The Fight is Coming

By 1LT Scott Mitzel & SSG Alan Buhl

Article published on: October 31, 2024 in Field Artillery 2024 Issue 2

Read Time: < 8 mins

The Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD C2) in TF Kangaroo’s Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) lit up with three unknown radar tracks. For what felt like the thousandth time, the crew manning air defense systems at a remote U.S. Army outpost in Syria, began deconflicting the tracks. The cavalry scouts of TF Kangaroo never would have imagined themselves as air defenders, but months of training prepared them to identify what was now hurtling through the air towards them: after acquiring a visual, the BDOC identified the airframes as Shahed-131s, an Iranian-manufactured Group 3 delta wing unmanned aerial system (UAS). The BDOC knew what these were, what they were capable of and what would happen if they didn’t act fast.

As the tracks began vectoring toward the forward operating base, TF Kangaroo sprang into action. Several callouts rang in the operations center: bearing, range, altitude, time to closest approach. Utilizing their defense systems, they engaged the hostile UAS with their Raytheon Coyote surface-to-air missiles. As the UASs began to dive down towards the friendly forces, three missiles streaked from the launcher in a desperate attempt to knock their targets out of the sky. Tense seconds passed as the staunch air defenders waited for the impact of the intercepting missiles. Just as it seemed like they had launched too late to save the lives of the U.S. Service Members and coalition forces on the outpost, one and then two missiles struck and destroyed two of the incoming UASs. Tragically one of the missiles buzzed past its target while the third and final drone impacted and detonated on the outpost, wounding two partner force Soldiers. Following the incident, the crew of the BDOC determined that their countless hours of training had built skilled competency in Countering Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) and had minimized the damage and casualties (Gordon, 2023).

While the Soldiers of TF Kangaroo were in a static defensive posture, the principles of conducting C-UAS remains the same for maneuvering formations. Field Artillery (FA) Soldiers need to be prepared for Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) in Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). Soldiers should study lessons learned from this engagement and other recent conflicts. The Army, specifically FA Soldiers, should study to identify UASs, report accurate locations and become competent in these skills through integrating C-UAS into training progressions.

Operations in Ukraine have provided an important lesson in small unmanned aerial system (sUAS) employment. Russian and Ukrainian forces have had near complete freedom of maneuver to collect and strike targets with both civilian and military drones of a variety of sizes. Ukrainians have utilized sUAS to great benefit; they exploit the technology for its low cost, both monetarily and to the force, for great payoffs. Small UAS available for under $300 can be used for close-fight intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and munitions delivery. These sUAS can fly above audible range and simple modifications like taping over lights make them difficult to spot without radar or other electronic warfare (EW) assistance. Open-source intelligence sUAS point of view videos available on Twitter and Reddit often show their targets totally unaware of the imminent threat to themselves as an armed sUAS hovers overhead, looking straight down at their targets. One notable example of the utility and ease of use of sUAS is of a Ukrainian teenager responsible for relaying the live locations and movements of a Russian armored column to Ukrainian artillery, resulting in over 20 vehicles destroyed, including several tanks (Arhirova, 2022). We must assume our enemies are studying the tactics of the Russo-Ukrainian War. However, this is not a new or evolving tactic; this is not a Russian or Ukrainian tactic and it is not going away. The use of sUAS as weapons of war is a baseline. If you cannot defend your formation from it, you are vulnerable to it. We need to prepare for these types of scenarios.

Commanders at all echelons and functions need to be familiar with the UAS threat and C-UAS fight. From ATP 3-01.81: “Units should always assume the enemy is using a UAS to observe or attempt to observe them.” Following that point shortly is: “Contact with unidentified unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) may be a precursor to an imminent attack. All units who were in the UAV’s path should assume they were observed and prepare for indirect fire on their positions.” Given the ease of use and concealment and availability of cheap commercial sUAS, it should be assumed that your unit is under constant observation and that an attack is simply a matter of prioritization for the enemy. The sUAS threat is assumed to be constant and every unit in a combat theatre must be versed in the C-UAS fight because every unit will be in the UAS engagement area. While the days of counterinsurgency have already loosened the idea of ‘frontlines,’ the introduction of UAS to the battlefield has ensured that all are party to the threat of direct engagements. The brigade air defense cell is unlikely to detect smaller group one and two sUAS and just as unlikely to be able to respond; it is incumbent on the spotted or affected unit to deal with unidentified sUAS.

Education is the greatest advantage we can easily gain and the skills needed to conduct C-UAS can be trained in numerous ways. Given the proliferation of UAS in the modern battlefield, it is critical and essential to include C-UAS in training progression. Soldiers need to be trained to recognize UASs from multiple countries and manufacturers to accurately recognize the potential threats they face. First, introduce visual aircraft recognition into table progressions. For example: include aircraft identification on the 13B and 13F skill level 10 written tests. Forward observers already train to recognize enemy ground and manned air assets; it is time to include UAS and expand to all Soldiers.

In addition to recognizing specific platforms, Soldiers should also train to classify aircraft with “WEFT,” (Wings, Engine, Fuselage and Tail). WEFT is outlined in TC 3-01.81 and standardizes description of visual features of aircraft, which may be used by listeners or readers to identify an airframe that a reporting observer could not identify. The importance of WEFT comes into play when you see side by side comparisons of our UAS next to peer-threat UAS. By acknowledging that threat UAS have a similar appearance to friendly UAS, it becomes apparent that detection and identification are not enough; a unit must remain vigilant and report “suspect” UAS to your higher echelon for deconfliction and verification that the spotted UAS is friendly or enemy.

The ability to recognize a UAS is only the start of the problem. Just as important as knowing what an observer is seeing, is knowing where they are looking. Aircraft are mobile and fast; delays in reporting chains make it difficult to accurately pin down a location for C-UAS or Air Defense elements. Creating a skillset for identifying where a UAS is, in space and time, will create a force able to accurately report and respond. Training Soldiers to report UAS will allow maneuver commanders to understand when and where they are being collected on and will be able to report to higher elements when they need to employ C-UAS assets. Department of Defense (DOD) installations all have a variety of UAS platforms. Use these assets and have Soldiers practice calling up SPOT reports of their Bearing, Range and Altitude (BRA).

An Iranian Mohajer 6, capable of ISR and armed attack mission sets.

Understanding the process of defeating UAS is no different than targeting: Detect, Decide, Defeat and Assess (D3A). Counter UAS cells operate under the same guidelines, but with different timelines and methods. Detect: eyes, ears, radar. Decide: Is the aircraft displaying hostile intent? Is it moving towards a friendly element? Does it appear to be carrying a payload? Defeat: What surface-to-air assets can be used as an effector? The size of the UAS will dictate the effector used. Assess: Was the engagement successful? If not, why? FA Soldiers have the benefit of being well-versed in conducting procedural-based drills, across multiple systems, as a team. Through training and rehearsals, this process is punctual and allows for decisive engagement of threats. Further simplifying the process is the fact that 13 series Soldiers have a command support relationship that facilitates training with maneuver elements. With this in mind: we as FA Soldiers can provide the base of knowledge, equipment and capabilities that other branches may not be as capable or ready to shift to, to meet the Army’s C-UAS needs.

an Iranian Shahed-129, visually similar to the American MQ-9.

In the book “Seven Seconds to Die,” John Antal references how the Armenians’ static defenses were not constructed to obscure operations within their defensive perimeter. The Armenians had numerous failures, but their complacency in position improvement was one of the most fatal and resulted in thousands of casualties from hostile sUAS (Antal, 2022). The Army needs to train for C-UAS during LSCO to avoid making the same mistake as the Armenians. As shown in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenian forces had not prepared to defend against an enemy using UAS. Defense and offense against UAS need to be rehearsed in conjunction with normal training progressions. Through training, units can then refine processes and we will improve as a force. One of the best defenses from an enemy is to remain undetected; conducting proper site selection in the field is critical to ensuring units are not telegraphing their location. Small UAS should always be a planning consideration for site selection; commanders need to be aware and develop courses of action with sUAS in mind. One tactics, techniques and procedure (TTP) from ATP 3-01.81 suggests units make use of organic sUAS e.g., Ravens to self-assess visibility to the enemy when occupied in any location in the field. Once emplaced, Field Artillery units without UAS defeat capabilities still impact the overall C-UAS mission by sending SPOT reports using the WEFT and BRAS system. By incorporating these considerations and processes, an FA unit can still function in the C-UAS fight as a sensor node in the Air Defense Early Warning system.

A Coyote missile, just launched from its pallet.

Just as the Soldiers of TF Kangaroo found themselves in a hostile environment conducting unfamiliar operations, the Army and specifically the Field Artillery community need to prepare for similar mission sets. The FA community needs to be trained to identify aircraft, report accurate locations and become proficient in these skills through integrating C-UAS into training progressions. We cannot fall victim to the assumption that someone else will solve the problem for us. We all have a responsibility to find solutions to tomorrow’s problems, today.

an Iranian Shahed-131, a point-to point crash attack UAS.

References