Exercises Austere Challenge and Avenger Triad 2024

Lessons Learned from a Corps Combat Aviation Brigade

By the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade Staff*

Article published on: May 1, 2025 in the January-March 2025 Issue of the Aviation Digest

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COL Ryan Kendall, commander, 12th CAB, discusses plans with MAJ Ryan Kline, Brigade Operations Officer, 12th CAB, during Exercise Austere Challenge 24, Grafenwoehr, Germany, March 11, 2024. U.S. Army photo by CPT Gabrielle Hildebrand.

With the reemergence of large-scale, protracted conflict in Europe for the first time since the 1940s, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military leaders are evaluating how to conduct combined arms operations in an increasingly complex operational environment. Combined arms, as part of Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), is significantly different in size, scale, and scope than the conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan. Corps and division commanders and their headquarters must win their respective fights at echelon, commanding and controlling combat forces as an integrated whole. Maneuver in the corps and division deep areas requires the effective integration of intelligence, fires, CEMA (cyber and electromagnetic activities), and aviation assets to provide the required operational reach, in addition to synchronization of limited logistics resources to ensure operational endurance.

As the corps or division commander’s only air maneuver element, combat aviation brigades (CABs) and CAB commanders play a critical role advising how to best integrate aviation as part of combined arms operations. These integration tasks must be evaluated and executed through iterative training and experimentation. The 12th CAB, as V Corps’s assigned CAB, is uniquely positioned to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that address the unique aspects of aviation operations at the corps level. The 12th CAB recently participated in two virtual exercises designed to prepare U.S. and NATO forces to operate across the full range of military operations—Austere Challenge 24 (AC24) and Avenger Triad 24 (AvT24)—which provided lessons that inform future training for the Enterprise.

This article highlights key observations from the 12th CAB’s participation in AC24 and AvT24, focusing on relatively new TTPs implemented during the exercise: the role of the Aviation Coordinator (AVCOORD) and the corps CAB as a deep maneuver asset.

Figure. Summary of the AVCOORD concept (12th CAB staff, 2024).

The Aviation Coordinator

During AC24, V Corps experimented with employing an AVCOORD (summarized in the Figure). Though not a current doctrinal position, the AVCO-ORD was defined in (then) Field Manual 6-0, “Mission Command-Command and Control of Army Forces,” from 1997–2003 as the senior aviation officer responsible for integrating staff efforts and coordinating the actions of divisional and corps CABs in support of the ground scheme of maneuver (Department of the Army, 2003, p. D-33). Through their unique ability to understand, visualize, describe, and direct aviation operations, the AVCOORD helps drive the corps’s operations process and inform the corps commander’s decisions, as described in Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, “Mission Command-Command and Control of Army Forces” (2019, p. 2-13). In these exercises, the 12th CAB Commander served as the V Corps's AVCOORD.

U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to the 12th CAB stand in front of the tactical action center during Exercise Austere Challenge 24, Grafenwoehr, Germany, March 11, 2024. U.S. Army photo by CPT Gabrielle Hildebrand.

Before digging deeper into the role of the AVCOORD at AC24 and AvT24, it is helpful to provide a few examples of what it is not. The AVCOORD is not an aviation equivalent to the fire support coordinator; the AVCOORD does not hold tasking authority over the corps CABs, assign priorities of support, or task organize division aviation units. Additionally, the AVCOORD is not a corps-level air operations cell that can retask aviation formations during execution. Instead, the AVCOORD—in conjunction with non-lethal enablers and fires—facilitates the synchronization and integration of aviation maneuver operations as part of the corps scheme of maneuver to achieve the corps commander’s objectives. The paragraphs below outline some specific lessons learned from implementing this concept.

During AC24, the AVCOORD participated in several battle rhythm events to assist the corps commander’s decision-making. The AVCOORD hosted an aviation huddle with four divisional CAB commanders prior to the corps commander’s update brief (CUB). The huddle ensured synchronized aviation planning efforts and shared understanding prior to the corps CUB, which enabled division commanders to better integrate aviation into their rapidly evolving plans. Additionally, the V Corps G32, in the role of Deputy AVCOORD, hosted the Deep Operations Working Group (DOWG) for subordinate units’ aviation staff to build a shared understanding of their missions and coordinate necessary resources. The nested touchpoints between CAB staffs and commanders, the AVCOORD, and division commanders allowed CABs to share resources, better integrate with the corps’s overall scheme of maneuver, conduct synchronized multi-CAB deep attacks, apply continuous pressure to the enemy, and ultimately significantly influence the battle’s outcome.

It is worth noting that the 12th CAB’s habitual relationship with V Corps played a critical role in the success of the AVCOORD concept. The corps commander’s familiarity with the CAB, the CAB commander’s understanding of the corps CG’s intent, and the CAB’s relationships with the corps staff members set conditions for the CAB commander to execute the AVCOORD role. However, this habitual relationship is the exception rather than the rule. Combat aviation brigades finding themselves task organized as a corps asset must quickly build trust with the higher headquarters, define the intent and limits of the AVCOORD role, and identify key events within the corps's battle rhythm to facilitate coordination with fires, intelligence, and other enablers.

Lessons Learned as a Deep Maneuver Aviation Asset

Based on the brigade’s experiences at AC24 and AvT24, the 12th CAB hopes to provide insight broadly applicable to any corps CAB, with lessons learned organized below by warfighting function.

Command and Control

Strike Net. During both AC24 and AvT24, the 12th CAB utilized a NATO SECRET network known as the Mission Partner Environment (MPE)1to operate a “Strike Net” chatroom during mission execution. This capability enabled real-time mission updates and coordination across enablers. The ability to rapidly reorient and execute fires against threats on the corps’s high-payoff target list proved significant to enabling overall scheme of maneuver. Strike Net drastically increased the overall situational awareness of all participants and provided the coordination mechanism to exploit opportunities in the execution of deep maneuver.

Integration vs. Deconfliction. In coordination with the V Corps staff, the 12th CAB successfully integrated into simultaneous rotary-wing operations across the corps's operational environment, utilizing procedural airspace coordination measures. Technical rehearsals and common graphics utilizing the command post computing environment (CPCE) across the MPE enabled integrated use of air corridors, holding areas, forward arming and refueling points (FARPs), engagement areas, and tactical assembly areas (TAAs). In combination with well-positioned liaison officers and coordination at the DOWG, cross-CAB synchronization was critical to sustaining continuous pressure on the enemy.

Of note, due to the exercise design of AvT24, division CAB response cells did not have the same level of participation as AC24. This limited their participation in battle rhythm events and coordination during planning, resulting in limited shared understanding and integration of division and corps aviation operations. Compared with 12th CAB’s experience during AC24, this highlighted the importance of the commander-to-commander huddle and DOWG for integrating CAB operations and synchronizing them as part of the corps's maneuver plan.

Movement and Maneuver

Standard Mission Packages. The 12th CAB task organized its rotary-wing attack capability to best sustain combat power and enable flexibility for the corps commander. Use of standard mission packages—i.e., a main effort, supporting effort, and exploitation force, each with a specified echelon of forces available—provided a sustainable model that could be tailored to the threat and operational environment. Additionally, this provided a valuable foundation of planning predictability to staff and enablers that proved critical in condensed planning timelines where the corps strived to rapidly exploit opportunities against enemy formations during each period of darkness.

Intelligence

Integrating Multiple Unmanned Assets. During one particularly successful deep attack at AC24, the Corps Collection Manager allocated tactical control of one line of MQ-1C Gray Eagle unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to 12th CAB, allowing the CAB to rapidly identify the priority target formation and associated enemy air defense assets. This further enabled execution of precision Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)2through corps fires assets, Gray Eagle Hellfire missiles, and organic long-range capability of the SPIKE™ Non-Line-Of-Sight missile on the AH-64. Additionally, UAS employment in advance of rotary-wing maneuver validated threat disposition and appropriate routing for maneuver to preplanned battle positions. The tactical control of UAS capability retained at the CAB in support of deep maneuver proved successful when planned and employed with similar rigor and intent as attack rotary-wing capability. Conversely, overly bureaucratic or ill-understood release authorities for UAS weaponry can impair a mission and generate increased risk to force.

Supporting Deep Maneuver. The corps CAB, operating in the deep area, requires intelligence support from the corps's analysis and control element to a degree greater than any other subordinate unit within the corps. The risk of loss to combat power for the corps in a deep maneuver operation must be clearly understood and enablers applied appropriately to mitigate risk. In both the Aviation Mission Acceptance Brief and Go/No-Go conditions check, the threat assessment, enemy disposition, and triggers for initiating deep maneuver must be clearly understood, with assets allocated to inform decision-making and risks.

U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to the 12th CAB stand for a photo during Exercise Austere Challenge 24, Grafenwoehr, Germany, March 10, 2024. U.S. Army photo by CPT Gabrielle Hildebrand.

Fires

Responsive Fires. Pre-planned fires in support of deep maneuver provided responsive capability to execute both precision SEAD and fire missions against opportunity targets. Fires participation in the Strike Net provided a mechanism for rapid engagement when paired with a well-placed fire support officer and technical rehearsal prior to execution. Rehearsals of pre-established lines of communication maximized the sensor-to-shooter capability and expedited fire mission timelines.

Priority Formations and Priority of Fires. In AC24 and AvT24, the presence of the AVCOORD in the Target Working Group and Target Decision Board resulted in the most effective employment of the corps-shaping capabilities of the CAB and field artillery brigade. Aviation Coordinator participation in these events also provided situational awareness and presented opportunities for the corps CAB to make recommendations on employment of rotary-wing attack capability in concert with other corps enablers and efforts. These venues also provided the AVCOORD the ability to shape the prioritization of key enablers, such as space and CEMA assets, for both the corps and division CABs.

A UH-60 from the 12th CAB, Wings of Victory, is prepped for the next day's flight at Wiesbaden Army Airfield. U.S. Army photo by MAJ Robert Fellingham.

Sustainment

Sustainment Common Operating Picture (COP). The AVCOORD maintained a running estimate of current and projected locations for all CAB air corridors, engagement areas, FARPs, and TAAs. The COP was maintained utilizing a CPCE layer and briefed daily at the DOWG. In addition to shared situational awareness on fuel and ammunition posture, this aspect of the AVCOORD role proved critical to the sustained and long-range employment of all corps’s rotary-wing capability.

Heavy Lift and Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)/Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC). The exercises utilized general support aviation battalion heavy lift capability to support corps sustainment efforts and rapid resupply of critical munitions. Additionally, the 12th CAB Surgeon developed a robust MEDEVAC and CASEVAC COP that provided flexibility and responsive capability across the corps's operational environment.

Protection

TAA/FARP Survivability. The 12th CAB received direct support of one air defense battery and military police company during AC24. These assets (Avenger Air Defense Systems, man-portable air defense systems, drone busters, gun trucks) were further task organized to provide organic protection capability to forward positioned assets of the CAB. During AvT24, Territorial Defense Forces provided additional protection and intelligence sources. Clear understanding of capabilities and limitations of these assets, combined with frequent survivability moves, proved essential to the protection of the corps’s combat power.

The 12th CAB’s experiences during AC24 and AvT24 highlight the potential of several new TTPs that facilitate the integration of aviation combat power as part of a combined arms team. These TTPs, such as the AVCOORD, require further experimentation and refinement during future exercises. These future exercises should increasingly reflect the realism of the modern battlefield, such as limited connectivity and the challenges of dispersed command and control nodes, in order to test the ability of the CAB commander to coordinate efforts across multiple echelons. Finally, units must incorporate the depth and complexity of corps deep maneuver into live training to further refine lessons learned during simulation.

“Wings of Victory!”

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