Setting the Conditions

Teaching Companies and Battalions how to “Lead with HE”

By CW3 Tanner Port and CPT Jared Rooney

Article published on: June 1, 2024 in Field Artillery 2024 Issue 1

Read Time: < 6 mins

Leading up to its Joint Readiness Center (JRTC) rotation, Falcon Brigade deliberately focused its training cycle on setting the conditions at echelon by leading with fires. The design behind this training methodology focused on coaching and mentoring company commanders and battalion staffs on how to incorporate fires to maximize their effectiveness. The brigade (BDE) accomplished this by nesting its training events with how the BDE commander (CDR) envisioned using the Joint Fires Enterprise at the JRTC. The key training event that allowed the brigade to facilitate the BC’s training guidance were the fires support coordination exercise (FSCX). Focusing primarily on offensive operations, maneuver (MNVR), intelligence (INTEL) and fires planners used a schedule of fires in support of the MNVR plan that leveraged all organic sensors (e.g. BDE reconnaissance troop, scouts and radars) to prioritize destruction missions that by extension also achieved a suppression effect. This article aims to outline the training methodology; tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used; and lessons learned.

FSCX Design

Fire support coordination exercies (FSCXs) have historically focused on the company (CO) CDRs and their fire support enablers, requiring them to execute an echelonment of fires that ensured constant suppression on the objective area. The intent of these FSCXs is to have the CO team focus on trigger math, risk estimate distances and familiarize MNVR CDRs with what “fires brings to the fight”. In contrast, the methodology behind Falcon Brigade’s FSCX design consisted of three lines of effort (LOE) that aimed to create a robust training scenario that would foster the synchronization of the warfighting functions’ (WFF) conditions:

• LOE 1 consisted of the BDE CDR evaluating the individual CO CDR’s troop leading procedures (TLPs).
• LOE 2 was creating an opportunity for the maneuver battalion’s (BN) staffs to conduct military decision making process (MDMP) and exercise the future operations/current operations (FUOPs/CUOPs) handoff to their respective tactical command posts (TACs) for execution of a BN (-) attack.
• LOE 3 was designing a scenario that would foster a shared understanding between CO CDRs and their fire support enablers on what conditions needed to be set in order to successfully conduct a combined arms breach.

What was different?

The BDE CDR’s intent was to design a FSCX scenario that focused on how the BDE and subordinate BNs would set the conditions for COs at echelon via the fires enterprise and a BN support by fire (SBF). Critical to success was the requirement for the MNVR BN’s TACs to command and control the fight. This departure from the typical BDE “White Cell” provided the BN CDRs the opportunity to visualize and train their TACs. For example, although army attack aviation (AAA) was in direct support (DS) of each FSCX iteration, operational control was retained at the BDE to set conditions via a deep attack for the MNVR BNs. Upon successful completion of the AAA deep attack, the MNVR BN’s TAC would initiate their respective BN MNVR and fires plans. To facilitate this, each BN received tactical control of an M119A3 and M777A2 Howitzer PLT in support of their “attack to seize” mission. In addition, the BNs were each allocated two priority targets to plan and execute. The BNs were coached and mentored on using their DS Howitzers to destroy enemy positions rather than suppress them.

Falcon Brigade executed an extensive leader professional development (LPD) series over three months to ensure BN-level leaders understood how to effectively employ and synchronize the brigade combat team’s (BCT) organic fire support assets to conduct destruction missions via a schedule of fires. Through intelligence preparation of the battlefield, the BDE used time/distance analysis to define each echelon’s fight (BDE/BN/CO) and subsequently identified the conditions that needed to be set to ensure success. This process in turn drove the refinement of the schedule of fires throughout the MDMP/TLP process by highlighting triggers and decision points.

Whereas a typical echelonment would focus on constant suppression by transitioning assets, a Falcon Brigade echelonment used each fire mission to provide a destruction/neutralization effect. This enemy-focused process stressed the rapid sequencing of high payoff targets via a schedule of fires that would provide the overall effect of a traditional echelonment of fires. Ultimately, the goal was to build a shared understanding on what fighting at echelon (CO/BN/BDE) truly means in large scale combat operations (LSCO).

Execution

Upon receipt of battle damage assessment (BDA) from the BDE deep attack, the MNVR BNs executed their respective series targets that focused on enemy machine guns nests. In addition, they executed an obscuration smoke mission that set the conditions for the emplacement of their BN SBF. Once the BN TAC determined the conditions had been set, the MNVR CO began its attack, culminating with the combined arms breach of a wired obstacle.

In support of the CO attack, fire supporters were forced to balance the art and science of:

• Refining BN fires plan’s attack guidance to support their MNVR element’s decision points/triggers, resulting in a comprehensive trigger, location, observer, delivery system, attack guidance, commication or TTLODAC (e.g. methods of control for 81mm/120mm/105mm missions)
• Integration of their organic 60mm mortar systems in either handheld or conventional mode to provide the ground commander the ability to execute preplanned suppression targets and targets of opportunity.
• Observation plans, adjacent unit coordination and target/BDA hand-off between the MNVR CO and SBF CO.

White Cell

To support this design, the White Cell monitored all FM traffic from the CO to BN TAC to capture MNVR and fires metrics to facilitate after action reviews (AARs).

Historically, the BDE’s fires/brigade aviation element (BAE) sections would simulate the BN TAC in a white cell capacity, performing such functions as receiving situational updates and fire missions. But the “monitor and metric” focus of Falcon Brigade’s TAC provided valuable feedback to the BNs on triggers/lulls in fire/and fire mission processing time.

JRTC

Building off the foundation laid at the FSCX, Falcon Brigade aimed to set the conditions for the MNVR BNs along their respective axes of advance. Objectives were identified along the route and the “Series Holly” schedule of fires methodology was applied to ensure a battlefield handoff between the BCT and the MNVR BNs. Key to the BCT’s success in this was the battlefield reporting from 1-73 CAV and the MNVR BNs’ scouts. Using the deliberate and dynamic targeting process, the BCT was able to rapidly identify high-payoff targets (HPTs) using organic assets and thus leverage division (DIV)-level assets to prosecute them. This concept was validated in the offensive phase of the operation and reflected in the fact the DIV fire missions were almost at parity with the BCTs organic assets (39 BCT fires vs 33 DIV fires).

The key takeaway of this operational concept is that Falcon Brigade was able to successfully identify targets that met DIV’s target selection standards (TSS) and leverage their assets against them. Removing enemy air defense artillery (ADA), fire support (FS) and MNVR (Armor) assets freed up the BCTs organic assets to target enemy assets they could actually achieve a destructive effect on.

Falcon Fires in the Offense

Assessing that conditions had been set via joint fires, the BCT was able to direct its own organic assets via its schedule of fires to set the conditions that would allow for the MNVR BNs to close with and destroy the enemy. The BCT accomplished this by using 4x destruction missions on confirmed enemy locations on OBJ Subaru (Shugart/Gordon). The BCT acquired these targets primarily via the BDE reconnaissance troop and cyber and electromagnetic activities (CEMA) assets. The ability to validate enemy locations on the objective facilitated a rapid target refinement process that was then incorporated into the BCT’s schedule of fires.

Conclusion

Falcon Brigade’s deliberate focus on setting the conditions at echelon fostered a culture of violence through leading with fires. The most significant lesson learned was the importance of determining what conditions need to be set to continue movement and whether the fire missions achieved its desired effect. This is necessary at both the combined arms rehearsal and the fires technical rehearsal. At echelon, the BCT leveraged organic and DIV fires to set the conditions for the MNVR BNs and established graphic control measures to communicate battlefield handovers. Upon confirmation that the BCT had set the conditions, the MNVR BNs would exercise the same “destruction then suppression” methodology with their allocated targets from BDE and their organic mortars to set the conditions for their companies.