The Application of the U.S. Army RM Process is Broken
By Major Courtney A. Zimmerman
Article published on: January 1st 2024, In the Annual Issue of the Protection journal
Read Time: < 9 mins
Leaders address risks that could trigger decision
points for the commander; however, they seldom specifically
address risk to force or risk to mission. Can
organizations assess unit risk to force or risk to mission using
the U.S. Army risk management (RM) model during the
military decision-making process (MDMP)? The answer is
currently no. There may be a single point of organizational
failure that prevents the implementation of RM in the operation,
or there may be a lack of education about the process.
Regardless, the RM process is not working effectively.
This article discusses the doctrinal processes for RM and
describes methods that units could use to incorporate RM
into operations.
The RM Process
Before addressing RM at echelon, let’s define some key
elements and explore how the Army conducts RM. Army
Techniques Publication (ATP) 5-19, Risk Management,1 discusses
conducting risk assessment and management using
the framework depicted in Figure 1.
The first step of the risk assessment/management process
is to identify the hazards—conditions that can potentially
cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to,
or loss of, equipment or property; or mission degradation.2
Next the hazards must be assessed. According to ATP 5-19,
risk is “the probability and severity-driven chance of loss,
caused by the threat or other hazards” and analysis of the
risk yields a risk level.3 Following the assessment, units consider
the mitigating effects of proposed controls and iteratively
reassess the risk until they determine the most effective
controls. They then continuously reassess these controls
to determine the residual level of risk. Commanders implement
the selected controls while supervising and assessing
the effectiveness of each.
Many might claim that this process applies only to garrison
operations—not to combat operations. Although the
requirement for a risk assessment/management process is
clear, implementation becomes blurred at higher echelons.
Such blurring explains why units fail to understand how to
conduct the RM process. The RM capability is an invaluable
tool for commanders and staff, as it provides a standardized
and systematic method to identify hazards and react to
changes within the operational environment.
As the operational environment evolves, RM must be conducted
in order to identify risks by operational phase to help
analyze risks to the mission. But RM is not a stand-alone
process;4 instead, organizations must integrate RM throughout
every warfighting function (WFF). Effective RM during operations depends on its full integration into the MDMP
and overall operations process. The MDMP is an iterative planning methodology used to understand the situation
and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order.5
“During mission analysis, the commander and staff focus on identifying and assessing hazards as they relate to
risk to force (increased probability of the degradation of an organization’s combat power) and risk to mission
(increased probability of failure to achieve a desired end state).”
—ADP 3-37, Protection, 10 January 2024.
Figure 1. Assessment Steps and Management Steps
“Risk management is the process to identify,
assess, and control risks and make decisions that
balance risk cost with mission benefits.”
—Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Campaigns
and Operations, 18 June 2022.
“It is imperative that commanders and units
apply the Army RM process throughout planning
and execution. Commanders make risk-based
decisions, and their entire organization must be
comfortable continuously integrating, applying
and communicating risk management to ensure
appropriate decisions enabling mission success.”
—Major General Christopher G. Beck, personal
e-mail correspondence
Risk Matrix
One recommendation for fixing the RM process is to apply a format to codify risk assessment in the MDMP. A
methodical technique must be employed in order to recognize the hazard during each step of the MDMP. According
to ADP 3-37, Protection, “The MDMP helps leaders apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and
professional knowledge to understand situations, develop options to solve problems, and reach decisions.”6 To be
effective, commanders must hold discussions with their staffs to ensure that they understand all operational
variables and to develop guidance prior to MDMP. The commander’s guidance and intent must address risk analysis
/RM so that the staff understands the commander’s assessment. This understanding will drive success in this
challenging but critical assessment.
Potential risks during mission analysis must be considered in the running estimates for all WFFs. However, the
simple identification of risks in the operational environment is not the only requirement. Leaders must also
explain how each risk affects forces or the mission. From that point forward, that specific WFF is responsible
for each step of the RM process.
The development of a course of action builds upon the risks identified during mission analysis. During this
phase of planning, the staff develops a more detailed plan. Therefore, the staff must assign each identified
risk to a specific operation phase and estimate the probability of occurrence (high, medium, low). Just because
an identified risk has a low probability of occurrence does not mean that the risk should go unidentified. The
staff also begins to formulate ways to reduce each risk. Will intelligence help avoid the risk? Will fires or
movement and maneuver eliminate it? Will protection help mitigate it? Or will some combination of these be
required? Alternatively, the staff could determine that the best approach is to accept the risk. ADP 3-37
defines each of these terms in the following manner:
-
Avoid —forego the activity that would produce unacceptable risk.
-
Eliminate —take action to remove the risk or transfer it to a unit that is
better-postured to manage the threat.
-
Mitigate —implement measures that decrease the probability or consequence of harm.
-
Accept —make an informed decision to act without further mitigating the risk.7
During the course-of-action analysis, the staff should further refine the details of each risk. In this phase of
planning, the staff must show how proposed controls will affect risk and where significant risk will be
incurred. While developing controls, the staff assigns required supporting tasks to units or assets. Residual
risk associated with risk to force and risk to mission will accompany the identified risk.
Figure 2 contains an example of a risk matrix at the division level.
Risk to Force and Risk to Mission
To complete the commander’s risk assessment, the staff should describe risks as risk to force or risk to
mission. The staff should link each hazard to the risk matrix shown in Figure 3. Identifying a hazard as red,
amber, or green on Figure 3 is subjective using qualitative analysis in the risk matrix. The risk or hazard
requires a refined evaluation from the staff subject matter expert. The commander must understand the controls
measured upon the overall affected risk assessment, which does not negate avoided, reduced, or eliminated risks.
Risks may occur in any operational phase. The overall assessments of risk to force and risk to mission should be
qualitatively categorized as low, medium, high, or extremely high.8 The commander must be able to recognize
vulnerabilities, identify and understand the risks, and plan to respond appropriately to protect the force and
mission.
Risks Tied to a Decision Point for the Commander
The RM assessment should impact the commander’s decision point. Regardless of the model used by the staff, the
staff must inform the commander of risks in time, space, and purpose and assist him/her in making decisions.
Commanders may then choose to avoid, eliminate, mitigate, or accept risk. If possible, risk should first be
avoided or eliminated. Then, the remaining risk should be mitigated to the extent possible before the commander
chooses to accept the risk.
The commander’s critical information requirements include information that the commander deems necessary to make
an informed decision. There are two subsets of critical information requirements—friendly forces information
requirements and priority intelligence requirements. Friendly force information requirements include information
that units need to know about themselves, and priority intelligence requirements include information that units
need to know about the adversary or operational environment. Essential elements of friendly information—or
information that the commander wants to hide from the enemy—are also important. RM should drive friendly force
information requirements and associated decision points so that the commander is better informed, mission
accomplishment is enhanced, and the force is preserved. Through reverse intelligence preparation of the
battlefield and during the MDMP, the staff determines the likely enemy actions, locations, and strength. From
there, the staff develops a collection plan, assigning collection in named areas of interest linked to priority
intelligence requirements. Units will be assigned to collect specific assets that are further tied to decision
points in the RM model. If staffs did not articulate risks based on decision points, friendly force information
requirements, priority intelligence requirements, and essential elements of friendly information, then key
aspects of risk to force or risk to mission that commanders should consider may not be highlighted.
WIF |
Operational Phase |
Hazard |
Impact |
Probability |
Avoid |
Eliminate |
Mitigate |
Supporting Task |
Asset Assigned |
Risk to Mission |
Risk to Force |
Sustainment (G4) |
|
Bypassing enemy poses a risk to sustainment units traveling along predictable routes |
Tempo, operational reach |
M |
|
|
X |
Convoy and route security |
MP |
L |
M |
M2 (AVN) |
|
FARP vulnerability |
Operational reach is reduced |
L |
X |
X |
|
Dedicated protection force |
MP |
M |
L |
Fires |
⭐ |
DIVARTY cannot range to FSCL |
Cannot engage HPTL |
M |
X |
|
X |
Coordinate with HPTL priority and PAA established to shape operations |
ABCT fires BN |
H |
H |
Fires |
⭐ |
Enemy IDF mass on 3/4 and 1-3 ABCT defensive positions |
Culmination |
M |
X |
X |
X |
Request Joint fires to increase speed and maximize fire power |
DIVARTY |
H |
H |
G39 |
|
Bothnian propaganda will be aggressive, including false claims against 4ID, and possible
exploitation/amplification of any actual CIVCAS/atrocities/detainee abuse |
Delay in OPTEMPO |
M |
|
|
X |
Disrupt and degrade strategic to operational C4I systems |
PSYOPS |
M |
L |
Protection (MP) |
|
Fratricide |
Degradation of 4ID combat power |
L |
|
|
X |
Establish contact points, IR, and LNOs |
MP |
M |
L |
L - Negligible effects on OPTEMPO
M - May require DIV to execute a branch plan
H - May prevent DIV from completing DO
Avoid - M2/Intelligence
Eliminate - M2/Fires/Nonlethal
Mitigate - Protection/PPL
Legend
4ID—4th Infantry Division
ABCT—armored brigade combat team
AVN—aviation
BN—battalion
C4I—command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CIVCAS—civilian casualties
DIV—division
DIVARTY—division artillery
DO—decisive operations
FARP—forward area refueling point
FSCL—fire support coordination line
G4—general staff level office for logistics
G39—information warfare staff section
HPTL—high-payoff target list
IDF—indirect fire
IR—infrared
LNO—liaison officer
M2—movement and maneuver
MP—military police
OPTEMPO—operational tempo
PAA—position area for artillery
PPL—priority protection list
PSYOPS—psychological operations
WFF—warfighting function
Figure 2. Example of a division level risk matrix
Ownership of RM
Throughout the operations process, commanders and staffs use RM to identify, prevent, and mitigate risks
associated with the WFF and the effects of threats and hazards with the potential to cause friendly and civilian
casualties, damage or destroy equipment, or otherwise impact mission effectiveness. RM is not the responsibility
of just one person; everyone plays a part. Commanders must acknowledge this and empower executive officers and
chiefs of staff to protect the force and enable mission success.
The executive officer or chief of staff must first assign the responsibility of managing the risk matrix to a
WFF. According to ADP 3-37, the protection cell RM responsibilities include—
- Identify and assess hazards and propose controls for each course of action during planning
and preparation for operations.
- Understand, visualize, and identify protection priorities.
- Develop goals, objectives, and priorities for the command force protection policy.
- Develop protection measures of performance and measures of effectiveness related to RM.
- Integrate and synchronize protection tasks and systems to increase the probability of
mission success.
- Monitor the conduct of operations during execution, looking for variances from the
protection plan or scheme of protection, and advise the commander when protection activities are not being
conducted.
- Incorporate mitigation measures to reduce operational risk to the mission.
- Assess unit RM and force protection performance during operations and provide recommended
changes for force protection guidance and controls.
- Capture lessons learned from RM.9
RM is also integrated with the planning and execution of operations. In some organizations, an Army civilian
safety officer integrates RM into operations. That safety officer must provide technical expertise to the
commander and staff. Finally, it is imperative that the assigned staff officer present an updated risk matrix to
the executive officer or chief of staff.
WIF |
Operational Phase |
Hazard |
Impact |
Probability |
Avoid |
Eliminate |
Mitigate |
Supporting Task |
Asset Assigned |
Risk to Mission |
Risk to Force |
Protection(MP) |
2a |
Execute hostile gap (river) crossing |
Operational rach/Basing readuced |
M |
|
X |
X |
Intergated preplanned fires, ISR,FW/RW cover |
MP |
H |
M |
C2 |
2a⭐ |
Desturction pf key C2 nodes (EW and cyber) |
Server Communications |
H |
X |
|
X |
OSEC strictly enforced; robust team to thwart AH/SAPA hackers; release phony plans |
G6 |
H |
L |
Protection(MP) |
2a |
Destruction of bridges and dams |
Operational reach/Basing reduced |
M |
|
X |
X |
Secure critcal infastructure (bridges) by MP static positions |
MP |
M |
L |
L - Negligible effects on OPTEMPO
M - May require DIV to execute a branch plan
H - May prevent DIV from completing DO
Avoid - M2/Intelligence
Eliminate - M2/Fires/Nonlethal
Mitigate - Protection/PPL
STEPs:
- Each WFF identifies risk (hazard) and impact during MDMP (MA)
- During MDMP (COA DEV), Risk will be identified by operational phase with the probability.
- WFF formulate how the hazard will be reduced or avoided, eleminated or mitigrated- or any Combination of
the three
- During MDMP conduct COA analysis in phases and issue suporting tasks associated with hazards, and risk
to mission and/or force.
Risk Matrix:
- Constant refinement
- Helps CDR see risk in time, space, and purpose
- Provides XO the science to the art of adjudication
- Risk in terms of risk to mission and risk to force
Key Risks to brief CDR during BUB/CUB:
- ⭐= Risk with a DP linked to it
- HDPs are associated to NAIs answering PIRs
- Risk the unit cannot directly influence
- Risk that can cause culmination
- Risk with political consequences
Legend
AH/SAPA—South Atropian People’s Army
BUB—battle update brief
C2—command and control
CDR—commander
COA—course of action
CUB—commander’s update brief
DEV—developement
DIV—division
DO—decisive operations
DP—decision points
EW—electronic warfare
FW—fixed wing
G6—general staff level office for signal and communication
ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
MA—mission analysis
M2—movement and maneuver
MP—military police
MDMP—military decision-making process
NAIS—named area of interest
OPSEC—operations security
PIR—priority intelligence requirements
PPL—priority protection list
RW—rotary wing
WFF—warfighting function
XO—executive officer
Figure 3. Assessment Steps and Management Steps
Conclusion
While WFFs own the risks or hazards, it is imperative that a leader within the organization to own RM. The identification of risks in time, space, and purpose will help the commander describe an operation and direct how to conduct it. The tools and knowledge necessary to inform the commander of risks and the actions required to mitigate them are in place. But our ability to apply RM in the U.S. Army is broken. By understanding the doctrinal RM process and incorporating RM into operations, unit leaders can fix this capability gap and change the culture within their organizations. Figure 3 can serve as a tool to assist with this process.
Author
Major Zimmerman is the chief of the Department of Instruction; Directorate of Training and Leader Development; U.S. Army Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear School; Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. She holds a bachelor’s degree in edu-cation from Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, and a master’s degree in environmental management from Webster University.
Endnotes
1
ATP 5-19, Risk Management, 9 November 2021.
2
JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters, 9 June 2022
3
ATP 5-19, Risk Management, 9 November 2021.
4
Ibid.
5
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, The Operations Pro-cess, 31 July 2019.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.