Implacable Foes
The War in the Pacific, 1944-1945
Review by Shannon Granville
Article published on: June 1, 2024 in the Army History
Summer 2024 issue
Read Time:
< 5 mins
By waldo heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio
Oxford University Press,
2017
Pp. xvi, 714. $24.95
Implacable Foes: The War in the Pacific, 1944–1945, was one of
three recipients of the 2018 Bancroft Prize for American history writing
from Columbia University. Its authors, Waldo Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio,
took on the daunting task of writing a single-volume history of the final
eighteen months of World War II in the Pacific Ocean. Even more ambitious,
their history covers not only the actual fighting but also the higher-level
decision-making and underlying economic and social factors that shaped the
course of the conflict.
Although the United States entered the war in December 1941 with a “Europe
First” grand strategy, the Japanese threat in the Pacific meant that a
nearly equal proportion of U.S. military resources soon flowed to both
fronts. The narrative of Implacable Foes begins in late 1943 when
the United States and its Pacific Ocean allies had managed to halt the
Japanese expansion and were preparing to drive Japanese forces out of their
island fortifications and entrenchments. The authors give detailed accounts
of the major combat engagements in the Pacific during this period, from New
Guinea and the Solomon Islands to the landings at Okinawa. Central to this
push was the American war economy, as assembly lines ran around the clock to
produce the ships, munitions, and related supplies needed to retake occupied
islands and control the surrounding seas. At the same time, the authors make
it clear that the fighting in the Pacific took place on many different
levels, and highlight various instances in which interservice rivalries and
personality conflicts among key political and military leaders exacerbated
disagreements over strategy and policy. Even as Allied forces advanced
across the ocean, the U.S. political leadership had to contend with a public
that was tiring of war and anxious to know how much more hard work and
difficulty would be needed to secure Japan’s surrender.
Implacable Foes suggests that this sense that U.S. public opinion
would not support a lengthy war of attrition on the Japanese mainland, at
the cost of many thousands of lives on both sides, was a contributing factor
to President Harry S. Truman’s authorization of the atomic bombings of the
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. This is by no
means a novel argument about the climatic decision-making of the war.
However, it does emphasize the idea that purely logistical calculations of
troop strength and material resources are but one element of many in
military history.
Implacable Foes is at its best when it looks at the unique aspects
of the war in the Pacific. The vastness of open water between the U.S. West
Coast and the Pacific Ocean island chains forced Allied logisticians to
figure out new ways to keep the fighting forces supplied over long
distances. Tropical diseases like malaria felled soldiers, sailors, and
marines as readily as a burst of Japanese bullets. The enemy’s approach to
combat, in general, was unlike that of any other foe: imperial Japanese
forces almost always chose death over surrender, often in the form of
suicide attacks. As the authors point out in the introduction, “no organized
unit of the Japanese Imperial Army surrendered during the entire Pacific war
until they were ordered to do so by the emperor” at the end of the war (7).
Allied troops therefore had to spend considerable time in mopping-up
operations, using grenades and flamethrowers to eliminate scattered pockets
of Japanese soldiers hidden in countless bunkers, caves, and trenches. The
crude, brutal nature of the ground war in the Pacific often took a heavy
mental toll on those who fought—though by this point in the conflict,
doctors were more likely to regard service members affected by “combat
fatigue” as casualties rather than cowards and offer them treatment and
care. The Allied armed forces did their best to counter the myriad tactical,
logistical, and medical problems posed by wartime, and the authors present a
compelling account of the various innovations in warfare that came about
because of the military’s experiences in the Pacific.
Even for a book of this length, Implacable Foes is not a
comprehensive account of the war. Heinrichs and Gallicchio are writing
primarily about the conflict in the Pacific Ocean, not the broader
Asia-Pacific Theatre. Those who are interested in, for example, the later
years of the China-Burma-India campaigns or the final struggle between
France and Japan over Indochina will need to consult other sources. However,
the title of the book itself is also a little misleading. As another
reviewer noted, “The Japanese story is told only enough to make sense of the
American story.”1
U.S. signals intelligence had been able to intercept Japanese diplomatic
communications (code-named Magic) even before the attack on Pearl Harbor,
and the book does include information from these and other wartime sources
to provide a window into high-level strategic discussions among the Japanese
leadership. Nevertheless, for a volume titled Implacable Foes—in
the plural—the fact that it is so overwhelmingly devoted to the U.S.
perspective does diminish the strength of the historical narrative.
One other note of caution for potential readers: in the paperback review
copy received by this magazine, at least five of the twelve maps are printed
in ways that cut off text or other information. An online preview of the
book’s electronic format, however, does not show any such formatting issues
with the maps. It is difficult to know whether this problem is unique to the
specific review copy received or to a more general issue with the printing
of the paperback edition. Readers should check their copies for map quality.
For those interested in gaining a broad general sense of the scope of U.S.
activity and decision-making during the later years of the conflict in the
Pacific Theater, Implacable Foes is a solid work. Waldo Heinrichs
(who passed away in 2019) served as an infantry soldier in World War II in
the European Theatre, and the combat-oriented sections show an attention to
detail that hints at an author’s personal understanding of the experiences
of frontline troops. The sections dealing with the home front and the war
economy are also strengths of the book. Even without a more complete picture
of the Japanese side of the war, it tells the story it sets out to tell.
Endnotes
1. Michael Sherry, review
of Implacable Foes: The War in the Pacific, 1944–1945, by Waldo
Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio, Journal of American History 106,
no. 3 (Dec 2019): 806,
https://doi.org/10.1093/jahist/jaz621.
Author
Shannon Granville is the senior editor with the U.S. Army
Center of Military History. Previously, she was editor and deputy
publications director with the Woodrow Wilson Center Press, where her
responsibilities included editing manuscripts for the Cold War
International History Project series copublished with Stanford University
Press. She has a master’s degree in international history from the London
School of Economics and a bachelor’s degree in history from the College of
William and Mary. From July 2022 to June 2023, she was a member of the
26th class of Mansfield Fellows, working with counterparts in the Japanese
government to study Japanese approaches to military history.