Twelve Days

How The Union Nearly Lost Washington In The First Days Of The Civil War

By Tony Silber, and Reviewed by Stephen Donnelly

Article published on: March 1st, 2025 in the Army History Spring 2025 issue

Read Time: < 4 mins

Potomac Books, 2023 Pp. xxi, 348. $36.95

Twelve Days: How the Union Nearly Lost Washington in the First Days of the Civil War illuminates a largely overlooked crisis at the commencement of the Civil War. Southern troops were within striking distance of the capital, the defenders were few and weak, and no one seemed to be coming to the rescue. If the South had seized the opportunity that was arguably theirs for the taking, the entire course of the war and indeed of human history might have been altered. The capital taken, the government in hiding, Lincoln on the run or imprisoned—these were all very real possibilities during the first days of the war. Game, set, match, and national humiliation was a real possibility. Only the arrival of Northern reinforcements to augment the pitifully small number of militia and guard troops available for the capital’s defense could avert it.

Most Civil War histories devote a page or two to this critical situation, omitting important details and failing to convey the real fear and desperation that Lincoln and his cabinet felt at the time. The government was genuinely in danger of falling, and no one seemed able to do anything about it. Abraham Lincoln, the ambitious politician who craved the chance to make an enduring name for himself, faced the tangible possibility that Washington would fall again as it had during the War of 1812. Instead of being revered for maintaining the Union and emancipation, he instead might face recrimination and ridicule like Governor Thomas Jefferson faced when he lost the Virginia state capital to the British during the revolution.

Twelve Days rectifies this gap in historical knowledge by detailing the critical days from the fall of Fort Sumter to the eventual rescue of Washington. Readers can see how this situation developed over time, and how it eventually was resolved satisfactorily. Washington was an antiabolitionist Southern city, teeming with insurrectionists and Southern sympathizers, and surrounded by the Confederate state of Virginia and the southern-leaning Maryland. A large enemy army lay just two days away by rail, with no Federal forces of any consequence available to stop them if they decided to advance. The city effectively was cut off from the outside world. Enemy forces cut northbound rail lines, blocked roads, burned bridges, severed the telegraph and, stopped the mail. There was no Northern newspaper available. Northern citizens and critical information were prevented from entering the city, adding to the fear and isolation that the people and government felt.

Lincoln precipitated the crisis by calling for 75,000 volunteers to crush the rebellion. This seemingly reasonable response to the attack on Fort Sumter led to vitriolic verbal attacks on Lincoln and the North. Washington, D.C., was seething with discontent, with an undercurrent of violence seemingly ready to be unleashed at the slightest provocation. The Union army was practically nonexistent. Several factors contributed to the early mismatch of forces, with the South gaining an early lead as Southern states started forming their new armies almost immediately after seceding. The Union, however, waited to make the call for volunteers until after hostilities commenced to avoid “provoking” the South. It put them at an immediate disadvantage. The country’s pathetically small national army was spread out around the country on garrison duty, with the bulk of the soldiers stationed across the Mississippi on a mission to “civilize” the Plains Indian tribes. The government officially relied on state militias to fill in the gaps during crisis times such as these. However, the last such crisis had been in 1812, and the state militias had become soft and informal, mere shells of what they were supposed to be. For this short window of time, the South would have something in its favor that it would not see again: numerical superiority.

While Lincoln and the state governors frantically worked to get sufficient troops to Washington, great events were transpiring to impede their progress and slow their advance. Virginia seceded, enemy troops captured the Harpers Ferry arsenal and the Navy Yard, armed mobs attacked Federal troops in Baltimore, and hundreds of officers (almost 25 percent) resigned their commissions. The uncertainty and communications blackout drove Lincoln nearly to despair, prompting him to cry out, “Why don’t they come? Why don’t they come?” (5).

The book documents the confusion, lack of coordination, and politics that delayed but did not prevent the eventual rescue of the city. An important factor for the Confederacy was that although the public favored direct attack, many of its leaders thought it more prudent to build up their forces and protect assets before launching an assault on Washington. This dichotomy of opinion bought the Union some extra time, which they used to their advantage. Troops from New York and Massachusetts eventually were organized and sent to the city, with a good deal of confusion, miscommunication, and political maneuvering by General Benjamin Butler to garner more credit than he deserved.

Twelve Days: How the Union Nearly Lost Washington in the First Days of the Civil War is a fascinating, informative read about an aspect of the Civil War of which many are ignorant. Had the twelve days ended differently, we certainly would not be so uninformed on the topic.