A Pitiful Unholy Mess
The Histories of Wheeler, Bellows, and Haleiwa Fields and the Japanese Attacks of 7 December 1941
By J. Michael Wenger, Robert J. Cressman, and John F. Di Virglio, and Reviewed by Christina A. Garner
Article published on: July 1, 2025 in the Summer 2025 Edition of Army History
Read Time: < 7 mins
Modern, popular understandings of the Japanese attacks on 7 December 1941 often center around the actions at Pearl Harbor, Hawai‘i. Images of battleships, like the USS Arizona and the USS Oklahoma, being set ablaze and subsequently sunk by Japanese munitions dropped from waves of aircraft are seared into the American conscience. These events are further canonized by the memorials visited by tens of thousands of individuals each year. However, the “day that will live in infamy” encompassed more than the maelstrom of destruction at Pearl Harbor. The attacks also engulfed the rest of the military installations on the island of O‘ahu, along with the military personnel and residents who were present on that fateful day.
Michael Wenger, Robert Cressman, and John Di Virglio’s A Pitiful, Unholy Mess is the fourth book in the Pearl Harbor Tactical Studies Series published by the Naval Institute Press. Collectively, these works offer a comprehensive view of the various military installations on the island of O‘ahu and how they were affected during the Pearl Harbor attack. In this latest installment to the series, the authors provide a detailed understanding of the development and utilization of the Army Air Corps’ airfields Wheeler, Bellows, and Haleiwa before, during, and immediately after the attacks of 7 December. Both the Americans and the Japanese considered these bases essential to the defense of the islands, thus leading them to be targeted early in the Japanese aerial onslaught to prevent American fighter planes from interfering with the attacks on the Pacific Fleet at anchor just a few miles away.
As a framework for comprehending the book, the authors devote the first two chapters to the development and construction of the airfields. From the early 1920s to the days leading up to 7 December 1941, significant energy, effort, and economic capital had been expended to transform the bases from what essentially were dirt runways interspersed with scrub guava brush and sugar cane to robust installations that were critical to the training of fighter squadrons and the defense of the islands. The following five chapters deal with the training and equipping of the fighter squadrons that operated at Wheeler, Bellows, and Haleiwa Fields. A juxtaposition quickly emerges: The U.S. soldiers stationed at these locations had been enjoying a sweet assignment in a tropical paradise that was thought to be far away from any future conflict, but they were forced to shift into gear as their locations gained importance in the defense of strategic assets in a conflict against an emerging enemy. The authors do an admirable job painting a picture of American commanders attempting to advocate for the modernization of equipment that rapidly was becoming obsolete, while attempting to build combat proficiency among an inexperienced population of junior officers and enlisted soldiers surrounded by the temptations of sun and surf.
As the Japanese attacks of 7 December play out, the authors devote the remaining five chapters of the book to an examination of the aerial assault, the American response, and the subsequent aftermath. A comprehensive breakdown of the waves of Japanese planes descending on the unsuspecting American airfields, illustrates how ill-prepared the American forces were to defend themselves or mount an effective response. Because the Americans’ ability to arm and launch their aircraft rapidly on that infamous day was minimal, the authors focus on the pilots who were able to get in the air and engage with their aggressors against overwhelming odds. Likewise, the resulting analysis of the Japanese attack demonstrates a flawed execution because of fractured command and control by flight leaders, target misidentification, and airfields obscured by smoke, which led to ineffective attacks by subsequent flights. The authors do not minimize the enormous loss of life and destruction inflicted by the unexpected Japanese attack, but they do allow that the attack was not as effective or deadly as it could have been.
To shape their analysis, the authors draw on various archival sources, both American and Japanese, to present a detailed understanding of the airfields and the attacks upon them. These unique sources, specifically the Japanese carrier reports, offer a perspective not found in older or better-known works on the events of 7 December. The authors use these sources to create detailed maps and graphics that allow readers to visualize the Japanese attacks and American responses at the various locations. A robust number of pictures are scattered across the pages, further supplementing the text and allowing for greater visualization and understanding of the airfields, equipment, and personalities discussed throughout the book. While visually appealing overall, some of the images do not contribute effectively to a deeper understanding of the subject matter and could have been removed to reduce clutter.
An invaluable contribution to the study of the defensive preparations of American airfields in Hawai‘i before World War II as well as the events of 7 December, this volume joins the authors’ previous works as a detailed, authoritative account on a milestone event in history. Accessible to both the casual reader and the military scholar, A Pitiful, Unholy Mess is a compelling narrative that provides further explanation to the Japanese attacks on Wheeler, Bellows, and Haleiwa Fields and should be considered by anyone exploring topics related to the interwar period, World War II in the Pacific Theater, or, more narrowly, the actions on that infamous day itself.
Author
Lt. Col. Christian A. Garner is an ac-tive duty Army officer who will assume command of the 502d Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Battalion at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, in the summer of 2025. A former assis-tant professor of history at the United States Military Academy, he has spent all his operational field-grade time serving in the Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility.