Institutional Options for Teaching and Training R&S

By CPT Francis Ambrogio

July 13, 2026 | Infantry, Summer 2026 Edition

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“Big R&S” vs “little r&s”

To some degree, every Soldier executes some kind of reconnaissance and security (R&S). No matter the military occupational specialty (MOS) or branch, every Soldier must, at some point, lay in the prone and pull security or conduct a leader’s recon to identify a suitable site for an objective rally point or a new command post.

This activity is not the same, however, as what is informally referred to as “Big R” reconnaissance and “Big S” security. Whereas “little r” reconnaissance is focused on enabling one’s own element and understanding its immediate area and situation, “Big R” reconnaissance is a process of answering commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) to provide situational understanding to the higher-level commander and headquarters in order to enable decision-making and shape the fight. Similarly, while “little s” security is about local survivability and tactical preparedness, “Big S” security is a matter of providing reaction time and maneuver space for larger and adjacent formations in order to protect the main body, and similarly, to enable decision-making. Fundamentally, both “Big R” and “Big S” drive operations by enabling timely decision-making to achieve positions of relative advantage.1This allows the higher-level unit to get inside the enemy’s observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop and engage him at an optimal point in time and space.” “Big R&S” is, at its core, an integrated information collection effort that enables situational understanding and drives operations.

The Army Structure (ARSTRUC) has changed in recent years, and in doing so, put the responsibility for “Big R&S” on different organizations than it historically has. However, the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security remain the same, and the Army can leverage the institutional education systems already established for training these skills in reconnaissance and security leaders, namely the Cavalry Leader’s Course (CLC), the Scout Leader Course (SLC), and the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course (RSLC).

From Squadrons to MFRCs

Traditionally, “Big R&S” was the responsibility of cavalry formations. While force structure has evolved over the decades, cavalry formations could be found at echelon as armored cavalry regiments supporting corps, division cavalry squadrons supporting divisions, and cavalry squadrons supporting brigade combat teams. The Army’s force structure recognized the fact that for large formations to win, they had to be able to see the enemy first, gain and maintain contact, retain freedom of maneuver, achieve positions of relative advantage, and then engage on the most advantageous terms possible. Cavalry units were a critical part of units’ reconnaissance and security efforts as one piece of a larger, integrated information collection (IC) plan.

The latest ARSTRUC reduced the number of cavalry formations in the Army. The 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Regiments are Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs) that retain the cavalry name as a nod to tradition; division cavalry no longer exists; and, most recently, only armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) retain cavalry squadrons. Corps and divisions do not have ground reconnaissance formations supporting them, and mobile brigade combat teams (MBCTs) and SBCTs only possess multi-purpose reconnaissance companies, with one at the brigade level and one in each infantry battalion. In MBCTs, these are standardized as multi-functional reconnaissance companies (MFRCs); however, they are not yet fully formed or standardized in SBCTs, so we will use MFRC here as a stand-in for this evolving type of formation that is currently comprised of a mélange of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), mortars, and infantry scouts.

MFRCs are novel formations that boast some of the most cutting-edge tools on the battlefield, and the Army may even develop larger formations along similar lines. Although they are not traditional cavalry reconnaissance formations, they are a new and critical component of units’ integrated “Big R&S” efforts, which are still essential for operations at scale, since commanders and staffs will always need situational understanding of the battlefield.

Reconnaissance: “A State of Mind”

MFRCs are infantry organizations. They fall under infantry-centric MBCTs and SBCTs and are led and manned mainly by 11-series personnel. They also possess 15-series Soldiers, who bring technical expertise as drone operators. While all of these personnel possess significant knowledge and experience, they generally do not have backgrounds in “Big R&S.” Focus on that particular mission set has always been the domain of 19Ds (cavalry scouts) and 19As (Armor officers), who do not and will not man MFRCs.

The Infantry and the Cavalry are different — otherwise the Army would not have different MOSs and training courses, not to mention different traditions and cultures. Yet there is significant overlap between their equipment, manning, and sometimes, mission sets. As one example of this, before the dissolution of motorized cavalry troops and mounted infantry weapons companies, these organizations were nearly identical on paper, fielding essentially the same vehicles and weapons (and associated optics) as well as a roughly equivalent numbers of Soldiers. The main difference was in the units’ mission-essential task lists (METLs) and the training and experiential backgrounds of their personnel.

The Infantry and the Cavalry are different — otherwise the Army would not have different MOSs and training courses, not to mention different traditions and cultures. Yet there is significant overlap between their equipment, manning, and sometimes, mission sets.

In my current role at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), I once coached a mounted weapons company that had been assigned a reconnaissance role. During our mid-exercise after action review, my team and I highlighted a saying I had heard from a former squadron commander: “Cav is not a branch; it’s a state of mind.”

To expand on that, we discussed how while all Soldiers always shoot, move, and communicate, as Infantrymen they were trained to highlight “shoot” and “move,” but in their assigned reconnaissance role, they needed to shift their approach to highlighting “move” and “communicate.” The company had the people and the tools it needed; what it had to adjust was its “state of mind,” since its role was to collect information and answer CCIRs — that is, shape the fight and enable their higher headquarters and sister units — rather than to close with and destroy the enemy.

There was no fundamental reason that this infantry formation or any other could not conduct “Big R&S” operations, given their equipment, manning, and capabilities. What hindered them from being as effective as they could have been, however, was the training and experience that would have helped them to approach the problem set with a “Big R&S” mindset.

Existing Institutional Options for Training R&S

The Army distinguishes between the roles of the Infantry (who close with and destroy the enemy) and the Cavalry (who serve as the eyes and ears of the force). Infantrymen and Cavalrymen go through separate One Station Unit Training (OSUT), generally serve in different units, and exist in organizations with their own distinct and venerable cultures. As technology and battlefield dynamics continue to evolve, the maneuver Soldier of tomorrow may look like some kind of hybrid of the two, but as things stand, the Army is saddling certain infantry units and Infantrymen with the Cavalry’s traditional role.

Changing Infantry OSUT or Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course (IBOLC) to include reconnaissance and security as core competencies is neither feasible nor necessary, given the existing high demands of these training courses and the fact that the majority of Infantrymen will serve in standard infantry formations. Our Infantrymen must be the best at being the Infantry, and the Army’s current training progression for 11-series personnel reflects that. The “main thing” must remain the main thing.

Those assigned to MFRCs and leaders who will serve on their higher staffs, however, need training to prepare them to conduct “Big R&S” operations. The Army has courses designed exactly for this purpose — CLC and SLC (formerly the Army Reconnaissance Course [ARC]), based in the U.S. Army Armor School’s 316th Cavalry Brigade, and RSLC, run by the U.S. Army Infantry School’s Airborne and Ranger Training Brigade.

All three courses train leaders in “Big R&S” and do so in a unique and challenging manner. CLC is a classroom course for company and battalion-level leaders that focuses on the military decision-making process (MDMP), integrating company and battalion R&S efforts into the brigade IC plan, and troop leading procedures (TLPs) for reconnaissance, using intensive MDMP repetitions and tactical decision exercises (TDEs) to develop expertise. Students receive the C6 additional skills identifier (ASI) upon graduation. SLC is a combined classroom and field course geared for platoon and section-level leaders. It has a heavy focus on R&S doctrine, and it trains advanced R&S skills, advanced land navigation, TLPs for reconnaissance, and operations orders (OPORDs). Graduates are awarded the R7 ASI upon completion. RSLC focuses on mastering the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security in the context of dismounted operations, and it drills down into specific TTPs for reconnaissance, including advanced land navigation, multiple communications methods, and advanced reporting based on specific CCIRs. Like the other courses, it also awards an ASI (6B). These courses are designed to take individuals already trained in standard maneuver and to build on that to form them into reconnaissance and security leaders.

These courses function on the Experiential Learning Model (ELM) and were developed using the Outcome-Based Training and Education (OBTE) methodology, which was further developed into a methodology called Adaptive Soldier and Leader Training and Education (ASLT-E).2Students are expected to study in advance of their classroom lessons and practical exercises, and the learning occurs by doing, whether on the sand table, in the field, in a repetition of MDMP, or in a TDE. The courses are designed for students to learn via discovery and experience. As an example of this, CLC instructors serve more as facilitators than as instructors, and they are notorious for answering questions with, “What does doctrine say?” and engaging students on the meaning of the doctrine before coaching them to potential solutions.

This educational approach differs significantly from the Army’s normal “task-conditions-standard” model in which a specific task, taught to be executed in a specific manner, is executed under a specific set of conditions. This method is input-based — it teaches “the what.” These courses’ learning model, on the other hand, takes a radically different approach. They demand self-study, force experiential learning, and push students to figure out their ways to successful outcomes and solutions that are in accordance with doctrinal principles, rather than a prescribed answer. Instead of requiring an identical “what” answer from each student, they guide students to develop workable answers that are true to the “why.”3

The frustrating “What does doctrine say?” response from the instructors and the coaching to discovery learning that comes with it force students to develop critical thinking skills and the ability to translate doctrinal principles into concrete plans and actions to answer CCIRs and achieve the commander’s intent in a dynamic, ambiguous operational environment. While this approach is more open-ended and seemingly less straightforward than a standard curriculum and teaching methodology, it is highly structured, expertly taught, and firmly grounded in doctrine and fundamentals.4

RSLC stands out from the other two courses in its specific focus on building expertise in dismounted operations in highly restrictive terrain. Students must demonstrate knowledge of the required tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for the reconnaissance fight while in austere conditions. For some time, RSLC focused more on the TTPs for mastery of “little r&s” to the exclusion of “Big R&S.” While it still trains practical TTPs and expects students to execute them to standard, it has recently revamped its plan of instruction (POI) to return to its roots of training the “unbounded” problem set and mindset necessary for conducting “Big R&S” operations. These updates to RSLC’s POI and return to its roots make it a critical component of preparing reconnaissance units to win the “Big R&S” fight at echelon.

Embracing Ambiguity and Conquering the Unknown

All three courses fervently emphasize operating in ambiguity, which is crucial during “Big R&S” operations. The nature of the job is that much, if not most, information is unknown. Information preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) must be as imaginative as it is thorough, and — particularly in CLC, with is emphasis on MDMP — students are held to an exacting standard when analyzing the operational environment and assessing potential enemy courses of action. Mission analysis and IPOE that think through terrain, infrastructure, and society in detail and that comprehensively understand the relative effects of all warfighting functions in time and space are absolute necessities, both to prepare for operating in the unknown and for determining where named areas of interest actually need to be. Units and staffs need this depth and quality of analysis to optimize their efforts, react to changing circumstances in accordance with the commander’s intent, and collect the critical information that paints the picture commanders need for timely and effective decision-making.

Doctrinally, cavalry squadrons deploy when brigade staffs publish warning order (WARNORD) 2. MFRCs, while currently lacking any such codified standard, must plan and execute operations similarly with respect to their parent battalion and brigade staffs’ planning timelines. The CCIRs that reconnaissance formations answer clarify the operational environment in which their parent organization and sister units are planning to and will fight. By nature of this operational timeline, reconnaissance leaders must be able to make sound analysis based on minimal information, confidently operate in a sea of ambiguity, and be agile enough to achieve the commander’s intent and answer CCIRs in an environment with high degrees of variability. This is, on a basic level, quite distinct from standard maneuver operations.

Standard maneuver operations tend to be closed-loop problems sets — a unit actions on a discrete objective, generally slices said objective into sectors, synchronizes in detail according to a directed timeline, and then consolidates gains once complete. This is not to say that maneuver missions are without any uncertainty or unpredictability — but generally, they are planned and executed based on “knowns.”

On the other hand, “Big R&S” operations tend to be unbounded problem sets. That is, the “knowns” of a maneuver operation began as “unknowns,” or CCIRs, that were answered by a reconnaissance element. While there certainly are specific questions to be answered, operational timelines to follow, and synchronizations to be orchestrated, the lesser amount of information and potential for significant changes make these operations fundamentally open-ended in a way that standard maneuver operations are not.

The open-ended nature of information collection and the multiple possibilities that may arise from the various answers to CCIRs, as well as the need to plan and execute with minimal information, make these operations categorically different. Leaders must, at times, plan and fight off of little more than commander’s intent and commander’s reconnaissance or security guidance. Rather than destruction of the enemy or seizure of a piece of key terrain, their goals can be more variable, such as confirming or denying information about terrain, infrastructure, a threat, or society. The prescribed reconnaissance tempo — whether stealthy or forceful, rapid or deliberate — changes not the literal speed of the operation, but the scope of information to be collected and the acceptable signature while doing so. Operations are driven by “latest time information of value” (LTIOV) — that is, how the reconnaissance formation’s information collection is driving the commander’s decisions and the rest of the organization’s actions in time and space. Additionally, R&S operations have unique considerations for the planning of fires, logistics, and casualty evacuation, which all three courses address at their respective echelons of focus. Leaders’ and units’ approach to “Big R&S” must be different from how they would approach a standard mission, and teaching the mindset that facilitates this is precisely what distinguishes CLC, SLC, and RSLC from other training courses.

The Cavalry Leader’s Course, Scout Leader Course, and Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course are excellent institutional options with which to achieve this outcome. These courses teach not only the doctrine and best practices for reconnaissance and security operations but force students to develop the agile mindset and critical-thinking skills that these missions demand. Leaders should see the three of them as complementary tools for training, educating, and preparing their organizations at echelon. Each course has a different emphasis, all of which are necessary to a reconnaissance organization. CLC — with its focus on MDMP, the reconnaissance unit’s integration into higher echelons’ IC efforts, and use of TDEs — is a course that every company commander and staff primary should attend. SLC, with its mix of heavy doctrinal learning, challenging land navigation, and open-ended field problems, is ideal for platoon leaders and section leaders. RSLC is a crucible that develops mastery of fundamentals applied in challenging dismounted scenarios, making it a highly beneficial course for any reconnaissance Soldier, especially the junior leaders who will be leading teams of scouts and drone operators. Finally, RSLC may also be a great opportunity for the 15-series Soldiers who bring technical knowledge to MFRCs but who do not possess the same background in patrolling and dismounted operations as their 11-series comrades — in a reconnaissance unit, every Soldier is a scout.

Conclusion

As the tools with which we fight evolve, so must the way we fight and the way we structure our force. Reconnaissance formations are one example where such a structural evolution has already occurred. MFRCs and any similar units that may be developed in the future present a tremendous opportunity to conduct reconnaissance and security with cutting-edge tools and to continue to develop those tools and associated TTPs. Although MFRCs are novel formations, the effects they provide — and the Army’s need for experts in reconnaissance and security — remain unchanged.

Successful completion of these courses — appropriate to position and echelon — should be the expectation for leaders involved in the reconnaissance and security fight, whether in an MFRC or in key positions on battalion or brigade staffs. Reconnaissance and security leaders require knowledge, both doctrinal and practical, as well as a particular mindset that thrives when tackling ambiguous, open-ended problem sets and acts decisively to meet the commander’s intent and illuminate the battlefield when faced with friction and the fog of war. CLC, SLC, and RSLC exist to develop these competencies and attributes in the Army’s R&S leaders.

Failure to train leaders in “Big R&S” will limit MFRCs to being “islands of misfit toys” — organizations of dedicated Soldiers with highly capable tools, but whose great potential goes under-utilized. They will certainly support local actions and shorten kill chains in the close fight, but without a “Big R&S” approach, they will not effectively contribute to integrated information collection efforts that enable timely decision-making and facilitate victory in large-scale combat operations.

Notes