Reviewing and Improving Standardization at Foreign Disclosure Offices
By CW4 Melissa R. Partaka, PsyD
| Warrant Officer Journal, July-September 2023 Edition
Read Time: < 8 mins
The Foreign Disclosure Branch, under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G2, at Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) could find increased efficiency through the provision of more affirmative oversight and direction, ultimately allowing more cohesion, communication, and connectivity throughout all Army Foreign Disclosure Offices (FDOs). The Department of Defense (DoD), and each of its military branches are all built on a set of standards that provide for uniformity across the organization. Regardless of whether a Soldier or civilian is supporting the military mission at Camp Parks, California, or Stuttgart, Germany, the standard for disclosure should remain consistent at all locations. This requirement for standardization through oversight and direction is critical to military operations and foreign partnerships alike. This is most readily demonstrated in the near-real-time need for disclosure of information to U.S. allies in Ukraine.
Foreign Disclosure (FD) standards are captured and made available for reference through military publications, including policies, regulations, manuals, and pamphlets. Minor differences may occur at various locations due to local command interpretation of the guidance or nuances of leadership. Still, in general, one should expect consistency regardless of location or mission. This has not proven to be the case with the foreign disclosure process.
In today’s interconnected world, the United States oftentimes needs to share classified military information (CMI) and controlled unclassified information (CUI) (formerly for official use only [FOUO]) with foreign partners. These situations include selling equipment, services, and associated technical information through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process. Before the authorized disclosure and sharing of information with foreign partners, several stakeholders must review the requested information to verify need-to-know, safety and implications, and legality of the release to the intended recipient(s).
The primary policy that governs the release of CMI and CUI to foreign partners is the National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 119 (Kissinger, 1971). The procedures to execute NSDM 119 are contained in the National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations, also known as National Disclosure Policy, or NDP-1 (Mattis, 2017). These policies are enforced within the intelligence community (IC) through the Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG) 403.1 (Clapper, 2013). Furthermore, they flow down to the Joint level through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 5230.01A (McKenzie, 2021) and into the Department of Defense for enforcement through the Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5230.11 (DoD, 1992). At this level, it branches out into the different military departments. Within the Department of the Army, the governing policy for FD is Foreign Disclosure and Contacts with Foreign Representatives, Army Regulation (AR) 380-10 (U.S. DA, 2015). Internally, various subordinate Army Commands establish similar guidance for execution at their level. One example of this is the Foreign Disclosure Operations Manual established by Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in TRADOC Pamphlet (TP) 380-10 (U.S. DA, 2019).
The overall requirements at each of the various levels of enforcement remain consistent. The authority to disclose must be in writing for specific individuals or positions. This is provided through a delegation of disclosure authority letter (DDL). This authority is limited to Foreign Disclosure Officers (FDOs) who have completed the required certification training, been appointed to the position in writing, and granted authority to release with a DDL. Foreign Disclosure is an inherently governmental function, therefore only government military and civilian personnel may conduct these duties; government contractors may not conduct the duties of an FDO. Personnel serving as an FDO must be of sufficient rank to execute disclosure decisions on behalf of the organization commander. Foreign Disclosure Representatives (FDRs) are government military, civilians, or contractors appointed in writing who assist, advise, and make recommendations to FDOs regarding Foreign Disclosure matters.
The inconsistency in Foreign Disclosure becomes apparent in the execution of the process for review prior to release. Most of the doctrinal guidance declares this process must occur through the Foreign Disclosure Management System (FDMS), a web-based repository where requests are initiated, routed, tracked, and returned to the requestor as approved or rejected, providing space for comments for correction or contacts for direct communication (U.S. DA, 2019). All submissions are stored for future retrieval and reference if necessary. FDMS is maintained as a SharePoint portal available on Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) or Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS) for CMI requests. FDMS is also available on Non-Classified Internet Protocol Network (NIPRNET) for processing of CUI requests.
Unfortunately, FDMS is not available within all Army organizations, which forces the Foreign Disclosure Office to develop local processes for their organizations. The typical alternate default option is to handle all FD requests and communications through email. These requests should be encrypted for digital protection of the information, but this is not always practiced or enforced. Due to the size of some documents in such requests, requestors must resort to utilizing DOD Safe to transmit the attachments, in addition to the separate request email. Organization of these requests and associated communications fall to the responsibility of the requestor(s) and the FDO, and should either person leave that position, all continuity and access to the correspondence is lost in the departure.
Inconsistencies in the process among these subordinate levels will continue and worsen across the Army until unifying requirements and systems access are made available and enforced at the Department of the Army level. To ensure such consistencies, the Foreign Disclosure Branch, under the Deputy Chief of Staff, G2, at HQDA should provide more affirmative oversight and direction to allow for more cohesion, communication, and connectivity throughout all Army Foreign Disclosure Offices. An internet search for “Foreign Disclosure” provides a link to a website that appears to attempt to accomplish just that, but the website was last updated in 2012, giving the impression that any efforts into this reform and standardization ceased years ago (U.S. DA, n.d.). More affirmative oversight and direction from the FD Branch would ensure consistent FD standards are put in place at all levels where FD actions occur. The oversight and direction could be in areas where local issues are experienced, such as ensuring the local Network Enterprise Center (NEC) or G6 gets FDMS on the network for access and use by those associated with the FD process.
Providing more affirmative oversight and direction to the FD process would have significant impacts to readiness and the total Army during Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) by providing a stream-lined process allowing for consistent communications and review of requests, expediting the release and sharing of information to foreign allies in near real time. This timely communication is a priority now more than ever as the Army fights side-by-side on the battlefield with its coalition partners and provides support to its allies, as demonstrated with the conflict in Ukraine. Furthermore, unlike in years past, the battlefield constantly changes minute-by-minute, so any delay in information could cost lives, as well as be devastating to force readiness.
This recommendation for providing more affirmative oversight and direction should be a top priority as the U.S. prepares the force for a possible conflict with Russia or China. Such a conflict would not solely be a force-on-force battle limited only to the United States fighting either Russia or China. Such a conflict would have worldly implications affecting most of the countries across the globe, whether militarily or economically. It would require unified collaborations with foreign allies, and such collaborations would stress the already taxed FD requirements. If the FD Branch would provide more affirmative oversight and direction across the Army, it would provide for cohesion, communication, and connectivity throughout all Army FDOs and aid in the urgent release of information to foreign partners.
To effectively establish and implement a standardized Foreign Disclosure review process, relationships and communication must occur between the various stakeholders. This begins with individuals at the HQDA FD Branch and extends to all the FD offices across the Army, as well as all analysts and other requestors involved in submitting requests for foreign release. Furthermore, Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM) and each of the regional and local installation NECs are vital to this process to ensure that FDMS is available. HQDA FD Branch should address any counterproductive stakeholders, enforcing the regulatory requirements. These issues can be identified through reporting or inspection of the FD process through the command inspection program (CIP).
Standardization and enforcement across the stakeholders are legally and ethically imperative. FDOs must abide by legal requirements when determining if requested information is eligible for release to the intended foreign governments and international organizations. These legal requirements are guided by ethical considerations. A standardized process in a central repository such as FDMS would allow for oversight by all FDOs within the organization, ensuring illegal or unethical favors are not conducted between requesting and releasing individuals within the process, as governed by U.S. Code, Title 18 § 798, Disclosure of Classified Information.
Recognizing that all policies originate at the strategic level and flow down to subordinate organizations, addressing this issue at the strategic level is the best course of action to impact change and implement the proposed solution. At that level, policies already exist, providing the framework for standardization throughout the force. Stakeholders can leverage these policies through enforcement at the subordinate levels to ensure standardization, resulting in cohesion, communication, and connectivity throughout all Army Foreign Disclosure Offices, providing oversight and compliance with legal and ethical considerations, with every element of the process being interconnected like the systems thinking process.
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