Data Overload: Observations on Data and Mission Command from JMRC

By LTC Jordan Bradford, MAJ Edwin den Harder, and COL CJ Kirkpatrick

Article published on: March 15, 2026 in the Spring 2026 issue of Armor

Read Time: < 16 mins

Data has become a cornerstone of decision making in modern military operations. As the complexity and speed of operations increases, commanders and staff must navigate an ever-growing stream of information to make timely, informed, and effective decisions. The ability to interpret, analyze, and apply data has transformed from a technical specialty to a critical skill set for leaders at all levels.1

“Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain.”2

For military staffs, the challenge of managing data is not a new phenomenon, but the scale and complexity of this problem continues to grow. Every technological innovation, from new unmanned aerial system (UAS) platforms to the proliferation of digital chat applications down to the team level, creates a new data stream. Flattened information sharing brings in more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) feeds, signals intelligence (SIGINT) data and electronic warfare (EW) reports. Each stream brings with it a new requirement for tracking, employment, and communication. Additionally, many of these systems have limited or no interoperability. The resulting volume of data at the tactical level creates a paradox: instead of clarifying the battlefield, it regularly overwhelms leaders and command posts (CPs), causing them to miss key information. Observations from the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) indicate that brigade and battalion staff consistently struggle to exercise effective command and control (C2) precisely because of this data overload.

As a Combat Training Center (CTC), JMRC puts brigade and battalion commanders and staff under the increased cognitive load of simultaneous planning and executing of operations across multiple time horizons against a thinking, realistic opposing force (OPFOR). Major trends that contribute to data overload in this environment include CPs that struggle to balance survivability and functionality, a lack of data management standard operating procedures/tactics, techniques, and procedures (SOPs/ TTPs), a focus on system management at the expense of analysis, and a lack of system interoperability. Two additional factors exacerbate the issue of data overload: the reduction in size of brigade and battalion staffs and the movement of the brigade’s Military Intelligence Company (MICO) personnel to the divisional echelon.

The resulting impact on C2 is not “analysis paralysis,” but a failure to recognize critical information in the stream of less crucial data, the loss of precious time to managing a disparate variety of systems, and an unclear common operating picture (COP). Unable to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess (UVDDLA) as effectively, commanders and staff cannot take advantage of fleeting opportunities or mitigate the risks caused by unexpected enemy actions. This article not only describes the problem and its contributing factors as observed at JMRC but provides best practices to help brigade and battalion commanders and staffs address this challenge.

The Problem: When Data Hinders Rather Than Helps

A decade ago, brigade combat teams (BCTs) confronted fewer individual pieces of data, often governed by mission command system capabilities, collection capabilities, and data transport network bandwidth. By way of analogy, BCTs used to face the challenge of putting together a 100-piece puzzle of a dog. The quality of the image was not great, but with a relatively small number of pieces and limited work putting it together, one could rapidly identify that it was a dog. Today the challenge equates to a highly detailed 10,000-piece puzzle of that same dog. The picture quality is amazing when the puzzle is finished - but the pieces are tiny and you need thousands of them to recognize that the puzzle is a picture of a dog. Additionally, the work required to organize all those tiny pieces is greater.

Figure 1. A representation of the Data, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom (DKIW) Pyramid. (Photo courtesy of Wikipedia Commons)

As opposed to the past, where commanders and their staff often struggled with a lack of data, the contemporary challenge is processing, understanding, and acting upon a massive influx of data. Much of the data received at a CTC is seldom converted into a structured or usable form, which increases decision risk and presents an unclear picture for commanders (See Figure 1).

A major contributor to this issue is the sheer volume of data received at the tactical level: ISR feeds, SIGINT data, EW reports, and digital chat-based reporting that often extends down to team level generate a tidal wave of data. With multiple units moving, receiving different forms of contact, and taking losses, this situation quickly leads to the generation of dozens of individual digital reports in a short period of time that compete for the attention of those monitoring the C2 systems. Although generally perceived as a positive development, flattened communications across multiple echelons can dramatically increase the cognitive burden on leaders. In the most dramatic example witnessed at JMRC, one company commander received about 18,000 messages across multiple tactical chat groups over the course of a training rotation. This poses the dilemma where leaders must either read or ignore these messages.

This constant stream of unfiltered and unstructured data leads to cognitive overload and the loss or lack of recognition of critical information. When a staff member is sifting through hundreds of chat messages, it is easy to miss a report that answers a priority intelligence requirement (PIR) or friendly force information requirement (FFIR), validates a key planning assumption, or indicates that the OPFOR is executing a different course of action (COA). When staff officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) must manage a variety of disparate systems, this consumes precious time and mental energy. The lack of integration between mission command systems means that staff often spend an inordinate amount of their time simply trying to get information from one system to another and onto their COP. This is time they cannot spend conducting analysis, synchronizing the fight, delivering lethal and timely fires, or anticipating the commander’s next decision point.

Figure 2. Six functions of a Command Post.

Trends

At JMRC, the data overload problem is formation-agnostic. In the past 18 months, mobile BCTs (MBCTs), Stryker BCTs (SBCTs), and armored BCTs (ABCTs) all grappled with balancing CP functionality and survivability, doctrinal gaps, training challenges, and technological/systemic issues that contribute to data overload. Equally noteworthy is that in the same period, no two brigades operated with the same primary C2 systems, primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plans, and the number and composition of their CPs. This is not a negative situation, as commanders are encouraged to test new concepts and configurations, but suggests that doctrine has not caught up with innovation.

Commanders are rightfully concerned with the survivability of their command posts, as large, static, and easily targetable main CPs (MCPs) are a liability on the modern battlefield. This has led to a trend in smaller, more mobile, and more dispersed CP configurations. However, training units often struggle to balance CP functionality versus survivability. While observations from the Nagorno-Karabakh and Russo-Ukrainian wars clearly indicate the need for dispersed CPs with low visible and electromagnetic (EM) signatures, simply reducing the size of CPs without critical analysis of functionality leads to issues.3 The pressure to reduce size of CPs often leads to the loss of critical capabilities and redundancies as members of the staff and their systems are dispersed. This, in turn, can result in an inability to execute the six functions of a CP (see Figure 2) during extended periods of high-tempo operations.

The lack of established and rehearsed SOPs and TTPs for digital information management is another leading contributor to data overload. Without these products or validation of processes through the staff training tables laid out in Training Circular (TC) 6-0.2, Training the Command and Control Warfighting Function for Battalions and Brigades, staff members attempt to establish product formats, reporting procedures, and knowledge management processes during military decision-making process (MDMP) or while in contact. Without prior familiarity and rehearsal, these attempts often induce more confusion than they alleviate and contribute to further cognitive overload.

Another observed trend is that training prior to JMRC rotations focuses on technical proficiency with systems, not the cognitive skills to analyze and manage the data they produce. Pressed for time during rotations, junior leaders and staff at echelon feel the temptation to pass raw data quickly rather than taking the time to analyze it and provide structured staff estimates or recommendations. This behavior leads to “stovepipes” by warfighting function as attendees do not provide the necessary inputs to integrating processes such as the targeting meeting or operations synchronization meeting (OPSYNCH). It also turns the commander into an action officer, pulling them away from their primary role. The result is a desynchronized fight with assets committed in the wrong location, attritted early, or failing to achieve their desired effects.

Additionally, garrison and home-station training provide insufficient “reps and sets” for staff to operate under conditions of sustained information saturation. A CP exercise (CPX) in garrison might involve a handful of simulated reports each hour, not the massive volume of accurate, inaccurate, and partial reports from organic and attached units that characterize the contemporary operating environment. It is not until a CTC rotation that units experience the full cognitive load of simultaneously planning and executing operations across multiple time horizons, meaning units must build systems at home station capable of handling larger than expected volumes of data.

Two years ago, working with multinational forces posed the only major interoperability challenges United States units faced. These challenges continue to grow as liaison officers (LNOs) now require more systems to ensure allies and partners remain integrated, but the problem is no longer isolated to multinational units. Given the partial fielding of a variety of mobile ad hoc networks (MANET), mobile user objective systems (MUOS), and the continued transformation to a modular, extensible, singular and open architecture under Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2), United States brigades now encounter interoperability challenges with adjacent brigades, aviation task forces, and their higher headquarters. Particularly for non-divisional units and rotational brigades not operating under their organic headquarters, communication systems interoperability must remain a key discussion. The issue is also experienced internal to a brigade, with direct reporting specialty companies and attachments that do not have a battalion headquarters over them experiencing it most acutely. Secure but unclassified – encrypted (SBU-E) networking alleviates some of these interoperability problems, but create new operational security (OPSEC) challenges at the tactical edge for the enemy to exploit.

Systems that are not integrated and do not communicate require “swivel chairs” or black box cross-domain solutions at echelon. While the manual movement of data between C2 systems is certainly not new to anyone who ever took a radio transmission and typed it into their Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBCP), the amount of data now requiring a “swivel chair” increases the demand on the most precious commodity of radio telephone operators (RTOs), battle captains, staffs, and commanders – their time. It is also a source of human error and often creates duplicate requirements – such as the plotting of icons on multiple digital systems. Each system has its own interface, its own login requirements, and its own training requirements. The staff officer becomes a systems integrator by default, a role that they are often not fully trained or equipped to perform. Thus, systems fielded to help reduce staff workload are frequently the key contributors to the cognitive overload experienced in CPs.

None of these problems are new. An alphabet soup of transitions in our past (FBCB2, BFT, JCR, WIN-T, CPOF, CPCE) have created similar data overloaded BCTs and interoperability frustrations. Many of the TTPs we used in the past to overcome the avalanche of data still apply – we just have to develop, inculcate, and enforce basic discipline and knowledge management practices.

Best Practices

The best practices to many of our current digital challenges can be found in long-standing, analog-era formats and procedures. The first step is to enforce ruthless discipline in communication.

Establish and adhere to a 4-channel PACE Plan. RTUs are most successful when they establish a brigade 4-channel PACE (command, operations and intelligence (O&I), fires, and administrative and logistics (A&L)) and clearly delineate what traffic goes in each channel. Defined PACE should also include transport, as a PACE is not functional when everything uses the same transport layer. Units must define the PACE and rehearse it at distance to ensure full functionality. Leaders must immediately address any attempts to create separate or extra channels outside of the established 4-channel PACE, as messages on extraneous chats can quickly turn a brigade’s orderly communication channels into something more akin to the unstructured chats we all often encounter on our personal devices. Particularly for digital chats, limiting attendees to only those that need access also helps keep communications channels streamlined and provides a forcing function for the filtering and analysis of data.

Use concise, standardized reports. Enforcing the use of concise, standardized formats in all digital reporting, especially in chat rooms, can dramatically cut down on unnecessary verbiage and make information easier to process quickly. Reporting formats like the SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment), SALT-W (size, activity, location, time, and what you are doing about it) and logistics status (LOGSTAT) help structure data and are also codified in doctrine to facilitate commonality in reporting4

Focus Reporting on PIR and FFIR tied to COAs and Decisive Points. The commander’s PIR and FFIR must drive information collection and reporting. Staff must constantly ask, “Does this help the commander make a decision?” and provide the filter to help the commander. When a PIR or FFIR is answered, simple processes like highlighting the chat message in a different color can ensure this critical information does not get buried by less crucial data.

Develop and enforce SOPs. Every brigade must develop, publish, and enforce a detailed SOP for information and knowledge management (KM) that governs how the formation communicates. This SOP should clearly define:

1.) Chat channel rules of engagement (ROE): Which chat rooms are for what purpose? Who is authorized to be in them? What are the rules for formatting messages? How are we identifying critical information that must not get lost between routine reports? 2.) The flow of information: The SOP should map out how a piece of data - for example, a contact report from a scout or ISR asset - is processed by the staff. Who receives it? Who logs it? Who analyzes it? Who is responsible for placing it on the COP? Establishing and rehearsing the SOP is essential to providing structure and setting expectations for communication across the organization.

Designing CPs. Rather than using the size of the CP as the first criterion, leaders should first establish the essential capabilities (personnel and systems) each command node must possess to meet its primary requirements. Once this occurs, it becomes much easier to reduce the size of command nodes without sacrificing functionality.

Embrace Automation: AI and Bot Integration. As AI integration into mission command systems continues to develop, brigades can leverage existing AI models to automate low-level tasks. Simple software bots or scripts can be programmed to monitor chat rooms for keywords related to PIR. When the bot detects a keyword, it can automatically highlight the text and send an alert to a specific channel, ensuring that potentially critical information gets immediate attention. This frees soldiers from the time-consuming task of reading every single message and allows them to focus their attention on analysis and prediction. One recent success at JMRC involved a brigade developing and employing an AI bot to assist with intelligence analysis. This bot parsed large amounts of data from the brigade internal O&I chats and provided estimates and recommendations on potential enemy COAs. While building and training this bot required a great deal of initial effort, it enabled a brigade S2 shop to rapidly identify key information and make assessments to the brigade commander.

Assume the “Swivel Chair” Burden: If a manual “swivel chair” between two systems is unavoidable, the highest echelon possible should execute that function. The higher headquarters, with its larger staff and greater resources, is generally better postured to absorb this friction than subordinate staffs. Observations indicate that pushing this burden down to lower echelons, particularly from the brigade to the battalion level, results in loss of information as subordinate elements do not have the personnel or system density to execute the swivel chair quickly enough while conducting their own operations.

“As communication technology has improved, so has the demand for information at the headquarters level. When these demands from headquarters are not synchronized with the work ongoing in units that are engaged in battle, the communication process itself can reduce battle effectiveness by diverting leader attention and by adding stress to an already overstressed situation.”

The Way Forward

Brigades and battalions cannot solve the data overload problem on their own. Divisions and corps have a critical role to play and a responsibility to their subordinate units. Higher headquarters must establish a clear, non-negotiable standard for how their subordinate brigades will communicate and share data. They must dictate the primary systems and reporting formats to solve the potential brigade-to-brigade interoperability challenges. Furthermore, if a division dictates a standard, it must also provide the necessary resources - the equipment/software, the training, and the field service representatives - to enable it.

Leaders at echelon should also take heed of this warning from a 1997 report: “As communication technology has improved, so has the demand for information at the headquarters level. When these demands from headquarters are not synchronized with the work ongoing in units that are engaged in battle, the communication process itself can reduce battle effectiveness by diverting leader attention and by adding stress to an already over-stressed situation.”5 Through frank conversations to address shortcomings and set clear expectations, leaders can mitigate this risk and address the challenge of data overload.

Data management is certainly not a new problem and is inherent in the nature of war. Commanders must always balance analysis and decision making with time available. New C2 systems and AI have the potential to enable better-informed decisions. We may be on the cusp of moving past “the general unreliability of all information present(ing) a special problem in war: all action takes place…in the twilight, which, like fog or moonlight, often tends to make things seem grotesque and larger than they really are.”6 In the meantime, care must be taken to ensure these tools serve as a solution for data management, not another contributor to the problem.

Notes