Static to Strategic

Re-Learning Shoot and Scoot

By SSG Robert Chambers

Article published on: August 1, 2024 in Field Artillery 2024 Issue 2

Read Time: < 7 mins

For nearly the past two decades, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) deployments for Rocket Field Artillery have been arriving at the forward operation base finding a covering to park the launcher. If a preset one has already been established and used by the last units, the base was there and standing-by to receive missions in a building named “HIMARS House.” Years of rotating different units in and out of the same operational areas utilizing the same hides, pre-set firing points and reload points has made the Rocket Field Artillery stagnate during counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. With the Army’s focus shifting to Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), we need to return to doctrine and re-learn how to shoot, move and communicate in a true near peer conflict.

To plan and conduct a Field Artillery move is in the artillery tables at the platoon level, but often once a unit has deployed to support the Global War on Terror, the highly mobile is removed from High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) as the launcher is rolling between the hide site and firing point. With the conflict in Europe, it is now more vital and prevalent than ever as a force to be more mobile as possible. With the capabilities to be off the firing point before the rounds even impact the target, it is imperative that units train to move away from the firing point and on to the next hide area, away from where any counterfire will impact. Ukraine has been utilizing HIMARS to their max ability through conducting raids to range targets then quickly moving to their next op area before counterfire comes in.

Mobility is a crucial factor in ensuring the survivability of launcher crews. By having the ability to move quickly and efficiently, these artillery systems gain a significant tactical advantage on the battlefield. Stationary artillery units become easier targets for enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. By continuously moving, launcher systems make it challenging for the enemy to detect and to track them effectively. Their mobility allows them to blend in with the surroundings, to utilize cover and concealment and to maintain a lower profile, reducing the risk of being detected by enemy sensors and intelligence assets.

Many of the threats to launcher systems come from not being mobile enough. The newest example of these threats is unmanned arial systems (UAS); they pose a growing threat on the modern battlefield. UAS can be employed by adversaries to locate and monitor launcher units, potentially directing indirect fire assets towards them. UAS may also be armed with explosive payloads, making them a direct threat to launchers and other critical assets both a means to find locations and as a weapon delivery system.

It is vital for section chiefs to learn how to properly move within the platoon operational area and immediately jumping internally to their next hide site after each mission. They should avoid getting into the habit associated with artillery table live fires of staying on the firing point with the LMs in the air, waiting on the command to stow. Stowing and moving is part of the launcher artillery tables and should be second nature to launcher crews, but due to many factors of the live fire qualification and dry fire rehearsals, it has become common to wait for the command to stow the LM even during the other tables and force on force training. This leaves the launcher and its crew in the open on the firing point exposed to ground, air and counterfire attack. These bad habits that are being instilled in the crews can have deadly consequences in a LSCO environment. Mobility is a crucial factor in ensuring the survivability of HIMARS and Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) systems.

The way forward is to stop treating all fire missions during artillery tables V and VI as “administrative shoots” and to have moving the launcher after missions practiced at the crew level more. The only acceptable reason for not moving after firing is if there is a firing incident, such as a rocket or a missile is observed as unsafe, so that an inspector can come down and see where the fault of the incident lies. With MLRS and HIMARS, the checks can occur in the hide away from the firing point on the Gunner Fire Control Panel. A recent National Training Center (NTC) rotation, a new platoon standard operating procedure (SOP) was made before heading out to the box to counter the UAS threat. Changing locations frequently and at the will of the section chief within the operational area of the platoon had significant results, leading to zero loss of launchers for the entirety of the rotation for the platoon that implemented survivability moves into their SOP.

Within the platoon, the section chiefs made the call of when to move between and create new hides based on how long the launcher was in one spot for Static to Strategic:Re-Learning Shoot and Scoot By SSG Robert Chambers 2 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin a while or once a UAS report was heard over the net. The combination of moving after firing and constantly remaining mobile significantly enhances the overall survivability of the launcher crews. By reducing the time spent in one location and making it harder for the enemy to pinpoint and track their position accurately, these systems increase their chances of evading enemy fire that improves their survival rates during the force-on-force exercise. By moving quickly, launchers disrupt the enemy’s targeting process. The short duration between firing and relocation reduces the window of opportunity for the enemy to observe the launch signatures, calculate firing positions and respond effectively.

The most glaring issues with the reclaimed mobility of the launcher was the other half of being a 13M, the ammunition sections. The ammunition sections are attached to the firing platoon in order to have a small yet essential resupply of launch pods containers (LPCs) in the Platoon operation area for quick reloading. The Ammunition Sections utilize Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks and Heavy Expanded Mobility Ammunition Trailers (HEMTTs and HEMATs), these truck and trailer combos are slow when it comes to getting the LPCs loaded and off loaded. A well-trained crew can upload all eight LPCs the HEMTT and HEMAT are capable of carrying in about thirty minutes, but that is a long time in the open on the ground working the attached crane and running all the straps needed to secure the LPCs to the bed of the vehicles. These crews faced the same threats as the launchers they support and crew drills were vital in ensuring the platoon stays as mobile as possible. A well-trained and capable ammunition section can set the place for a platoon’s ability to maneuver.

In order to effectively train how we fight; units should step back and see what is neglected when it comes to getting ready for LSCO. Twenty years of COIN operations has given a lot of Soldiers plenty of experience but not applicable experience when it comes to a near-peer threat. The next fight may be one of large-scale maneuvering, a stark difference from the way we have been fighting in the past. Being able to tactically move while maintaining communication and firing capability will greatly increase the effectiveness and survivability of Rocket Field Artillery units that may find themselves in these future conflicts.