Survivability by Design

Aviation Protection in the Large-Scale-Combat Operations Fight

By CW3 Joseph M. Schwermer

July 1, 2025 | Aviation Digest, July-September 2025 Edition

Read Time: < 10 mins

In the evolving battlefield of large-scale combat operations (LSCO), the protection warfighting function is more paramount than ever for Army Aviation units. The threats are more lethal, precise, and ubiquitous than ever before. The proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), long-range fires, cyber intrusions, and persistent surveillance capabilities presents a multidomain challenge, especially for aviation task forces, whose mobility, range, and striking power make them high-value targets

Survivability isn’t luck, it’s engineered. That means building agility, deception, dispersion, and doctrinal discipline into every phase of the operation. Recent conflicts show why protection is crucial; Russian command post losses in Ukraine, UAS attacks on U.S. forces in the Middle East, and long-range fires targeting sustainment nodes all underscore the cost of failing to adapt (Horton, 2025; Liebermann, 2021; Nieberg, 2024; Schinella & Welch, 2024). Aviation task forces can survive initial strikes and maintain tempo through deliberate planning, distributed command, use of terrain, and Counter UAS (C-UAS) training across all mission phases.

Integrating Protection Into Planning and Operations

Protection isn’t just about defense—it’s about freedom of action. It enables aviation task forces to continue the mission, even in contested environments. Commanders must weigh survivability against operational effectiveness, shaping plans that account for both.

During the military decision-making process (MDMP), the staff identifies vulnerable phases such as transitions, forward arming and refueling point (FARP) establishment, or aircraft staging, and matches them to threats like long-range fires, persistent observation, and electronic warfare. A layered protection strategy includes camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, terrain use or engineered hardening, early warning systems, and doctrinal rehearsals.

Protection begins with the commander. Assigning responsibilities, prioritizing resources, and empowering subordinates to act on intent—all of this drives a proactive protection culture. Leaders must regularly review protection priorities, whether defending a tactical assembly area (TAA), securing a FARP, or hardening digital infrastructure, and adjust based on evolving threats.

A practical example came from a recent National Training Center (NTC) rotation: A UH-60 company’s command post was hit during a simulated long-range UAS strike. The unit’s failure to rehearse battle drills led to prolonged exposure, and operation ceased for over 2 hours. In contrast, their FARP operating forward rehearsed weekly react-to-contact and C-UAS drills, allowing immediate displacement and reestablishment at their alternate location with no impact to operations.

Sustainment and mission command systems require equal protection. Fuel and ammunition points must use terrain masking and counter-reconnaissance; convoys must be prepared for irregular threats, and TAAs must understand emission control to reduce detection. Protection working groups are critical for synchronizing these efforts. Effective working groups produce threat overlays, risk matrices, protection priorities, and identify vulnerabilities keeping protection integrated with operations.

Survivability of Command and Control Nodes

Command and control (C2) nodes remain priority targets in LSCO. Aviation must decentralize. That means dispersing tactical command posts (TACs), logistics hubs, and mission command elements across the operational environment to complicate enemy targeting.

But dispersion alone doesn’t cut it. Survivability demands masking, deception, and disruption. Use terrain like reverse slopes, forests, or even urban clutter. Employ standardized camouflage nets and tent profiles to limit thermal/visual detection. Incorporate decoys such as mock tactical operations centers (TOC) with idle generators, fake antennas, and remotely activated systems that draw intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) attention away from real assets.

During a recent NTC rotation, an aviation battalion employed a distributed C2 architecture that proved decisive in maintaining mission command during enemy targeting. Instead of centralizing its main command post in one large tent, the unit dispersed its current operations, planning cells, and command elements into small, function-specific nodes across the entirety of its TAA.

Each node operated independently with deliberate limited electronic signatures, separate power sources, and redundant communications. This dispersion complicated enemy targeting efforts and reduced the understanding of key C2 nodes within the TAA.

When enemy fires were committed to disrupt aviation operations, the result was minimal casualties and no disruption to mission command. The battalion maintained full operational tempo, with all core functions, airspace coordination, fires integration, and sustainment planning, continuing without interruption.

These techniques must be rehearsed and not improvised to be effective. Training must reflect that survivability is driven by function, not form. Dispersed C2 drills, camouflage discipline, and deception plan execution should be unit-level battle rhythms. Soldiers should understand that every stake they pound, antenna erected, and vehicle parked contribute to the fight for survivability.

Leveraging Terrain for Protection

Consider the case of a Tactical UAS section conducting an aerial reconnaissance of its unit’s TAA after occupation to assess its concealment and exposure. The live feed revealed gaps in camouflage coverage, exposed vehicle clusters near the main command post, and concentrated generator heat signatures visible from altitude. Using this real-time feedback, leaders directed immediate adjustments by dispersing vehicles and generators into defilade, improving netting placement, and repositioning equipment near rock outcrops. The UAS-enabled assessment allowed the unit to rapidly improve terrain utilization, enhancing survivability without delaying operations. In contrast, a nearby support unit that relied on open desert for speed was “destroyed” during a UAS-coordinated fire mission within 2 hours of setup.

Terrain is a free asset if used deliberately. Command posts, FARPs, and TAAs must capitalize on features like reverse slopes, forests, or abandoned structures to mask their presence from enemy ISR. Terrain analysis, aided by modeling tools and reconnaissance, can assess UAS line-of-sight, indirect fire threat arcs, and key mobility corridors. For aviation units, every ridgeline and tree line are potential shields against enemy observation and targeting.

Mobility remains a key tenet of survivability. Static positions, no matter how well camouflaged, grow more vulnerable over time as the enemy collects and updates its targeting data. Frequent displacement, guided by METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civil considerations), disrupts enemy collection cycles and reduces the likelihood of being targeted. Units that reposition regularly reset the enemy’s intelligence picture and maintain the initiative.

However, when aviation units must operate from fixed locations such as airfields or long-duration TAAs, they must shift focus from mobility to reinforcement. Engineer support becomes critical in these scenarios. Engineers can improve survivability by constructing hardened pads, establishing bunkers, and reinforcing camouflage. Early integration of engineers allows aviation task forces to develop defensible layouts without sacrificing operational readiness or mobility.

Ultimately, terrain is a force multiplier when used creatively. Whether enabling movement or reinforcing static positions, deliberate terrain utilization degrades enemy targeting, preserves combat power, and extends operational reach in the LSCO environment.

C-UAS Operations

The proliferation of UAS has transformed the battlefield. From tactical reconnaissance to precision strikes, UAS provides adversaries with a low-cost, high-payoff method to disrupt operations. The aviation task force, with its concentrations of high-value assets and personnel, presents a particularly lucrative target.

The Russo-Ukrainian War demonstrates their impact. Small quadcopters deliver grenades with precision, while Group 3 UAS provide real-time targeting for long-range fires—or one-way attacks— as observed in the 2021 al-Tanf, Syria, attack and the 2024 Tower 22 (Jordan) strike (Horton, 2025; Liebermann, 2021).

In response, aviation units must train and posture themselves to counter this threat with a multilayered defense.

1. Detection: Equip airfields and command posts with early warning systems, including observation posts, radar, and acoustic sensors. Observation posts increase detection range, allowing critical reaction time to react to enemy UAS.

2. Identification: Train units to distinguish friendly from enemy UAS using visual markers, air corridors, and Blue Force Tracking, coordinating with airspace managers and air defense units. Common operating pictures and airspace control measures will reduce misidentification of UAS.

3. Response: Integrate kinetic (e.g., Fixed site-low, slow, small unmanned aircraft integrated defeat system; counter rockets, artillery, and mortar; and rifles); and non-kinetic (e.g., jammers, drone busters, electronic warfare systems) defeat mechanisms. Rapid-response quick reaction forces can target UAS launch sites, disrupting enemy operations. Counter-UAS battle drills must be rehearsed to ensure every Soldier takes the appropriate action.

Training must transform every Aviation Soldier into a sensor and a shooter. During a recent NTC iteration, a junior mechanic spotted and downed a simulated ISR drone with his M4—preventing a simulated FARP attack. Empowerment through training is how protection becomes culture.

Recommendations

To enhance aviation survivability in LSCO, units must:

1. Institutionalize Protection in Training and Doctrine: Incorporate LSCO-specific scenarios such as degraded communications, UAS, and contested logistics into all training.

2. Prioritize Protection as a Command Imperative: Embed protection into unit culture by assigning dedicated protection officers, establishing protection working groups, and requiring leaders to routinely assess and mitigate operational risks. Protection must be viewed not as a supporting effort, but as a critical enabler of combat power.

3. Enhance Multidomain Awareness: Integrate intelligence from cyber, space, and information domains, coordinating with adjacent units and higher headquarters to counter hybrid threats that extend beyond traditional ground-based attacks.

4. Adopt Technological Innovations: Field and employ low-signature equipment, mobile C-UAS systems, advanced camouflage materials, and resilient digital infrastructure. These tools should be accompanied by doctrinal adjustments, including dispersed C2 structures and digital emission control measures.

5. Drive Continuous Adaptation: Use after-action reviews, real-time intelligence, and battlefield observations to refine protection strategies. Incidents like the al-Tanf and Tower 22 attacks must inform tactical adjustments, training priorities, and individual accountability to avoid repeat vulnerabilities.

Conclusion

Survivability is not a checkbox; it’s a mindset. By prioritizing distributed C2, countering UAS threats, leveraging terrain, and embedding protection in planning and training, aviation task forces can survive initial strikes and sustain combat power. Survivability is a design principle—deliberately planned, rigorously trained, and adaptively executed. In LSCO’s high-intensity environment, aviation units that protect themselves effectively will remain agile, resilient, and lethal, preserving combat power when it matters most.

Editor’s Note:

This article is a consolidation and revision of four previously published articles from the Eagle Eye Newsletter (NTC Warrior Chronicles), edited by CW3 Joseph Schwermer, former Eagle 3A–Assistant Operations Trainer and Eagle Eye Editor. CW3 Schwermer has served 18 years in the United States Army, including 13 years in Army Aviation. His experience spans Gray Eagle, Shadow, and small UAS platforms. Previous assignments include the 224th Military Intelligence Battalion, 4-6 Air Cavalry Squadron, and 2D Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. He served on the Eagle Team for 27 months and observed 16 NTC rotations. CW3 Schwermer is currently serving in the 25th Infantry Division, CAB, as an unmanned aerial vehicle operator at Wheeler Army Airfield in Hawaii.

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