The Battle of The Bulge and The Apex of Operational Art and Design
By Sergeant Major Jody L. Mease
Article published on: January 1st, 2024 in the Army Chemical Review 2024 Annual Issue
Read Time: < 13 mins
In December 1944, the Battle of the Bulge, fought in the
frigid Ardennes Mountains between Belgium and Luxembourg, became firmly established in military history.
The battle, which lasted from 16 December 1944 to 25 January 1945,
marked Adolf Hitler’s final major World War II
offensive on the Western Front.
Initially taken by surprise,
American forces withstood the brunt of the German attack
and eventually managed to halt the German advance, forcing a withdrawal. When the battle is analyzed through the
lens of operational art (OA) and design, it is clear that, despite early German successes, critical flaws in planning and
implementation led to Germany’s defeat.
The U.S. Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) played a vital
role in the Allied strategy during intense combat by effectively integrating resources, objectives, methods, and risk
management. The collective efforts of 2,097 CWS officers
and 26,909 CWS enlisted personnel were pivotal in fortifying American defenses against chemical warfare. The Soldiers excelled at additional tasks, garnering support from
commanders who acknowledged their indispensable role in
wartime readiness.
This CWS involvement transcended
traditional limitations through the integration of tactical expertise within a complex and unpredictable theater of war.
The determination of those who were committed to overcoming unexpected challenges and the multifaceted nature of
warfare were highlighted during this period. This article
analyzes the Battle of the Bulge by applying OA and design
and considering the ends, ways, means, and risks of the operation.
Understanding the Intricacies of
OA and Design
The strategic method that commanders and staffs use to
create campaigns and operations that integrate ends, ways,
and means to organize and employ military forces is known
as OA.
Joint force commanders apply OA through judgment,
decision making, and adaptation to the evolving operational
environment (OE). The application of OA in planning helps
develop insight into the issues at hand; it reduces the ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex OE.
Additionally, joint
force commanders and their staffs facilitate unified action
by setting objectives, establishing priorities, and assigning
tasks to subordinate forces, allowing for acknowledgment of
the operating processes, capabilities, objectives, and priorities of interagency partners and other interorganizational
participants.
OA embodies the strategic concepts and visions of commanders and their staffs; operational design
translates these conceptual ideas and thoughts into practical vigor, thereby moving toward the desired end state.
Operational design is the cornerstone that shapes the
planning process; it provides an analytical outline that commanders and planners can use to dissect and grasp the
OE. The critical elements of operational design include the
desired end state and conditions, centers of gravity, decisive
points, lines of operation, operational reach, direct and indirect approach, culmination, timing and tempo, operational
pause, and risk.
Operational design helps guide the application of OA, beginning with a definition of the problem and
the development of an operational approach to solve it. The
campaign subsequently begins to take shape as the following critical questions are addressed: What, how, and with
what risks will resources be distributed, priorities be established, and military objectives be achieved?
Joint force commanders and staffs consider factors such as the OE, enemy
capabilities, and friendly force limitations throughout the
design process. This framework, meticulously shaped by the
commander’s strategic insight, infuses the abstract mastery
of OA.
Bridging the realms of OA and design is pivotal to
understanding the end state set for the Battle of the Bulge.
Decoding Strategic Ends
At its core, the Battle of the Bulge was a clash of military strategic ends and objectives, as two great adversaries competed for tactical control within the rugged terrain
of the Ardennes. The Ardennes Offensive was Hitler’s last
desperate attempt to force an end to the war in Europe on
favorable terms. The German offensive aimed to drive a
wedge through Allied lines, seize vital supply routes, and
hasten the end of the war. Hitler planned to drive through
the Ardennes to capture Antwerp, Belgium, with the desired
strategic end state of splitting the Allied armies. That outcome would isolate British forces in the north while cutting
off vital supply lines to U.S. formations farther south. Hitler
hoped that such a dramatic blow would shatter the Allied
cohesion and will to continue fighting, allowing Germany to
regroup and convince the Western Allies to negotiate peace,
as occurred after the massive 1918 German spring offensives during World War I.To achieve this goal, the Germans identified key road junctions and Belgian towns (such
as St. Vith and Bastogne) as decisive points for capture.
Seizing these key locations would allow German forces to
rapidly advance to the west, toward Antwerp, along several
attack routes through the rugged Ardennes. Hitler believed
that Germany could force a decisive operational victory if
the German forces could quickly reach Antwerp—before Allied reactions solidified.
On the opposing front, the desired strategic end state
involved holding the German offensive and preserving the
Western Allies’ drive forward. The Western Allies viewed
Germany as militarily defeated; their goal was to press
on, into the heart of the German forces, while avoiding
any significant setbacks.Objectives included halting the relentless German offensive, reclaiming lost ground, and
pushing the unified forces of Nazi Germany (Wehrmacht)
back to their original position. Preventing the capture of
Antwerp, a key port and supply hub that was coveted by the
Germans, was critical to the Western Allies’ plan. The Allies
simultaneously aimed to inflict substantial damage on the
German forces, strategically weakening the capacity of their
army, navy, and air force to sustain the fight.
The strengths of the Allies were the unity and combined
combat power of American, British, and other coalition forces. The Allied forces faced the arduous challenges of halting
the enemy advance and preserving their hard-earned gains.
The center of gravity encompassed the town of Bastogne,
Belgium, strategically positioned on the main road to Antwerp. The significance of Bastogne lay in its potential to
either resist German occupation or become the linchpin that
enabled a crucial supply line to Antwerp. Hitler planned to
shatter this potential.
Applying an Operational Approach of Wits
and Ways
As Hitler’s plan unfolded, paving the way for disruption,
CWS concurrently implemented a strategic blend of offensive and defensive measures that would impact the outcome
of the battle. By using protective equipment to combat the
harsh conditions; devising ingenious methods of warfare;
and deploying smoke screens, flame throwers, and chemical agents, chemical warfare turned the tide. It stood as a
testament to the power of strategic ingenuity.
During wartime, managing the demands of scarce resources, supply allocation, and tactical planning proved
time-consuming. Time limitations also posed challenges
for gas warfare training.Despite these complexities, CWS
provided smoke generator units to screen troop movements,
white phosphorus grenades for signaling and screening, and
flame throwers and incendiary grenades to destroy enemy
equipment and fortifications. These capabilities directly
enabled critical Allied operations. For example, in December 1944, the 86th Chemical Mortar Battalion, Camp Campbell, Kentucky, displayed its strengths and combat effectiveness by contributing to defense efforts alongside various
infantry divisions, including the 75th Infantry Division, the
82d Airborne Division, and the 7th Armored Division, located
at St. Vith. The 86th Chemical Mortar Battalion provided
white phosphorous smoke rounds, which created chaos
among enemy forces. With the enemy overwhelmed and
disoriented, its forces started to retreat—thanks to the coordinated efforts of the 86th and the supporting divisions.
Although the use of chemical weapons was limited during the Battle of the Bulge, the threat of chemical weapons
remained throughout the conflict. CWS supplied bulk smoke
pots to create concealment for river crossings, helping Allied forces maintain the momentum. Smoke generator teams
tirelessly worked in frigid weather conditions to provide concealment whenever and wherever needed. Through these
diverse applications, CWS chemical units directly contributed to the Allied effort that led to the defeat of Germany.
The innovative use of chemical smokescreens by CWS exemplified tactical genius and paved the way for strategic
maneuvers that would prove crucial in tilting the balance of
the conflict. This ingenuity set the stage for the subsequent
strategic operations that would lead to a turning point in
the battle.
Leveraging Strategic Means
In the bitter chill and relentless combat of the battle,
CWS, alongside Allied forces, mastered the art of deception
through smoke—a strategic veil meticulously deployed from
an arsenal of agents embedded in hand grenades, rifle grenades, artillery shells, and smoke pots. The battlefield, covered in haze, became a stage where troops were transformed
into shadows and supply lines were obstructed. American
forces commanded the skies with large-scale smoke screens
created by mechanical smoke generators, blurring the lines
between the air and land domains. The smoke shield masked
the Allies from the piercing eyes of the enemy, but also produced a fog that confused and disrupted enemy plans. The
capabilities of the smoke generator teams safeguarded the
lives of countless Soldiers and Allied forces.
Despite the capabilities and ingenuity of the smoke generator teams and the clever tactics of the Allies, the Germans quickly recognized that the pace of these smoke operations was unsustainable. Therefore the Germans assembled
a powerful strike force with which to achieve surprise and
breakthrough in the Ardennes in the opening days of the
Battle of the Bulge. More than 200,000 troops, 2,000 artillery, and 450 tanks and assault guns were amassed for the
German offensive.Many of the assault units had extensive
combat experience. The Germans also stockpiled significant
fuel and ammunition reserves for the initial attack. However, they needed to accurately assess their capacity to support
and sustain a prolonged offensive and match strategic ends
with means. Their goal of rapidly advancing to Antwerp and
splitting Allied forces could have been more ambitious, if
not for the depleted state of Germany in late 1944.At that
time, the Germans lacked the fuel, transport, and logistics
capacity to support an extended mobile campaign deep into
Allied territory and the German offensive quickly outran its
operating systems. Mechanized assault units raced ahead
of infantry support and lost momentum when tanks ran
low on fuel or broke down. In addition, narrow roads in the
Ardennes limited maneuverability, allowing U.S. forces to
hinder the German advances by establishing roadblocks and
destroying bridges. The German Air Force, Luftwaffe, was
unable to gain air superiority, enabling Allied aircraft to
damage German armor, trucks, and supply lines.Allied air
operations disrupted German efforts to maintain open roads
and deliver sufficient ammunition and fuel to the frontline.
The mismatch between ambitious operational reach and
inadequate sustainment quickly caught up to the Germans.
The rapid Allied response and strong counterattacks overwhelmed the German forces, which could not support the intensity of combat operations. Once the Allies countered the
initial surprise attack, the Germans lacked the resources
and operational freedom to advance to the Rhine River—let
alone to Antwerp.This situation highlighted the need for Germany to align its means with its attempted ways and
ends. While more modest offensive goals may have been
achievable, Hitler’s desire for a decisive victory proved to be
unrealistic. The overextension into the Battle of the Bulge
would become a defining moment in the assessment of
Germany’s wartime strategy.
Maneuvering Through the Risks
The miscalculation associated with Germany’s wartime
strategy led to the Ardennes offensive, which was accompanied by significant operational risk—a jeopardy to irreplaceable armored units and national credibility. The armored
division of the German army moved into combat without adequate logistical support, risking destruction if the advance
came to a halt. The lack of necessary resources and operational freedom meant that German forces would need help
to sustain an advance to Antwerp while facing certain Allied
counterattacks. The possible failure of the offensive also put
the legitimacy and control of the Nazi regime at risk. Allied advantages in mobility, firepower, and air supremacy
ultimately diminished the chances of a decisive German victory. A rational analysis demonstrates that the dangers of
the battle far exceeded the potential benefits.
CWS also faced serious risks during the German offensive. Harsh weather conditions negatively impacted the
speed of deployment of troops and equipment. In addition,
without support, CWS teams faced isolation until reinforcements arrived and resupply occurred.The quick counteraction by committed CWS units, compounded by a shortage
of munitions, could have led to severe losses. Limitations of
the CWS increased the danger that mechanized forces faced
when undertaking such a bold counterattack so late in the
war.
Ultimately, the unnecessary strategic risk that Germany took during the Battle of the Bulge also jeopardized essential U.S. CWS units. The chances of achieving decisive
success were minimal, which increased the probability of a
catastrophic failure of Nazi ambitions and the remaining
armored forces. Both Germany as a nation and CWS as a
crucial branch of the U.S. military faced existential risks in
the Ardennes gamble.
Conclusion
An OA and design analysis reveals strategic deficiencies
in Germany’s last significant offensive on the Western Front
during World War II. Although achieving initial tactical surprise provided some success, the inability of the Germans
to maintain momentum meant that their operational reach
outpaced their capabilities. A thorough and accurate assessment of their forces as well as those of their enemy might
have led the Germans to a more viable strategy. Meanwhile,
the Allied coalition demonstrated resilience and adaptability
in responding to the unexpected German attack. Key CWS
capabilities effectively obscured movements and strategically shaped the battlespace to support Allied counteroffensive maneuvers. The intricacies of OA and design illustrate
why the German strategy and Hitler’s campaign to conquer
Europe failed.
Endnotes
Roger Cirillo, Ardennes-Alsace: The U.S. Army Campaigns
of World War II, The U.S. Army Center of Military History,
2019, https://history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-26/CMH_Pub_72-26(75th-Anniversary).pdf, accessed on 17 September
2024.
Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, Office of
the Chief of Military History, 5 May 2010.
Brooks E. Kleber and Dale Birdsell, The Chemical Warfare
Service: Chemicals in Combat, U.S. Army Center of Military
History, 1966.
Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Planning, 1 December
2020.
Ibid.
JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, 18 June 2022
Ibid
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3105.01B, Joint Risk Analysis Methodology, 22 December 2023
JP 3-0.
Cole.
William K. Goolrick and Ogden Tanner, The Battle of the Bulge (World War II), Time-Life Education, 1 January 1977.
Cirillo.
Goolrick.
Cole.
Donald M. Goldstein et al., Nuts! The Battle of the Bulge:
The Story and Photographs, Brassey’s Inc., 1994.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Kebler and Birdsell
Ibid.
Ibid.
The 86th Chemical Mortar Battalion Presents Its Battle
History, U.S. Army, 1946, https://digicom.bpl.lib.me.us/ww_reg_his/83/, accessed on 17 September 2024.
Kebler and Birdsell.
Leo P. Brophy et al., The Chemical Warfare Service: From
Laboratory to Field, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988.
Cirillo.
Cole.
Diane T. Putney, ULTRA and the Army Air Forces in World War II: An Interview With Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Office of Air Force History, 1987.
Goldstein
Cirillo
Kebler and Birdsell.
Author
Sergeant Major Mease is the chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and explosives protection sergeant major for the 11th
Airborne Division, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska.
She holds a bachelor’s degree in leadership and workforce development from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.