Education: The Blue Print of the Army

By CW4 Matthew Chrisman, CW4 Joseph Galbraith, CW4 Michael Gudmundson, CW4 Will Sirmon, and CW4 Josh Wills

April 1, 2024 | Warrant Officer Journal, April-June 2024 Edition

Read Time: < 25 mins

Editors Note: The contributing authors developed this article during the Warrant Officer Senior Service Education Course (Class 24-0004) as their capstone project in May 2024. Their individual information is found in their author’s notes.

Introduction

To develop the proper blueprint of education, you must start with leadership. Does the chosen leadership have the right experience to develop these blueprints? Can the leadership work well with other leaders to establish a good education mission statement? The US Army must address TRADOC leadership education shortfalls within a multifaceted institutional domain; leader relationships, the operational environment, and professional military education will strengthen the Army’s foundation and promote a more enhanced global leader.

A Stronger Sergeant Major and Warrant Officer Relationship

To achieve a better educated, cohesive, and lethal fighting force, we can focus and improve on relationships amongst leaders that will get us to this goal. Turning for a moment to the Army Warrant Officer (WO), we can pick apart the aspects needed to educate the WO of the future. The Army has 48 WO military occupational specialties, which are the jobs WOs operate in. Most technical branches require Soldiers to achieve a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) rank to be partially qualified for an appointment as a WO. Not just any NCO will suffice. Only the very best NCOs will be selected to become WOs. Understanding that the Army must recruit the best NCOs to become WOs, it is prudent for WOs to work closely with and have strong professional relationships with those responsible for the development of NCOs, and that is the Sergeant Major. The Army Warrant Officer and Sergeant’s Major cohorts must bridge relationship gaps, fostering collaboration, communication, and mutual respect for a more robust military force.

Dissecting this relationship gap between Sergeants Major (SGM) and WO cohorts, we can examine, identify, and determine areas that need special attention and prioritize factors that will help build strong, lasting bonds between the two cohorts. After all, SGMs and senior WOs seek opportunities to engage in initiatives to improve NCO and WO education.

For centuries, the link between senior officers, or commanders, and their senior enlisted NCO, or SGM, has been established, codified, and battle-tested. Those in charge revere these two professionals as the most competent and committed leaders the Army has chosen for leadership. Their bond is strong; the bond between WO and SGM should be just as strong.

A WO cohort comprises the best trained, most technical, and highly competent NCOs the Army offers. Army WOs are invested in the educational development of the NCOs within their career management field (CMF). The WO cohort’s existence means that CMF’s NCOs will strive for excellence and push themselves to greatness. Should an NCO choose a path for WO selection, their achievements in the operational, institutional, and self-development training domains will be scrutinized to prove they stand above their peers. As stated before, the best NCOs will be chosen as WOs. When the senior WO and SGM cohorts work together to develop and improve the three training domains, professional military education for both cohorts will reap the benefits.

Separately, understanding the educational impacts of large-scale Combat Operations (LSCO), knowing that improving education takes work, and knowing how important communication strategies between stakeholders are while paying attention to ethical considerations makes the undertaking of building a strong partnership between senior WOs and SGM seem less daunting.

Educational Impacts to Large-Scale Combat Operations

This recommendation for stronger bonds between SGM and WOs is for developing better education initiatives that have lasting impacts on readiness and the total Army in LSCO. Ultimately, a more cohesive and collaborative enlisted and warrant leadership structure can enhance readiness across the Army. When SGMs and WOs work together effectively, they can better support their units’ training, morale, and readiness. At the operational or strategic level, this may influence the types and intensity of training and exercises conducted by the organization. Adequate and realistic (battle-focused) training is essential for maintaining readiness for LSCO scenarios. If the recommendation involves the integration of new technologies or capabilities, there may be implications for readiness. The Army must ensure that Soldiers are trained to use these technologies effectively and properly maintained and supported in the field (ex., C-sUAS, micro-sensors, autonomous detection).

Improving Education Takes Work

Convincing the Army to prioritize, approve, and implement initiatives for collaboration efforts between cohorts comes with a cost. In a resource-constrained environment where growth is not permitted, it is understood that other avenues must be considered. Army WOs and SGM approach challenges from different perspectives due to their unique roles and experiences. Working together allows them to consider a broader range of factors and develop more comprehensive solutions to complex problems. Collaboration and mutual support create effective pathways for career development for both Senior NCOs and WOs. This can include opportunities for cross-training, leadership exchanges, and joint assignments that broaden both cohorts’ skill sets and experiences. A strong bond between SGM and WOs can contribute to overall unit cohesion and effectiveness. When senior leaders are aligned and supportive of each other, it sets a positive example for junior enlisted soldiers and fosters a culture of teamwork and mutual respect.

Communication Strategies Between Stakeholders

An undertaking like the emphasis on relationship building, where little to no emphasis was, to begin with, will undoubtedly draw levels of scrutiny. “It is important to note that there is no timeline to human ego development, and there can be no one-size-fits-all approach to its progress.” Relationship and communication strategies between vertical and horizontal stakeholders are vital for seeing the merits and benefits of SGM and WOs closing relationship gaps. This endeavor will succeed with a strong relationship, clear conscience, and consistent communication. There are also the nay-sayers or counterproductive stakeholders which must be considered. These and other communication considerations regarding educational goals based on bonds between cohorts are valid.

Strengthening communication between SGMs and WOs creates opportunities for mentorship and guidance. Chief Warrant Officers can mentor Sergeants Major on technical aspects of their roles, while Sergeants Major can provide leadership and professional development mentorship. Working closely together allows SGM and senior WOs to collaborate more effectively on solving complex problems and addressing challenges within their units. Their combined perspectives and expertise can lead to more innovative solutions, like improvements in education. Instead of dwelling solely on the negative aspects of the situation, focus on finding constructive solutions. Dealing with counterproductive leaders can be emotionally taxing and stressful. Therefore, by approaching the problem with a proactive and solution-focused mindset, you can mitigate the negative impacts and work towards positive change within the organization. The ultimate recommendation is that SGM and WOs lead by example. You can positively influence the culture and dynamics within the organization, even in the face of counterproductive leadership.

Ethical Considerations

Addressing ethical considerations in building strong bonds between SGM and WOs requires thoughtful leadership, clear guidance, and ongoing oversight from senior leaders. By prioritizing fairness, integrity, and professionalism, the leadership should advocate for and implement a strong bond between SGMs and senior WOs while upholding its core values and ethical standards. Advocating for a strong bond between Sergeants Major and Chief Warrant Officers should uphold the authority and prerogatives of officers within the organization. Maintaining transparency and integrity in all professional interactions is crucial to mitigate the risk of favoritism or bias. All Soldiers should have equal opportunities for mentorship, professional development, and advancement regardless of rank or position. And lastly, when WOs and SGMs collaborate, they can contribute diverse insights and expertise to the decision-making process. This can lead to more informed and well-rounded decisions that account for both technical considerations and personnel-related factors.

Soldiers and subordinate units highly regard the relationships among their senior leaders. The capacity in which those seniors collaborate is where the examples are set, behaviors observed, and leadership is followed. Sergeants Major and Warrant Officers have a collaborative opportunity to boost educational initiatives that will benefit both NCO and WO cohorts. “Imagine the impact if this template spread across multiple centers of excellence. The benefits would multiply exponentially, helping to strengthen trust and build understanding within leadership teams before unit arrival.”

As the relationship between Sergeants Major and Warrant Officers expands, it sets a foundation of trust that will mold the blueprint for negotiating and educating the force. When addressing the difficulties of LSCO or irregular warfare, our soldiers expect strong bonds amongst their leaders.

Irregular Warfare

“To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” -Sun Tzu

In recent years, the operational environment has been shifting towards Irregular Warfare (IW) within each of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC). IW is a conflict where one or both sides do not adhere to conventional military tactics and strategies. Instead, IW elements use unconventional methods such as guerrilla tactics, sabotage, terrorism, and other forms of asymmetric warfare. Several factors, including changes in the global security environment, technological advancements, and the proliferation of non-state actors, have shifted the Operation Environment. For the United States Army to meet and win within each GCC, there will need to be a deep analysis of the operational approach for the self-development, operational, and institutional domains.

IW has been used since ancient times, and elements have been employed throughout our military campaigns. The definition of IW has been heavily debated in recent years. The current Reference Copy of Joint Publication 1, Volume 1 Joint Warfighting (JP 1) defines irregular warfare as “a struggle among state and non-state actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy. In the gray zone between war and peace, ARSOF provides the United States Government with a small-foot-print option for influencing unfriendly regimes and counterinsurgencies and assisting in containing possible conflicts that may undermine US and allies’ partnership. Large-scale maneuver elements focus on combat power by dominating physical terrain. Army Special Operation Forces expand the breadth and depth of their operational reach by working by, with, and through indigenous elements to deter or defeat hybrid threats. The goal is to set conditions for Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) as the primary or supporting role of the US Army or Joint Force. ”Traditional warfare aims to win wars. Irregular warfare aims to secure or maintain the legitimacy of a government” (Lt Col Abby Barger, Published July 6, 2023, Wild Blue Yonder Online Journal).

One of the main drivers of the shift towards irregular warfare is the changing global security environment. Traditional state-on-state warfare is becoming less common as states are increasingly unwilling to engage in large-scale military conflicts. Instead, regional and international powers increasingly rely on proxy forces and non-state actors to achieve their strategic and operational objectives. Non-state actors, such as terrorist groups and insurgent movements, are becoming more prevalent and influential in global conflicts (Figure 1). Some have reshaped antigovernment-leaning and anti democracy-inspiring countries, thus increasing recruitment for these movements while filling their global operational approach for state actors, specifically Russia, China, and Iran (Seth G Jones).

…if we learned anything from Iraq and from the two decades of battling various asymmetric threats, it is that victory means both military success and lasting peace.

Advancements in technology have played a significant role in irregular warfare evolution. The proliferation of cheap and accessible technology, such as drones and cyber weapons, has lowered the barriers to entry for non-state actors, allowing them to conduct sophisticated attacks that were once the exclusive domain of nation-states. This has created a more complex and unpredictable operational environment where traditional WWII military tactics and strategies may be less effective or moved into a supporting role. A recent example of a technology shift is Ukraine’s employment of drone support or a primary effort to stall Russian force’s advancement or Iran-backed militia “Houthi” conducting drone attacks against US Navy warships. So, how will the US Army provide early and frequent exposure at the junior level that will inevitably guide and make a better leader for strategic, operational, and tactical elements?

“a gray zone ‘win’ is not a win in the classic warfare sense,” but rather, “maintaining the US Government’s positional advantage . . . or simply denying an adversary a decisive positional advantage.” (General Joseph Votel)

Forging ARSOF/US ARMY Expertise

One of the main issues is that when repetition is not consistent or interrupted, it causes the development and the capability of the expertise to be slowed. For example, the current ARSOF pipeline has all elements focused on the Pineland Scenario that spans from US Support to FID to US Sponsored seven phases of Unconventional Warfare. According to doctrine and US Code, there are 14 core activities for Special Forces Green Berets, but 1st SFC (A) focuses on a list of nine: COIN, FID, UW, CT, the counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, special reconnaissance, security force assistance, and information operations. IW is composed of five elements: counterinsurgency, stability operations, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, and unconventional warfare. Once the ARSOF soldier has graduated from their pipeline, they move on and are gainfully employed globally, fulfilling GCC requirements and pursuing deepening knowledge of their trade. As ARSOF soldiers continue to move up the ladder of Bloom Taxonomy (Figure 2), they increasingly attempt to apply their expertise to the current environment, the partner element, or their organization. The interesting assumption is that everyone is equal in learning, understanding, and applying their profession.

The downside is that we, as an organization, are chasing that next rank, reducing learning, understanding, and employing capability. Since September 11, 2001, we have drastically reduced the time we allow individuals to remain with their operational element, which lengthens the time for deep knowledge developmental edge. As illustrated in Figure 2 and considering DA PAM 600-3 and 600-25, the time to go from knowledge to evaluation has extended because of two issues. The first is training certification, and management has moved up from the tactical level, which has reduced the deep understanding of a problem and how to approach and mitigate risk. The second issue is the reduced time at the tactical level, which has diminished high-quality repetitions that make a better leader by dealing with various problems that require and enhance decision-making skills. For example, when I arrived at my first Special Forces Company/Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA), the average age in the company was 38, with ten years on an ODA. This 10-year period creates a deep understanding and knowledge that allows commanders to accept risk more freely and permits individuals to answer requirements globally while working off only the commander’s intent. So, how do you forge expertise? Take a hard look at DA PAM 600-3/600-25 to possibly create two pipelines that allow individuals to make the rank of E-8 and let the other one follow the command track to make E-9. This will serve two purposes: the individual who wants to stay at the tactical level will conduct high-quality repetitions to build a better team at the lower level with more profound knowledge. While still allowing the command track individual to pursue up and out while maintaining a deep knowledge individual to assist with hard decisions from the tactical level. So, what will be required of Army elements in a permissive, semi-permissive, and denied environment outside of the core fundamentals that are taught to maneuver and support elements? Below are some fundamental changes that can be implemented to enhance effectiveness in technical environments, whether you are attending PME or an advanced class. The individual and leader will utilize DA PAM and a mapped-out plan that will monitor and assist with the soldier’s success.

Increase Cybersecurity Training

Cybersecurity is becoming a crucial aspect of irregular warfare with the increasing use of technology. Army personnel must be able to identify and mitigate cyber threats that can disrupt their operations or compromise their mission. This includes training in secure communications, encryption, and digital forensics to help target or assist in signature reduction. Recent conflicts have shown that integrating cyber-enabling capabilities with warfighting functions provides a marked advantage. One aspect of these hybrid strategies involves using cyber operations to disrupt communication and information systems. The US Department of Defense has acknowledged the growing cyber threat, emphasizing enhanced cyber defenses and capabilities to protect critical infrastructure and maintain operational advantage (US Department of Defense, 2018). Using drones, encrypted communications, and non-uniformed combatants complicates detecting and attributing hostile actions. A RAND Corporation study highlights how such tactics have been effectively used in conflicts, forcing conventional forces to adapt to a constantly evolving threat landscape (RAND Corporation, 2019).

Enhance Electromagnetic Warfare Training

Electromagnetic warfare (EW) is another critical capability that requires elements to be trained to improve their lethality in operational environments. They need to be able to identify and disrupt enemy command, control, cyber, and communication networks, jam enemy signals, and protect their communications from interception with assistance in signature reduction. EW training should be a significant focus due to the shrinking size of the world. Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) soldiers should have more training or equipment to automate programming and Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) activity reporting. US Army EW training will improve with adjusted programming with current equipment and improved programming with fielded equipment. EW equipment takes too much time to program and configure to keep pace with the changing operational environment. The process is preparing, programming, confirming, adjusting, and operating. To prepare EW equipment, the CEMA 17 series soldier should research the geographic location where EMS equipment will operate with current EMS activity data from US spectrum management, intelligence, and host nation civilian spectrum management sources. To complete the programming, the unit spectrum manager will review all EMS-dependent equipment to allocate frequencies for every EMS-dependent system to conduct the mission. ADP 3-0 states, “No two operational environments are the same.” A recommended option is for the EMS survey team to be sent to the employment location to identify and compare EMS activity with research and expected EMS results. Survey team data can reduce interference, identify additional EMS activity, and confirm that current programming power levels meet commanders’ intent for signature management. Near-field surveys can detect changes in EMS activity that have not already been considered.

Incorporate Advanced Technologies

Advanced schools must be developed to provide training in the latest technologies and innovations to improve from lethality to governance in technical environments. This includes everything from drones and advanced communications systems to new weapons and equipment. Additionally, they need to be able to troubleshoot and repair these systems in the field and understand the underlying technical principles to support, enhance, or identify repairs. The equipment or soldier training recommendation is a false option; as technology develops, equipment should stand up to automation as soldiers stand down for human EMS activity survey, programming, and reporting. The military will fight with the soldiers and equipment currently fielded. Equipment AI automation and most/all system integration are feasible, and human-in-the-loop management will reduce costs when equipment automation integration is trusted and verified. Miscalculations can result in unintended deaths; therefore, the verification standard must be high. Just like a physical map cannot be spoofed or jammed, the programming and AI must have comparable independent or standalone tests. The purpose of the test is to confirm AI programming accuracy. For example, detect when programming needs update, wrong data input, or an unknown error is causing malfunction or decrease in accuracy. Technology accuracy testing can be a simple operator process like zeroing an M4.

Focus on Data Analysis and Intelligence Gathering

Data analysis and intelligence gathering are becoming critical components of irregular warfare with the increasing use of technology. Operational elements must be trained to analyze data and intelligence to identify enemy patterns and vulnerabilities. This includes training in data analysis software and traditional intelligence-gathering methods. Tactical sensors may be the only ones in contested and congested EMS environments to conduct data analysis and intelligence gathering. Equipment AI automation, system integration, and accuracy testing can use local sensors to verify national intelligence gathering and exchange data without a cross-domain solution. CEMA EMS survey equipment and soldiers operate under separate authorities than intelligence. This means combat data can be exchanged with any host nation civilian or military to build everyday operation picture awareness. For example, US sensors detect a friendly civilian or military partner operating on unauthorized frequency. The intelligence community may be unable to release how we know a non-U.S. transmitter is active. CEMA community sensors can immediately share frequency, power level, emitter azimuth, and likely equipment location due to operations under separate authorities. Commanders and staff must distinguish CEMA combat data from the rigor of an intelligence product; this same product would increase risk if applied in a kinetic targeting scenario.

Enhance Mission Planning and Execution

With the increasing complexity of technical environments, mission planning and execution become even more critical. Elements need to be able to plan complex operations that involve advanced technologies and adapt to changing situations in the field. Mission planning and execution should be a significant focus geared towards more high-quality sets and reps of MDMP to ADM, thus promoting personnel to employ at the top of Bloom’s Taxonomy. For example, EMS AI automation and human-in-the-loop equipment programming management integration improve joint and multinational common operation picture development. The OE will change with every sensor and transmitter. Most conventional Army EMS sensors are programmed to require an operator to interpret data and report in another system. This slows down OE condition reporting and is a recommended starting point to improve EMS equipment automation. EMS-dependent node emplacement limits the ability to identify and detect spectrum activity to identify suspected, confirmed, or authorized transmitters within a set distance. EMS transmitter placement can manipulate threat sensors to delay, deceive, or deny advisory decision-makers. Mission planning and execution are dependent on equipment programming.

The operational environment has irregular warfare identified as changing, driven by various factors, including changes in the global security environment, technological advancements, and the proliferation of non-state actors. This shift poses significant challenges for traditional military forces, which must adapt their strategies and tactics to be effective in this evolving environment. To do so, they invest in new technologies, capabilities, and approaches that can help them better understand, respond to irregular threats, and operate effectively in non-traditional and unpredictable environments. The role of all Army elements in irregular warfare is critical, and their effectiveness is often determined by their level of lethality in technical environments. By implementing the abovementioned changes, Army elements can improve their ability to operate and engage in complex technical environments and ultimately increase their effectiveness of lethality in irregular warfare.

Relationships between the forces help bridge the educational gap, allowing for a broader spectrum of knowledge across the LSCO-MDO spectrum. For junior and senior leaders, an aviation framework will further develop the necessary skills to support, engage, and destroy the enemy on future battlefields.

Aviation Leader Education

The sharing of updated education information is crucial in the current LSCO environment. Training dollars must be stretched, but not at the expense of effectiveness. Sharing our craft across the domains can strengthen integration and interoperability. All branches should learn early and often how the branches affect each other. Like the benefits of irregular warfare across different formations, Aviation can be used more efficiently if many organizations know its capabilities. What you can do for me and what I can do for you should be a new motto in training education. The basic capabilities of conventional manned aviation should be briefed early during ROTC and OCS to provide base-level knowledge to junior officers as they begin their careers in the US Army. Aviation’s capabilities and integration should continue as the leader advances in their career and need to be a requirement for officers’ professional military education (PME) from the Captains Career Course (CCC), Intermediate Level Education (ILE), and the US Army War College. The end state for these educational requirements will produce a far more adaptable, agile, and cognitive ground force that is ready and prepared for LSCO-MDO operations.

Conventional Manned Aviation Capabilities (ROTC, OCS)

For conventional Army units, the aviation branch employs three vertical lift combat platforms comprised of a utility, cargo, and attack helicopter capable of performing tactical troop transport, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), heavy lift and heavy assault, and attack and reconnaissance. The education required at the junior officer level involves the capabilities of the primary vertical lift assets in aviation and how they can support the ground force.

UH60 Blackhawk

The Army fights at the squad level, with eight soldiers led by one Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO). The UH60 is capable of tactical troop transport of a fully equipped infantry squad in seats. Due to its powerful engines and drivetrain, it can insert combat troops within various terrain with a range of approximately 220 nautical miles. The UH60 can provide 9000 lbs. of vertical lift for cargo and equipment (sling load) but is limited by environmental conditions. On a typical summer day, at sea level, about 6000 lbs. is about the maximum and is further limited as density altitude increases. Furthermore, this platform provides battlefield air ambulance and medical evacuation services. In large-scale combat operations, this service is integral in caring for our military’s wounded and transporting them to the next higher level of care.

CH47 Chinook

When the size of the force or equipment weight limits the UH60, The CH47 Chinook can pick up the slack. The CH47 is a heavy lift, heavy assault cargo aircraft capable of tactical troop transport, cargo operations (both internally and externally), and transportation of up to 33 combat troops with seats. It provides vertical resupply and can transport military equipment internally and externally on the battlefield. The sling load can lift to 26,000 lbs, but environmental limitations further decrease this number. As with the UH60 example above, the CH47 could lift about 20,000 lbs, given the same environmental conditions. The Chinook has the same all-terrain capability as the UH60 but can also land in water for boat recovery. The CH47 has a range of approximately 330 nautical miles.

AH64 Apache

Close Air Support (CAS), reconnaissance, anti-armor, and escort describe the mission of the AH64 Apache. Close air support offers the Apache as an asset to troops engaged on the ground, with a variety of weapons, including a 30mm cannon, rockets, and hellfire missiles. The AH64 can also provide aerial reconnaissance using multiple sensors and cameras to determine an enemy’s position, numbers, and equipment. In the 1980s, the AH64 Apache was initially designed as a tank killer and is the perfect aerial artillery platform to engage and destroy the enemy’s armor capability. With a range of 300 nautical miles, the AH64 can provide security escorts for other aircraft, such as vehicle convoys on the ground.

Ground Force Commander (CCC, ILE, War College)

For ground force commanders at the company to brigade level, a higher level of education on aviation operations and implementation is paramount concerning large-scale combat operations across a multi-domain battlefield. A more in-depth knowledge of Aircraft capabilities, mission planning, communication, and special considerations will be required as our force prepares for the next war. The ground force commander must clearly understand economies of force to ensure that the Ground Force Commander (GFC) and Air Assault Task Force Commander (AATFC) can provide the required assets.

The 101st Airborne has set the gold standard for using helicopters, mainly lift assets, to get the humans and equipment to the target on time. They train intensively and cohesively together as an infantry and aviation force. The ground force commander knows how to use these flying machines like a train conductor with a finely tuned watch. He or she gets to practice with these aviation assets because they are in their backyard, usually an airfield on the same base as his infantry force. This is the training level required for all infantry units in the US Army. Previous missions have shown that a scenario where a GFC knows precisely how to use the aviation tool is an exception. Typically, the varied missions that aviation is tasked with provide minimal training opportunities for the aviation company because of the need for more knowledge of the requestor. Often, aviation commanders are forced to simulate their training scenarios. The GFC is typically the leader of a force that has never trained with helicopters and now knows how to use them as intended.

Air movement operations are conducted to reposition units, personnel, supplies, equipment, and other critical combat elements supporting current and future operations. Air movement operations allow the ground force commander to control the tempo of operations and meet the enemy force at the time and place of choice as he or she sets conditions. Utility and cargo helicopters supplement ground transportation to help sustain continuous offensive and defensive operations and allow the supported commander to overcome rugged terrain and time constraints on operations.” (FM 3-0, 2022)

In the new LSCO fight, helicopters will continue to be used as an agile and flexible asset to take the fight to the enemy, where fixed assets cannot go due to terrain and radar threats. A helicopter’s low and slow profile is hard to detect with radar. A concept that most non-infantry-type units do not consider when planning a simple air movement is that of minimum force. How many troops are needed on the target to conduct the mission? The broader concept concerns the economies of force and one in which the AATFC must work. In the LSCO battle, an acceptable loss of aircraft will have to be accepted against a near-peer army, and both commanders will need to understand how this affects the management of the aviation mission. Also, which personnel are considered essential to the mission? GFCs also must be familiar with the many limitations of the lift assets. FM 3-0 It is critical for all crews and the ground force commander to be aware of potential impacts to fuel, time on station, ability to support follow-on missions (such as immediate casualty evacuation [CASEVAC]), or other potential impacts within the AO if the AATF does not land on time due to a Cherry call. Crews and planners should also verify the communication capabilities of the supporting element, providing the Cherry/Ice status and any lag time required to relay the call to all involved parties. (FM 3-0, 2022)

Army Aviation Captains Career Course

Professional Military Development

Commanders, leaders, and planners across the branches need to be educated about the capabilities of aviation assets that they will be working with in this new fight. As leaders, we are responsible for developing soldiers to build and lead teams. Education can start well before the command level in base-level education, beginning with basic training. The Captains Career Course (CCC) is a branch-specific professional military education course that prepares officers for the company command role. This would be an excellent opportunity to integrate aviation assets’ use and capabilities and learn how to exploit their strengths. As the leader advances into the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) and War College, a higher level of understanding and competency will be taught, including the core competencies from FM 3-04, Army Aviation.

This FM would be the background for teaching Army Aviation’s role in Unified Land Operations. Army Aviation has seven core competencies:

1. Provide accurate and timely information collection

2. Provide reaction time and maneuver space

3. Destroy, defeat, disrupt, divert, or delay enemy forces

4. Air assault ground maneuver forces

5. Air movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies

6. Evacuate wounded or recover isolated personnel

7. Enable command and control over extended ranges and complex terrain

These competencies are available to the entire joint force. Commanders and leaders should employ and seek out the aviation tool set. Education on integration with aviation formations remains a gap in the Army, and as our force works on large-scale combat operations, it must be corrected. This valuable integration will allow readiness for future fights and more coordinated planning between ground and air operations.

Lastly, advancing technology can also be integrated from the ground unit to maximize aviation assets. The next generation of vertical lift assets (future vertical lift) will utilize technology to allow plug-and-play systems to limit delays in the approval process. Utilizing out-of-the-box thinking and specialized training at the senior leader level and existing aviation assets is necessary to prepare for the LSCO fight.

Conclusion

The framework to solve academic deficiencies in TRADOC leadership education must start with relationships. This will create the blueprint required to address these shortfalls and expand the knowledge of our next-generation war-fighting leader. Ground force commanders will need to understand how principles of irregular warfare can shape the future battlefield and how aviation knowledge and implementation will give them the combat tools to be successful.

Editor’s Note: This article was peer reviewed by twenty-seven members of the multicomponent, combined arms Warrant Officer Senior Service Educational Course 24-0004 through revision and editing as well as the editing process at the Warrant Officer Career College throughout May and June 2024.

References