From Contact to Overmatch
Redefining Armor Fundamentals Through Transformation in Contact
By COL Bryan Bonnema, MAJ Aram Hatfield, and MAJ David Sturm
Article published on: March 15, 2026 in the Spring 2026 issue of Armor
Read Time: < 9 mins
The fundamentals of Armor have not changed, but how we execute them is being radically transformed. In 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 3rd Infantry Division (ID) known as the Raider Brigade, we have spent the last 18 months wrestling with this reality. The arrival of ubiquitous drones, persistent sensors, and machine-speed targeting is creating a new, complex environment. To make sense of this, we developed a theoretical framework we call Isolation–Exploitation–Regeneration (IER). IER is our theory for how to sequence modern combined arms. It is a mental model, not a rigid checklist. It proposes that we first use unmanned systems and long-range precision fires to find, fix, and attrit the enemy at key critical nodes, forcing them to fight disconnected battles (Isolation). Only then do we commit our massed, mounted combat power—our tanks and Bradleys—to strike the weakened enemy at a decisive point (Exploitation).
Finally, we rapidly reset the force to sustain a punishing operational tempo and repeat the cycle (Regeneration). We have used the IER framework to forecast the ways we believe transformation will change how units execute the fundamentals and identify the associated gaps and challenges.
The Armor Force Fundamentals
The Armor School recently codified the Armor Force Fundamentals, giving us a shared understanding of what constitutes “the fundamentals.” It is broken into three parts: the Daily Dozen (the basics like security and maintenance), Critical Tactical Tasks (the small-unit actions like react to contact), and Formation-Specific Fundamentals (the core missions of our tank and scout formations). These fundamentals are designed to help commanders prioritize training and anchor leader development. Transformation does not replace these fundamentals; rather, it profoundly redefines their execution. The following analysis briefly examines this impact.
How the Fight is Changing
Figure 1. Illustrates the “Isolation Phase’ of the IER framework.
At a high level, transformation is re-shaping our fight by moving the ABCT from a platform-centric model to a network-enabled one. This vision is being realized within the ABCT today, reflecting the Army’s broader objective to become more data-centric, resilient, and expeditionary.
Reconnaissance and security will shift to a forward line of sense (FLOS). Instead of relying solely on a manned screen, we will push a persistent sensor network kilometers ahead of our manned formations. This robotic force will be a layered system of small drones at the platoon, medium-range drones at the battalion, and longrange sensors at the brigade, all running software that automatically finds and flags targets. The effect will be earlier detection and disruption, allowing commanders to preserve combat power and choose when and where to strike. This is a key enabler of the Isolation phase of IER, allowing us to detect, disrupt, and attrit enemy key nodes before manned platforms are committed. Airspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) have already become core company and battalion fights. The proliferation of friendly and enemy drones means that counter-UAS (C-UAS) has become a fundamental element of local security for every unit. Likewise, emissions control (EMCON) is now a critical command and control measure.
Perhaps the most profound change won’t be to our equipment, but to our leaders. The future battlefield will place an unprecedented cognitive load on our company and platoon-level leaders. The increasing amount of data feeds at lower levels means that junior leaders must be ready to simultaneously process a drone feed on one screen, an Android Tactical Assault Kit (ATAK) display on another, and the real world through their sights or the hatch.
A Deeper Look: Redefining the Execution of the Fundamentals
Figure 2. Illustrates the “Explotation Phase’ of the IER framework.
The impact of these changes is best understood by looking at how they alter the execution of our fundamentals in practice. For the Daily Dozen, the impact is profound. Security is now about establishing a C-UAS bubble and a robotic FLOS to provide warning time measured in hours, not minutes. Cover, concealment, and emissions control now prioritizes signature management in the thermal and electromagnetic spectrums over hiding in just the visible spectrum. Reconnaissance is now a continuous, multi-domain effort, fusing inputs from unmanned systems, aerial electronic warfare (EW), and ground sensors. Operations orders and graphics must evolve to include new control measures like UAS lanes, C-UAS bubbles, and digital kill boxes. Rehearsals must move beyond the sand table to include digital kill-chain walkthroughs and airspace deconfliction drills.
This redefinition extends to our Critical Tactical Tasks. Establishing security now involves deploying a network of sensors and effectors. Reacting to contact is increasingly a reaction to a digital signature or an automatic target recognition (ATR) system alert from the FLOS. The first action may not be direct fire, but a precision strike cued by an unmanned system. Re-establishing a perimeter and redistributing ammunition as part of consolidation and reorganization now must include regenerating the FLOS forward, re-arming loitering munitions, and updating the common operating picture. Conducting field maintenance will mean that a maintenance team will be just as likely to bring a ruggedized laptop and a 3D printer for a broken drone part as they are a torque wrench. Conducting casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) operations will become a complex tactical problem. Getting a wounded Soldier out will require a planned and rehearsed C-UAS corridor, obscuration, and deception to draw the eyes of enemy drones away from the evacuation route.
Our Scout Fundamentals are also transforming. A screen now transcends mounted and dismounted observation posts, requiring a deep, resilient, and multi-domain sensor web that can detect, identify, and sometimes even service targets long before they reach the main body. A reconnaissance handover is now a digital transfer of data, ensuring a seamless transition of understanding.
Finally, Tank Fundamentals are evolving. Engagement area development now begins 20 kilometers out, as the FLOS identifies enemy assembly areas. The execution of an instride breach now begins with loitering munitions and first-person view (FPV) drones suppressing overwatch before the reduction or assault force is exposed, pre-serving the shock effect of our armor.
Gaps in Training, Doctrine, and Leader Development
This redefined execution of our fundamentals naturally exposes gaps across our training, doctrine, and leader development enterprise.
In training, we lack sufficient brigade-scale, instrumented repetitions that integrate unmanned systems, EMS, C-UAS, and digital fires in a contested environment. We must practice in degraded modes and incorporate AI-enabled planning. Critically, we must treat EW, small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS), and C-UAS as 10-level tasks. Our experience shows that small-unit innovations, like adapting the Integrated Weapons Training Strategy (IWTS) to scale FPV drone capabilities, can be highly effective, but this requires ranges capable of massing these new effects and standardized approval pathways.
In Doctrine, we must formally codify the IER framework and the FLOS. We lack standardized unmanned control measures, clear precision strike release authorities at echelon, and established tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for cueing fires based on EMS intelligence. Without this common language, we risk confusion and fratricide at speed.
In Leader Development, we must build the “headware” for this new environment. Leaders at the company and battalion level need practical literacy in EMS and C-UAS, kill-web management, and complex airspace control. This reflects the modernization enterprise’s emphasis on delivering capabilities at speed and scale—a principle that must apply not just to equipment, but to the knowledge our leaders need to employ it. We need a repeatable “innovation-to-scale” pipeline that allows the best ideas from our small units to be rapidly shared, tested, validated Army-wide.
Challenges and Risks in Transformation-in-Contact
This transformation is not without significant challenges and risks that de mand our full attention. Operationally, the density of airspace and EMS activity at speed elevates the risk of fratricide and signature exposure. We must also guard against an overreliance on automation without clear human-judgment rules, as mandated by DoD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems.1 Sustainment at tempo—resupplying precision effects, power, and maintenance—will remain a pacing item. We must also assume our adversaries will adapt with jamming, deception, and C-UAS/EW capabilities.
Institutionally, we face the danger of learning the wrong lessons, succumbing to resistance to change, and managing increased costs. Perhaps the greatest risk is lacking a unifying framework, which can lead to a deviation from the Armor Force Fundamentals as we chase niche capabilities.
A Guiding Framework: Isolation–Exploitation–Regeneration
Figure 3. Illustrates the ‘Regeneration Phase’ of the IER framework.
To mitigate these risks and align the branch, the IER framework provides a clear structure for planning and execution.
Isolation: Replace traditional mass-on-mass confrontation with persistent un-manned “see-sense-strike” complexes. Using AI-powered machine learning and precision fires, attrit and suppress enemy defenses at critical nodes, forcing them to fight disconnected battles.
Exploitation: Preserve sufficient mounted combat power to rapidly capitalize on the tactical successes created during isolation. Use tank and mechanized infantry assets as an exploitation force to move through gaps created by unmanned systems, protected by robust C-UAS capabilities to maximize shock effect.
Regeneration: Recommit unmanned systems to reestablish the FLOS and transition to the next objective. Leverage the reduced logistics footprint of unmanned systems for faster resupply and repositioning, enabling a sustainable and punishing operational tempo.
This framework provides a common lexicon to plan, execute, and assess operations. It helps prioritize our training and procurement efforts and ensures that technology serves our operational concepts, not the other way around.
TiC positions the ABCT as the Army’s premier formation for generating over-match and imposing costs in contested environments, converting faster isolation, decisive exploitation, and rapid regeneration into operational tempo and decision advantage. Strategically, this advances deterrence credibility and warfighting readiness. To secure this future, we must impose institutional imperatives upon ourselves: codify the IER framework, standardize our control measures, scale innovation from the bottom up, and align our training and sustainment enterprises to the realities of contested, multi-domain operations. By doing so, we will empower the Armor branch to fight and win for generations to come, ensuring it remains at the forefront of the Army’s transformation.
Figure 4. RACER technologies that enable Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) to maneuver on unstructured, off-road terrain at speeds that are only limited by considerations of sensor performance, mechanical constraints, and safety. (Photo by Thomas Sakell)
NOTES
1. U.S. Department of Defense, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” DoD Directive 3000.09 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 25, 2023).
NOTE: The authors acknowledge using Ask Sage for brainstorming, prose refinement, and formatting assistance in preparing this article.
Authors
Colonel Bryan Bonnema is currently the Brigade Commander for the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, operating in the EU-COM area of responsibility. His key command and leadership roles include commanding the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment and G3 of the 1st Armored Division. COL Bonnema has been awarded the Purple Heart and two Bronze Star Medals. His education includes a bachelor of science from the United States Military Academy, a master of military art and science from Air University, and a master of strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College.
Major Aram Hatfield is currently serving as the Operations Officer (S3) for the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, at Fort Stewart, Georgia. Major Hatfield’s key previous assignments include serving as the Executive Officer for the 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment; a G5 Planner for the 3rd Infantry Division; and commanding A Troop, 3rd Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment. He holds a bachelor of science from the United States Military Academy, a master of science from Eastern Michigan University, and a master of arts from the School of Advanced Military Studies.
Major David R. Sturm is currently serving as the Brigade Intelligence Officer (S2) for the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, at Fort Stewart, Georgia. A graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, his previous key assignments include serving as a G5 Intelligence Planner for the 3rd Infantry Division and as a Brigade/Battalion Intelligence OC/T for the Operations Group at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California. MAJ Sturm commanded a Military Intelligence Company and served as a Battalion Intelligence Officer while assigned to the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, at Fort Riley, Kansas. He earned a bachelor of science in psychology from Texas A&M University.