Control vs Coordination

An Argument for the Disaggregation of Graphic Control Measures and Inclusion of the Battlefield Coordination Line into U.S. Army Doctrine.

By MAJ Donald S. Frazier, 1AD

Article published on: August 1, 2024 in Field Artillery 2024 Issue 2

Read Time: < 9 mins

“The staff has been planning for months. Phase lines and Graphic Control Measures (GCMs) are meticulously developed and synchronized across all maps and common operating pictures (COPs). The forward boundaries, intel-handover line and the limit of the Airspace Control Sub-Sector (ACSS) are integrated perfectly. G2 has spent countless hours refining a detailed enemy assessment and assigning triggers to shift battlefield framework. Branch plans and targeting objectives have been approved for the next 96 hours. The stage is set. In four hours, the Corps will cross the line of departure.”

Fast Forward 18 hours.

“The enemy action is dramatically different from the assessment. There is minimal resistance. The commander directs a shift in battlefield framework to enable the Corps to exploit opportunities and seize the initiative. G2 begins coordination to shift the intelligence dandover line (IHL), air planners revise the unit airspace plan (UAP) and G33 disseminates refined framework across the command posts and subordinate unit headquarters.”

“G2 reports it takes four hours to transition the IHL. The air cell updates that emergency airspace changes require six hours. Current operations assesses it will take one hour to push common graphics.”

“The Corps stalls, the initiative is lost.”

This vignette is no fairy-tale, it is an unfortunate trend and by-product of aggregating graphic control measures with fire support and airspace coordination measures onto common phase lines. In the interest of simplicity, the commander forfeited the necessary flexibility to seize opportunities and retain decisive advantage.

Imagine instead; the commander attempts to exploit an opportunity. He or she immediately directs a boundary change. Common graphics are distributed within the hour, enabling parallel planning at the lowest level. The IHL is separate from the division forward boundary (DFB) and coordination no longer disrupts the boundary shift. The air cell has an approved airspace plan beyond the DFB, but short of the fire support coordination line (FSCL) facilitating the immediate shift of framework. The Corps maintains tempo and wins the day.

As the Army modernizes doctrine for Multi- Domain Operations (MDO) in support of Large- Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), we must establish a dynamic process to adjust framework and reduce the coordination requirements for the ground force commander. The Army needs to review and more clearly define GCMs and appropriately consider the deliberate employment of fire support coordination measures (FSCMs) and Airspace Coordinating Measures (ACMs).

Boundaries are “lines that delineate surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas.1” There are three principal types of boundaries as defined in FM 1-02.¹ “Operational Terms:” Forward, Rear and Lateral.² Boundaries are surface focused and outline the Area of Operation (AO) in depth and breadth, but do not frame the AO in all three dimensions.

Figure 1: Simple Battlefield Framework

FSCMs help establish deep and close. The coordinated fire fine (CFL) enables permissive fires in the division deep area. The FSCL delineates coordination requirements for the joint attack of surface targets.³

ACMs facilitate the efficient use of airspace and provide safeguards for friendly forces.⁴ The coordination level is the “procedural method to separate fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft.”⁵ The coordinating altitude (CA) “separates users and is the transition altitude between different airspace control elements.”⁶

Boundaries delineate the surface area of the AO. The CFL delineates the deep and close fight. The airspace plan is an agreement between the ground force commander and the airspace control authority to establish a coordinating altitude, below which the ground commander exercises airspace control. The FSCL is established by the land component or joint force commander and is the forward edge of coordination authority for the establishing headquarters.⁷

Commanders must have total ownership of their AO; employ boundaries to deconflict ground forces and leverage fire support coordination measures and the airspace plan to enable the seamless integration of fires and maneuver and create opportunities to mass kinetic and non-kinetic joint effects. The Battlefield Coordination Line (BCL), a Marine Corps FSCM⁸ is recognized in joint doctrine and is the ideal solution to enable Army units to disaggregate FSCMs and ACMs from GCMs.

Tactical Command and Control (TAC C2) platforms are airspace control elements employed by the air component commander to control air operations.⁹ TAC C2 is available in airborne platforms and ground-based platforms.¹⁰ Air Support Operations Centers (an airspace control element) are co-located with division joint air-ground integration centers (JAGICs) and communicate regularly with TAC C2 to clear airspace in the division and Corps deep. TAC C2 bridges the gap between the “demonstrated limit of a division’s ability to control airspace” and the FSCL.

The JAGIC is trained to positively and procedurally control joint fires and airspace users from a division’s rear boundary to the FSCL.¹¹ However, “[JAGICs] must demonstrate they can control [airspace] and have established procedures that satisfy theater airspace control plan (ACP) requirements.¹² The Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), co-located with division, can control airspace from the rear boundary to the FSCL unless the size of the AO is too great for the division to demonstrate the ability to control all of the airspace within it.

Tactical Corps headquarters identify the forward edge of division battlespace with the DFB. This is the limit of a division’s authority to affect the battlespace without coordination with HHQ. This should not be the limit of a division’s airspace control responsibilities.

The DFB, a graphic control measure, must not align with the forward limit of a division’s airspace control sector, because the Corps commander should not be required to coordinate with the air component to adjust boundaries within his or her AO. When the ASOC at division cannot control airspace to the FSCL, TAC C2 may be required to control airspace between the division limit of airspace control and the FSCL. It takes hours to coordinate with to adjust airspace control even if the plan is preconstructed. The Corps should plan to create the largest feasible division airspace control sector to maximize the Corps reach and minimize coordination requirements to facilitate the responsive integration of fires. Army and Air Force doctrine lacks the coordination measures to articulate an intermediate coordination line between the division forward boundary (controlled by Corps) and the FSCL (controlled by the CFLCC or JFC.)

The BCL is the FSCM that the Marine Corps employs to address this challenge. The BCL: “facilitates the expeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity between the BCL and the FSCL.”¹³ The BCL solves an Army and Air Force problem by providing a linear FSCM between the CFL and the FSCL and enables Corps commanders to disaggregate the DFB from the forward limit of a division’s airspace control sector. Ground commander can still strike targets beyond the BCL and short of the FSCL and the air component’s airspace control responsibility is reduced to that airspace the Corps cannot control.

Division airspace control sectors do not imply that the division is the only entity that employs effects within the sector. The ASOC in the division AO controls all aircraft below the CA within the control sector. The Corps coordinates all fires through airspace control sectors, whether that is an air component platform or an ASOC co-located with the subordinate Division headquarters. There should be a clear distinction between the directed limit of division effects; the DFB and the limit of airspace control delegated to the Division airspace control sector. Corps commanders achieve maximum flexibility by employing all airspace controllers in their AO to the limit of their capabilities.

Figure 2: DIV ACSS (BLUE) and the CFACC TAC C2 (PURPLE) disaggregated from the DFB using the BCL.

The Corps AO must remain dynamic, flexible and three-dimensional. Boundaries establish ground control clearly articulate battlespace owners and afford divisions sufficient battlespace to transition targets from the Corps and shape conditions for brigade combat teams (BCTs) in the close fight. TAC C2 short of the FSCL comes at a cost to the air component. Air planners must create the most flexible airspace plans possible to maximize the effectiveness of joint assets. Limiting a division’s airspace control sector its forward boundary places undue strain on the air component by generating a need for redundant airspace control. When the Corps, through division assigned airspace, cannot employ the means to control the airspace from division rear boundary to FSCL, it should make every attempt to provide as much airspace coverage as possible.

Corps headquarters maintain authority over the battlespace between the division forward boundary and the Corps forward doundary. The airspace control sector does not underscore the division commander’s authority to operate or effect beyond the forward boundary without coordination. The BCL is the tool Corps and the airspace control authority could use to produce a dynamic, integrated airspace plan that integrates the Army aligned resources with dedicated air component platforms, from the rear boundary to the FSCL.¹⁴

Permissive and flexible battlespace enables commanders to exploit opportunities and secure asymmetric advantage. The only way to achieve this is to deliberately disaggregate coordination measures from boundaries and to incorporate all elements of joint doctrine, specifically the BCL into Army and Air Force doctrine to preserve options and create decision space for commanders.