Area for Forward Arming and Refueling Operations
A Path Forward
By MSG Stuart L. Mcquinn, CW3 Michael J. Sturgill, CW4 Edward A. Smith, and CW3 Joseph M.
Schwermer
Article published on: April 1, 2025 in the April-June 2025 Issue
Read Time: < 13 mins
Forward arming and refueling point Soldiers ensuring fire extinguishers are serviceable
and present at pump assembly. Photo provided by the authors.
The area for forward arming and refueling (AFAR) is a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) variation
that is quickly gaining traction throughout Army Aviation. As Army Aviation shifts its focus to Large-Scale
Combat Operations (LSCO), survivability and sustainment become paramount. Traditional FARPs are increasingly
vulnerable to enemy detection and precision fires, necessitating a more agile alternative. Area for forward
arming and refueling operations provide a solution by enabling rapid, concealed refueling close to the
forward line of own troops (FLOT). The Eagle Team has observed a best practice, which is units establishing
multiple AFAR locations with concealed fuel trucks. These trucks rapidly approach inbound aircraft, execute
refueling, and immediately displace. This new agile tactic, technique, and procedure (TTP) enhances
survivability and extends operational reach. With appropriate measures in place, AFAR operations can be
performed safely with minimal risk. This article examines the problem set, safety considerations, training
strategies, and planning methodologies necessary to integrate AFAR into aviation operations.
In the contemporary operational environment (OE), “Peer threats use a wide variety of actions, activities,
and capabilities to preclude [emphasis added] a friendly force’s ability to shape
an operational environment and mass and sustain combat power” (Department of the Army, 2022, p. 2-9). A very
simple way to preclude Army Aviation’s ability to sustain combat power is to quickly and decisively
eliminate our FARPs. Given the depth at which aviation will be established on the battlefield (division rear
or beyond), attack and lift aircraft will have to travel greater than 150–200 km to reach the FLOT. Without
the ability to rapidly refuel, aviation units risk culmination, leading to an inability to mass combat
power.
During the conflict in Ukraine, persistent drone surveillance has enabled precision strikes on logistical
nodes within minutes of detection. Traditional FARPs, with fixed fuel lines and visible equipment, present
lucrative targets for adversaries with long-range fires and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) capabilities. The AFAR mitigates this risk by leveraging terrain for concealment and enabling rapid
displacement.
The AFAR provides commanders and leaders the ability to place all vehicles and equipment in defilade, where
they remain (hidden) until air mission commanders notify the officer-in-charge (OIC)/noncommissioned OIC
(NCOIC) that aircraft are inbound for refueling and rearming. This hinders the enemy’s ability to detect and
target friendly aircraft and equipment. The AFAR can enhance survivability for sustainment personnel, while
prolonging the culmination of aviation operations. However, the successful application of any emerging TTP
in combat all starts with mitigating risk through focused training.
Safety Mindset
As with any new concept, safety concerns must be addressed throughout training and operational
implementation. Given the high personnel turnover rates within Army units, it is essential that AFAR
procedures are regularly practiced to maintain proficiency. Currently, Army doctrine, specifically Army
Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-04.17, “Techniques for Forward Arming and Refueling Points,” (2018) and ATP
3-04.1, “Aviation Tactical Employment,“ (2020)1 lack specific techniques or procedures for conducting AFAR operations.
Since AFAR is a new concept, units must experiment in training to refine best practices. As units gain
experience, they should incorporate these lessons into their tactical standard operating procedures (SOPs)
and unit SOPs. This creates a foundational base upon which the Army can build and refine its execution of
AFAR operations. Over time, this will lead to the development of standard TTPs that will inform future
doctrine.
Certification Process for AFAR Operations
A critical aspect of implementing AFAR operations is the certification process. While ATP 3-04.17 includes a
sample checklist for FARP certification (Department of the Army, 2018, Appendix C), many aspects of that
checklist will not apply to the AFAR. A structured certification framework should mirror the rigor of FARP
validation, while accounting for AFAR’s unique considerations. It is necessary to create a new checklist
that combines elements from the FARP certification checklist, the Aviation Resource Management Survey
checklist for cold fuel procedures,2 and other requirements specific to the AFAR and the unit’s
requirements and operations.
Aviation rotational training unit landing AH-64 at FARP. Photo provided by the authors.
This new checklist should be tailored to the needs of the unit, as the certification process will vary based
on mission sets and equipment. For example, in an AH-64 Apache battalion, special consideration must be
given to handling munitions such as Hellfire missiles, rockets, and 30 mm. A standardized method
for positioning the formation safely, with the aircraft pointed in a safe direction, must be established
before executing AFAR operations. The certification process can be streamlined and simplified compared to
regular FARP procedures. For example, a one-page checklist created by the aviation safety officer, could be
completed by a trained officer or NCO to ensure the operation is conducted safely and efficiently.
Passenger Safety and Marshalling Areas
In traditional FARP operations, passengers are required to exit the aircraft and move to a marshalling area
for safety. This procedure is in place due to the inherent fire risks associated with refueling. However,
AFAR operations involve significantly faster refueling and rearming times, sometimes within 10 minutes of
the aircraft’s arrival, given a highly trained crew.
For instance, when fully equipped Soldiers are reboarding a UH-60 after refueling, it typically takes a
well-trained team 3–5 minutes. This process can take more than twice as long in a CH-47 Chinook. The time
spent offloading and reloading could lead to 10–15 extra minutes of unnecessary exposure. This delay further
exposes the operation to enemy detection. Commanders must weigh the risk of refueling aircraft with
passengers aboard vs. prolonging the occupation of the AFAR. Striking the right balance is key to minimizing
exposure and addressing risk to force vs. risk to mission.
Night Operations and Ground Safety Considerations
Night and blackout driving is a critical skill for ground guides maneuvering fuel trucks near aircraft. Many
Soldiers in combat aviation brigades (CABs) lack proficiency to drive in blackout conditions. Attempting to
guide fuel trucks under such circumstances—especially when rotors are turning—poses a significant risk. To
mitigate this risk, commanders must focus on building foundational driving skills, starting with daytime
missions that transition into night operations. This allows Soldiers to gradually build proficiency and
confidence before tackling AFAR operations under full night-vision goggle conditions.
Another potential solution is to re-evaluate how fuel trucks approach aircraft from a safety perspective to
further minimize the risk to aircraft and personnel. Area for forward arming and refueling operations are
likely to take place in low light/nighttime conditions, making nighttime proficiency essential. It is
crucial that the Army continue to prioritize this type of training to ensure the effectiveness of AFAR
operations during both day and night.
Communication and Coordination Across Units
Effective communication is critical to the success of any complex operation, especially one as intricate as
the AFAR. Many units experience challenges with communication, which can lead to increased risk during
operations. Miscommunication or a lack of coordination between company, battalion, and brigade levels could
derail the operation and compromise safety. Given that the AFAR is still a new concept with limited
established doctrine, units must engage in thorough planning and constant feedback loops. Lessons learned
during training and initial operational attempts should be documented and shared across the aviation
community. The development of standardized TTPs and SOPs will be essential in making the AFAR concept a
repeatable and reliable process.
Employment
Eagle Team Observer, Coaches/Trainers recently observed a general support aviation battalion (GSAB)
conducting AFAR training to refine and practice procedures to prepare for future operations. The key points
are:
1. Pre-Mission Planning and Coordination
The battalion S-3 (operations officer) determined mission requirements, site selection, and timing. The S-4
(logistics officer) assessed sustainment requirements, including fuel and munitions needs. The forward
support company (FSC) commander developed the execution plan and coordinated logistical assets.
Communication and rehearsals were conducted between aviators and sustainers to ensure synchronization.
Aviation rotational training unit Soldiers fueling AH-64. Photo provided by the authors.
2. AFAR Deployment and Site Preparation
Once an AFAR team has been activated, the first task is ensuring a suitable landing zone (LZ) for inbound
aircraft. Terrain elevations play a much greater factor in safe execution, with aircraft to M978 distances
being much shorter than a traditional FARP’s layouts utilizing the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck
Tanker Aviation Refueling System or the Advanced Aviation Forward Area Refueling System. After thorough site
reconnaissance is completed, the AFAR team begins marking locations for aircraft to land safely with to land
safely with standard visual markers commonly used for night operations. The team can then maneuver the M978s
into the terrain for concealment until aircraft arrive. This phase of the operation will generally be 10–30
minutes prior to aircraft arrival.
3. Execution at H-Hour
Displacing M978s into separate sections of the LZ allows the AFAR team to adjust rapidly if aircraft alter
the landing plan. Upon arrival, the command and control (C2) node coordinates which vehicles will be
utilized during the operation using a ground guide, ensuring safe and minimal maneuvering toward the
aircraft on the ground. Upon completion of refueling, those vehicles coordinate with C2 to return to its
concealed position. This phase generally lasts between 10–20 minutes and concludes with the AFAR team
cycling to the next location.
Training Progression
The recent GSAB training event demonstrated the effectiveness of AFAR operations; however, it also revealed
critical areas where refinement is needed. While the execution was successful in a controlled environment,
challenges such as nighttime vehicle movement, rapid refueling under pressure, and coordination between
aviation and sustainment elements underscore the need for a deliberate and standardized training
progression. Without structured instruction, key operational risks such as fuel handling errors, munitions
mishaps, and vehicle movement in blackout conditions could compromise the operation. To ensure AFAR
operations become a repeatable and reliable capability, units should adopt a phased training approach that
builds proficiency at all levels before execution.
Forward arming and refueling point Soldiers monitoring operations. Photo provided by the
authors.
Phase 1: Individual Training–Before AFAR can be successfully integrated into full-spectrum operations,
personnel must master AFAR-specific tasks. Ground crews train on refueling procedures, blackout driving, and
munitions handling, ensuring each team member understands the fundamentals and can operate safely in austere
environments.
Phase 2: Crew Certification–To build cohesion and efficiency, AFAR teams conduct full setups in controlled
environments, refining coordination, safety procedures, and execution under simulated combat conditions.
This phase ensures that each team can perform AFAR operations safely and efficiently before integration into
larger-scale training.
Phase 3: Collective Training–Finally, AFAR operations must be incorporated into battalion- and brigade-level
exercises to validate interoperability with aviation and sustainment elements. This phase ensures that the
AFAR can be executed effectively in LSCO, giving commanders confidence in their unit’s ability to sustain
aviation operations forward on the battlefield.
By implementing this phased training model, units can ensure that AFAR operations are not just an emerging
concept but a sustainable and standardized capability. A deliberate approach to training will improve
operational readiness, reduce risk, and enhance the ability of aviation units to support the ground force
commander in dynamic, contested environments.
Planning at Echelon
The AFAR should be a deliberate effort directed at the squadron or battalion level through the operations
process to prevent culmination due to sustainment. A key element to any operation is
depth, which Army Doctrine Publication 3-90, “Offense and Defense,” defines as
“the simultaneous application of combat power throughout an area of operations” (Department
of the Army, 2019, p. 4-2). Field Manual 3-04, “Army Aviation,” further states that “depth is best achieved
when aviation attacks, air assaults, and FARP/AFAR placements are deliberate, iterative division-level
considerations” (Department of the Army, 2025, p. 15).3
Contested FARP operations in the support zone. Chart provided by the authors.
Sources:
At the National Training Center (NTC), we have seen considerable success when CAB commanders delegate C2 of
AFAR and FARP operations to the aviation support battalion (ASB)–specifically the support operations
officer. This enables centralized control of all sustainment planning in the military decision making process
(MDMP) and provides product uniformity across all brigade squadrons and battalions.
Army Techniques Publication 3-04.17 establishes FARP (AFAR) site selection as a function of METT-TC4 and is controlled by the
battalion S-3. The primary planning considerations are that the FARP (AFAR) meets unit mission requirements,
provides support throughout the battlefield under all conditions, and avoids threat observation and
engagement. Area for forward arming and refueling site selection should be planned in-depth across all
phases of the operation, not just one mission at a time. Provided adequate equipment and personnel, multiple
AFAR teams should be employed as close to the FLOT as feasible, with each team occupying its own respective
zone. A well-developed decision-support matrix (DSM) should define specific conditions or triggers for AFAR
displacement, as determined through MDMP.
In addition to in-depth AFAR site planning, sustainment and resupply of the AFAR should receive equal
consideration. In the contemporary OE, it may be realistic to assume that once the AFAR team(s) are
employed, it could be weeks to months before they are able to return to the aviation tactical assembly area
for refit. So the primary question(s) then is by what means, from what location, and at what points in time
is Class I (food, rations, and water)/III(petroleum, oil, and lubricants)/V (ammunition) being resupplied to
the AFAR, and are these resupplies time-based or trigger-based? These are also decision points that should
be included on the DSM.
As Army Aviation refines AFAR operations, success will depend on deliberate training, standardized
certification, and institutional backing. Leaders at all echelons must champion AFAR’s integration into
training cycles and advocate for its inclusion in future doctrine. By prioritizing agility, survivability,
and sustainment, aviation units will enhance their ability to project power and sustain combat operations in
LSCO.
Notes
1. ATP 3-04.1 may be accessed through the Army
Publishing Directorate website with a common access card (CAC).
2. The Aviation Resource Management Survey checklist may
be found at the Joint Technical Data Integration website and requires a CAC.
3. Field Manual (FM) 3-04, “Army Aviation,” has been
recently published and is available at https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN43343-FM_3-04-000-WEB-1.pdf
4. Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and
support, time available, and civilian considerations.
References
Authors
MSG Lee Mcquinn, Eagle 17A–an FSC trainer,
has served for 14 years in a variety of aviation sustainment positions. His most recent assignment was
as the Airborne FARP NCOIC at the 82D CAB, the 122 ASB Fuel and Water Sustainment Platoon Sergeant, and
previously, the LOG NCOIC for Iraq North. He has served on Eagle Team for 12 months and observed eight
NTC rotations.
CW3 Mike Sturgill Eagle 3S–an Aviation Safety Officer trainer, has served for 18 years
in the
U.S. Army and the past 11 years as an aviator. He served 5 years as rated Aviation Safety Officer.
His previous assignments include 2-3 GSAB, Multinational Force and Observers (Sinai Egypt),
Military District of Washington. He has served on Eagle Team for 6 months and observed two NTC
rotations.
CW4 Ed Smith Eagle 08–a Senior WO trainer, has served 25 years in the U.S. Army and 15
years in Army Aviation. He has 6 years of rated time as an Aviation Safety Officer and 7 years as an
Instructor Pilot/Standardization Pilot. His previous assignments include 4-2 Attack Reconnaissance
Battalion, 3-6 ACS, and 1-14th. He has served on Eagle Team for 33 months and observed 24 NTC rotations.
CW3 Joseph Schwermer Eagle 3A–an Assistant Operations trainer and Eagle Eye
editor, has served for 18 years in the U. S. Army and 13 years in Army Aviation. He has experience with
Gray Eagle, Shadow, and small unmanned aircraft systems. Previous assignments include 224th Military
Intelligence Battalion, 4-6 Air Cavalry Squadron, and 2D Brigade, 101st. He has served on Eagle Team for
27 months and observed 16 NTC rotations.