‌Strengthening Army Readiness for NGC2 Systems‌

Theory-centered training

By Capt. Arinze Nwachukwu, 15th Signal Brigade

Article published on: September 1, 2025 in the Fall/Winter 2025 of Army Communicator

Read Time: < 11 mins

U.S. Army officer teaching a class, gesturing while explaining content on projected slides and whiteboard notes.

Chief of Signal and Signal School Commandant, Col. Julia M. Donley, hosts a briefing focused on NGC2 for Signal School instructors and training developers July 22, 2025. (Photo by Laura Levering, U.S. Army Signal School)

The Army’s pursuit of decision superiority and Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) requires a signal and cyber workforce that can operate and defend complex network systems in contested environments. However, current training models often rely on platform-specific and procedural instruction that does not prepare Soldiers for rapid technological change.

This article advocates for a theory-driven approach to institutional training that prioritizes core principles of networking, data flow, system behavior, and cyber defense.

Instruction that is grounded in conceptual mastery equips Soldiers with knowledge that is transferable across legacy, transitional, and emerging systems. This training approach improves adaptability and strengthens the Army’s ability to maintain resilient mission command under degraded conditions. By integrating foundational theory with realistic scenario-based practice, the Signal School and the Cyber School can better prepare Soldiers to meet the demands of modern operations and support the Army’s transformation toward NGC2. A theory-driven model enhances readiness, improves operational flexibility, and supports the Army’s pursuit of decision superiority across all domains.

The convergence of cyber, space, air, land, maritime, and electromagnetic spectrum capabilities increasingly shapes the nature of modern warfare. It creates complex operational environments where actions in one domain influence and accelerate effects in others (Marler, 2023; Nettis, 2020). As these domains become increasingly interconnected (Vassiliou et al., 2025), adversaries take every opportunity to probe networks, interfere with communications, and exploit systemic vulnerabilities with precision and persistence (Burcham, 2022; Lewis & Crumpler, 2019; Plevnik & Vuk, 2025; Radanliev, 2024; Rahimi & Jones, 2025; Safitra et al., 2023). Army senior leaders recognize that this competition is already underway. For instance, Lt. Gen. Jeth Rey, Army deputy chief of staff, G-6, notes that the battlefield exists in digital form long before physical conflict begins, stressing that adversaries challenge Army systems during periods of competition and crisis (Rey, 2025).

Despite the growing complexity of the operational environment, as noted by Montgomery (2019) and other military scholars, the Army must be fully equipped and postured to achieve decision superiority across the entire crisis continuum (Marler, 2023; Montgomery, 2019; Nettis, 2020). Military experts assert that a force achieves decision superiority by sensing, understanding, deciding, and acting more rapidly and accurately than its adversaries (Bellione, 2023; Hoadley, 2021; O’Shaughnessy, 2020).

While modernization initiatives – particularly NGC2 – are designed to deliver a resilient and integrated command architecture that enables this level of informed and timely decision-making (Pomerleau, 2025), this article argues that |these advanced C2 systems can only achieve their intended effects when operated, secured, and sustained by Soldiers who possess the knowledge and adaptability required to employ them in contested conditions.

The Army’s readiness posture must demonstrate to the American people that their Soldiers possess the adaptability, training, and modern capabilities required to prevail in any environment. The force must inspire confidence by proving its readiness to fight and win the nation’s wars, whether in competition, crisis, or armed conflict. This assurance depends on a force that is skilled, resilient, and capable of meeting the demands of an increasingly complex and contested operating environment (Rahimi & Jones, 2025; Rey, 2025; Wilbricht, 2025).

As Rey (2025) stressed, Soldiers must be able to secure, maintain, and adapt complex networked environments even when systems are degraded by attack, disrupted by interference, or strained by the operational tempo. Preparing this workforce requires a shift in how Signal and Cyber Schools train future communicators and cyber operators. Curricula and programs of instruc tion (POI) that focus on a single device or technology are insufficient in an environment defined by rapid technological change and continuous adversary activity.

A “foundations first” approach that emphasizes theory, core principles, and conceptual mastery is essential for building Soldiers who can operate confidently across generations of systems and adapt to the evolving demands of multi-domain operations.

“NGC2 is the most accelerated program in the Signal Corps’ history.”

- Col. Julia M. Donley, Chief of Signal and Signal School Commandant

Limitations

The current instructional model at the Signal School, for instance, relies heavily on teaching Soldiers to operate specific hardware and legacy systems. Students often spend large portions of their training learning procedures associated with equipment that reflects older generations of command and control platforms.

Additionally, POIs rooted in step-by-step device operation do not prepare Soldiers to understand the underlying principles that govern network behavior, data movement, routing logic, spectrum management, or defensive cyber operations. When Soldiers rely on memorized steps for a specific system, they struggle when presented with new or unfamiliar technologies. This equipment-centered model limits adaptability. It prevents Soldiers from transferring knowledge to dynamic network environments that evolve through software updates, virtualization, cloud integration, and data-centric architectures.

Experts have argued that instructional programs across federal cyber workforces often fail to remain relevant because technology evolves faster than curricula can adapt (Black et al., 2024; House et al., 2025; Leader, 2024; Lewis & Crumpler, 2019). This challenge is particularly evident in the Army, where reliance on legacy equipment-based POIs creates a structural lag between what schoolhouses teach and what operational units employ. Additionally, many formations field new communication systems and cyber tools far more rapidly than institutional training can keep up with. As a result, Soldiers who graduate proficient in outdated systems require significant retraining upon arrival at their units. This persistent gap undermines confidence in institutional education and slows the Army’s ability to generate a ready and capable force. Furthermore, institutional laboratories frequently rely on equipment that is difficult to sustain because vendors no longer provide updates or technical support. This issue limits opportunities to incorporate cloud environments, virtualized networks, and modern defensive tools that more accurately represent today’s operational conditions.

Instructors are often further constrained by curriculum designs that emphasize procedural repetition over conceptual mastery. As a result, Soldiers learn how to push buttons on specific devices rather than develop a fundamental understanding of how networks function (Lewis & Crumpler, 2019). This approach limits adaptability and leaves new graduates unprepared for the demands of modern, rapidly evolving systems.

Risks

Operational readiness depends on Soldiers who can think critically and respond effectively in contested environments. Equipment-focused training creates significant gaps in this regard. Modern multi-domain operations demand personnel who can operate through degradation and adapt when adversaries disrupt command and control through cyber intrusion, signal interference, or information operations (Bastian, 2023; Rey, 2025; Wigness et al., 2022). Soldiers trained only on device-specific procedures often struggle when systems malfunction or when unfamiliar conditions arise.

As Bellione (2023) notes, decision superiority requires operators who can restore services, reconfigure networks, and adjust rapidly under pressure. The accelerating pace of technological change exacerbates these gaps. NGC2 introduces modular and software-driven architectures that differ from legacy platforms (Pomerleau, 2025). These systems require an understanding of distributed networking, data management, and principles of resilience. Soldiers must diagnose and correct issues in environments where interfaces and tools are constantly evolving.

Training that relies solely on available schoolhouse equipment limits the Army’s ability to generate a force capable of transitioning to new technologies. Narrow instructional approaches yield limited problem-solving abilities, whereas emerging threats necessitate Soldiers who understand enduring concepts that apply across diverse systems.

Insufficient foundational knowledge also weakens the Army’s ability to fight and win in contested conditions. As adversaries continue to expand their capacity to disrupt communications across multiple domains (Wigness et al., 2022), Soldiers who lack an understanding of network behavior cannot maintain connectivity or restore communications during an attack. These issues place mission command at risk and slow coordinated action across complex operational environments.

Recommendations

Signal and Cyber Schools are pivotal in preparing Soldiers for the Army's transition to NGC2. There needs to be a shift in the training POIs and curricula toward a foundations-first approach that emphasizes theory, principles, and conceptual mastery. Training should ensure that Soldiers understand how to operate networks, how data flows, how to make routing decisions, and how cyber threats exploit vulnerabilities. Instruction built on core principles will allow Soldiers to operate any system they encounter, even when the interface or tool differs from what they used in the schoolhouse.

Modernization also requires increased use of hands-on and scenario-based environments. Platforms such as the Persistent Cyber Training Environment allow Soldiers to practice tasks in realistic settings that reflect modern threats and technologies (Ryan, 2022). These environments reinforce fundamental concepts and allow Soldiers to apply critical thinking under pressure.

The curriculum should also incorporate modern technologies such as cloud services, virtualization, software-defined networks, and datacentric architecture. These technologies represent the direction of NGC2. Soldiers who understand the theory behind these capabilities will be better prepared to support modernization in operational formations. Learning should also emphasize adaptability and continuous development. Certifications, advanced coursework, and cyber competitions help Soldiers maintain proficiency throughout their careers.

A shift toward theory based instruction will also support the Army’s ability to retain a talented cyber workforce. Soldiers who understand the fundamentals of their profession are more confident in their roles and better equipped to contribute to mission success. This training approach creates a more potent force prepared to operate in complex and contested environments.

Conclusion

The future of warfare demands signal and cyber Soldiers who can think critically, adapt quickly, and secure advanced systems under conditions of degradation or attack. The current reliance on legacy equipment and device-specific training limits the Army’s ability to prepare such a force. Modern operations require operators who understand the fundamental principles of networks and cyber defense rather than the procedures associated with a single tool. Training built on core concepts enhances adaptability, supports modernization, and strengthens the Army’s pursuit of decision superiority.

A foundations-first approach at the Signal School will ensure that Soldiers are ready to support NGC2 and capable of meeting the demands of multi-domain operations.

Portrait of Captain Arinze Nwachukwu

References

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Author

Capt. Arinze Nwachukwu is a cyber operations officer (17A) currently serving as the assistant operations officer for 15th Signal Brigade, where he synchronizes resources to enhance training of signal and cyber professionals. Nwachukwu has led mission planning and execution for Cyber Protection Teams, developed intelligence products as an Analytic Support Officer, and collaborated with senior command staff at U.S. Army Cyber Command. He holds a Bachelor of Science in accounting, a post-baccalaureate in enterprise resource planning, and a Master of Business Administration. He is pursuing a doctorate in digital forensics.