Shaping the Deep Fight

MFRC Lessons Learned at Saber Junction 25

By CPT Aviel Lee, CPT Andrew Carter, 1SG Ryan Anderson, 1LT Jonathan Hyun

July 1, 2026 | Infantry, Summer 2026 Edition

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Figure 1 — ROC-T Task Organization
The initial ROC-T task organization included three scout platoons, an operations section, and headquarters section.

Since its inception in 1775, the U.S. Cavalry has served as the foundation of the U.S. Army’s reconnaissance and security mission. In 2024, Headquarters, Department of the Army made the decision to restructure brigade combat teams (BCTs), which resulted in the inactivation of cavalry squadrons within mobile and Stryker BCTs. This spurred brigades to develop innovative solutions to the problem set traditionally tackled by their cavalry squadrons — conducting reconnaissance and security operations, enabling timely decision-making by the commander, and placing the higher command in a position of relative advantage. The multi-functional reconnaissance company (MFRC) emerged as the most widely adopted solution. These brigade-specific, purpose-built companies combine human sensors with a blend of new technologies while still adhering to the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security to fill the ground reconnaissance gap.

In April 2025, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment stood up the Regimental Observer Collection Troop (ROC-T) as its deep-area MFRC. Designed to operate forward of the main body to conduct reconnaissance and support targeting, the ROC-T embedded teams of traditional scouts with electronic warfare specialists, forward observers, and unmanned aerial systems. This combined-arms approach to reconnaissance aims to push sensors forward and support decentralized mission command by giving the leaders on the ground ready access to a wide array of sensing and strike capabilities. The ROC-T concept was validated at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center’s Saber Junction 25 exercise as a viable model for future long-range reconnaissance and targeting MFRCs, but its execution exposed fundamental challenges in planning, synchronization, and sustainment that are essential to successful employment.

Planning: Reconnaissance Must Shape the Fight

Reconnaissance is not an inconsequential ancillary task. It is the mechanism by which the commander achieves decision advantage. The disciplined, early production and diligent updating of the collection plan turn collection into anticipation.1Planning reconnaissance operations has historically been the purview of cavalry squadron staff (primarily 19A officers and 19D NCOs) who, through career progression and formal courses — such as the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leader Course, Scout Leader Course, and Cavalry Leader Course — develop the expertise required to plan for and execute these complex operations. The experience of planning without a cavalry squadron staff at Saber Junction 25 made it apparent that such institutional knowledge is critically lacking at battalion and brigade levels. The result was a maneuver plan that drove the information collection effort instead of being shaped by it. A well-designed information collection plan allows the commander and staff to anticipate risk, effectively match friendly assets to enemy capabilities, and refine the triggers for critical decision points. If a staff produces a tactical plan that drives the collection plan instead of being shaped by it, the result is a rigid maneuver plan vulnerable to desynchronization and deception, which can lead to missed opportunities and increased risk on the battlefield.

ROC-T identified six doctrinal products that staff must provide to the MFRC in a timely manner to enable successful multidomain reconnaissance and targeting operations:

• Commander’s reconnaissance guidance (CRG)2

• Event template3

• Information collection matrix (ICM)4

• Decision support matrix (DSM)5

• Targeting synchronization matrix6

• Electromagnetic order of battle7

The CRG is broken into four elements: focus, tempo, engagement criteria, and disengagement criteria. These set the parameters for the reconnaissance operation and define the threshold for risk that the commander is willing to accept. The CRG informs the reconnaissance element on how they must plan the execution of their operation. In the absence of all other fighting products, a reconnaissance element can fight off the CRG alone.

Electromagnetic sensing is one of the most powerful tools in the MFRC kit. It provides the capability to passively detect and locate electromagnetic signals of interest while remaining virtually undetectable.

The event template maps likely enemy actions and timelines to provide the basis for planning collection strategies, synchronizing intelligence with friendly operations and developing the DSM and ICM.8The ICM is the product that translates priority intelligence requirements into discrete collection tasks and assigns the appropriate asset to each; it is in essence the directive tasking order for the reconnaissance unit. An effective ICM arrays the ground reconnaissance elements and collection assets significantly forward of maneuver battalions in time and space so the information collected can be integrated into the planning process before the commander allocates his forces. The DSM is what truly ties the maneuver plan to the information collection plan. The DSM ties decision points to named or targeted areas of interest, commander’s critical information requirements, collection assets, and potential friendly response options.9The DSM codifies a commander’s anticipated decision points in binary manner to facilitate rapid operational shifts without requiring input from the commander or staff primaries amid combat operations. An information collection effort that has been focused by the event template, prioritized against the DSM, and synchronized by the ICM allows commanders to see earlier, decide faster, and execute with confidence.

Electromagnetic sensing is one of the most powerful tools in the MFRC kit. It provides the capability to passively detect and locate electromagnetic signals of interest while remaining virtually undetectable. Embedding scout teams with electronic warfare specialists allows these sensors to be brought further forward, where they can sense the greatest density of electromagnetic signatures with the least amount of friendly interference. The electromagnetic order of battle is a product that provides information on key emitters to deconflict enemy frequencies from friendly and civilian ones. Arming the MFRC with this product allows the electronic warfare specialist to interpret what their system is detecting to provide better situational awareness and enable rapid decision-making.

Figure 2 — Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess Methodology and Assets (Field Manual 3-60, Figure 2-3)

Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities.10 Targeting is an iterative process that begins in the planning phase and integrates both ground forces and long-range shaping or enabling assets. A higher headquarters will employ its reconnaissance unit to inform and refine its targeting process. The staff can then synthesize the base information collection products with new information being reported from the reconnaissance effort to produce the target synchronization matrix. This product provides a common operating picture to synchronize the entire fires enterprise and gives the reconnaissance unit two critical products: the target list worksheet (TLWS) and the high-payoff target list (HPTL). The TLWS aligns delivery systems to specific targets. The HPTL prioritizes enemy systems, nodes, and formations whose defeat will most directly enable the success of an operation. Together, these products nest the ground reconnaissance effort with higher-echelon priorities to expedite the targeting kill-chain by informing the engagement criteria for precision systems.

Figure 3 — Proposed Future MFRC Force Design
This design would preserve small, specialty integrated scout teams and an operations section while adding nonstandard vehicles, a signal section, and a weapons squad in each platoon.

Commanders and staff at all echelons must embrace reconnaissance and security doctrine and formal training to effectively employ their ground reconnaissance units. Reconnaissance by its very nature carries a high degree of risk and uncertainty that requires deliberate planning to mitigate. By equipping the reconnaissance unit with the right tools, it empowers them to exercise the autonomy necessary to develop the picture in an otherwise opaque operating environment. Early production of the CRG, the ICM, and the DSM will translate the commander’s intent into a synchronized collection effort that directly supports operational planning and decision-making. Equipping MFRCs with an electromagnetic sensing capability and providing them with an electromagnetic order of battle is essential for supporting collection in a multidomain environment. Finally, providing them with the target synchronization matrix turns collection into kinetic action by reducing the sensor-to-shooter process to shape the fight earlier. Together these six products will equip MFRCs with the direction needed to inform adaptive maneuver planning and provide commanders at every echelon with the decision advantage needed to fight and win in complex environments.

Synchronization: Operations Management and Command Relationships

The ROC-T force design includes an operations section to enable parallel planning with higher headquarters, streamline information flow, reduce delays in the sensor-to-shooter process, and enhance command and control. The section includes an operations officer, operations NCO, collection manager, and electromagnetic warfare officer. Although the operations section was not fully manned for Saber Junction 25, the ROC-T’s experience as an MFRC reporting directly to the brigade further reinforced the need for one. During initial planning and preparations, demands on the ROC-T commander were significant. In addition to executing internal troop leading procedures, the commander was frequently pulled away from the troop by the higher headquarters to plan, advise, rehearse, and attend numerous battle rhythm events that could consume 8-12 hours per day. This workload highlighted the necessity of an operations officer and staff to absorb responsibilities typically distributed across a battalion command team and staff.

During execution, the integration of ROC-T into information collection and maneuver plans became unsynchronized without a persistent liaison colocated with higher headquarters. This resulted in frequent last-minute taskings driven by changes to the maneuver plan rather than a synchronized collection effort. The problem was exacerbated further by ill-defined command relationships between ROC-T and specific warfighting functions. Guidance issued from the movement and maneuver, fires, and intelligence enterprises was often conflicting or exceeded the troop’s ability to support.

The conclusion drawn from this experience is that the demands of parallel planning and maintaining continuous synchronization with the higher headquarters of a client force across multiple warfighting functions while also managing company-level operations cannot be sustained by the commander, first sergeant, and executive officer alone. MFRCs should adopt a dual-leadership model, supported by a dedicated operations section, to enable the parallel planning and synchronization necessary to execute decentralized operations in complex environments.

Sustainment: Mobility, Coordination, and Extrication from Decisive Engagement

MFRCs cannot replace the cavalry squadrons’ core security mission; the ROC-T’s design favors low-signature reconnaissance over firepower. Similar ground reconnaissance units require a mobility platform that supports movement through restricted and severely restricted terrain, improves survivability via speed and low signature, protects against adverse weather conditions, and can outpace a client force. Additionally, the MFRC’s long-range, extended duration mission requirements necessitate a mobility platform that includes organic power generation systems while preserving stealth and endurance. Given these requirements, non-standard vehicle options that preserve mobility and low-signature advantages while improving survivability and sustainment should be pursued for MFRCs regardless of their BCT type.

Coordinating between MFRCs operating in a noncontiguous battlespace and adjacent units can be challenging, depending on operational limitations and the complexity of the tactical situation. At Saber Junction 25, ROC-T was often required to coordinate with adjacent units for casualty evacuation. Synchronizing fires and movement to the casualty site proved to be significantly time-consuming and often exceeded acceptable timelines for real-world conditions. Rapid and reliable coordination was eventually achieved after platoon command posts were colocated with the command posts of adjacent units, enabling immediate communication and faster coordination for support. The experience underscored the importance of strategically positioning key leaders to leverage support relationships and highlighted the need for medics assigned to MFRCs to be certified to provide prolonged field care.

Direct-fire engagements at Saber Junction 25 forced the ROC-T to re-task organize its three identical scout platoons in favor of including a dedicated security/extraction capability to recover casualties or teams caught in decisive contact. The immediate standard operating procedure that emerged kept one platoon in reserve as a quick reaction and local security force at the troop command post. This approach proved limiting when scout teams were dispersed beyond the forward lines and exposed the quick reaction force to protracted compromise. The proposed solution going forward is to designate one squad per platoon as a weapons squad (equipped with two M240 teams, one AT4 team, and one sniper team) to act as a forward, platoon-level strike element. This model of having two scout squads — each embedded with scouts, electronic warfare specialists, and forward observers — and one weapons squad in each platoon preserves the MFRC’s decentralized reconnaissance mission while giving platoons an immediate, organic capability to provide security and extricate engaged teams.

Conclusion

ROC-T’s performance at Saber Junction 25 validated the potential of MFRC formations to conduct deep area reconnaissance and enable long-range targeting. Success depends on deliberate planning, continuous synchronization, and sustainable employment practices. Higher headquarters, which are now responsible for planning reconnaissance and security operations, should prioritize timely production of the tools necessary to support the MFRC information collection and targeting effort. While its final form is still being developed, the fundamentals of the MFRC’s core reconnaissance mission remain the same. MFRCs face the challenge of evolving with new technology and experimenting with innovative solutions without losing sight of the institutional knowledge built on decades of experience. MFRCs must continue to share lessons learned to improve their design and refine their mission-essential tasks if they are to be the commander’s eyes and ears on an increasingly complex battlefield.

Notes