How Innovation Helps Cavalry Formations Solve Age-Old C2 Challenges

By MAJ Mike Eads and MAJ Matt Coccia

Article published on: May 14, 2025 in the Spring 2025 Edition of Armor

Read Time: < 10 mins

Decades of reconnaissance efforts have focused on addressing communication and command and control (C2) challenges in contested environments over long distances. While cavalry units typically encounter no issues establishing contact with enemy forces, they often face difficulties providing rapid and accurate reports due to communication limitations. Moreover, the large size of squadron-level command posts sacrifices their speed and maneuverability, and their corresponding electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) signatures exposes them to risks of enemy contact.

Testing new concepts

4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment (Stryker) completed a combat training center (CTC) rotation as part of exercise Saber Junction 23 (SJ23) at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center where we tested and validated two new concepts to improve C2 of forces over long distances: The Regimental Enabler Command Post (REC-P) and the recently fielded Integrated Tactical Network (ITN) communications systems. Both innovations enabled the regiment and the cavalry squadron to fight lighter and leaner, while reducing risk to both force and the mission. By integrating the bulk of the squadron staff at the REC-P, the squadron planning efforts were better synchronized with the regiment throughout the rotation.

Figure 1. Squadron Command and Control Node Role and Duties PACE from 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment (4/2CR) CPSOP (U.S. Army)

Reducing signature, vulnerability

The REC-P is a command post (CP) located in a permissive environment, and in the case of SJ23, more than 80 kilometers to the rear of the FLOT, housed within a defendable hardstand building out of direct and indirect fire contact. The building simulated the occupation of any suitable structure, potentially located in a nearby town or urban area near a brigade-size area of operations during large-scale combat operations (LSCO). The regimental staff located at the REC-P included the Regimental Intelligence Support Element (RISE), the deputy commanding officer, and eventually included a robust future operations cell along with a large portion of the regimental administrative/logistics operations center (ALOC). These personnel adjustments were made in stride to reduce the regiment C2 signature. Our squadron had most of our ALOC and half our primary staff, including the S-2 and our intelligence section, operating out of the REC-P. The squadron commander, the S-3, and fire support officer were located at the forward command post. The core value of the REC-P is the reduction of the EMS and physical signatures of command posts near the FLOT.

Our forward command post consisted of four vehicles and 20 personnel. It was the only headquarters element in the box for the rotation. Its smaller footprint allowed it to move around the battlefield much easier than the typical squadron-sized command post. For example, we were able to breakdown and setup in less than 15 minutes. The typical squadron CP may have upwards of 12 vehicles to include security elements, along with associated tentage, and 35-40 personnel to sustain and move across the battlefield.

CP roles, ensuring redundancy

During the rotation we refined our standing operating procedure (SOP) to differentiate the roles and responsibilities for our different C2 nodes as depicted in Figure 1.

We found the functions of each node were important to define and morphed throughout the rotation as we continually refined our processes. One key function of the recon squadron staff element at the REC-P was to work closely with regimental planners, ensuring the synchronization of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance across the battlefield. Additionally, regimental and squadron intelligence analysts and planners at the REC-P were able to successfully do their jobs because they didn't have to contend with the added stress of multiple jumps during the typical CTC rotation. The squadron staff at the REC-P provided the commander with daily planning updates, even following heavy periods of fighting by the forward elements. Planning timelines and battle rhythm events were less impacted because of the REC-P's distance from the FLOT. Between the constant, uninterrupted intelligence analysis, and a more expedient reconnaissance asset management process, we found clear advantages to the permissive environment afforded by the ITN capabilities resulting in effective C2 at range. The combat trains command post and field trains command post had their typical responsibilities as described in Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, along with some added reporting requirements and the ability to assume the duties of the other CPs as necessary.

Transforming in contact

Management of multiple command posts requires thoughtful analysis of where key personnel are placed, how they can best affect operations and decision making, and what their clearly defined roles and responsibilities are. This is especially critical when introducing an innovative command post concept. Staff roles and responsibilities need to be reevaluated based on location of the command posts in relation to the FLOT, or the higher headquarters. The communication capabilities must also be evaluated to determine if changes in the unit's battle rhythm and reporting processes need adjustment. Additionally, key signal support personnel may need to be rebalanced across the CPs to account for the wider range of communication platforms needing to be maintained.

If conducting a battlefield update brief, from three different CPs, including one like the REC-P, ITN must be fully functional to support the inclusion of key personnel required to both receive, and provide inputs. The management of the ITN which includes satellite communications, ground stations, user terminals, multiple radio systems, along with tactical and non-tactical internet protocols, requires an array of signal specialists to support each CP. This is no easy personnel task but can be managed with careful planning and continual assessment.

Managing capabilities

We learned several lessons about the placement of key personnel during the exercise. We know the cavalry squadron intelligence officer plays a critical role in enabling reconnaissance and assessing the enemy course of action (CoA) and disposition for the regimental commander. For instance, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron,states that “the S-2 is the critical link between BCT priority intelligence requirements and squadron collection,” which is why we embedded the S-2 within the RISE to act as that link. It was located at the REC-P. With no assistant S-2 forward due to manning shortfalls, this left the squadron commander without an experienced intelligence officer collocated with him at the tactical-actions center.

Having the S-2 located within the RISE increased the regiment's ability to assess the enemy situation and provided a direct intel link for the recon squadron staff conducting the military decision-making process during operations at the REC-P. However, this degraded the commander's ability to use a dynamic assessment of the enemy's CoA, combat power and timeline. Our recommendation is to ensure the commander has a capable intelligence officer forward to provide those real-time assessments.

Figure 2. C2 Node 2-Minute Drill Sync (U.S. Army)

The S-6 was also located at the REC-P, along with several upper and lower Tactical Internet (TI) and tactical communications specialists. This was critical to maintaining the systems of the ITN. The Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) was the primary voice communication capability utilized between the REC-P and the forward elements of the squadron and the primary voice communication from the squadron to the regiment. In addition to MUOS, the squadron relied on the Mission Partner Environment and Secure Internet Protocol Router networks for voice and data communications. This was a challenge with disbursed C2 nodes across great distances due to the limited upper TI expertise within the squadron. Ensuring we had the right subject matter experts located at the forward CP to enable communications with the regiment was critical to the mission but limited our flexibility supporting multiple C2 nodes with low-density signal personnel. We accomplished this in limited capacity with air movements via rotary wing, though this was unreliable and likely unrealistic during LSCO.

The challenges with limited expertise on ITN systems and the validation of personnel placement should be mitigated through multiple internal command post exercises and ITN validation exercises prior to unit deployment. An increased number of these exercises would have helped our squadron better position the right key personnel and capabilities ahead of exercise Saber Junction 23. While we were able to transform in contact by adjusting and updating SOPs in stride, we recommend a deep look at the equipment and manning of each CP and exercising the concepts to codify the SOPs as early as possible. It will also be important for the Army to prioritize and invest in our 25-series Soldiers through recruiting and incentivizing to keep pace with the modernization of ITN capabilities.

Endurance over long distance

Two of the greater challenges we faced during the exercise were fighter management and maintaining an accurate common operational picture (COP) between C2 nodes. During Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration we struggled to balance planning efforts with all the requirements of Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration at a CTC because we had limited personnel in the staging area. Therefore, we recommend both nodes should be together for improved synchronization during this stage of operations, with the REC-P positioned at the Intermediate Staging Base. Additionally, once the exercise began there were greater demands on the personnel at the forward CP, so balancing security, command post operations, and rest cycles began to challenge the team mid-way through the exercise. To assist in maintaining endurance, a key tenet of multi-domain operations, we would recommend considering a rotation of key personnel between the C2 nodes, such as the executive officer and the S-3.

We also found how critical it was for both the REC-P and forward CP to remain synchronized during prolonged operations. The issues we faced in maintaining our proposed battle rhythm highlighted the need for continuous adaptation to optimize staff synchronization. What we developed to help improve the C2 nodes maintain accurate COPs while dispersed was a synchronization battle drill as depicted in Figure 2. This enabled each node to simultaneously update their COPs through voice or text communication during a daily COP sync executed multiple times per day, often taking 10 minutes or less.

Way forward

By combining the REC-P concept with the capabilities of the ITN system, not only did we learn to fight distributed to improve survivability on the battlefield, but we also found improved integration with readiness and sustainment planning efforts between the regiment and squadron staffs. While the REC-P and forward CP may not be the ultimate solution, they represent a positive step forward with great promise of improving the ability to conduct staff planning during LSCO, remain flexible and survivable, and maintain C2 over vast distances.

Ongoing tests and adaptations by 4-2 Cavalry aim to address challenges faced during SJ23 and synchronize a staff split between CPs positioned to maximize operational reach. The evolving nature of command post theories in real-world conflicts, such as in Ukraine, underscores the importance of agile and efficient C2 nodes on the modern battlefield.