Always Out Front

Intelligence Support to the Rear Area

By Major Joseph Marchand and Captain Tommy Milton

Article published on: July 1, 2025 in the Military Intelligence July-December 2025 Issue

Read Time: < 8 mins

Soldiers and leaders participate in a battalion-wide field training exercise focused on establishing, occupying, and defending a brigade support area, July 24th, 2023 U.S. Army Fort Carson.

Introduction

The 1st Armored Division recently completed Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 25-01. During most division-level exercises, the intelligence warfighting function places most of its efforts in the deep area to support targeting and priority intelligence requirements development. As part of the intelligence process, the division G‑2’s employment of an efficient and redundant collection plan directly impacts the division’s ability to destroy critical enemy assets and enables the commander’s situational understanding of the enemy. The division’s ability to shape the deep fight sets conditions for the brigade combat teams to maneuver in the close fight. However, focusing on the deep and close areas often leads the division staff to overlook the threat in the rear area. Before WFX 25-01, intelligence representatives from the division rear command post (RCP), maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB), and division sustainment brigade (DSB) developed a concept for ensuring continuous synchronization across all three organizations that included establishing regular battle rhythm events, the formation of a rear area intelligence cell, and the clear delineation of roles and responsibilities. Upon implementing this concept, the rear area intelligence team utilized each organization’s organic resources both to provide a holistic understanding of the rear area common intelligence picture (CIP) and to develop lessons learned for future operations.

The Rear Area

Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Operations, defines rear operations as “tactical actions behind major subordinate maneuver forces that facilitate movement, extend operational reach, and maintain desired tempo."¹ The rear area is critical during large-scale combat operations as it is where most of the division’s support is located. Figure 1 is a depiction of an operational framework for a corps and its divisions.

Field Manual 4-0, Sustainment Operations, further explains that the size of the rear area is based on mission and operational requirements.² At the onset of operations, a division’s rear area might be similar in size to the deep and close areas, but as the brigade combat teams advance forward, the rear area grows.³ The size of the rear area creates challenges for the division’s MEB, which is responsible for providing security, as its limited assets can be stretched thin depending on the depth of the rear area and its protection requirements.

Although the division support area is typically the primary support system in the rear area, there are also forward arming and refueling points, bridging assets, air defense systems, long-range rockets, and radar systems directly supporting both the deep and close fights. Destruction or damage to any of these critical assets impacts not only the division’s operational reach and tempo but also its ability and flexibility to allocate protection assets. The greatest threats to the rear area come from special operations forces coordinating long-range fires and from bypassed enemy formations. These elements can disrupt or delay division operations if allowed to operate unimpeded in the rear area. To identify and neutralize these threats adequately, the intelligence team must develop and maintain a coherent understanding of the threat picture in the rear area.

Furthermore, as the protection warfighting function enterprise becomes more proficient at eliminating threats, the intelligence enterprise requires a more detailed understanding of the rear area threat. As protection assets shift from an avoidance or deterrence framework toward an eliminate model, the intelligence apparatus must scale operations to support them. This operational shift requires more focus on collection and targeting in the rear area, demanding more robust cooperation and synchronization between typically disparate intelligence cells. With multiple brigade-sized elements operating in the rear area, the intelligence team is challenged to synchronize these units to form a singular CIP.

Figure 1. Notional corps deep, close, and rear areas with contiguous divisions⁴

Creating Shared Understanding

In the rear area, the primary intelligence hub is the Rear Command Post (RCP) G-2 which is predominately comprised of members from the Division G-2. Supporting this effort are the DSB S-2 and the MEB S-2, which also contribute to the overall intelligence picture. The intelligence warfighting function of these three units must be synchronized to create a shared understanding of the threat within the rear area. This synchronization ensures a coherent execution of the intelligence process, which integrates directly into the operations process and enables commanders’ decision making.⁵

During Command Post Exercise III, the RCP G‑2, MEB S‑2, and DSB S‑2 determined that a lack of communication and synchronization of the intelligence warfighting function across the rear area led to a duplication of efforts. For example, on multiple occasions we found ourselves working on similar products or submitting the same collection requests. To resolve this problem before WFX 25-01, we identified three approaches to ensure synchronization of the intelligence warfighting function across the rear area:

• Regular engagements with all rear area S‑2 elements.
• Formation of an intelligence cell within the RCP.
• Clear identification of roles and responsibilities.

Figure 2. Intelligence contribution to information collection⁶

Regular engagements. To create shared understanding, rear area intelligence elements must establish regular touchpoints or battle rhythm events to synchronize assessments, priorities, and taskings. To this end, the RCP G-2, MEB S-2, and DSB S-2 met around the RCP map board daily at 1000. This battle rhythm event allowed the three organizations to review events from the past 24 hours, collaborate on the rear area assessment for the next 72 hours, identify collection requests, submit requests for information, and delineate taskings. This timeframe was ideal because it allowed us to synchronize assessments and collection requests prior to daily engagements with the division G-2. Additionally, the RCP G-2, MEB S-2, and DSB S-2 held regular informal touchpoints throughout the day and night to ensure continuity of effort across the rear area and to support product development. These touchpoints often included other elements operating in the rear area, including air defense and engineers.

Intelligence cell. Aside from holding regular touchpoints with S‑2s across the rear area, we also formed an RCP intelligence cell comprised of personnel from the RCP S-2, MEB S-2, and DSB S-2 elements. This improved communication across all three organizations and allowed us to synchronize our assessment of the rear area. The following is a breakdown of intelligence cell members from each organization:

• RCP: During WFX 25-01, the division G‑2 provided a military intelligence company grade officer, a counterintelligence technician warrant officer, and an experienced intelligence analyst noncommissioned officer to support the RCP. They were augmented by an all-source intelligence analyst provided by Texas Army National Guard from the main command post—operational detachment. While collaboration across the intelligence formations at the RCP increased productivity, each element’s command post still required intelligence support. For the RCP division staff, the company grade officer primarily worked on future operations and developed the rear area collection plan to support targeting. The main command post-operational detachment all-source analyst primarily worked current operations, updating the analog CIP and monitoring significant activities, while the intelligence analyst noncommissioned officer worked the night shift. The inclusion of a representative from the G‑2X was also critical as it allowed the rear area intelligence cell to pass requests for information and source-directed requirements directly to the division G‑2X to coordinate collection requirements with interrogation teams and counterintelligence teams in the field.
• DSB: During WFX 25-01, the DSB S‑2 placed an intelligence analyst noncommissioned officer, as well as its entire geospatial engineering team, in the RCP G‑2 to provide intelligence support and terrain analysis directly to the RCP. The DSB also provided a liaison officer (LNO) to the home station mission command node. While reassigning these capabilities to the RCP limited the support and resources the S‑2 team could provide the DSB main command post, it directly enhanced support to the division, and subsequently, the rear area. By developing assessments and identifying named areas of interest in the rear area, the intelligence analyst provided direct feedback and support to the RCP G‑2. The geospatial team produced over 100 products throughout the exercise, most critical being terrain and route analysis, which assisted the RCP and the DSB support operations team in identifying options for division support areas, logistical support areas, and forward logistics elements. Finally, while providing an additional analyst as an LNO initially reduced the DSB’s organic intelligence resources, in the long run it benefited both the division and DSB immensely. It allowed the DSB and RCP to quickly receive up-to-date assessments from the division G‑2 while allowing the DSB, RCP, and MEB to collaboratively provide updated assessments of the rear area.
• MEB: The MEB provided two intelligence LNOs to the home station mission command node. These LNOs worked next to the DSB LNO, which allowed them to collaborate on the daily rear area assessment product and coordinate collection support across the rear area to mitigate future threats. While the MEB did not have an intelligence representative in the RCP, their S‑3 was closely tied in with the intelligence cell, especially when developing named areas of interest for enemy activity, directly informing the MEB’s organic collection plan and the distribution of protection capabilities across the rear area.

Roles and responsibilities. Finally, while regular engagements and forming the intelligence cell increased communication and shared understanding for intelligence personnel across the rear area, we also identified specific roles and responsibilities for each organization. Each intelligence element in the rear area often has only 1 or 2 personnel, unilaterally limiting the resources it can provide. However, by cross-loading tasks and identifying roles across the different entities, the rear area can create an intelligence cell capable of answering priority intelligence requirements, providing situational understanding to commanders, and developing a collection plan that supports the rear area.

One of the critical capabilities the rear area intelligence cell provides is the rear area threat assessment. The division intelligence apparatus and other command posts are primarily concerned with understanding the enemy in the deep and July–December 2025 5 close areas. The home station mission command node and the division main command post relied heavily on the rear area assessment provided by the DSB, RCP, and MEB to understand the threat to friendly assets in the rear area. The reliance on these elements allowed the rest of the division to stay focused on the deep and close areas without having to devote additional resources or time to the division’s rear area.

• RCP G-2 roles and responsibilities. The RCP G‑2’s responsibilities focused on supporting the RCP staff and providing situational understanding of the threat in the rear area to the Deputy Commanding General– Support. Based on these requirements, the RCP must stay integrated with the other intelligence elements in the rear area to ensure a coherent understanding of the threat. For division battle rhythm events, the RCP G‑2 primarily attended the protection working group and protection decision board. One tool the RCP G‑2 utilized to better understand the threat in the rear area was the development of the enemy high-payoff target list. This tool was vital as it forced S‑2 elements in the rear area to understand the enemy commander’s decision points and intent. Based on these two criteria, the G‑2 team could identify what friendly assets the enemy commander believed they needed to target to enable mission success. This directly informed the division’s prioritized protection list and the allocation of protection assets across the division.
• DSB S-2 roles and responsibilities. The DSB S‑2 responsibilities focused on providing threat and terrain analysis to main supply routes, alternate supply routes, and current and future sustainment areas including division support areas, logistical support areas, and forward logistics elements through the geospatial team. The two critical products that the 1st Armored Division DSB produced daily included the threat route analysis and the rear area assessment, in coordination with the RCP and MEB teams. The threat route analysis directly informed the division transportation office and its designation of route statuses across the area of operations. The DSB S‑2 also participated in the G‑2/S‑2 synchronization and collection working groups, which allowed us to share our assessments and synchronize collection requests with other units operating in the rear area.
• MEB roles and responsibilities. Within the division rear area, an MEB is typically designated with area of operations responsibilities. These rear area control responsibilities include area security, terrain management, information collection, integration and synchronization, civil affairs operations, civil-military operations, psychological operations, movement control, mobility support, clearance of fires, personnel recovery, airspace control, and minimum-essential stability tasks.⁷ Aside from its organic capabilities, the MEB can control collection assets. During WFX 25-01, the division provided two Terrestrial Layer Systems in a general support role. The placement and utilization of these assets were critical to identifying enemy special forces locations across the rear area, which informed the MEB commander where to place his resources.

Lessons Learned

Collectively, we learned much from Command Post Exercise III and used those lessons to adjust our approach and enable success for WFX 25-01. We recognized that there should have been better integration with other units in the rear area. Although the RCP, DSB, and MEB S‑2 elements established regular touchpoints to share information, most of the engagements with other units operating in the rear area were ad hoc, including those with the combat aviation brigade, division artillery, air defense, and engineer elements. Formally integrating these elements would provide a more holistic understanding of the threat in the rear area and better synchronize assessments across the division. Additionally, including junior intelligence Soldiers in these formal and informal touchpoints would support their development, expose them to unfamiliar resources and information, and help them understand the importance of sharing information across the intelligence warfighting function.

Conclusion

While the division’s ability to shape the deep fight sets conditions for brigade combat teams to maneuver in the close fight, the rear area is often overlooked from an enemy perspective. The disparate nature of the rear area creates a challenge for the intelligence enterprise to synchronize assessments and resources to create a single coherent CIP for commanders. During WFX 25-01, intelligence elements in the 1st Armored Division rear area developed a concept of employment that greatly enhanced the understanding of the rear area threat both for the intelligence community and among the staff. This concept included establishing rear area intelligence battle rhythm events, the formation of a rear area intelligence cell, and the clear delineation of roles and responsibilities. Upon implementing this concept, the rear area intelligence team was able to utilize each organization’s organic resources to provide a holistic understanding of the rear area CIP and develop lessons learned for future operations. While there is more that can be built upon by future units, the 1st Armored Division intelligence team established a concept that allowed us to create shared understanding across the division intelligence enterprise while enhancing situational awareness for commanders at multiple echelons and command posts.

Endnotes