The Importance of Emotional Intelligence for Special Forces Warrant Officers during Unconventional Warfare Operations

By Dr. Daniel W. Ross, DM, MS, NRP

Article published on: June 1st 2025, in the April-June 2025 Edition of Strength in Knowledge: The Warrant Officer Journal

Read Time: < 20 mins

On June 6, 1962, President John F. Kennedy delivered the commencement address at the United States (U.S.) Military Academy in West Point, New York. Part of his speech highlighted special warfare activities and the growing number and importance of “unconventional” U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) soldiers for conflict in a constantly changing world. He stated, “In many countries, your posture and performance will provide the local population with the only evidence of what our country is really like. In other countries, your military mission, its advice and action, will play a key role in determining whether those people will remain free.” President Kennedy alluded to the importance of having highly trained individuals cultivate relationships abroad to represent U.S. values such as freedom in the face of “another type of warfare, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins, war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins” (Tracy, 2023). To this day, the power to cultivate relationships remains a foundational element of U.S. Army SF operations.

This short article discusses the importance of emotional intelligence (EI) for cultivating relationships during unconventional warfare (UW) operations. The specific population of interest is the entry level (WO1-CW2) U.S. Army Special Forces Warrant Officer (SFWO) serving on a Special Forces Detachment-Alpha (SFOD-A). These leaders play a distinct role in SF UW operations, and their key responsibilities within an SFOD-A hinge on their ability to develop and maintain relationships across multiple domains. The article covers a brief background on the SFWO, provides context to the UW principal task, and discusses relevant points concerning EI. The discussion focuses explicitly on the relationship management, social awareness, self-management, and self-awareness aspects of EI in UW operations. Unconventional warfare often takes place in complex, ambiguous, and challenging environments. The EI aptitude of an SFWO contributes significantly to the critical necessity of developing relationships with a partner force during UW operations. It can be the difference between life and death or mission success and failure.

The Special Forces Warrant Officer

The entry-level Special Forces Warrant Officer (MOS 180A) serves as the assistant detachment commander (ADC) of an SFOD-A. As second in command, the ADC assumes leadership in the detachment commander’s absence or during split-team operations. These SFWOs (WO1-CW2) serve as combat leaders and staff officers within SFOD-A. The ADC role, distinctive to SF, requires the SFWO to be the focal point for synchronizing all detachment staff functions (SFWOI, 2024; USAREC, 2024).

SFWOs advise commanders on all aspects of special operations, specifically UW, and maintain responsibility for integrating emerging technologies. The ADC may also advise, command, direct, or lead indigenous forces up to battalion size. The ADC serves a critical role in leading the SFOD-A through mission planning, fusing operations and intelligence, and facilitating Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) coordination to ensure operational success. They oversee training and resource management while maintaining information flow and team continuity (SFWOI, 2024; USAREC, 2024). By synchronizing these responsibilities, the ADC enhances the SFOD-A’s effectiveness in executing complex missions across the operational continuum. Most importantly, they leverage their UW expertise to ensure an SFOD-A’s success in executing this important core activity and principal task.

Unconventional Warfare

Current U.S. doctrine considers UW a subset of irregular warfare (IW), a concept that also includes counterinsurgency, stability operations, foreign internal defense (FID), and counterterrorism (Kilcullen, 2019). Unconventional warfare is defined as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area” (Theohary, 2024). UW remains one of USSOCOM’s core activities and is the founding principle and primary mission of the U.S. Army SF (Green Berets). Green Berets are specifically selected, trained, organized, and equipped to conduct UW on behalf of the United States government (USG) (Department of the Army, 2014; USASOC, 2016; Tovo et al., 2024).

At its most basic level, UW involves providing support to foreign resistance movements. Practically, SF executes UW missions by advising, assisting, training, and equipping indigenous fighters. This mission enables the U.S. to pursue an indirect approach to tackling adversarial threats abroad without resorting to overt conventional conflict (Tovo et al., 2024). Such a politically sensitive and strategic-level initiative aimed at shifting the balance of power within a foreign country or among sovereign powers requires creative, adaptable, and emotionally intelligent military leaders on the ground (Department of the Army, 2014). Special Forces leaders serve as the primary means of employing this national strategic politicomilitary tool on behalf of the USG (Department of the Army, 2021). Successful employment of special operations forces (SOF) to conduct relationship-based special warfare, such as UW, relies heavily on advisor EI aptitude to influence a resistance movement or indigenous partners in a manner consistent with USG objectives (Ekman et al., 2021).

Emotional Intelligence

An intriguing psychological and leadership concept related to the trait approach to leadership and emotional intelligence (EI) emerged in the last decade of the 20th century (Northouse, 2022). Emotional intelligence can be conceptualized as the ability to understand and manage personal emotions while influencing others’ emotions (Mazilu, 2021). The concept of EI involves the interplay between the affective and cognitive domains, enabling leaders to perceive emotions, use emotions to facilitate thinking, explore reasoning through emotion, and manage both internal and external emotions in their environment (Northouse, 2022). Four additional vital components of EI include relationship management, social awareness, self-management, and self-awareness (Goleman & Boyatzis, 2017; Northouse, 2022).

The leadership ability to perceive and interpret emotions accurately and then respond to emotional situations accordingly should benefit job performance. Evidence exists that social-emotional skills such as EI enhance job performance in military populations that traditionally operate under stressful conditions (Krishnakumar et al., 2019). Since EI represents one of the few traits that can be trained, further evidence exists that EI-based training programs can enhance the success and effectiveness of military advisors, such as SFWOs, tasked with advising, training, and accompanying foreign security forces across the globe (Jeppesen, 2017). Emotionally intelligent skills, such as perceptiveness, regulation, emotional flexibility, and understanding, are crucial for SF leaders, such as SFWOs, to perform optimally in stressful, austere, and high-stakes environments (King, 2017).

EI for UW Operations

Both EI and UW emphasize the ability to influence human behavior, build relationships, and adapt to Page 15 Volume III, Issue 2 complex, uncertain operational environments. Emotional intelligence involves the ability to identify, understand, and regulate personal emotions, as well as to perceive and influence the emotions of others (Mazilu, 2021). Well-developed EI aptitude requires numerous qualities, such as motivation, empathy, and social skills. More specifically, relationship management, social awareness, self-management, and self-awareness contribute significantly to EI capacity (Goleman & Boyatzis, 2017; Northouse, 2022). These qualities contribute to effective leadership, communication, and decision-making in ambiguous and complex environments. Unconventional warfare involves using irregular military forces and asymmetric tactics to achieve strategic objectives by enabling resistance movements or insurgencies against an adversary (Department of the Army, 2014; USASOC, 2016). Employing psychological operations, guerrilla tactics, intelligence operations, and influence campaigns to undermine enemy control during UW requires SF leaders to leverage the power of EI to manipulate and leverage social, political, and military dynamics to achieve broader operational goals. Success begins with the ability to manage relationships.

Relationship Management

Unconventional warfare typically occurs in complex, ambiguous, and austere environments where the ability to build relationships with a partner force can mean life or death for an SFOD-A or the difference between mission success and failure. According to Ekman et al. (2021), UW success often depends on an individual’s or unit’s ability to understand the vulnerabilities of their foreign counterparts at psychological, cultural, and operational levels. Leaders such as SFWOs must influence their host-nation counterparts in ways that align with U.S. military and USG objectives. For example, Nagata (2024) discusses the SF power of relationship management: “This vital form of intangible power originates from the thoughtful, deliberate, and persistent creation of relationships that lead to partnerships, and this intentional effort is irreplaceable for advancing and protecting U.S. national security interests.” Overall, the application of special warfare is often relationship-based, requiring EI and empathy (Ekman et al., 2021). Thus, the relationship management aspect of EI remains crucial to the role of the SFWO and SFOD-A during UW operations.

Social Awareness

Social awareness also plays a distinct role in UW because SF leaders must develop a crucial understanding of a foreign population’s cultural nuances, social dynamics, and grievances to effectively influence or support a social or resistance movement (Votel et al., 2016). Social awareness is the ability to recognize others’ emotions and the dynamics at play within an organization or social environment (Landry, 2019). Part of social awareness involves meeting the UW challenges posed by social movements or social revolutions with appropriate training and education. Social and cultural awareness can be strengthened by focusing on social movement theory, cultural studies, language proficiency, influence operations, negotiation skills, subversion, and political warfare (Votel et al., 2016). As the central hub for information and training management on the SFOD-A, the SFWO must possess the capability to refine the team’s social awareness efforts to enhance EI for UW operations.

Self-Management

As discussed, an SFOD-A is an elite cohesive unit that performs high-risk operations on behalf of the USG (Cooper et al., 2020). Unconventional warfare demands that individuals on an SFOD-A remain vigilant to their operational environment and manage their emotions during high-pressure, stressful situations. From an EI standpoint, self-management involves regulating one’s emotions, particularly in high-stress situations, and maintaining a positive outlook despite daunting challenges. Many times, leaders who fail to develop self-management skills respond impulsively and struggle to control their reactions effectively (Landry, 2019).

Consequently, SF personnel undergo rigorous, multidimensional screening processes and extensive training to assess their qualifications and prepare them mentally and physically to endure elevated stress levels and intense combat experiences that can last for months (Cooper et al., 2020). Selfmanagement skills enable SF leaders, such as the SFWO, to perform effectively across extreme environments, from high-impact, kinetic actions to lower-tempo, advise-and-assist missions (King, 2017). To remain resilient during UW operations, these key leaders must sustain superior physical and cognitive performance to lead and navigate unique mission demands in the face of ever-evolving, challenging conflicts (Farina et al., 2017).

Self-Awareness

One final, and perhaps the most crucial, aspect of EI for SFWOs conducting UW operations involves self-awareness. Self-awareness serves as the foundation of effective leadership. It enables individuals to understand their strengths and weaknesses, recognize their emotions, and assess their impact on both personal and team performance (Landry, 2019). In 2005, the Department of the Army created an all-encompassing definition of the Army Warrant Officer and used the term “self-aware” as the first descriptor (USAWOCC, 2025).

Currently, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession, states, “Leaders require self-awareness if they are to accurately assess their own experience and competence as well as earn the trust of those they influence” (Department of the Army, 2019, p. 1-17; Horval, 2020). Unconventional warfare operations inherently demand significant cross-cultural skills (Delcoure, 2014). Self-awareness is crucial for developing cultural competence (Pappamihiel, 2013). Therefore, the self-awareness aspect of EI significantly contributes to the SFWO’s ability to manage UW operations effectively.

Conclusion

To be successful, SF leaders must build trust and maintain effective relationships with partner forces, local populations, and JIIM stakeholders. During UW operations, SFWOs often need to navigate various cultural differences, manage interpersonal conflicts, and adapt to rapidly changing situations. The EI aptitude of an SFWO serving on an SFOD-A is crucial to these complex, ambiguous, and politically sensitive UW operations. Their ability to manage relationships, navigate social dynamics, and exercise self-awareness and self-management helps to ensure operational effectiveness and ultimately influences mission outcomes. In UW, EI is one of the essential human dynamics that support the notion that “humans are more important than hardware” in the special operations community.

References