The War in Ukraine
How Multi-Domain Formations Are Combatting Russia
By CPT Bradley Thrasher
Article published on: November 19, 2024 in the November 2024 Issue of the Pulse of Army Medicine
Journal
Read Time: 6 mins
Ukrainian soldiers pack up a drone used for aerial observation during an Operational
Capabilities Concept evaluation at the International Peacekeeping and Security Centre in Yavoriv, Ukraine,
Sept. 11, 2018. The evaluation was being conducted by a multinational OCC evaluation team during the Rapid
Trident exercise to assess Ukraine’s military interoperability capacity. (U.S. Army National Guard photos by
Army Spc. Amy Carle)
Over the last 249 years, the operational environment (OE) in which the U.S. Army operates has significantly
evolved. Today, emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), hypersonics, machine learning,
nanotechnology, and robotics are driving a fundamental change in the character of war.1 Simultaneously, strategic competitors like Russia
and China are synthesizing emerging technologies with their analysis of military doctrine and operations.2 Peer threats seek “to
exploit…overmatch opportunities”3
and “fight…through multiple layers of stand-off in all domains – space, cyber, air, sea, and land.”4 The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain
Operations (MDO) 2028 concept5
counters layers of stand-off through three (3) tenets: calibrated force posture, multi-domain formations, and
convergence.6 While the MDO strategy
prepares the U.S. Army for operations within contested OEs, recent engagements, such as the Russian invasion of
Ukraine on February 24, 2022,7
underscore the relevance of this concept in combatting dynamic peer threats.
At the outset of the invasion, President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, aimed to seize the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv
and establish a presence throughout the country.8 Despite Russia’s projections of a “swift victory,”9 and pervasive doubt in Ukraine’s capacity to
withstand an invasion,10 Kyiv
remains unseized,11 with Ukrainian
forces having “recaptured 54% of occupied territory”12 to date. Ukraine’s ability to leverage the tenet of ‘multi-domain
formations’ through independent maneuver, employment of cross domain fires, and maximization of human potential
has largely enabled its forces to resist Russia’s offensive since the initial invasion in 2022.
Independent maneuver
Ukraine’s capacity to independently maneuver and rapidly adapt tactics within a degraded OE largely denied early
Russian advances on Kyiv. Doctrinally, “multi-domain formations conduct independent maneuver by continuing
operations in a contested environment.”13 Critical to this end are subordinates who leverage disciplined
initiative to react to changes in the OE.14 Reinforced by troop density15 and jamming technology,16 Russia’s initial advances necessitated decisive
tactical action from Ukrainian units. To the northeast of Kyiv, Ukrainian units met and halted the Russian
advance near Chernihiv17 by
strategically directing “the mass of Russian troops into narrow stretches of terrain – dirt roads that were
impassable, thawing fields or swamps that would ensnare vehicles and force greater fuel consumption.”18 To the west, the Russians
attempted to cross the Irpin River to reach Moshchun: a gateway to Kyiv.19 In response, Ukrainian units employed “hit-and
run attacks…and punishing artillery strikes on…pontoon bridges.”20 When “Russian jamming cut off communications and made Ukrainian drones
inoperable,”21 Ukrainian units
placed artillery rounds on the Dnieper River dam, effectively flooding the Irpin and Russia’s pathway to
Moshchun.22 To further counter
jamming, Ukrainian air defense units would “violate all doctrine,”23 operating in close proximity to the Russian
front line to rapidly acquire targets.24 Thus, Ukraine’s ability to maneuver, utilize rapid decision-making, and
employ “guerrilla tactics”25 in
the absence of strict orders ultimately forced Russia to retreat by late March from Kyiv.26
U.S., Coalition and Five Eye alliance partners experiment with Air Combat Command’s Tactical
Operations Center-enabled Control Reporting Center during the Shadow Operations Center – Nellis’ Capstone
event at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, Dec. 8, 2023. The 805th Combat Training Squadron experimented with
and developed tactics, techniques, and procedures for integrated two-way kill-chain automation between the
operational and tactical command and control including battle management levels, to create competitive
advantages for the United States and its allies and partners. (The image has been altered by removing badges
for security purposes, cable color changed from red to black, and cropped to focus on the subject.) (U.S.
Air Force photo by Keith Keel)
Cross-domain fires
Supplementing maneuver tactics, Ukraine’s acquisition of modern technologies has enabled the successful
employment of cross-domain fires, allowing for the rapid targeting of Russian forces. In combat, “cross-domain
fires integrates and delivers lethal and nonlethal fires across all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and
the information environment.”27
Throughout the war in Ukraine, it is clear that “Russia continues to prefer massed fires against targets that
cannot be seen rather than precision strikes against identified targets.”28 Ukraine, however, “has focused on analyzing
sensor data, prioritizing targets, applying economy of effort, automating the assignment of targets to the
nearest capable munition, and conducting precision strikes.”29 Ukraine’s ability to employ “man-portable air-defense systems, antitank
guided missiles, and first-person view unmanned aerial systems”30 in conjunction with traditional fires31 has rendered nearly 3,197 Russian tanks and
6,160 armored vehicles ineffective as of July 2024.32 The use of cross-domain fires has also proven effective in “targeting
supply lines, depots, and command centers,”33 imparting a “psychological impact on Russian soldiers.”34 Ukraine’s leveraging of
technology in conjunction with traditional fires has, therefore, been pivotal in degrading Russian resources and
morale.
Human Potential Maximization
Critical to the employment of advanced weaponry, Ukraine’s human potential has been bolstered by modern
technology and leveraged to combat Russian hybrid threats. Today, “man-machine interfaces, enabled by AI and
highspeed data processing, improve human decision-making in both speed and accuracy.”35 One tool Ukraine employs is the “Geographic
Information System for Artillery (GIS Arta).”36 Commonly referred as “the Uber for artillery,”37 GIS Arta “optimizes across variables like target
type, position, and range to assign ‘fire missions’ to available artillery units.”38 AI-enabled data analysis has also bolstered
Ukrainian success.39 For instance,
“by ingesting reams of images and text… AI models can find potential clues, stitch them together, and then
surmise the…location of a weapons system or a troop formation.”40 These capabilities enable “Molfar, an intelligence firm with offices in
Dnipro and Kyiv, to typically find two to five valuable targets every day.”41 Lastly, Ukraine’s “decentralized IT army,
consisting of over 250,000 IT volunteers at its peak, has been formed to counter Russian digital threats.”42 Overall, the prevalence of
modern technology and cyber defense capabilities has enhanced Ukraine’s potential to impart lethality in both
physical and digital realms.
Conclusion
Despite the influence of multi-domain formations in Ukraine, one may argue that ‘calibrated force posture’ is
more critical to garner success during large-scale combat operations (LSCO). By definition, “calibrated force
posture is the combination of capacity, capability, position, and the ability to maneuver across strategic
distances.”43 The ability to
rapidly maneuver is essential to closing with and engaging lethal enemies. However, the prevalence of
technologically adept adversaries within the OE demands not just a capacity to maneuver, but the ability to
harness modern weaponry more efficiently than the enemy. Ukraine’s ability to persist for over two years against
Russia, a preeminent competitor, highlights the importance of units that not only independently maneuver but
leverage cross-domain fires and human potential to achieve overmatch. At the start of Russia’s 2022 invasion,
“the prevailing view in Russia…and even among many Ukrainians, was that a Russian blitzkrieg would seize Kyiv,
oust Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and install a loyal puppet.”44 Despite these beliefs, Ukrainian units have
persisted for over two (2) years by utilizing “tactical agility…and international material support to inflict
shocking numbers of casualties and persistent battlefield disappointment on…Russian adversaries.”45 Ukraine’s ability to seize the
initiative under maneuver within a degraded OE and employ technology in conjunction with conventional weaponry
successfully disrupted Russian advances on Kyiv. Through the optimization of technology, Ukraine’s human
potential has enabled the rapid acquisition of targets and the deterrence of Russian cyber threats. With all
factors considered, the current war in Ukraine highlights the indispensable role of multi-domain formations in
LSCO, providing real-time insight into the changing character of warfare.
References
Center for Preventive Action. (2024, May 20). War in Ukraine. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved May 20,
2024 from https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine
Collett-White, M., Bankova, D., Bhandari, A., Kumar, P., & Ovaska, M. (2023, February 20). How Ukraine
Endured. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/ANNIVERSARY-SURVIVAL/movaklxlmva/.
Department of the Army. (2019). The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Warfare. TRADOC
Pamphlet 525-92.
https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets/TP525- 92.pdf
Department of the Army. (2024).The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations. The OE
2024-2034: LSCO.//g2webcontent. z2.web.core.usgovcloudapi.net/OEE/Story%20Posts/
TRADOCG2_2024JUL30_OE_2024_2035_Lg_Scale_Comb_ anonymous.pdf.
Department of the Army. (2018). The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1. https://
adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets/TP525-3-1.pdf.
Garamone, J. (2024, March 19). US will not back down on support for Ukraine. US Department of Defense.
Retrieved from https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/
Article/3711625/us-will-not-back-down-on-support-for-ukraine/#:~:text=The%20collective%20support%20
will%20ensure,today%20and%20into%20the%20 future.%22&text=The%20United%20States%20stands%20
by,own%20security%2C%22%20he%20said.
Gibbons-Neff, T., & Shyvala, Y. (2024, March 12). Jamming: How electronic warfare is reshaping Ukraine’s
battlefields.” The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/12/world/europe/ukraine-drone-russia-jamming. html
Graham, T. (2023, February 17). Ukraine has held off Russia’s invasion – so far. Here’s how.” Council on
Foreign Relations. Retrieved from
https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/ukraine-has-held-russias-invasion-so-far-heres-how.
How Ukraine is using AI to fight Russia. (2024, April 8). The Economist. Retrieved from
https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2024/04/08/how-ukraine-is-using-ai-to-fight-russia
Kirichenko, D. (2023, July 20). Ukraine’s tech sector is playing vital wartime economic and defense roles.
Atlantic Council. Retrieved from
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-tech-sector-is-playing-vital-wartime-economic-and-defense-roles/
Noorman, R. (2023, June 15). The Russian way of war in Ukraine: A military approach nine decades in the
making. Modern War Institute at West Point. Retrieved from
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-russian-way-of-war-in-ukraine-a-military-approach-nine-decades-in-the-making/
Pifer, S. (2022, December 8). The Russia-Ukraine war and its ramifications for Russia.” Brookings
Institution. Retrieved from //www.brookings.edu/articles/the-russia-ukraine-war-and-its-ramifications-for-russia/.
Sonne, P., Khurshudyan, I., Morgunov, S., & Khudov, K. (2022, August 24). Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian
valor, Russian blunders combined to save the capital. The Washington Post. Retrieved from
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U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine. (2024, August 9). US Department of State.
https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/.
Endnotes
1. Department of the Army, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain
Operations 2028, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: Department of the Army, 2018), i,
https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets/TP525-3-1.pdf.
2. Department of the Army, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain
Operations 2028, i.
3. Department of the Army, The Operational Environment and
the Changing Character of Warfare, TRADOC Pamphlet 525- 92 (Fort Eustis, VA: Department of the Army, 2019),
iii,
https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets/TP525-92.pdf.
4. Department of the Army, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain
Operations 2028, i.
5. Ibid., iii.
6. Ibid.
7. “U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine,” U.S. Department
of State, August 9, 2024, https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-co-operation-with-ukraine/.
8. Steven Pifer, “The Russia-Ukraine War and its
Ramifications for Russia,” Brookings Institution, December 8, 2022,https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-russia-ukraine-war-and-its-ramifications-for-russia/.
9. Mike Collett-White et al., “How Ukraine Endured,”
Reuters, February 20, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/graphics/
UKRAINE-CRISIS/ANNIVERSARY-SURVIVAL/movaklx-lmva/.
10. Thomas Graham, “Ukraine Has Held Off Russia’s Invasion
– So Far. Here’s How,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified February 17, 2023,
https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/ ukraine-has-held-russias-invasion-so-far-heres-how.
11. Jim Garamone, “U.S. Will Not Back Down on Support for
Ukraine,” U.S. Department of Defense, March 19, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/
Article/3711625/us-will-not-back-down-on-support-for-ukraine/#:~:text=The%20collective%20support%20will%20
ensure,today%20and%20into%20the%20future.%22&text=The%20United%20States%20stands%20by,own%20
security%2C%22%20he%20said.
12. Center for Preventive Action, “War in Ukraine,”
Council on Foreign Relations, last modified May 20, 2024,
https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine
13. Department of the Army, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain
Operations 2028, 19.
14. Ibid.
15. Paul Sonne et al., “Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian Valor,
Russian Blunders Combined to Save the Capital,” The Washington Post, August 24, 2022,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/interactive/2022/kyiv-battle-ukraine-survival/.
16. Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Yurii Shyvala, “Jamming: How
Electronic Warfare is Reshaping Ukraine’s Battlefields,” The New York Times, March 12, 2024,https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/12/world/europe/ukraine-drone-russia-jamming.html.
17. Sonne et al., “Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian Valor,
Russian Blunders Combined to Save the Capital.”
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Department of the Army, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain
Operations 2028, D-6.
28. Department of the Army, The Operational Environment
2024- 2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations, The OE 2024-2034: LSCO (Fort Eustis, VA: Department of the Army,
2024), 10,
https://g2webcontent.z2.web.core.usgovcloudapi.net/OEE/Story%20Posts/TRADOCG2_2024JUL30_OE_2024_2035_
Lg_Scale_Comb_anonymous.pdf.
29. Department of the Army, The Operational Environment
2024- 2034: Large- Scale Combat Operations, 10.
30. Ibid., 15.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 19.
34. Ibid.
35. Department of the Army, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain
Operations 2028, 20.
36. David Kirichenko, “Ukraine’s Tech Sector is Playing
Vital Wartime Economic and Defense Roles,” Atlantic Council, July 20, 2023,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-tech-sector-is-playing-vital-wartime-economic-and-defense-roles/.
37. Kirichenko, “Ukraine’s Tech Sector is Playing Vital
Wartime Economic and Defense Roles.”
38. Ibid.
39. “How Ukraine is Using AI to Fight Russia,” The
Economist, April 8, 2024,
https://www.economist.com/science-and-tech-nology/2024/04/08/how-ukraine-is-using-ai-to-fight-russia.
40. The Economist, “How Ukraine is Using AI to Fight
Russia.”
41. Ibid.
42. Kirichenko, “Ukraine’s Tech Sector is Playing Vital
Wartime Economic and Defense Roles.”
43. Department of the Army, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain
Operations 2028, 17.
44. Graham, “Ukraine Has Held Off Russia’s Invasion – So
Far. Here’s How.”
45. Randy Noorman, “The Russian Way of War in Ukraine: A
Military Approach Nine Decades in the Making,” Modern War Institute at West Point, June 15, 2023,
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-russian-way-of-war-in-ukraine-a-military-approach-nine-decades-in-the-making/.
Author
CPT Bradley Thrasher is an Environmental Science and Engineering Officer currently stationed at Fort Meade,
MD. He is the author of the winning essay from Captain’s Career Course at MEDCoE, JBSA Fort Sam Houston, TX
in August 2024.