Arming East Asia

Deterring China In The Early Cold War

Review by Katherine (Hyun-Joo) Mooney

Article published on: June 1, 2024 in the Army History Summer 2024 issue

Read Time: < 4 mins

By eric setzeKorn
Naval Institute Press, 2023
Pp. xi, 307. $31.95

Arming East Asia: Deterring China in the Early Cold War explores President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Mutual Security Program (MSP) in East and Southeast Asia, shedding light on the administration’s efforts to contain China during the early Cold War. The author, Eric Setzekorn, contends that, in contrast to his predecessor Harry S. Truman and successors John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, Eisenhower gradually shifted focus to mutual security efforts in East Asia during his presidency. Furthermore, Setzekorn argues that the MSP, along with military aid in the Far East more generally, has not been taken seriously as an integral component of a surprisingly comprehensive strategy employed by the Eisenhower administration. Overall, Eisenhower’s focus on reinforcing local military forces instead of deploying U.S. troops in the region was cost-effective and efficient in Taiwan (formerly Formosa) and (South) Korea and somewhat successful in South Vietnam, Thailand, and Japan.

The Eisenhower administration advocated for mutual security in the Far East using five key points: (1) provide military aid to establish a vital East Asian alliance against Communist military threats; (2) target the aid to reduce allies’ defense spending and allow them to recover economically from World War II; (3) support cost-effective development and maintenance of military strength compared to deploying U.S. forces directly; (4) position East Asian partners’ forces to deter and respond to hostile actions; and (5) gradually enhance the economy and governance of East Asian partner nations, offering a long-term advantage in the Cold War and an alternative to Communist development models. In doing so, the United States invested significant time and billions of dollars in developing strong local military forces, first in Taiwan and South Korea and then, from 1956 onward, in Southeast Asia and Japan—despite domestic pushback due to “donor fatigue” (96). By the end of Eisenhower’s two terms, more than 1.4 million soldiers in East Asia had been trained and supported through American military assistance. These mutual security policies also contributed significantly to positive economic growth in the ensuing decades.

The book’s structure follows a broad chronological approach, moving smoothly from the Truman administration to the Eisenhower years from 1952 to 1960, and concluding with a brief assessment of the legacies of Eisenhower’s MSP and the enduring challenges in these regions from the Kennedy administration to the present day. Chapter 1 reviews the historical backdrop of mutual security policies inherited from the Truman administration and the lingering distrust between the United States and Far East nations. Chapter 2 analyzes the strategy and policies of the Eisenhower administration during its initial term and its aim of expanding and reshaping military and economic aid for sustained deterrence in East Asia. Chapters 3 and 4 illustrate successes in Taiwan and South Korea despite hurdles. Chapter 3 delves into the development of South Korean military and economic sectors with U.S. assistance. Chapter 4 focuses on Taiwan, serving as the initial test case for Eisenhower’s approach, exploring the impact of American military aid and advice on this regional partner. Chapter 5 examines revisions and reforms to mutual security efforts prompted by public and congressional criticisms, which intensified from 1953 and peaked in 1957 to 1958.

Chapters 6 and 7 differ from the previous chapters by focusing on the Eisenhower administration’s challenges in Southeast Asia and Japan from 1956 to 1960. In Eisenhower’s second term, a commitment to continuity, limited political support in Congress, and a relatively unchanging strategic posture in East Asia hindered these policies. Dealing with South Vietnam, Thailand, and Japan required flexible, ad hoc responses, which were generally unfavorable in Washington, particularly as these nations presented challenges as security partners. Chapter 6 scrutinizes security assistance policies in Southeast Asia, with emphasis on South Vietnam and Thailand, highlighting their distinct developmental challenges. Ultimately, internal security issues in South Vietnam and Thailand fell between the military and civilian realms. Chapter 7 centers on Japan and the tensions between the U.S. and Japanese governments throughout Eisenhower’s presidency. Japan was not fully integrated into an American military program until the mid-1950s. Japan lacked a strong local political leader who could advocate for military partnership, unlike the “strongman” relationships with leaders in Taiwan and South Korea (108). Finally, Chapter 8 assesses the handover to the incoming Kennedy administration and evaluates the successes and failures of nearly a decade of mutual security assistance.

Setzekorn is clear from the beginning that his study aligns with the revisionist perspective, affirming that Eisenhower pursued a well-structured, efficiently executed, and ultimately successful East Asian policy centered on mutual security. Revisionism can be traced back to the 1970s, when a shift in critiques emerged as a new generation of historians, influenced by the Vietnam War and Watergate, began recognizing Eisenhower’s adept and subtle exercise of power. Historian Fred I. Greenstein characterized it as the “hidden-hand presidency” (6). Released government documents and Eisenhower’s personal materials provided more insight into the formulation of crucial decisions and policies made during the 1950s, which Eisenhower had preferred to shape and discuss confidentially. Setzekorn proves through archival evidence that Eisenhower was efficient, focused, and often relentless in pursuing his defense policies abroad.

In addressing the contemporary challenges posed by China’s assertive influence in East Asia, Setzekorn argues that Eisenhower’s policies from 1953 to 1961 offer valuable insights. The book underscores the importance of strategically building allies and military capabilities through military education and advocating for cost-efficient and sustainable deterrence strategies. Setzekorn’s meticulous study fills a significant gap in Cold War military history and provides lessons for today’s policymakers in dealing with the complexities of China in the twenty-first century. For instance, Eisenhower believed that land power, encompassing both U.S. ground forces and allied armies, was crucial for deterring China and shaping broader regional security. In the 1950s, like today, land power demonstrated resilience and interconnectedness and provided a credible deterrent without posing a threat to potential adversaries. Overall, Setzekorn is correct in his overarching argument: exploring the MSP provides insights into U.S. national security strategies and the rivalry with China and offers a new perspective on the Eisenhower administration and its approach to foreign affairs during the Cold War era.