The Combat Aviation Brigade and Digital Call for Fire

Increasing Lethality of the Division

By MAJ Andrew Agee, CPT Joseph Conroy, CW2 Andy McMullen and CW2 Page Frazier

Article published on: january 1st, in Field Artillery 2024 Issue 1

Read Time: < 13 mins

The rapidly changing battlefield in large-scale combat operations (LSCO) requires the division to dynamically deliver effects to meet the commander’s intent and targeting objectives. The joint air ground integration center (JAGIC) enables this process by executing and clearing joint fires and controlling division airspace. The JAGIC is the focal point of the division’s current operations integration cell (COIC) floor and the division fires enterprise must make every effort to add efficiency to this fire support system. The digital call for fire (D-CFF) capability inherent to the combat aviation brigade (CAB) affords the division options for fire mission routing, enables reduced mission processing times and allows the conservation of critical munitions for both aviation and division artillery (DIVARTY) assets. Examining the technical process and analyzing these outcomes associated with D-CFF will highlight opportunities for the division to increase overall effectiveness and lethality.

The D-CFF capability from the MQ-1C Universal Ground Control Station (UGCS) and AH-64E is enabled by the onboard blue force tracker 2 (BFT2) system. The BFT2 allows the operator or pilot to generate preformatted calls for fire and route them to the appropriate Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) utilizing the Secret Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) network. The technical requirements to execute D-CFF include an AFATDS connected to upper tactical internet (TI), an AFATDS database with the aircraft built into the unit and communications workspace at echelon and network permissions both locally and through the Mission Command Support Center (MCSC). Multiple publications provide the technical step-by-step configuration process to enable D-CFF. This article focuses on the practical application of D-CFF for the modern Army division. D-CFF provides the division additional beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) means to transmit fire mission data and widen the division’s kill web. The D-CFF requires no “swivel chair” actions and inserts the fire mission into the appropriate position in the kill chain.

The execution of D-CFF from the MQ-1C and AH-64E provides the division with numerous options for routing fire missions based on target description, time sensitivity, or mission requirements. The division targeting working group (TWG) should drive the identification of the ideal fire mission routing path and the targeting decision board (TDB) agenda should include subsequent routing approval. The division should consider the D-CFF mission routing as crucial as the high pay-off target list (HPTL), target synchronization matrix (TSM) and division kill contract during the TWG/TDB process. With mission requirements and the HPTL changing daily it is necessary to continually revisit the mission routing during the TWG/TDB. Applying this analysis to the targeting process will increase the efficiency and lethality of the division’s fire support system.

The MQ-1C Gray Eagle is a strategic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) unmanned asset employed at the division echelon. Its place on the battlefield is often beyond the forward line of troops (FLOT). Operating within the deep fight, it’s a prime enabler in maintaining enemy contact, orienting the supported force, providing early and accurate warning and providing reaction time and maneuver space. Its sensors, electro-optics, radar capability and laser marking allow effortless detection, identification and prosecution of targets for DIVARTY delivery assets. The unmanned aerial system (UAS) is designed to fly higher and longer than most aviation assets on the battlefield while remaining significantly undetectable to our adversaries.

The MQ-1C UAS is equipped with the BTF2 system that provides access to D-CFF and enhances the comprehensive initiative of fires. The system is a digital means to gain situational understanding of not only friendly forces but also known enemy dispositions. It is an over-the-horizon capability that is not hindered by line-of-sight requirements. The software is intuitive and acts as a bridge between the aircrew, aircraft and adjacent warfighters. In execution, the aircrew can detect a possible target and trigger the processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) procedure with a few clicks of a button. The D-CFF can be utilized without taking away any other capability of the UAS, making it an independent kinetic multiplier. Once identified as hostile, the UAS operator can transfer targeting information directly to the end user of the AFATDS. This communication does not require proximity; it is secure, encrypted and proven in real-world applications. This process enables the fire mission to bypass extra protocols, reducing the time it takes to achieve effects on target.

The Field Artillery Intelligence Officer (FAIO) located in the G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) receives intelligence from every collection asset available, including the live feed of the MQ-1C. This enables the FAIO in close coordination with the JAGIC Chief to execute target validation and send targets to the JAGIC. The FAIO commonly sends targets to the JAGIC through the Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS). Sending targets through JADOCS requires the FAIO to manually input the target data obtained from the MQ-1C’s sensor into the JADOCS to populate on the target board of any subscribing JADOCS client. Once the JAGIC has received the target via JADOCS, the JAGIC Chief transmits it digitally to the JAGIC AFATDS and then to the DIVARTY AFATDS for prosecution. This process takes time and can result in fire mission congestion at the JAGIC JADOCS.

Applying the capability of MQ-1C D-CFF to this process enables the fire mission to skip steps by the operator directly routing the fire mission to the JAGIC or DIVARTY AFATDS. The FAIO monitoring the MQ-1C feed, still in close coordination with the JAGIC Chief, will execute target validation and direct the Gray Eagle operator to initiate a D-CFF on an identified HPT. It is important to note that under this construct the FAIO controls which fire missions require a MQ-1C D-CFF and instructs the operator on all actions to take in terms of mission routing based on the options approved in the TDB. The Gray Eagle operator would not be authorized to generate D-CFF missions without the FAIO first executing target validation and providing approval. For example, MQ-1C D-CFF could be used to send targets deemed time-sensitive or targets at the top of the HPTL from the Gray Eagle UGCS directly to the DIVARTY AFATDS to shorten execution time. Meanwhile, depending on the approved attack guidance matrix (AGM), the MQ-1C operator at the direction of the FAIO could route targets that are number 2 or 3 on the HPTL directly to the JAGIC AFATDS. The FAIO would route the remaining HPTs via the current standard process of manual input into JADOCS. This staggered process for fire mission paths further prioritizes fire missions destined for DIVARTY and alleviates potential backlog in the JAGIC during high-intensity operations. The shortened mission chain makes DIVARTY rockets more effective and enables DIVARTY to conserve critical munitions for future division operations. Similarly, for the MQ-1C, decreased fire mission processing times because of D-CFF allows the Gray Eagle to maintain AGM-114 Hellfire missiles for aircraft defense or for when specific enemy critical capabilities are identified. This process, as described, can decrease overall mission processing time by removing links from the kill chain and adding efficiency to the delivery of surface-to-surface fires to enhance the lethality of the division.

The most significant hurdles to the execution of D-CFF for the CAB are training proficiency in forward observer tasks and fire support manning below the brigade level.

The AH-64E is another tool at the division’s disposal to deliver effects in the division deep area. For the CAB’s attack out of contact in the division’s deep area to be successful, the division must adequately plan and resource the operation. During the division targeting process, the division must source the requirements for suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) to enable CAB operations. The types of SEAD include immediate fire mission requests, pre-planned targets, division-level shaping tied to a kill contract and non-lethal effects. It is a combination of these forms of SEAD that sets the CAB up for success. The division should authorize a quick-fire net between the CAB and DIVARTY for immediate fire mission requests to facilitate more responsive fires and prevent delays in DIVARTY’s response. Without D-CFF, this process requires receiving the fire mission through voice or tactical messaging for manual input into the air cavalry squadron or attack battalion AFATDS to start the digital kill chain. The combination of a swivel chair action and a longer mission processing path severely increases the response time of DIVARTY rockets.

AH-64E D-CFF can help the division achieve the purpose of an attack out of contact by decreasing fire mission processing times and enabling the AH-64Es and the DIVARTY to maintain critical munitions for future operations. Applying the D-CFF capability to the CAB to DIVARTY quick-fire net, an AH-64E executing an attack out of contact can route missions directly to the DIVARTY for prosecution. The JAGIC remains in the loop when the DIVARTY pushes the fire mission data to the JAGIC for air clearance. The AH-64E D-CFF quick-fire net to DIVARTY allows the JAGIC to continue to focus on the holistic division deep fight and alleviate a fire mission backlog at the JAGIC. The quick-fire net enables the AH-64E to execute D-CFF against HPTs with responsive fires while simultaneously engaging enemy formations with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles to achieve the purpose of the attack mission. The AH-64E can utilize terrain to mask the aircraft and time engagements with DIVARTY fire missions to mass effects. The achievement of mass and simultaneity will increase the effectiveness of AH-64E Hellfire missiles and DIVARTY rockets, ultimately conserving critical munitions. The D-CFF quick-fire net shortens the path fire missions must travel and decreases fire mission processing times. Applying AH-64E D-CFF in division operations again adds efficiency to the broader fire support system and further bolsters the lethality of the division.

The most significant hurdles to the execution of D-CFF for the CAB are training proficiency in forward observer tasks and fire support manning below the brigade level. MQ-1C operators and AH-64E pilots execute recognition of combat vehicles (ROC-V) training as part of their gunnery training progression. However, this is a perishable skill that the CAB must include in training at every opportunity. Additional training iterations of ROC-V will ensure operators and pilots correctly identify HPTs during operations allowing an efficient D-CFF process without wasting critical DIVARTY rocket munitions. Another crucial aspect of implementing D-CFF is training operators and aviators on the elements of a call for fire and the proper format of a D-CFF. A checklist for D-CFF procedures and including dry D-CFF training in routine training flights will help build confidence and proficiency across the MQ-1C and AH-64E communities. The last obstacle to the execution of D-CFF is fire support manning at the air cavalry squadron and attack battalion levels. Currently, the Army authorizes each of these battalion-sized elements: one fire support officer (FA CPT), one fire support NCO (13F SFC) and one AFATDS. This number of personnel and equipment must be increased to execute and maintain 24-hour operations during LSCO. The fire support officer is involved heavily in planning and should never be relied on to operate the AFATDS. The fire support NCO is the primary AFATDS operator and would require supplemental manning from the CAB fire support element for prolonged operations. These units require an increase in authorized 13F Soldiers to serve as AFATDS experts and operators to configure and troubleshoot the system during 24-hour operations. Adding one fire support NCO (13F SGT) and two fire support specialists (13F SPC) to the fire support elements of the air cavalry squadron and attack battalion would ensure these units could maintain a high intensity fires fight. The CAB can overcome potential training proficiency impediments to D-CFF through realistic training that validates the described mission routing paths and incorporates D-CFF into routine training flights.

The D-CFF capability organic to the combat aviation brigade brings many options for fire mission routing, which will decrease fire mission processing times. This purely digital process provides a means to build efficiency into the division’s fire support system by streamlining missions around or through the JAGIC as necessary. The results of the D-CFF process creates more effective surface-to-surface fires and conserves critical DIVARTY and AH-64E munitions. The practical application of MQ-1C and AH-64E D-CFF offers an innovative way to increase the lethality of the division by dynamically and rapidly delivering effects in the division’s deep fight.