US Must Harden Space Ops Against China and Russia

Countering the invisible war

By Capt. Adrian Pickett, 2nd Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment

Article published on: June 20, 2025 in the Summer 2025 edition of Army Communicator

Read Time: < 3 mins

Russia’s focus on Starlink and space-based assets during its ongoing military operations has raised concerns about countering Western space-enabled communications and intelligence platforms. Russia's approach includes targeting Starlink, which provides a significant battlefield advantage in Ukraine, and attempting to jam or spoof Starlink transmission using advanced electronic warfare (EW) platforms like the Tirada-2S and Tobol systems. Russia has also explored cyber attacks against the Starlink network and the possibility of targeting ground terminals or uplinks with kinetic or cyber-hybrid strategies.

Russia's strategic doctrine classifies space as a critical warfighting domain, aiming to deny or degrade adversaries' access to space assets, particularly for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); navigation, and command and control (C2). Russia has tested kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles and is developing ground-based systems that can blind, dazzle, or disrupt satellite sensors and communications.

Russia is utilizing EW platforms to target GPS, satellite communications (SATCOM), and drone control links, demonstrating its ability to interfere with commercial and military satellite links. NATO and U.S. forces focus on resilience by hardening space-based communications, improving anti-jamming technology, and diversifying low Earth orbit (LEO) and medium Earth orbit (MEO) satellite architecture. Future systems will feature proliferated LEO constellations for redundancy and survivability under EW and kinetic threats.

China’s First-Strike Strategic Aspiration

China and Russia are increasingly concerned about the U.S.'s space-based capabilities, particularly Starlink and other LEO satellite constellations. As the People's Liberation Army (PLA) modernizes, it strategically focuses on counter-space operations and EW to deny the U.S. and its allies a space advantage in future conflicts. China focuses on countering Starlink's military potential through a defensive strategy that includes offensive space, EW, and cyber capabilities. Starlink's dual-use capability, which has been successful in Ukraine, has led to research advocating for developing systems to track, jam, or destroy satellites. China is also exploring swarm targeting using AI-enabled satellite tracking systems. Integrating EW and cyber capabilities under one command allows China to attack satellite networks in multiple ways.

China is investing in ground-based EW platforms that can jam U.S. military SATCOM, GPS, and commercial networks like Starlink and developing AI-based spoofing that can confuse navigation and ISR data. Then, we are addressing China's space threat, which the U.S. addresses through expanding resilient satellite constellations, hardening against EW, and integrating with allies through shared space defense architectures. This strategy aims to disrupt, degrade, or destroy space-based assets through EW and related means, triggering an accelerated space resilience race.

The United States must employ resilient technologies, joint deterrence strategies, and active diplomacy to counter China and Russia's attempts to weaponize the space and EW domains. By strengthening alliances and promoting norms, the U.S. can defend its interests and uphold the International Space Organization in the new era of contested space.

China and Russia have a strategic doctrine that views space as a warfighting domain, with EW being a key pillar of Russia's A2/AD strategy. The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) integrates space, cyber, and EW missions under Russian Aerospace Forces and EW brigades. Primary concerns include Starlink enabling C2, ISR, and drone swarming; U.S. space dominance threatening strategic autonomy; and Star-link supporting Ukraine's battlefield communications and ISR. Advanced PLA cyber units can target SATCOM ground stations and Starlink uplinks, while ground-based systems can jam GPS, SATCOM, and radar.

Space domain awareness rapidly improves space tracking and monitoring through AI and sovereign space sensors. Domestic LEO constellations are developing Guowang, which relies more on denial than competition. Both nations see Starlink and U.S. space-based infrastructure as strategic vulnerabilities to exploit in a conflict.

In conclusion, the U.S. must combine resilient technologies, joint deterrence strategies, and active diplomacy to defend its interests and uphold the International Rules-Based Order (IRBO) in the new era of contested space.