, such as accidentally draining radio batteries or not knowing how to conduct operator level troubleshooting of their equipment. Frequent and deliberate rehearsals of the PACE plan with key leader oversight should be planned into the training calendar of units at all echelons.

Figure 2. Combat Power Model found in ADP 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. July 2019.

Multiple other lessons were learned regarding C2 practices. Due to the impressive C2 architecture in theater, division level headquarters were able to maintain 24/7 video strike bridges with downtrace brigades and battalions, allowing for instant touchpoints and flattened communications. Subordinate headquarters provided liaison officers (LNOs) to be physically located with their higher headquarters, while division level headquarters provided LNOs to their adjacent units. These LNOs allowed for enhanced coordination between different units, further helping provide timely reports and accurate information to commanders thus enhancing their decision making.

Drone Threat Mitigation

The 12-Day War highlighted the significance of drone mitigation in modern conflict, as Iranian forces employed a range of UAS and OWAUAS with varying effects. These Iranian UAS along with precision-guided munitions posed a substantial threat to the United States, Israel, and coalition forces. The Iranian drone capabilities include a range of systems, from small, handheld drones to larger, fixed-wing UAS. The smaller drones, like what is often seen in the Russia-Ukraine War, are designed to crash into their targets, detonating their payload on impact. These drones are highly maneuverable and can be difficult to detect, making them a significant challenge for air defense systems. The larger drones, on the other hand, can carry more sophisticated payloads. These drones can be used to conduct reconnaissance, strike targets, and disrupt command and control systems, making them an asset for Iranian forces. These drones can be as small as a few feet in length but still carry a significant payload capable of destroying equipment and personnel. Several Iranian drone variants, such as the Mohajer and Shahed 129, have operating ranges of hundreds of kilometers and could strike deep into friendly force territory.

Despite the U.S. Army’s recognition of the increased significance of drone threat mitigation, there remains a doctrinal gap in current military doctrine such as FM 3-0, Operations. FM 3-0 mentions UAS threats and the importance of addressing them, but it does not provide detailed guidance on how to do so. The 12-Day War proved that US forces are extremely proficient at static base defense using Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) systems and air-to-air interdiction, but we are untested at countering drones while on the move. While going through the military decision-making process (MDMP) at the brigade and battalion levels, it is imperative to consider available air defense assets and integrate their proper usage into courses of action that are developed. Potential solutions to the challenge of drone threat mitigation for maneuver units include the use of wearable or hand carried drone jammers. For tank companies and scout troops, outfitting Abrams and Bradley crews with weaponry such as shotguns can provide crewmen with an extra capability to counter small drones that may be difficult to destroy using the traditional personal weapons crewmen are issued. Overall, current U.S. Army doctrine recognizes the growing threat posed by drones and emphasizes there is a need for a multi-disciplinary approach to countering them. As doctrine evolves, more work will be needed to develop comprehensive guidance on how to counter UAS threats.

Predictive Sustainment and Logistical Resilience

The importance of pre-positioned stocks for rapid force projection cannot be overstated. These stocks are a critical enabler, providing the necessary materiel to support initial entry and subsequent operations. However, as the 12-Day War demonstrated, even the most carefully planned prepositioned stocks can be rapidly depleted during sustained combat operations. To truly enhance readiness, sustainment planning must evolve beyond simple usage data. By embracing the principles of Predictive Logistics, sustainment commands can fuse real-time operational tempo (OPTEMPO) data, intelligence assessments, and environmental factors—a process known as sustainment preparation of the operational environment (SPOE). For example, by analyzing how the desert environment in CENTCOM degrades components like rubber seals and engine air filters, brigades can proactively forecast and preposition these specific parts, moving from a reactive to an anticipatory sustainment model. This data-driven approach is essential for creating the deliberate, joint maintenance plan needed to ensure equipment drawn from army prepositioned stock (APS) can maintain a high operational readiness rate during a sustained, high-tempo fight.

While brigade combat teams (BCTs) do receive a valuable repetition at utilizing APS while planning and executing rotations at the National Training Center (NTC), the very nature of an NTC rotation creates a training gap regarding the long-term realities of utilizing the APS fleet. The primary focus of BCTs at NTC is getting their fleets mission-capable for a two-week force-on-force battle. Equipment is used hard for a short duration, but little thought is given to what the operational readiness rate would be on day 30, 60, or 90 of a real conflict. While the NTC repetition is essential for mastering the speed required to draw APS, it is only the first step. Without dedicated training at home-station that focuses on long-term planning, maintenance forecasting, and fleet management, our armored forces risk continued success in an enduring conflict.

Figure 3. Layered defense unmanned aircraft system example from ATP 3-01.81 Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (C-UAS) Operations. May 2025.

Further, the 12-Day War highlights that relying solely on large, centralized APS sites creates a vulnerability and increases our risk-to-force. A solution to this challenge lies in building resilience through dispersal, decentralization, and alternative sourcing. This involves establishing a network of smaller, distributed supply caches to mitigate enemy targeting and ensure continuity should any cache be targeted. Agility is achieved by embracing non-traditional methods. For instance, forward-deployed units equipped with additive manufacturing capabilities (such as the U.S. Army Central Innovation and Manufacturing Center and their 3D printing initiatives) can produce certain non-critical repair parts on-demand, drastically reducing lead-times on these parts. Simultaneously, leveraging operational contract support (OCS) to establish pre-arranged contracts with host-nation or commercial partners for common supplies like water and fuel frees up military transportation assets for specialized munitions and critical components. This creates a multi-faceted and adaptive sustainment network, ensuring that combat power is maintained even when traditional supply lines are contested or disrupted.

Units Must have the Maintenance Capacity to Fight Forward

The 12-Day War strongly reinforced the critical importance of both maneuver and sustainment units having the maintenance capacity to fight forward. Pre-war maintenance infrastructure re-lied on large supply support activities (SSAs) and maintenance collection points (MCPs) serving as hubs for equipment repair, maintenance, and parts distribution. While these SSAs and MCPs have provided United States forces the ability to scale operations and have facilitated distribution of all classes of supply to all corners of US-CENTCOM, they also created very visible high value targets for enemy targeters.

To mitigate this vulnerability, soldiers must be experts at performing 10-level (operator-level) and 20-level (organizational-level) maintenance. Soldiers must be trained to perform routine preventative maintenance, trouble-shooting, and repairs. Similarly, mechanics must be experts in 20-level maintenance, able to solve complex maintenance problems with the capability to return equipment to fully mission-capable in a timely manner.

Predictive maintenance is vital in a LSCO environment. In LSCO, units cannot afford to experience equipment failures or extended downtime. Maintainers must be able to forecast maintenance issues based on historical trends to identify issues before they occur. Before and during the 12-Day War, 3rd ESC employed this predictive maintenance planning while supporting the Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) batteries in theater. 3rd ESC identified shortages in stockages for parts such as the Cooling Leaflet Electronic Terminal (CLET) fan, and in turn expeditiously sourced and transported several more into theater. Through this proactive planning, operational readiness statuses remained above 90% during the most critical points of the conflict, reducing the demand on the Joint Logistics Enterprise and allowing transportation assets to be utilized for other critical missions.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the 12-Day War provided invaluable lessons for our modern forces, highlighting the importance of adaptability and proactive planning in the face of evolving threats. Key decisions made at the strategic level and rapid execution at the tactical level prevented further escalation and limited direct United States involvement in the conflict. The lessons discussed above all underscore how complex and uncertain modern warfare is. As Armor leaders, we are trained to be experts in combined arms maneuver warfare, but to truly understand the complexities of modern warfare it is essential to broaden our perspectives beyond the tactical level. Joining a sustainment command as a broadening assignment offers a unique opportunity to understand the operational and strategic levels of warfare. By serving in a sustainment command, Armor leaders can develop a comprehensive appreciation of the logistics and support systems that enable our formations to operate effectively. Ultimately, the 12-Day War serves as a reminder that the character of warfare is changing, and as armored leaders at the forefront of ground combat we must adapt in response. By incorporating these lessons learned into our doctrine, training, and operations, we can enhance our ability to deter, disrupt, and defeat our adversaries, and emerge victorious in the conflicts of the future.

Notes