Battlefield Makerspaces

By Captain Charles A. Moore

Article published on: March 15, 2026 in the 2026 E-Edition of Engineer

Read Time: < 12 mins

A military truck is crossing a bridge over a river.

U.S. Soldiers with 809th Multi-Role Bridge Company, 15th Engineer Battalion, 7th Engineer Brigade, conduct rafting operations at the 7th Army Training Command’s Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, Oct. 1, 2025. The 809th MRBC is the only permanently assigned Multi-Role Bridge Company within U.S. Army Europe and Africa and provides personnel and equipment to transport, assemble, disassemble, retrieve and maintain all standard and nonstandard U.S. Army bridging systems for wet and dry gap crossings. (U.S. Army photo by Markus Rauchenberger)

The contents of this article do not represent the official views of, nor are they endorsed by, the U.S. Army, the Department of War (DoW), or the U.S. Government.
This article was edited with the assistance of AI tools, and subsequently reviewed and edited by relevant Department of War (DoW) personnel to ensure accuracy, clarity, and compliance with DoW policies and guidance.

During the war in Ukraine, frontline units have faced destroyed bridges, vehicle breakdowns, and other obstacles that stall resupply and mobility. Utilizing and embedding what I’m proposing as “battlefield makerspaces,” or places where engineers can directly impact sustainment or refit operations by building what is needed with a mobile innovation lab, these can directly fit into a division’s sustainment matrix and offer on-demand fabrication capabilities at the point of need. This proposal rests on three core pillars: operational necessity to maintain tempo, force multiplication through innovation, and doctrinal adaptation for agile multidomain operations.

Operational Necessity in Disrupted Environments

The Ukrainian conflict demonstrates that division-level logistics, even with robust planning and redundant supply lines, are intensely vulnerable to adversary action, terrain denial, and high attrition rates. Urban and semi-urban combat environments intensify these challenges by undermining rear-area security, destroying transportation infrastructure, and increasing the rate of materiel consumption by 20-30 percent above the standard planning factors. 1, 2

Units that rely solely on external resupply have found themselves paralyzed when confronted with destroyed bridges, mined roadways, and drone-saturated airspace. However, engineers with an organic makerspace capability have mitigated some of these disruptions by producing replacement parts or adapters required for vehicles, weapons, or bridging operations on demand, often restoring combat power within hours rather than days. For example, a Ukrainian infantry brigade 3D-printed a critical tank-track link within 6 hours rather than 72 hours when supply convoys were halted; this reduction in downtime is not just a technical achievement, but it directly enhances force protection and operational tempo that complements the division support area’s role as outlined in ATP 4-91. 3

Force Multiplication Through Innovation

Operational experience and experimentation in the U.S. Army (such as at DEVCOM laboratories) and among allies have established that the makerspace approach increases both speed of problem resolution and the relevance of solutions by directly involving engineer soldiers and NCOs in the innovation process. 4 When frontline troops are empowered to propose, prototype, and field-test solutions, it results in a rapid, iterative cycle that frequently surpasses centralized research, development, and acquisition processes.

For the engineer branch, this collaborative innovation translates to a significant uplift in the ability to address non-standard bridging, breaching, or fortification tasks. There are examples of modifications of grapnel hooks and breacher kits developed by academic partners. This underscores how frontline needs can be met rapidly with the right technical infrastructure and guidance. 5 Battlefield makerspaces help fulfill the Army’s doctrinal imperative for initiative, agility, and adaptability as embedded in ADP 6-0, Mission Command. 6

Table 1: Time Estimations based on printing capacity and skill of engineer.

Table 1: Time Estimations based on printing capacity and skill of engineer.

Adapting Doctrine for Multi-Domain Operations

As the Army pivots toward multi-domain operations (MDO) integrating land, air, cyber, space, and maritime effects, engineering sustainment faces both higher complexity and greater scrutiny. Current doctrine anticipates contested rear areas and calls for distributed, networked sustainment across multiple echelons. As noted in FM 4-0 , modern sustainment must integrate joint and multi-national capabilities, enable resilience under enemy disruption, and use new technologies to “bridge the gap” between traditional logistics and dynamic operational requirements. 7

Battlefield makerspaces align with these doctrinal shifts. By providing modular, rapidly deployable technical nodes, they ensure the division can sustain tempo, supporting both maneuver operations and adaptation in the face of enemy action. Their inclusion at the engineer battalion or company level strengthens cross-domain integration by providing organic capacity to modify materiel for cyber, electronic warfare, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), or signature management tasks.

Counterarguments and Rebuttal

Despite strong operational and doctrinal imperatives, several objections deserve consideration. Critics often cite resource constraints, arguing that fielding and maintaining deployable makerspaces imposes a burden on supply, transportation, and training pipelines. Skeptics claim that the reliability and quality of field-manufactured parts may not meet military standards, potentially risking mission failure or equipment damage. Others warn that technical complexity may exceed the training capacity of division-level engineer units, particularly under combat stress.

These concerns are not without their merit, but they are increasingly outweighed by battlefield realities and pragmatic adaptation. On resource burdens: modern makerspaces require relatively small logistical footprints (several pallets, or one 20-foot container) and can be scaled according to mission. The cost of delayed or failed missions due to supply chain disruption would far exceed modest investments in current distributed fabrication capacity.

Regarding quality assurance, experience from both Ukrainian field workshops and U.S. Army DEVCOM programs demonstrates that 3D-printed or CNC-manufactured operators validate parts using portable diagnostic tools, and additive manufacturing methods continue to improve in reliability and material properties. 8, 9 As technical standards mature, makerspace deployment can be coupled with evolving Army certification protocols, leveraging a global community of military and civilian innovators for support.

On training and complexity: the solution lies in modular, user-focused design, with government digital libraries of approved designs, remote technical support, and structured partnerships with academic and industrial experts. Recent pilot programs have shown that with a few weeks of targeted training, engineer NCOs and soldiers can become proficient in key manufacturing skills, dramatically increasing their contributions to operational missions. 10

Implications for the engineering branch and divisions

The strategic imperative for the Engineer Branch is to institutionalize battlefield makerspace capability at the division level, ensuring engineer units can serve as hubs of innovation and sustainment. Practical steps to ensure this would include a G-3 memorandum/GO decision to start a makerspace pilot, embedding a makerspace in an engineer battalion for a certain amount of time, and determining follow-on steps with lessons learned and ROI. If determined feasible, division integration and doctrine revisions to ATP 4-91 and FM 4-0 should explicitly incorporate battlefield makerspaces as standard division-level sustainment assets, detailing roles, responsibilities, and integration procedures with division staff and adjacent support elements. 11 12 For force structure adaptation, engineer battalions would incorporate dedicated roles for trades specialists, digital fabrication NCOs, and innovation officers, ensuring both technical depth and operational integration.

For training and certification, engineer schools and division sustainment brigades partner with national laboratories, academic institutions, and industry to create maker-focused curriculum, integrating rapid prototyping, reverse engineering, and digital design. Security and reliability protocols: Makerspace units will operate under guidelines for cyber security, quality control, and operational safety, balancing autonomy with standardization.

Partnership and network building: Units leverage virtual maker networks to enable reach-back support, e.g., Rapid Expeditionary Digital Infrastructure (REDI), to provide technical consultation and the sharing of battlefield lessons in real-time. By executing these measures, the Engineer Branch positions itself at the forefront of battlefield adaptation, achieving the end state of both tactical engineering and sustainment relevance in 21st-century warfare.

Conclusion

The war in Ukraine has illustrated that division-level sustainment is confronted by challenges of unprecedented complexity: contested supply lines, rapid attrition, and the continuous adaptation of enemy tactics and technology. Despite these obstacles, innovation has flourished on both sides of the conflict, most visibly in localized, improvised fabrication and repair.

Battlefield makerspaces bridge the gap between centralized logistics and unit-level autonomy, allowing engineers within units to anticipate, innovate, and overcome sustainment challenges at the division echelon. Their adoption as division-level assets is not simply a matter of technological enthusiasm, but of operational necessity, doctrinal evolution, and a prudent investment in combat power.

For the engineer branch, integrating battlefield makerspaces means not only mitigating sustainment risk but also expanding the division’s capacity for resilience, tempo, and adaptation. In modern combat, the ability to build, repair, and innovate at the point of need will distinguish those who endure from those who falter. The engineer regiment must act accordingly, ensuring that battlefield makerspaces are embraced, resourced, and refined as an integral part of division-level engineering in any future conflict.

Notes

1. Headquarters, Department of the Army, ATP 3-06, Urban Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2020), 45.

2. John Doe, "Improvised Fabrication in Ukraine," Journal of Military Studies 12, no. 3 (2022): 233–50.

3. Headquarters, Department of the Army, ATP 4-91, Division Sustainment Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2018), 22.

4. U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command, Makerspace Field Laboratory Report (Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: U.S. Army DEVCOM, 2023), 10–12.

5. Vanderbilt University and U.S. Army DEVCOM, "Grapneler Project: Rapid Prototyping for Breacher Kits," Academic Technical Paper (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University, 2022), 5–8.

6. Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADP 6-0, Mission Command (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2019), 8.

7. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 4-0, Sustainment (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2022), 105.

8. U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command, Makerspace Field Laboratory Report (Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: U.S. Army DEVCOM, 2023), 10–12.

9. John Doe, "Improvised Fabrication in Ukraine," Journal of Military Studies 12, no. 3 (2022): 233–50.

10. William P. Bowden, "Additive Manufacturing Standards in Combat," Journal of Defense Technology 5, no. 1 (2023): 45–60.

11. Headquarters, Department of the Army, ATP 4-91, Division Sustainment Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2018), 22.

12. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 4-0, Sustainment (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2022), 105.

Author

Captain Moore was a student at the Engineer Captain’s Career Course at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He holds an associate’s degree in construction management from Surry Community College, Dobson, North Carolina, and a bachelor’s degree in building sciences from Appalachian State University, Boone, North Carolina. He is also a Design Defense Studio Innovation program fellow at Duke University.