Boots, Not Bandwidth

The Case for Dismount-Led Intelligence in the Jungle

By MAJ Matthew A. Hughes, MAJ Victor Modesto De Sousa, Brazilian Army, MSG Anthony Hernandez, WO1 Alexander Terrenzio

| Infantry, Summer 2026 Edition

Read Time: < 24 mins

Above, Soldiers in 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), cross a river during Exercise Southern Vanguard 24 in Oiapoque, Brazil

Soldiers in 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), cross a river during Exercise Southern Vanguard 24 in Oiapoque, Brazil, on 15 November 2023. (Photo by SPC Joshua Taeckens)

From 31 October to 16 November 2023, forces from the 2nd Brigade,101st Airborne Division; 7th Special Forces Group; and the New York Army National Guard joined the Brazilian Army’s 23rd Jungle Infantry Brigade to execute Exercise Southern Vanguard 24 in the jungle environments of Belém, Macapá, and Oiapoque, Brazil. This combined exercise, developed by U.S. Army South in conjunction with the Brazilian Army’s Land Operation Command and Northern Military Command, included jungle training (academics), a military freefall to conduct special reconnaissance, a conventional air assault, a ground tactical movement, and a combined raid.

Among several valuable observations from the exercise, the Brazilian Army’s after action review included the following insight regarding operations in jungle environments:

The dynamism of frontline actions, the vast and growing array of resources employed in combat, and the need to update situational awareness for the benefit of higher command underscore the importance of the soldier as an intelligence vector and their role as a trigger for the flow of information. Therefore, it is necessary to highlight one aspect as an opportunity for improvement: the intensification of intelligence training and the development of a mind-set for constant intelligence […] reporting, at all levels.1

Environmental factors and gaps in doctrine, equipment, and training limit the effectiveness of traditional intelligence collection platforms. As MAJ Michael Everett recently stated in the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, “Current IPOE [intelligence preparation of the operational environment] doctrine… is lacking in one significant area: considerations for extreme environments, including the arctic, desert, and jungle environments.”2He explained that these unique environments require “a fundamentally different approach to IPOE.”3In this regard, the approach in jungle environments necessitates an uncharacteristic dependence on dismounted Soldiers for effective IPOE, in particular, defining the operational environment and describing environmental effects on operations with an intelligence collection plan that features dismounted troops.

In this article, analysis focuses on IPOE steps 1 (define the operational environment) and 2 (describe environmental effects on operations). As threat types and characteristics can vary greatly across jungle environments, this article does not elaborate on steps 3 (evaluate the threat) and 4 (determine threat courses of action). Based on a variety of factors unique to jungle environments, dismounts — the most reliable sensor — play a pivotal role in information collection and fill intelligence gaps. Recommendations to remedy identified gaps in collection and analysis address training, unit composition, and security cooperation.

Figure 1 — Substeps and Outputs of Step 1 of the IPOE Process (Army Techniques Publication [ATP] 2-01.3, Figure 3-1)

Figure 1 — Substeps and Outputs of Step 1 of the IPOE Process (Army Techniques Publication [ATP] 2-01.3, Figure 3-1)

IPOE Step 1: Define the Operational Environment

Units perform IPOE to gain a comprehensive understanding of variables like terrain, weather, and threat capabilities and limitations to account for these factors throughout planning and decision-making. The IPOE process begins with the identification of administrative boundaries and significant characteristics or activities within the OE that may influence friendly and threat courses of action and command decisions (Figure 1). Within an operational environment, operations may “simultaneously encompass multiple domains, military engagements, and populations.”4The jungle is similar to other extreme environments in that “regardless of technological advances, the elements are always the most significant challenge.”5Hence, this step is essential in jungles for effective planning and mission success.

In jungles, this step is particularly complex given the variety of geographic features including dense canopies, various types of vegetation, and river networks. Weather conditions can also cause rapid changes in landscapes, to include islands appearing or disappearing based on monsoons and flooding.

IPOE Step 2: Describe Environmental Effects on Operations

Having identified significant characteristics of the environment, the staff assesses impacts to operations during IPOE step 2. This step accounts for existing and projected conditions in the area of operations (AO) and area of interest (AI) to determine the effects on both friendly and threat operations. Environmental effects have a significant impact on all levels of the operation and require an in-depth analysis of impacts to warfighting functions. This is especially relevant to intelligence, as jungle terrain and weather factors significantly affect information collection operations. A deliberate study investigates characteristics of the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations using analytical frameworks to understand how each can affect the mission, constituting step 2 of the IPOE process (see Figure 2).

Terrain

Terrain includes natural features and man-made features. The staff analyzes the military aspects of terrain using the acronym OAKOC: observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment.

Figure 2 — Substeps and Outputs of Step 2 of the IPOE Process (ATP 2-01.3, Figure 4-1)

Figure 2 — Substeps and Outputs of Step 2 of the IPOE Process (ATP 2-01.3, Figure 4-1)

Observation and fields of fire in the jungle are extremely limited during daylight hours and virtually nonexistent at night. The jungle’s thick canopy and dense vegetation impose significant constraints on human vision and aerial observation, including degraded satellite and aerial surveillance, limiting geospatial intelligence collection.6Consequently, advantages in observation lie with those inside the vegetation, looking toward an avenue of approach or key terrain. Within the depths of the jungle, most troop encounters are incidental, precisely due to this limitation. In this context, the use of thermal and electro-optical equipment becomes increasingly important, making proper utilization of technology a decisive factor in force imbalance.

In jungles, avenues of approach (AAs), or “path[s] used by an attacking force leading to its objective or to key terrain,” include roads, trails and primary jungle (never cut before).7Maritime or riverine AAs are those that allow movement by water, so in jungles, they can be oceanic (coastal) or fluvial, with transport capacity being the determining factor in establishing a river as an AA or an obstacle. Aerial AAs are generally river channels that permit tactical contour flights (nap of the earth), while for general overflights, the entire area of operations is usually a free air corridor with obstacles like large rock formations or mountains.

In general, key terrain can be elevated positions that provide good fields of observation and fields of fire or cover and concealment from direct fire, but clearings, inlets, river junctions, road junctions and settlements are the most common types of key terrain in jungles. The clearings are favorable for airmobile operations as a resupply or landing points for logistical transport. Inlets allow control of large-scale landing areas, enabling better logistical support and troop transportation. Controlling inlets is of great importance for units with river capacity for operations at brigade level or higher. River and road junctions serve as key control points for large-scale movement, requiring expansive AAs to maneuver logistical assets. Settlements are key terrain, as most transportation modes that constitute AAs converge there and depart from them.

Dense vegetation (including secondary jungle, or areas that have been cut along roads but have grown back denser than the original jungle), rugged terrain, large rivers and streams, and swamps and flooded areas are the main obstacles to ground operations in a jungle environment. These obstacles restrict the use of medium and large vehicles, hinder logistical support, reduce observation for indirect fire, complicate command and control, and, above all, make intelligence collection vital to the success of operations. Dense vegetation also reduces signal propagation, but high frequency (HF) waves can travel via ionospheric refraction, skipping off the ionosphere (the layer of charged particles in the upper atmosphere) to reach distant locations and bypass obstacles like vegetation blocking a direct path. The limited infrastructure and technology in most jungles means that the “detection of even faint electronic signatures can indicate the enemy’s presence,” so signals intelligence can be particularly effective in these environments.8Concerning cover and concealment, medium- and large-sized trees provide both, while the canopy enhances concealment from aerial observation. However, movement along waterways or roads is easily identifiable. Visibility from within the jungle looking outward is generally superior to outside-in visibility, as forces positioned inside can use natural concealment while observing movements along open terrain or AAs.

Weather

The jungle environment is known for its extremely humid climate. The process of photosynthesis, combined with the presence of rivers, streams, and large aquifers — common in this type of terrain — contributes to increased air moisture within the operational area. This high humidity affects military operations by accelerating equipment degradation and intensifying Soldier fatigue.

Precipitation patterns directly influence rivers. As a result, imagery that is not recent — potentially within a few hours — may be unreliable for important terrain features. New islands may appear from one day to the next in jungle rivers. Such rapid changes reduce the dependability of static imagery, requiring frequent updates for accurate terrain conditions. Weather patterns, such as monsoon season, greatly increase operational risk and impose limitations on technology like cloud cover that can block aerial imagery collection. Flooding can also limit access to AAs, forcing troops to rely on alternative routes or adjust their tactics based on terrain conditions.

The heat in this environment is extreme. Proximity to the equator or tropics, combined with the dense tree canopy, amplifies both temperature and thermal sensation. This affects the performance of certain weapons, making sustained operations significantly more challenging. Winds in the jungle are restricted to open areas. The dense vegetation typical of this environment significantly limits airflow within the forest, increasing the perceived temperature inside the canopy.

Visibility in jungle operations is significantly affected by environmental factors such as fog, dense vegetation, and limited light penetration. Fog, common in the early morning and late evening, further restricts visibility, as well as heavy rainfall. Nighttime visibility is nearly nonexistent due to the lack of natural illumination. The dense canopy prevents moonlight and starlight from penetrating, causing near-total darkness. This significantly restricts movement, as forces must navigate almost exclusively via AAs, such as rivers or roads, which serve as the only reliable routes under low-light conditions. The absence of natural light heightens the importance of light discipline, as even the faintest glow — whether from equipment, vehicles, or personal devices — becomes easily detectable against the surrounding darkness. Infrared and thermal optics are crucial tools, but their use must be carefully managed to prevent unwanted detection. As a result, maintaining strict light control is essential in jungle operations, where darkness itself can be both a tactical advantage and a severe operational limitation.

Civil Considerations

To assess civilian impacts to operations and categorize cultural and human factors in the operational environment, the staff uses the acronym ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. Population centers within the jungle are key terrain and constitute areas that are critical to logistical and operational control. They consolidate essential infrastructure and serve as nodes connecting AAs such as roads, rivers, and airfields. Settlements are strategic points for troop movements and sustainment support. Bridges and road intersections within or around these cities are critical nodes that regulate the flow of troops and supplies; thus, they require reinforced protection to avoid disruptions in logistical support. Control of these areas enables effective force projection and territorial dominance, both of which are decisive for successful operations in a jungle environment.

Brazilian and U.S. Soldiers conduct a movement by boat during Exercise Southern Vanguard 24 in Oiapoque, Brazil, on 12 November 2023. (Photo by SPC Joshua Taeckens)

Brazilian and U.S. Soldiers conduct a movement by boat during Exercise Southern Vanguard 24 in Oiapoque, Brazil, on 12 November 2023. (Photo by SPC Joshua Taeckens)

Concerning structures, urban infrastructures — such as medical posts, hospitals, and Class III supply facilities (for fuel and lubricants) — play a vital role in sustainment. In addition, food distribution networks, airports, river ports, and ground terminals facilitate the rapid transport of troops and supplies. Urban architecture and strategically significant buildings can serve as observation posts, command centers, or defensive strongpoints against enemy action, ensuring that the operational tempo is maintained even under adverse environmental conditions.

Regarding capacities, settlements in the jungle provide operational advantages that enhance overall combat effectiveness. Their integrated transportation and communications networks — featuring airfields, river ports, and interconnected roads — facilitate rapid force movement and enable a high operational tempo, even in challenging terrain. Concentrated hubs for command and control, along with on-site maintenance and repair facilities, enable swift reconstitution of forces and rapid adaptation during engagements. Moreover, developed settlements support the integration of sophisticated intelligence assets and real-time surveillance systems, allowing commanders to coordinate operations more effectively across complex jungle environments. In essence, the inherent capacities of urban nodes directly favor maneuver, sustain connectivity, and amplify tactical responsiveness on the OE.

In terms of organizations in jungle environments, various civilian and social organizations exert significant influence over the operational landscape. Non-governmental organizations, indigenous communities, riverine populations, and local groups may either facilitate or hinder military actions. Indigenous and riverine peoples, with their deep knowledge of the terrain and survival skills, can offer vital intelligence or, alternatively, resist external control. Humanitarian and environmental organizations may also impact operations by shaping local perceptions and generating political challenges. Engagement with these groups must be managed through carefully coordinated information operations to secure local support and mitigate adverse influences.

Key local figures in jungle cities — such as political leaders, indigenous chiefs, religious authorities, and influential merchants — can play decisive roles in supporting or obstructing military operations. Their cooperation or opposition may determine the operational landscape, particularly through the flow of local intelligence and community influence. Military intelligence assets, including local informants and field agents, are crucial to leveraging these relationships, allowing commanders to negotiate strategic support or neutralize potential sources of disruption.

Significant religious and cultural events occurring within jungle cities can profoundly impact operational tempo. Traditional ceremonies, indigenous rituals, religious festivities, and social demonstrations may alter population movements, thereby affecting troop mobility and logistical routes. Likewise, political and social events — such as protests or community mobilizations — can create operational instability that must be monitored and integrated into risk assessments. Commanders must incorporate these variables into their planning, ensuring strategic adaptability in an ever-changing operational environment.

Dismounted Contributions to Intelligence: Soldiers as Intelligence Vectors

As a result of terrain, weather, and civil considerations limiting the employment and intelligence value of many traditional collection assets in jungles, dismounts play a central role in the intelligence collection plan and bottom-up refinement of the common operational picture. “Like other environments, intelligence professionals perform all intelligence disciplines in the jungle,” including counterintelligence (CI), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), open-source intelligence (OSINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and technical intelligence (TECHINT).9A variety of environmental factors reduce the effectiveness of traditional intelligence collection platforms and increase reliance on reconnaissance patrols and observation points for useful information.

Greater dispersion of forces in jungles compared to other environments also degrades redundancy and cueing of collection assets. Units may need to taskorganize intelligence capabilities for greater redundancy and distribution of expertise and technical capabilities for information collection. In jungles, commanders “delegate information collection tasks to lower echelons,” which increases reliance on dismounts for intelligence collection.10

Mobility restrictions in the jungle increase reliance on dismounts and require that “all information collection systems be light, man-portable, and rugged.”11One Brazilian Army observation from Southern Vanguard 24 noted how lightweight, open vehicles are favorable for reconnaissance compared to armored or closed designs as they provide greater visibility and perception of surroundings.12Although some routes or trails may be navigable by vehicles and potentially yield some collection during movements, dismounts are less likely to be detected and enjoy greater mobility for reconnaissance.

Repeated or persistent presence of dismounts through patrols or observation posts also yield valuable intelligence likely missed through other information collection assets in jungles due to gaps in coverage for weather conditions. For instance, dismounts can identify mobility impacts of weather changes, such as flooded areas during monsoons, improving awareness of terrain conditions when change detection through geospatial intelligence assets is not possible. Persistent observation can also establish patterns of life for high-value targets when environmental conditions limit collection by other platforms.

While SIGINT collection would require task-organized forces with military intelligence personnel due to classification and technical considerations, light infantry or cavalry scouts can employ small unmanned aerial systems (UASs) in support of geospatial intelligence collection. Use of these systems is even more limited by weather factors than UAS at higher echelons, but they constitute an organic intelligence capability where forces are likely dispersed, and a small unit may not have priority for intelligence collection. Weather and maintenance permitting, this approach offers quick intelligence collection with imagery or full motion video, and it affords some physical standoff from the observed target. However, visual or audible detection and the limited range of small UAS can tip off a threat about the presence of a nearby force.

Although HUMINT is another technical field with activities like interrogation limited to Human Intelligence Collectors (35Ms), dismounts may contribute to collection and targeting efforts through inputs to analytical or targeting products like link diagrams. The jungle environment tends to have low population density, so settlements play a fundamental role in data collection. Through daily activities, “Soldiers talk and interact with the local populace and observe more relevant information than technical sensors can collect.”13Soldiers may conduct conversational interaction with the local population or during sensitive site exploitation to ask direct questions and ascertain useful information.14Soldiers may also conduct tactical questioning of detainees “at or near the point of capture,” focusing on information that is of “immediate tactical value.”15These activities can improve unit understanding of local threat networks and key relationships.

A Soldier assigned to 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment moves through the jungle during operations as part of Exercise Southern Vanguard 24 in Oiapoque, Brazil, on 12 November 2023. (Photo by SPC Joshua Taeckens)

A Soldier assigned to 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment moves through the jungle during operations as part of Exercise Southern Vanguard 24 in Oiapoque, Brazil, on 12 November 2023. (Photo by SPC Joshua Taeckens)

Dismounts also gather information during tactical site exploitation after actions like a raid or cordon and search, yielding actionable intelligence difficult to collect via any other means. In jungles, the potential intelligence value of such information is high, as threat forces often rely on paper documents, maps, hand-written orders, and basic communication equipment with limited access to technology. Similarly, biometrics collection can identify persons of interest and build out threat networks to enhance targeting.16

Inherent in this dependence on dismounted forces is a reliable communications network for reporting. Missions should include a complete primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan and designated locations and/or times for transmissions to ensure timely reporting. Pre-mission briefs should also inform patrols of priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), and dismounts should be proficient in tactical site exploitation and providing intelligence summaries (INTSUMs). The Brazilian Army noted the following during Southern Vanguard 24:

It is essential to improve the use of the Reconnaissance Squad (Scouts), leveraging them as intelligence sensors more effectively. This includes ensuring the ability to establish rapid and efficient communications to accurately report on the enemy’s approach, especially during ambush execution. It is important to create and refine TTPs [tactics, techniques, and procedures] for intelligence reporting, with a focus on transmitting critical information with maximum accuracy. This directly contributes to increased […] commanders’ situational awareness and improved real-time decision making.17

Because jungle environments reduce collection redundancy across intelligence disciplines, reliable communication is critical to ensure the timely reporting of dismounts — the primary source of actionable information.

Ultimately, jungle environmental factors limit the use of cueing, collection redundancy, and sensor mix. Dismounts are the most reliable, and sometimes, the only means of collection against some targets. Their reporting fills intelligence gaps regarding the operational environment, impacts of the environment on operations, and the enemy.

Recommendations

Although jungle training, such as combined exercises, has greatly improved expertise and experience in jungle operations, gaps remain in doctrine and training. There may also be opportunities to refine unit composition or designated functions to enhance intelligence collection and planning. Key recommendations to address these gaps and improve intelligence contributions of dismounts follow.

Dismounts are the most reliable, and sometimes, the only means of collection against some targets. Their reporting fills intelligence gaps regarding the operational environment, impacts of the environment on operations, and the enemy.

Incorporate tasks supporting intelligence into the Jungle Operations Training Course (JOTC)

One recommendation to address these intelligence gaps and capitalize on dismounts for collection is to incorporate additional training on support to intelligence collection into the 25th Infantry Division Lightning Academy's JOTC at Schofield Barracks, HI. Training tasks currently include aspects of combat tracking and sensitive site exploitation, but the course would be an ideal time to reinforce principles like PIRs, debriefings, and how dismounts contribute to developing an accurate intelligence picture.

After formal instruction, students can validate training on these tasks during the three-day culminating exercise (CULEX). Following each mission, debriefs, along with feedback from instructors, can provide practical training and enhance Soldiers’ awareness of reporting procedures and proficiency in providing relevant intelligence. Separately, the course can include field expedient antenna training to improve unit capabilities to maintain communications with higher headquarters for timely intelligence reporting.

Reestablish company intelligence support teams (CoISTs)

Given the decentralized nature of jungle operations, the reintroduction of CoISTs can help remedy some intelligence gaps and challenges. CoISTs emerged during the height of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan around 2007-2009 in direct response to intelligence gaps at the tactical level — specifically the company echelon which has no organic intelligence capability or analysis section. Generally, a CoIST was an NCO-led team with additional equipment and sometimes training to collect information and facilitate time-sensitive information-sharing.18Through patrol briefs and debriefs, intelligence preparation of the operational environment, site exploitation, and other activities, they advised the company commander by enhancing intelligence and their reporting improved the intelligence picture for higher commands.

Although companies sourced CoISTs internally, pulling them from tasks like pulling security or manning a quick reaction force (QRF), the majority of commanders with combat experience in those theaters felt that “the contributions of the CoIST [were] well worth the costs associated with resourcing it.”19Furthermore, the Marine Corps recognizes the importance of tactical intelligence to the degree that it contains company-level intelligence cells with collection capabilities, and its force structure continues to evolve with Force Design 2030 providing “each company a signals intelligence/electronic warfare support team.”20

CoISTs would be an excellent asset in jungle environments, likely even more critical than in open terrain due to isolated company-level operations. They can provide rapid analysis on weather effects, terrain considerations like choke points, and pattern recognition for threats. With training and equipping, CoISTs can also incorporate sensors or drones for autonomous collection and real-time analysis. Still, continuous flows of information would likely require satellite communication (SATCOM) capability or planned periodic movements to high ground to establish communications with higher headquarters. Ultimately, CoISTs can bring agility to companies operating in jungle environments by translating raw field data into actionable insight for the commander and higher headquarters.

A platoon leader in 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment participates in a platoon-level jungle mock-reconnaissance operation in Oiapoque, Brazil, on 13 November 2023. (Photo by SPC Joshua Taeckens)

A platoon leader in 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment participates in a platoon-level jungle mock-reconnaissance operation in Oiapoque, Brazil, on 13 November 2023. (Photo by SPC Joshua Taeckens)

Train on field expedient antenna construction

HF and satellite communications capabilities mitigate communications challenges in the jungle, but reliable friendly communications and collection on the enemy or threat require proper training and equipment. Field expedient antenna construction is a critical task for some military occupational specialties. Yet, few units train on these tasks as they take a lower priority compared to more urgent tasks and training. In contrast, every freshman at the Brazilian Army’s Military Academy of Agulhas Negras trains on multiple types of antennas and how to make them, incorporating this task into land navigation lanes to transmit information at each point. The U.S. Army also has limited experience with this type of communication equipment in triple canopy jungle, so combined training in environments like those in northern Brazil during Southern Vanguard 24 offers ideal conditions to develop these skills.

Harness technology for the debriefing process and interpretation/translation

Utilizing software to generate transcriptions for debriefs can improve the value of dismounts’ intelligence contributions. Debriefs tend to be time-consuming as Soldiers type out a summary of events during a patrol or answer questions of an intelligence analyst recording responses. Automated transcriptions can save time, accurately capture Soldier accounts, and improve data-mining value.

Separately, software programs can aid with interpretation/translation involving partner nation radio communications or with local tribes speaking unfamiliar languages or dialects, which is common in jungle environments. Southern Vanguard 24 after action reviews highlighted reliance on basic software tools to translate intelligence summaries from or to partner nation forces, even with losses in “some of the nuance of military terminology.”21Soldiers can use recent innovations like the radio interoperability capability-universal (RIC-U) voice bridge for real-time interpretation of radio communications to overcome the language barrier and improve shared understanding.22This can foster information sharing and intelligence reporting. The RIC-U, however, “requires physical cabling between American and [partner nation] tactical radios, which limits its value in a dismounted scenario.”23Standalone commercial software that does not rely on network connections can aid with understanding languages and dialects of local tribes to foster human intelligence.

Reactivate long range surveillance (LRS) teams for jungle operations

As part of efforts to modernize and reduce costs, the Army deactivated or dissolved most LRS units by 2017 but retained some in larger formations or incorporated some capabilities into reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadrons. For jungle environments, however, where units are frequently dispersed, LRS capabilities are essential at lower-echelon units. After action reports from the Southwest Pacific Area during World War II and Vietnam indicate a clear “need [for] a jungle reconnaissance capability” — a capability still relevant and needed at lower echelons operating in jungle environments.24

Conclusion

In the jungle, a unit’s quality of intelligence preparation of the operational environment depends heavily on the contributions of dismounted Soldiers, particularly in defining the operational environment and describing environmental effects on operations. Where terrain, weather, and canopy degrade or negate most information collection platforms, dismounts remain the most reliable and often the only viable sensors. This characteristic necessitates deliberate integration of dismount-centric collection into the information collection plan, training that generates proficiency in reporting and exploitation tasks, and force design that equips and empowers dismounts as the primary collection elements.

Notes

1. Caio Vitor Stallaiken Cabral Lima, “Ações da Companhia Pioneira na Operação CORE 24 – Experiências e Esinamentos [Actions of the Pioneer Company in Operation CORE 24 – Experiences and Lessons Learned],” Revista Doutrina Militar Terrestre [Journal of Land Military Doctrine] (October-December 2024), 30.

2. Michael Everett, “Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment in the Subarctic,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (July-December 2024), 1, https://mipb.ikn.army.mil/media/eqxpsjs1/2024-07-12-e_ipoe_online.pdf.

3. Ibid.

4. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, March 2019, para. 3-1.

5. Everett, “Intelligence Preparation,” 2.

6. ATP 3-90.98, Jungle Operations, September 2020, 3-17.

7. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-90, Offense and Defense, July 2019, para. 2-46.

8. ATP 3-90.98, 3-17.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 3-5.

11. Ibid., 3-17.

12. Odilson De Mello Benzi, “A Participação do Centro de Doutrina do Exército na CORE 24: Contribuições para a Evolução da Doutrina Militar Terrestre [The Participation of the Army Doctrine Center in CORE 24: Contributions to the Evolution of Land Military Doctrine],” Revista Doutrina Militar Terrestre [Journal of Land Military Doctrine] (October-December 2024), 67.

13. ATP 3-55.4, Techniques for Information Collection During Operations Among Populations, April 2016, para. 1-13.

14. Ibid., para. 1-11.

15. Ibid., para. 1-12.

16. ATP 3-90.15, Site Exploitation, July 2015, 1-4.

17. Luan Maddêo Paula, “Um Pelotão de Fuzileiros na Operação CORE 24 [A Rifle Platoon in Operation CORE 24],” Revista Doutrina Militar Terrestre [Journal of Land Military Doctrine] (October-December 2024), 41.

18. Phil Sussman, “COIST Staffs Play a Crucial Role on Today’s Complex Battlefield,” Army News Service, 19 June 2009, https://www.army.mil/arti-cle/23048/coist_staffs_play_crucial_role_on_todays_complex_battlefield.

19. Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-20, Company Intelligence Support Team Handbook (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, January 2010), 7.

20. Nathaniel Lambert, “CLIC Bait: The Company Level Intelligence Cell in 2030,” Proceedings 148/4 (April 2022), https://www.usni.org/magazines/ proceedings/2022/april/clic-bait-company-level-intelligence-cell-2030.

21. MAJ Andrew S. Campbell, interview in “Annex A. Key Leader Interviews,” Exercise Southern Vanguard 24 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2024), 29, https://api.army.mil/e2/c/ downloads/2024/12/30/805c4127/25-911-u-s-army-south-exercise-southern-vanguard-24.pdf.

22. ShaTyra Reed-Cox, “Soldiers Bridge the Communications Gap at Southern Vanguard 24,” Army News Service, 10 November 2023, https:// www.army.mil/article/271596/soldiers_bridge_the_communications_gap_ at_southern_vanguard_24.

23. MAJ Aaron M. Spence, “Chapter 3: Experimentation at Exercise Southern Vanguard 24” in Exercise Southern Vanguard 24, 15.

24. 1LT Matthew E. Miller, “Jungle Reconnaissance and the Pivot to the Pacific,” Infantry (October-December 2013), 43-44.

Authors

MAJ Matthew A. Hughes is a U.S. Army foreign area officer and Military Intelligence officer. He is currently an instructor for the Command and General Staff Officer Course at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). He holds a Master of International Public Policy (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies), Master of Arts in intelligence studies (American Military University), and Bachelor of Science in Arabic/Spanish with a minor in terrorism studies (U.S. Military Academy).

MAJ Victor Modesto de Sousa is a Brazilian Army officer with more than 21 years of experience, including extensive service in the Amazon Region. He recently served as an instructor for the Maneuver Captain's Career Course at WHINSEC. Since July 2025, he has been serving as an Instructor at the Brazilian School of Officers Improvement (EsAO), where he teaches land force doctrine to Brazilian Army captains. A graduate of the Agulhas Negras Military Academy (AMAN) and holding a postgraduate degree from the Officer’s Improvement School (ESAO), he completed the Jungle Operations Course at the Jungle Warfare Training Center (CIGS). He commanded a jungle platoon in the Border Detachment Company of Clevelândia do Norte (2011-2012) and later commanded the Border Detachment Company of Clevelândia do Norte (2020). Additionally, he served as an intelligence officer (S2) in the 34th Jungle Infantry Battalion in Macapá, which is responsible for the Clevelândia do Norte area.

MSG Anthony Hernandez is a senior Infantry NCO currently working in operations at WHINSEC. He is a graduate of the Ranger Course, Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course, Advanced Land Navigation Course, Basic Airborne Course, Basic and Assault Climber Courses (Summer), and the Marine Assault Climber Course. He has served in a long-range surveillance company as a senior scout observer, assistant team leader, and team leader; Ranger instructor at the Mountain Phase of the Ranger Course; and has served in every position in an infantry line battalion. MSG Hernandez trained with several units of partner nations in the jungles of Meteti, Panama; Melgar, Colombia; and the Lancero Amazons base in Amazonas, Colombia.

WO1 Alexander J. Terrenzio is an Army Aviator currently assigned to the 1st Battalion, 145th Aviation Regiment at the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence at Fort Rucker, AL. A former Infantry NCO, WO1 Terrenzio most recently served as an instructor at the WHINSEC NCO Academy. His distinguished ground career includes three years with the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry “Wolfhounds” in Hawaii, where he served as a weapons squad leader for Hellraiser Company and conducted specialized tropical warfare training in the Philippines. A 2022 graduate of the Jungle Operations Training Course and the Air Assault Course, WO1 Terrenzio is now leveraging his extensive small-unit tactical experience as he undergoes flight training to support the next generation of combined arms operations.