Looking to the Past for LSCO Inspiration
Desert Redleg: Artillery Warfare in the First Gulf War
By MAJ Destry S. Balch
Article published in: 2024 in Field Artillery 2024 Issue 1
Read Time: < 11 mins
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21236/AD1307141
The role of division artillery units (DIVARTYs) has been a topic of heated discussion for the operational force
since their reimplementation in 2014. Aside from their bi-annual roles in simulated Warfighter Exercises (WFX),
many leaders are unable to draw much inspiration for the true scale of what a DIVARTY provides the division and
how to effectively integrate that capability. Desert Redleg: Artillery Warfare in the First Gulf War by L. Scott
Lingamfelter (US Army Colonel, retired) explores how the 1st Infantry Division Artillery (1ID DIVARTY) planned,
organized and executed the largest organization of FA units since World War II. It provides present-day FA
leaders much needed insight into the function of a DIVARTY in large-scale combat operations (LSCO) and provides
inspiration for how a DIVARTY commands, controls and sustains large-scale artillery operations.
Blending personal memoir with historical analysis, Lingamfelter recounts his firsthand experience as the 1ID
DIVARTY Executive Officer (XO) during the “Big Red One (BRO)” operational train up, deployment,
execution and redeployment in the First Gulf War from 1990 to 1991. Along the way, Lingamfelter analyzes the
logistical and operational friction the 1ID DIVARTY faced and highlights challenges that modern DIVARTYs will
encounter in future large-scale conflicts. Lingamfelter divides the 1ID DIVARTY combat operations into three
phases: 1) Artillery raids against Iraqi forces from 16-24 February 1991, 2) Preparatory fires against Iraqi
positions prior to the 1ID breach on 24 February 1991 and 3) Field artillery tasks supporting the 1ID from the
breach up to the suspension of hostilities on 28 February 1991.
Lingamfelter describes the preparatory fires before the combined arms breach of the Iraqi defenses, in which
nearly every delivery system under the DIVARTY’s control continuously fired for an hour in support of the
combined arms breach. The Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division, Major General Thomas G. Rhame stated
that, “the performance of the FA in combat has caused all of us to remember what we had perhaps forgotten,
namely its incredible destructive power and shock effect. The preparation fires I witnessed prior to our assault
on the breach line were the most incredible sight I have seen in 27 years of service.”
The Army has primarily trained and fought counter-insurgency operations since 2003. Since then, institutional
LSCO fires skills have atrophied, making it crucial to draw inspiration and guidance from the past. Throughout
Desert Redleg, Lingamfelter repeatedly emphasizes two primary responsibilities a DIVARTY has in LSCO: 1) Command
and control (C2) of all FA units supporting the division and 2) Sustainment of those FA units, especially
concerning ammunition.
C2 of FA Units Supporting the Division
The first responsibility of a DIVARTY in LSCO is the C2 of all FA units supporting the division. This requires
accurate positioning of delivery systems at the correct time with the appropriate ammunition to effectively
engage targets and execute the detailed synchronization of the supported division’s fire support plan. 1ID
DIVARTY masterfully executed the ability to rapidly adapt the FA C2 structure to support and sustain the fires
demands of the division. At execution on D-Day (24 February 1991), the 1ID DIVARTY controlled a total of
seventeen artillery battalions, including nine 155mm battalions, four 203mm battalions, three M270 battalions
and an additional three M270 / Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) batteries.
C2 of FA units is a complex process that is standardized in FM 3-09. The two most important elements of FA C2 in
FM 3-09 are 1) Army Support Relationships (formerly known as FA Tactical Missions) and 2) the tenets of
“AWIFMN.”
The 1ID DIVARTY tasked organized their supporting FA units into the four doctrinal FA support relationships:
direct support (DS) for the FA cannon battalions to support their maneuver brigades and decrease the response
time for brigade level targets; general support (GS) for FA units to exclusively service deep division targets
for the 1ID Force Field Artillery Headquartuers (FFAHQ); seneral support reinforcing (GSR) to enhance the
supported unit’s ability to mass when the supporting unit was not servicing targets for the FFAHQ; and
reinforcing (R) to enable the supporting FA unit’s exclusive massing of fires for the supported FA unit.
Detailed definitions of these support roles and their accompanying Seven Field Artillery Inherent
Responsibilities are found in FM 3-09, Chapter 4.
1st Infantry Division Artillery (DIVARTY) Task Organization 24 February 1991
Unit |
Task Organization |
Support Type |
1ID DIVARTY: Force Field Artillery Headquarters (FFAHQ) |
1-5 FA (155mm SP)
4-5 FA (155mm SP)
3-4 FA (155mm SP)
B-6 FA (MLRS)
D-25 TAB |
DS 1/1ID
DS 2/1ID
GS
GS
GS |
75th Field Artillery Brigade: R 1ID DIVARTY |
1-17 FA (155mm SP)
5-18 FA (203mm SP)
A-1-158 FA (MLRS)
A-6-27 FA (ATACMS)
C-26 TAB |
R 4-5 FA
GSR 1-5 FA
GS
GS VII Corps Artillery
GS |
1st UK Armored Division Artillery: R 1ID DIVARTY |
2 FD (155mm SP)
26 FD (155mm SP)
40 FD (155mm SP)
32 HV (203mm SP)
39 HV (MLRS) |
GSR 4-5 FA
GSR 4-5 FA
GSR 4-5 FA
GSR 4-5 FA
GS |
42nd Field Artillery Brigade: R 1ID DIVARTY |
3-20 FA (155mm SP)
2-29 FA (155mm SP)
1-27 FA (MLRS) |
R 1-5 GA
GSR 1-5 FA
GS |
142nd Field Artillery Brigade: GSR 1ID DIVARTY |
1-142 FA (203mm SP)
2-142 FA (203mm SP)
1-158 FA (MLRS) |
GS
GS
GS |
Legend:
- GS - General Support
- GSR - General Support Reinforcing
- R - Reinforcing
- DS - Direct Support
- TAB - Target Acquisition Battery (Counterbattery Radar)
- MLRS - Multiple Rocket Launch System
- ATACMS - Army Tactical Missile System
- UK - United Kingdom
1ID DIVARTY also embraced the tenets of AWIFMN:
Adequate fire support for the committed units: 1ID DIVARTY placed 1-5 FA and 4-5 FA in DS of each of their
maneuver brigades (1/1ID and 2/1ID, respectively) and subsequently assigned them their own GSR and R cannon
battalions to provide adequate fires. This allowed the brigades to service targets in their own deep areas and
provided them the ability to mass multiple FA BNs on maneuver objectives before their seizure or clearance.
Weight to the main effort: 2/1ID was the main effort for the division. 1ID DIVARTY not only placed 4-5 FA in DS
of 2/1ID, but gave them four cannon battalions in GSR, one cannon battalion in R and priority of GS fires during
the attack phase of the operation.
Immediate responsive fires: 1ID DIVARTY accomplished responsive fires by decentralizing a large portion of the
supporting FA units. Placing units in DS to maneuver brigades or R to other FA units is the most common
facilitation of responsive fires. However, establishing quick fire nets for planned targets and rehearsing
mission processing procedures prior to combat operations were vital to ensuring that firing units processed fire
missions as quickly as possible after target identification.
Facilitation of future operations: The 1ID DIVARTY staff conducted extensive analysis into the positioning of FA
units on the battlefield as well as time-distance analysis of friendly maneuver units. This was vital to ensure
that the supported maneuver brigades of 1-5 FA and 4-5 FA (along with their own R and GSR FA units) did not
outpace them as they switched their support relationship from GS to DS.
Maximum feasible centralized control: Generally, the maximum C2 limit of any unit is around three to five
subordinate units. It would be impractical for the 1ID DIVARTY to exercise direct C2 over all seventeen
supporting battalions. If the 1ID DIVARTY was unable to effectively C2 a particular unit, that unit would be put
into a supporting role to another, to ensure that every delivery system stayed shooting for the duration of the
operation. 1ID DIVARTY delegated specific control authorities to subordinate FA brigade HQs but maintained
centralized command of all supporting units by exercising the duties and responsibilities of an FFAHQ outlined
in FM 3-09. This ensured that no echelon controlled more than five subordinate units but still maintained the
maximum feasible centralized C2 through the 1ID DIVARTY commander.
Never keep artillery in the reserve: Lingamfelter emphasizes the critical concept that any non-firing tube,
launcher, or cannon is an opportunity wasted by the division commander. Every FA unit was continuously tasked
with planning, rehearsing, or executing fire missions for 1ID.
Without the deliberate C2 structure provided by the 1ID DIVARTY, the joint force could not have coordinated and
executed the massive rocket and cannon artillery raids, massed preparatory fires and rapid reorganization of
delivery units to their supported maneuver brigades that were vital to the rapid defeat of the Iraqi army. Every
division requires a well-trained and well-educated DIVARTY to provide that C2 to effectively manage internal FA
units and integrate any external FA units into their task organization. Due to the increasingly complicated
nature of warfare and the high-demand/low-availability of cannon, rocket and missiles in LSCO, the mantra of
every DIVARTY should be “right command/support relationship, right time, right place, right ammo.”
These relationships are the first crucial element that facilitates accurate and timely fires.
1 ID DIVARTY and Supporting Units Ammo Expenditures 16-28 FEB 1991
Operation |
HE |
DPICM |
RAP |
Rockets |
Artillery Raids (16-23 FEB 91) |
5792 |
1436 |
1980 |
1606 |
Preparatory Fires Prior to Breach (24 FEB 91) |
4621 |
1515 |
0 |
414 |
Breach to Change of Mission (24-28 FEB 91) |
5614 |
4057 |
290 |
540 |
Total |
16027 |
7008 |
2270 |
2560 |
Modern DIVARTY commanders can exercise and increase their proficiency in C2 of division FA units during WFX and
during command-post exercises (CPXs). When DIVARTY commanders plan training objectives for their CPXs or WFX,
they should aim for their DIVARTYs to successfully C2 up to twelve (12) individual FA Battalions, with one to
three reinforcing FA BDE HQs to enable the delegation of control. Twelve (12) should be the aimpoint because it
is more than the span of typical “garrison” C2 but not so many that it detracts from the
DIVARTY’s ability to effectively plan. This forces commanders to place units in the support roles outlined
in FM 3-09 to effectively fight. Commanders should request FA Battalions and brigades that include as many
diverse weapon systems as possible (M777A2, M119A3, M109A6/7, M270A1, M142) and even emerging system battalions
like Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) to exercise the rapid transition of support relationships and
nuances in fire mission processing that were so vital to the 1ID DIVARTY’s success. Learning how to
rapidly integrate external units and consistently tasking, changing and exploring the intricacies of support
relationships is the only way that DIVARTYs will be able to learn how to provide adequate C2 to supporting FA
units in future conflict.
Sustainment of FA Units Supporting the Division
Providing the ammunition for the 1ID DIVARTY’s task-organization was a significant logistical feat for its
staff. Transporting and storing artillery Class V ammunition is burdensome for even the best trained and fully
manned logistical units. It requires intricate knowledge of fuze/shell combinations, propellant types, munition
ranges and projectile functions that may not be well understood by those outside the FA branch. Lingamfelter
provides an extensive analysis of the ammunition required to keep the King of Battle shooting during the Gulf
War. The expenditures totaled almost 25,000 cannon shells and over 2,500 rockets in the campaign’s twelve
days of ground combat operations. The result of the artillery ammunition expenditure was the destruction of 50
enemy tanks, 139 armoured personnel carriers (APCs), 30 air defense systems, 152 artillery pieces, 27 missile
launchers, 108 mortars, 548 wheeled vehicles, 61 trench lines and bunker positions, 92 dug-in and open infantry
targets and 34 logistical sites.
Modern DIVARTY and FA battalion staffs struggle to forecast or properly plan for the appropriate type and
quantity of ammunition to support their commander’s objectives. One could reference ATP 3-09.23, Chapter 7
for historic trends of the type and quantity of cannon ammunition based on the operation type, but these tables
are generic “cookie cutter” planning tools and no such tables exist for rockets. The targeting cycle
and the subsequent identification of Field Artillery Tasks (FATs) are what truly drives FA ammunition forecasts
and unit basic loads (UBLs). The quantity and type of ammunition required to support those FATs are a function
of “Battlefield Calculus,” or the total amount of ammunition required based on range to the target,
target type and the commander’s desired effect.
Just like C2, modern DIVARTY commanders should train ammunition management during CPX and WFX and most
importantly during battle rhythm academics and leadership professional development (LPDs). An effective method
to establish Class V discipline in any formation is to modify leader certification exams to add nomenclatures,
fuze shell combinations, munition ranges, munition functions, Department of Defense Identification Codes
(DODICs) and vehicle haul capacities and develop a unit development plan to educate the formation on Class V.
Leaders will only make learning their ammunition a priority if their commanders make it a priority.
Education aside, a good litmus for commanders to gauge their unit’s ability to manage ammunition is how
well they forecast expenditures. If a staff is unable to effectively forecast ammunition 72 hours out, it
indicates that 1) the staff does not understand the capabilities, limitations and functionality of the
ammunition they are managing, or 2) the division’s targeting cycle is broken and cannot provide the
necessary inputs for the DIVARTY staff to forecast the ammunition required to support their assigned FATs.
Battlefield calculus, outputs of targeting, haul capacities, controlled supply rates, required supply rates and
UBLs are all topics that are far too complex to outline in this article. Previous FA officers have already
written about these topics and copies of their findings can be found below. The first is an article from 2001
written by MAJ Brent Parker and CPT Michael Philbin and the second from 2014 written by CPT Westly T. LaFitte.
Both are prime examples to the level of detailed planning and analysis required to execute effective fires in
LSCO.

To be successful, the 1ID DIVARTY staff had to ensure every staff section integrated into the 1ID targeting
cycle. Treating the DIVARTY staff as an extension of the Division staff, not just a subordinate HQ involved in
parallel planning, was an essential element 1ID DIVARTY used to ensure delivery systems were in the right time,
in the right place, with the right ammunition and right command support relationship to execute their FATs.
Parallel lines never touch.
Conclusion
As the joint force looks ahead towards LSCO, the Field Artillery Branch should draw insights and inspiration from
the Gulf War to understand the complexity and challenges associated with planning, executing and sustaining
fires. Although current DIVARTYs are learning how to adapt to fighting in LSCO, they have not demonstrated their
true potential and lethality in more than three decades. Lingamfelter’s detailed historical account
highlights the command, control and sustainment that DIVARTYs must apply in the LSCO of tomorrow, even thirty
years after the Big Red One was “rounds complete.” For the FA branch to effectively provide this
vital support in future conflicts, “Desert Redleg: Artillery Warfare in the First Gulf War” by L.
Scott Lingamfelter should be mandatory reading material for FA Captains Career Course, students at the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College and all FA battalion and DIVARTY staffs across the Army. In the words of COL
Lingamfelter, “You go forward best, by going back first.”
References
Lingamfelter, L. S. (2020). Desert Redleg: Artillery warfare in the First Gulf War. University Press of Kentucky.
Author
MAJ Destry “Sam” Balch is a FA BOLC Gunnery Instructor at the US Army Field Artillery School. MAJ
Balch has served tours in support of OPERATION SPARTAN SHIELD, OPERATION ATLANTIC RESOLVE and OPERATION
INHERENT RESOLVE. His previous positions include Battery Fire Direction Officer (3/4ID), Platoon Leader
(3/4ID), Battalion Fire Direction Officer (3/4ID), 4ID DIVARTY Fire Control Officer, Brigade Fire Support
Officer (2/82 ABN), Battalion Fire Support Officer (2/82 ABN) and Howitzer Battery Commander (2/82 ABN).