Dynamic Front 22

Artillery Systems Cooperation Activities (ASCA)

By MAJ Karl B. Kunkleman

August 1, 2024 | Field Artillery, 2024 Issue #2

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NATO soldiers discuss coordinates during a multinational live-fire training as part of Exercise Dynamic Front 22 (DF22), Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, July 17, 2022. (Photo by SPC Dominique Crittenden, 5th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

[NOTE: The purpose of this article is to improve multinational fires interoperability utilizing ASCA protocols and provide responsive fires across the European Theater.]

Background. Dynamic Front is the European Theater’s premiere integrated fires exercise involving North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies and partner nations. This U.S.-led exercise focuses on fires interoperability, fires planning and command and control (C2) at distance. Dynamic Front exercises NATO fires integration at the battalion (BN) and above level, exercising the digital kill-chain across the fires enterprise. Additionally, units train interoperability across the human, procedural and technical domains while simultaneously exercising the mission command capabilities of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) (HICOM).

Dynamic Front 22’s exercise design validated the ARRC’s ability to conduct dynamic target allocation and fire mission processing through subordinate firing elements; provided a proof of concept to deploy a Multinational Field Artillery Brigade (MN FAB); and trained Artillery Systems Cooperation Agreement (ASCA) protocols. The exercise comprised of over 2,800 personnel from nineteen countries, including six ASCA members. Dynamic Front 22 successfully refined best practices for integrating multinational personnel into the staff and to control and execute fires through the European multinational fires enterprise.

Recommendations

• ASCA is a multinational interoperability software program interface designed to allow multinational fire control systems to share data utilizing the same upper tactical internet (TI) network and defined as the Mission Partner Environment for Dynamic Front exercises. The Mission Partner Environment is a NATO SECRET RELEASABLE upper TI network. ASCA requires appropriate system classification aligned with the network classification requirements across multinational formations and allows for using national federated mission networks. Authorization is required for all nations/units to operate on the federated mission network (FMN) or have an approved cross-domain solution to federate onto the network. Key to network federation is physical network validation at the final planning conference (FPC) and a published Join, Maintain and Exit Instructions (JMEI).
• Visualization of mission flow can be challenging when executing ASCA messaging. Referencing ASCA 007 (Commanders Operating Guidance)¹ is essential in developing the task organization and guidance’s that allow for seamless fire control system integration. All commanders’ fire direction personnel and staff require access to ASCA 007 and National Interface Operating Procedures (NIOPs) to build a shared understanding of capabilities across national fire control systems. Additionally, units should develop analog flow chart diagrams that depict the system platforms, mission flow and communication network used to distribute data to identify potential frictions in fire mission processing before execution. Identifying friction points and locations where swivel chairs are unavoidable facilitates the safe and expedient data flow between nations.
• A best practice is to require all nations’ fire control systems physically connect to the NATO releasable network during the FPC and conduct ASCA 040 testing. ASCA 040 testing consists of nine messaging tests incorporating the entire fire architecture to validate ASCA messaging. To accomplish this task, join, maintain and exit instructions, the network manager must publish JMEI before the FPC. All participating nations must meet the classification and system federation requirements to join or be hosted on the network.
• Extend ASCA University to a six-day model that encompasses training (U.S. only), testing and validation of the database and data distribution, culminating in a digital fire support validation exercise executed by the unit. All participants will execute ASCA University with the assigned IP and NATO Alias on a closed network, open IP switch. At the end state, all units connect to the live NATO releasable FMN network and are ready to execute operations immediately.

Discussion Points

• Technical competence, lack of emphasis on digital sustainment training and preoperation network federation have degraded the interoperability and functionality of the ASCA interface across the Fires warfighting function. This degradation across the technical domain resulted in an overreliance on the human and procedural domains to execute multination fire missions. Additionally, systemic training shortfalls in fire direction and establishing a fires communication PACE plan with issued equipment further stressed the procedural and technical interoperability domains inside the digital kill chain, increasing fire mission processing times.
• Digital fire control system classification requirements and operating parameters vary by ASCA nation. Most fire control systems of ASCA nations are classified as “restrictive” based on national classification requirements when conducting live fire. Increasing the classification to “secret” presents additional information security barriers for these countries requiring additional clearances and associated manning concerns to operate these fire control systems at higher system classification. This results in ASCA nations resorting to cross-domain solutions to transfer ASCA messages across the different security classifications if the nation has developed and fielded a cross-domain solution and, worst case resorting to a ‘swivel chair’ between systems.
• During Dynamic Front, the Italian Liaison Officer (LNO) team employed their tactical fire direction system, Sistema Informatico di Reggimento di Artiglieria (SIR), as an unclassified system and were unable to adjust their classification without additional resources and approval. This system was not approved on the Authorization to Operate (ATO) memorandum provided by U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREURAF), preventing them from connecting to any live network outside ASCA University. The inability to connect to the network forced the liaison officer (LNO) to execute ‘swivel chair’ mission processing for all fire missions, significantly increasing the overall processing time. A cross-domain solution through the German ASCA gateway could provide a cross-domain solution to address this issue; however, the decision to change the task organization of the Italian Field Artillery battalion never occurred.


British and Romanian service members observe map coordinates during a multinational live-fire training as part of Exercise Dynamic Front 22 (DF22), Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, July 17, 2022.(Photo by SPC Dominique Crittenden, 5th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

• Currently, two versions of the ASCA software are in use, version 7.02 and version 5.4.1.1. These versions are not backward compatible, requiring commanders to utilize the lowest common denominator across the task organization. Few member nations have currently fielded version 7.02. Great Britain (GBR) employs the Fire Control Battlefield Information System Application (FC BISA) with separate ASCA version interfaces that cannot currently communicate. The ARRC and MN FAB operated on FC BISA 4.0, capable of executing ASCA V5.4.1.1, while the 26th RA and 1st RHA operated on FC BISA 4.2, capable of executing ASCA V7.02. Unfortunately, these two versions cannot communicate, requiring a ‘swivel chair’ to transfer firing data between the MN FAB to the GBR BNs, increasing processing time.
• Tactical Communications Information System (TACCIS) (UK SECRET) network facilitated C2 and fire direction communication between the ARRC to the MN FAB while the Mission Partner Environment (MPE) (U.S. NATO SECRET) network provided connectivity from the ARRC, through the 41st Field Artillery Brigade (FAB) LNO team, to the 41st FAB. This resulted in confusion, information loss and increased mission processing times. A cross-domain solution was not established between these two networks, resulting in a break in digital communications. This network design invalidated all network testing completed during ASCA University since ASCA University was executed on a closed network with an open IP switch.
• ASCA University focused on understanding interoperability across the ASCA community and participating training audience. The key objectives of ASCA University were to validate the existing databases, distribute data between fire control systems, execute ASCA 40 testing procedures and limit technical dilemmas or disruptions across ASCA data distribution in a controlled, closed-network environment.
• Integration of Fort Sill ASCA subject matter experts (SME) before the execution of training is highly recommended to ensure teaching and testing procedures comply with the most up-to-date information and system capabilities. Additional integration of these individuals in the planning process did not occur and resulted in avoidable friction before the execution of ASCA University and Dynamic Front 22.
• Database development and validation must remain consistent with the NATO STANAGs and AARTYP-1.² The 56th Artillery Command, with assistance from the theater ASCA Lead and Fort Sill ASCA SME, must validate the database before publishing. Initially, the database had incorrect Unit Reference Numbers (URN) and NATO Aliases. This resulted in a directed database reconstruction during ASCA University, requiring revalidation before the dry and live fire. We recommend a standing exercise database across all NATO field artillery exercises.

Conclusion

The Dynamic Front exercise series continues to grow in complexity each year. The ability for Allies and Partners to continually progress along the three domains of field artillery interoperability must extend beyond the execution of ASCA University and the Dynamic Front exercise dates. Each year, incremental increases in technical, procedural and human fires competencies were shown during the exercise. As units prepare for Dynamic Front, the expectation is that the lessons observed and identified are trained and improved so the European Fires Enterprise can continue to advance rapidly in delivering lethal fires.

Disclaimer: CALL presents professional information, but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other official U.S. Army publications. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of material they provide.

Endnotes