Restoring Decision Advantage

Operational Art and the Integration of CJADC2 in Multi-Domain Warfare

By MAJ José L. Rivera

Article published on: June 1, 2026 in the Summer 2026 Edition of Gray Space

Read Time: < 10 mins

Restoring Joint Decision Advantage in the Electromagnetic Spectrum

The Joint Force is facing increasing challenges in maintaining decision advantage due to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) integration of cyber, electronic warfare (EW), and space capabilities, which contest every layer of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). By 2040, the United States aims to restore freedom of action across cyberspace and the EMS to effectively deter aggression and operate in a contested Indo-Pacific environment. This article focuses on Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) as the primary joint framework for restoring decision advantage in a contested EMS and cyber environment. Restoring decision advantage necessitates a clear alignment of strategic aims with specific processes, authoritative frameworks, and capabilities that facilitate joint operations in the EMS and cyberspace. This article applies operational art to argue how the CJADC2 framework must integrate joint cyber, electromagnetic, and information capabilities into a single, resilient decision network to restore decision advantage in a contested EMS and cyber environment. Joint Publication 5-0 frames this process as understanding the environment, defining the problem, and developing an operational approach. This approach aligns with the 2022 JADC2 Strategy, which defines JADC2 as the joint capability to sense, make sense, and act across domains to achieve decision advantage (U.S. Department of Defense, 2022). Since its inception, CJADC2 has evolved from a conceptual vision toward an operational framework. In this sense, CJADC2 serves as the bridge between national strategy and the campaigns that must bring it to life.

Nature and Character of War

While the nature of war has not changed—it remains an act of force to compel an enemy’s will—its character has evolved toward system-on-system confrontation. This change is driven by PLA’s core operational doctrine, “systems destruction warfare”; RAND research shows that the PLA conceives modern warfare as “a confrontation between opposing operational systems” with victory deriving from paralyzing the adversary’s system through precision strikes on critical nodes (Engstrom, 2018, pp. ix-21). The Department of Defense China Military Power Report 2024 echoes this assessment, describing how the PLA has reorganized under joint-theater commands and new cyber and information forces to gain decision advantage in conflict (U.S. Department of Defense, 2024, pp. 67-70, 112-129). Furthermore, the People’s Republic of China has more than tripled its ISR satellites since 2018; this expansion enhances its ability to continuously monitor and target its adversaries (Dahm, 2024, p. 6). PLA systems-confrontation warfare also blurs the boundaries of the competition continuum by targeting U.S. command-and-control (C2) architecture in the competition phase, giving them an operational advantage during crisis and conflict.

The PLA’s emphasis on integrated fires and non-kinetic effects directly targets U.S. C2 infrastructure. This emphasis on attacking decision-making systems, rather than forces, frames CJADC2 as a response to the changing character of war rather than a discrete technological initiative. CJADC2 seeks decision superiority by integrating diverse capabilities across domains, creating a cohesive and responsive operational framework without relying on sheer mass. The U.S. Air Force formally defined CJADC2 as the “art and science of decision-making to rapidly translate decisions into action” (Marler et al., 2022, p. 6). As an operational approach rather than a program of record, CJADC2 depends on interoperable data, shared authorities, and integrated EMS maneuver. Yet, without full cyber- and spectrum-level integration, CJADC2 remains conceptual due to the absence of a department-wide framework, shared data standards, mission-partner integration, and measurable objectives necessary for transition from concept to operational capability (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2025, pp. 14-15; U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General, 2025, pp. 14-20).

Fragmented Command, Control, and Information Architecture

Despite visible progress, the Joint Force continues to rely on legacy systems, which hinder the integration and agility needed for modern multi-domain operations. Service modernization efforts—such as Project Convergence, Project Overmatch, and the Advanced Battle Management System—remain ungoverned by common standards or metrics that align or contribute to CJADC2 (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2025, pp. 22-24). Additionally, the assessment found that restrictive classification policies continue to inhibit information sharing (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2025, pp. 22-24). This restriction limits coalition interoperability and slows decision making. As a result, programs evolve in parallel rather than as an integrated enterprise. Warfighters and analysts pull data from multiple systems, complicating its collection, assessment, and transfer across platforms. This “swivel chair” approach highlights the very gap CJADC2 is intended to address but which remains unresolved absent an enterprise-wide framework (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2025, pp. 4-5). The report provides a stark warning—as suggested by its title, “Progress Hinges on Establishing a Comprehensive Framework”—to align investments, authorities, and performance measurement across the Department of Defense.

Recent developments further highlight both progress and persistent fragmentation. The Joint Fires Network (JFN), which transitioned to a formal acquisition program in October 2025, illustrates the Department’s attempt to institutionalize sensor-to-shooter integration at scale (Freedberg Jr., 2025). While JFN represents meaningful movement toward cross-service integration, its emergence also underscores the need for unified CJADC2 data. Taken together, these developments show that while individual programs are advancing, CJADC2 still lacks the integration needed to achieve sustained joint advantage.

This fragmentation reflects a persistent tension between service autonomy and joint integration. Joint Publication 5-0 reminds planners that integrated planning across the competition continuum is essential to align campaigns, crises, and contingencies within a single, resource-informed framework (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2025, pp. V-1–V-3). Without a common digital backbone and shared data language, the joint force cannot achieve machine-speed coordination or sustain advantage on the battlefield, a gap that ultimately reflects questions of command, accountability, and stewardship.

While a unified CJADC2-governance framework is technically necessary, it requires strong leadership to implement it effectively. Decision timelines are shrinking, and commanders are being asked to act faster, often with incomplete information. Automation and machine-enabled tools can help manage that pressure, but they do not carry the weight of judgment. When force is employed, the responsibility does not shift to the systems; it stays with the commander.

Conditions-based authorities and machine-generated recommendations can improve tempo and reduce cognitive strain and burden, but they also create a risk if accountability becomes blurred. The risk is not theoretical. It reinforces why CJADC2 governance must be grounded in the Law of Armed Conflict and professional ethics, not just data standards or process workflows. Decision advantage must not simply become a function of speed. It depends on commanders who can interpret context, accept risk, and remain accountable when systems fail or when the situation changes faster than the data.

An Operational Approach for CJADC2 Integration

Joint Publication 5-0 defines operational design as the framework by which commanders understand the environment, define the problem, and develop an operational approach (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2025, p. III-1). For CJADC2, that means describing how the joint force will move from a fragmented EMS/cyber posture to a resilient, data-centric decision network in assigned areas of responsibility. Applied to CJADC2, this framework yields three main efforts: unified governance, converged formations, and institutionalized assessments. This operational approach is shaped by key elements of operational design: clear objectives, appropriate lines of effort, and operational reach.

First, governance clarifies strategic and operational objectives, identifies friendly and adversary centers of gravity in the decision space, and sets the limits and risk tolerances that shape subsequent lines of effort. The information environment (IE) must be treated as a single maneuver space, not just a technical domain. Recent Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) assessments show that inconsistent data schemas and security controls across combatant commands impede CJADC2 execution (Taylor, 2025). Their position reinforces that governance reforms must address the foundational data architecture on which CJADC2 depends. Therefore, the joint force should operate under aligned authorities and shared-planning standards that translate strategic guidance into executable operations. Second, converging formations translate these objectives into lines of effort and decisive points in the EMS and IE. This allows commanders to synchronize capabilities so that cyber, space, EW, and fires create complementary effects. RAND’s Multiple Dilemmas study notes that current command structures create bottlenecks when integrating cyber and space capabilities and advocates for greater decentralization and automation to improve decision speed (Priebe et al., 2024, pp. 53-66). Finally, institutionalized assessments, in turn, support anticipation, transitions, and the continuous refinement of the operational approach by linking measures of effectiveness and performance to changes in the OE and to key decision points. Planners should build metrics such as latency, resilience, and interoperability into every military exercise rather than bolting them on afterward. Large joint exercises like Pacific Sentry, Northern Edge, Project Convergence Capstone, and others offer the venues to test those ideas in real time, turning experimentation into operational learning. Together, these efforts provide an operational approach for CJADC2 that uses elements of operational design to link ends, ways, and means: a clear objective (restoring decision advantage), defined decision-space COGs, lines of effort in the EMS and IE, and an assessment framework that manages risk and tempo over time.

Implications and Assessment

CJADC2 redefines how the Joint Force campaigns and learns. Decision advantage will depend on the tempo—the speed with which a commander can collect, understand, analyze, and act despite disruption. The PLA’s doctrine of systems-destruction warfare identifies the electromagnetic spectrum as the decisive arena for paralyzing adversarial command networks (Engstrom, 2018). To counter this, U.S. joint doctrine recognizes the electromagnetic operational environment (EMOE) as a contested battlespace. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3320.01D directs commanders to integrate Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO) across all phases of planning and execution to preserve freedom of action in the EMOE (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2025a, pp. A-1–A-2). The manual further underscores that the EMS is a maneuver space on par with air, land, and maritime domains, requiring commanders to synchronize protection, exploitation, and attack functions to achieve EMS superiority. Integrating JEMSO principles within CJADC2 enables commanders to sustain decision continuity by preserving electromagnetic freedom of action, even under degraded communications. Resilience and adaptability must become measurable outcomes.

Joint Publication 5-0 defines assessment as “a continuous process” that measures progress toward mission accomplishment (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2025b, p. VI-1). Within CJADC2, commanders execute this process on two tracks: technical performance (measures of performance) and operational effectiveness (measures of effectiveness). CJCSM 3320.01D expands on this requirement by directing that commanders assess EMS operations for their effectiveness, progress toward EMS superiority, and ability to support overall mission objectives (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2025a, p. D-1). It also calls for evaluating gaps between the actual and predicted EMOE. The GAO further recommends that CJADC2 assessments consolidate lessons learned across joint experiments to prevent duplication and institutionalize adaptation (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2025, pp. 18-19).

Coalition integration also depends on shared spectrum and information-management practices. The DoW’s JADC2 strategy identifies “Modernize Mission Partner Information Sharing” (MPIS) as one of its five lines of effort, designed to ensure that allied and partner networks can exchange operational data and shrea decision support tools (U.S. Department of Defense, 2022, pp. 2, 7). NATO’s Federated Mission Networking (FMN) framework offers a proven precedent for this kind of interoperability among coalition partners. These frameworks together advance JADC2’s Line of Effort (LOE) 5 by extending decision advantage across joint and combined operations. Together, MPIS and FMN illustrate how data standards and trust frameworks can enable multinational partnerships to function as a combined decision network. Aligning these efforts early in campaign design reduces technical friction and extends CJADC2’s reach across the Joint Force and its allies.

Conclusion

Winning the next great-power conflict will hinge not only on the speed of command and decision making but also on the effective integration of technology, strategy, and coalition partnerships. CJADC2 integrates cyber, electromagnetic, and information capabilities to unify fragmented modernization efforts into a coherent system of systems. Operational art provides the connective tissue that links national strategy to tactical execution, ensuring the joint force can act with unity of effort and precision speed. Therefore, CJADC2 provides the operational construct needed to restore decision advantage against a peer adversary in the contested EMS and cyber environment.

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