‌Joint Readiness Is Not Optional

Closing the Army’s Preparation Gap

By CW3 Emmanuel Tello, Military Intelligence

Article published on: March 1st 2026, in the March 2026 Edition of Strength in Knowledge: The Warrant Officer Journal

Read Time: < 5 mins

The Army prepares for large-scale combat operations (LSCO), but it does not adequately prepare Soldiers for the joint headquarters where those operations are planned and enabled. As great power competition intensifies, joint staffs must make timely, accurate decisions faster than adversaries. Field Manual 3-0 states that the Army will meet these challenges by conducting multidomain operations as part of a joint and multinational force (Department of the Army, 2025). Despite this doctrinal emphasis, the Army underprepares Soldiers for the demands of joint duty assignments. This gap creates avoidable operational friction that degrades staff lethality and hinders headquarters’ ability to generate options and execute decisions at speed. To close the gap between the Army’s training model and the requirements of joint assignments, the institution must integrate joint concepts earlier in professional military education (PME), mandate specialized pre-joint assignment education, and apply deliberate talent management to align individual expertise with joint requirements.

PME Must Integrate Joint Concepts Earlier

The Army’s PME system builds deep technical and branch-specific expertise but postpones meaningful joint exposure until the most senior levels. Joint PME is largely reserved for officers pursuing a general officer rank (CJCS, 2018). Within the Warrant Officer cohort, structured joint education does not meaningfully emerge until CW3s prepare for advancement to CW4. As a result, Soldiers arrive at joint headquarters highly proficient in service-specific processes yet unprepared to translate that expertise into a joint framework.

This readiness gap often means that during the first three to six months of a joint tour, a Soldier is learning to function rather than contributing at full capacity. This adjustment period directly reduces staff lethality at a time when speed determines advantage. Incoming personnel rely on informal, ad hoc training, which reduces staff productivity and shifts additional burden onto experienced members who must compensate for these knowledge gaps.

Furthermore, this gap is most evident in complex staff processes, such as targeting. While Army personnel receive extensive education on service-specific methodologies, joint staffs operate within a distinct cycle governed by Joint Publication 3-60, which features different staff roles and separate approval authorities (CJCS, 2024). A Soldier trained in the Army’s D3A (decide, detect, deliver, assess) methodology may struggle when assigned to a joint targeting board operating on a fixed 72-hour air tasking cycle, governed by different staff roles, approval authorities, and battle rhythms. Contemporary analysis of enlisted joint education reinforces that these challenges are not isolated to commissioned officers; a 2024 assessment found that without standardized Enlisted Joint Professional Military Education (EJPME), noncommissioned officers must rely on self-directed learning, leading to inconsistent outcomes across combatant commands (Raffaele, 2024). Earlier PME integration would reduce this friction before arrival at the joint headquarters.

Pre-Joint Assignment Education

Joint assignments demand more than technical competence; they require an understanding of how different services think, plan, and exercise authority. Each service operates within its own professional culture shaped by distinct planning norms, command relationships, and decision-making philosophies. In joint headquarters, positional authority often outweighs rank, and processes follow joint battle rhythms rather than Army-specific methods (CJCS, 2025).

Without prior education on these cultural differences, Soldiers may misinterpret the authority of approval, staff roles, or coordination requirements. What appears to be procedural confusion is often a cultural mismatch. These misunderstandings slow staff integration and degrade decision speed during high-tempo operations.

AR 350-1 defines institutional, operational, and self-development domains of training (Department of the Army, 2025). However, the Army largely expects Soldiers to learn joint culture through operational immersion rather than institutional preparation. This approach assumes adaptation will occur without deliberate preparation. Instead, it shifts the burden to gaining headquarters, which must absorb friction while new personnel acclimate.

The Army should institutionalize a standardized pre-joint preparation pipeline delivered after assignment notification and before report date. This program could leverage distributed learning modules, virtual staff exercises, and assignment-specific orientation tailored to the gaining command. Distance learning platforms already used across PME provide a scalable mechanism to introduce joint culture, battle rhythms, and planning processes prior to arrival. By shifting preparation into the institutional domain rather than relying on self-development, the Army can reduce integration friction and improve immediate staff effectiveness.

Align Talent Management with Joint Requirements

Talent management practices compound the readiness gap by identifying joint assignments too late for deliberate preparation. Soldiers frequently receive orders with limited time to pursue targeted education or mentorship. This reactive model conflicts with research demonstrating that joint effectiveness depends on deliberate alignment of education, experience, and assignment timing (Harrell & Miller, 1996).

When preparation begins only after assignment notification, readiness becomes an individual burden rather than an institutional responsibility. The gaining headquarters must absorb integration friction during the opening months of a tour—precisely when cohesion and speed matter most.

The Army should treat joint service as a deliberate career track rather than an incidental assignment. Human Resources Command can identify officers and warrant officers with strong joint potential during key developmental positions and flag them for future joint utilization. This early designation would allow T2COM and branch proponents to align PME timing, distributed learning, and preparatory education with projected joint assignments. Instead of receiving orders and scrambling to prepare, Soldiers would enter joint billets with synchronized education, mentorship, and doctrinal familiarity already in place.

Mentorship reinforces this alignment. Leaders with prior joint experience provide practical insight into inter-service coordination, approval authorities, and coalition dynamics that doctrine alone cannot convey—pairing joint-bound personnel with experienced mentors before arrival transforms joint duty from a temporary assignment into a deliberate warfighting competency.

Conclusions

Joint operations are no longer the exception but the norm in modern warfare. As the Army prepares for LSCO and multidomain conflict, joint staff effectiveness directly influences operational tempo and strategic advantage. The Army’s current preparation model relies too heavily on individual initiative, creating predictable friction at critical levels of command.

Integrating joint concepts earlier into PME, institutionalizing assignment-specific pre-joint education, and aligning talent management with projected joint utilization will reduce avoidable friction and improve staff lethality. Preparing Soldiers for joint service is not merely a professional development goal; it is essential to the military’s ability to generate combat power in the next fight.

T2COM, the Army G-3/5/7, and Human Resources Command must align education, assignment timing, and talent management with deliberate pre-joint preparation. Joint readiness must be institutionalized before Soldiers arrive—not learned after they report.

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