The American Army in Germany, 1918–1923

Success Against the Odds

By Dean A. Nowowiejski, and Reviewed by Janine M. Hubai

Article published on: September 22, 2024 in the Fall 2024 edition of Army History

Read Time: < 9 mins

University Press of Kansas, 2021 Pp. viii, 376. $54.95

In The American Army in Germany, 1918–1923: Success Against the Odds, Dean A. Nowowiejski tells the story of the American occupation of the Rhineland in Germany after World War I. Attempting to fill in gaps of scholarship in military governance, Nowowiejski moves away from a diplomatic history and focuses on the institutional history of post–World War I governance of the American zone in the German Rhineland by the U.S. Army. He breaks the occupation of the American Zone of the Rhineland into two major phases: (1) The Third Army’s occupation in Germany from December 1918 to July 1919, and (2) the American Forces in Germany’s (AFG) occupation from 8 July 1919 until its departure in 1923—although he dedicates the bulk of his book to the latter. Celebrating the ability of the commander of the AFG, Nowowiejski argues that Maj. Gen. Henry T. Allen’s successful navigation of the complex relationships of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission (IARHC) and his skill in turning the recruits of the AFG into a highly trained and respected force makes it a surprising and worthy story about “ leadership, diplomacy, international relations, soldier training and education . . . and the performance of the United States Army in military government” (8).

During the first phase of the occupation, the Third Army followed the retreating German Army t hrough difficult, war-torn terrain to Coblenz, Germany. Leaving France’s friendly and celebratory atmosphere for the uncertain environment of a defeated Germany, the American soldiers found a trepid civilian populace who expected a barbarian American Army. Yet, over time, civilians found the Americans to be disciplined soldiers whose job entailed enforcing order and international laws. Although there were antifraternization laws, American soldiers were billeted in local German hotels and homes, which made avoiding social intimacy difficult. Brig. Gen. H. A. Smith and Col. Irvin L. Hunt oversaw the initial months of the occupation by writing the ordinances of the military government, supervising their implementation, and administering them to the city of Trier. Despite f laws such as confusing lines of authority and uneven policy creation, Nowowiejski details the efforts of the Third Army to grant some authority to local German leaders to give a sense of partnership between the occupier and the occupied, setting the stage for the second phase.

The second phase occurred when the Third Army changed to the AFG, and Allen took command on 8 July 1919. Here, the author strongly celebrates Allen’s leadership in the Rhineland. Nowowiejski calls Allen a “model commander and accomplished soldier-diplomat,” whose internationalism was unusual when Americans favored isolationism (10). Nowowiejski claims that Allen managed the occupation largely on his own with limited direction from the U.S. State Department or the War Department. As an officer with international experience as an attaché to Russia and Germany before World War I, as the military governor of Leyte in the Philippines, and as the founder of the Philippine Constabulary, Allen understood the workings of military governance. He was a man of wealth who felt most comfortable in the upper echelons of society, making it easy for him to blend into the diplomatic and political circles of the IARHC, using his influence to protect American interests in the region. Nowowiejski successfully frames Allen’s position in the political context of America’s refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, which prompted America to sign a separate peace agreement with Germany. This state of affairs gave Allen an “unofficial observer” role in the workings of the IARHC, rather than being an official member. Allen used his diplomatic skills and networks to keep the French and Belgians from infringing on German soil and interfering in the economic redevelopment of the American zone. As Warren G. Harding entered the White House in 1921 and the Senate refused to continue funding the AFG efforts, Allen lost his influence in the region as the number of American soldiers dwindled. The occupation ended in 1923.

Nowowiejski’s work is strongest in detailing the history of the training and education program that Allen implemented to turn the AFG recruits into disciplined, well-respected soldiers. When many World War I veterans returned home, recruits replaced the combat-tested veterans. Given the delicate political and diplomatic situation in postwar Europe, the American soldiers needed to be ready for any resurgence of violence. Nowowiejski’s meticulous description of the development of Allen’s training program is a testament to the thoroughness of his historical account. He also details the responsibilities of the occupying force, including maintenance of roads, bridges, railroads, public utilities, public health, and food supplies. The soldiers also were tasked with destroying German war materiel and selling American vehicles, animals, and other items to German citizens. The AFG offered the local community protection and helped the Rhineland regional economy in several ways: industries and public utilities were profitable, Army excess live-stock was sold to local farmers to restock their farms, and the money spent by the AFG soldiers in the community boosted the local economy. The American soldiers lived a privileged life in Coblenz, as they tended to have better financial conditions than most of the German population and enjoyed the city’s recreational offerings. Allen ensured that the Salvation Army and YMCA huts provided the soldiers with plenty of entertainment (especially to ward off visits to the local red-light district). Allen also organized horseman-ship events and competitions with other occupied armies to show the strength and abilities of the American forces.

Nowowiejski offers an extensive, even exhaustive, number of examples of Allen’s leadership skills. He paints Allen as almost too perfect, skirts over potential areas of f laws, and overextends some of Allen’s perceived legacies. In one instance, Nowowiejski suggests that “Allen’s interaction with diplomats across Europe . . . in many ways foreshadowed . . . American relations that happen today in the United States’ Mission” to NATO (41). However, he offers little evidence of how or why he makes this assertion. Part of Nowowiejski’s issue is the lack of varied sources. He often relies on one or two sources written by either the person of the subject themselves or the Army in general, offering only one perspective. This same problem also indicates an unbalanced view when discussing how the Germans viewed the Americans. Although it may be true that Americans and Germans found a way to coexist and that Americans helped increase the region’s economy, Nowowiejski offers too perfect of a picture. He suggests that Germans escalated violence shortly before the official signing of the Treaty of Versailles and that some American soldiers committed infractions. However, he does not go into further details. Looking into records that give the Germans’ point of view could have offered a more balanced reality of American occupation, and issues of soldier-civilian relations. Nowowiejski too often refers to the “ benevolence” of the AFG but explains Allen as a “successful host while using his authority over billeting . . . to cultivate friends and to resist pressure” (86). Would the inhabitants whose living circumstances were leveraged by the occupying power speak of their benevolence in the same way Nowowiejski suggests? This critique underscores the need for a more realistic and balanced view of history, highlighting the dangers of an overly idealistic portrayal of historical events.

These criticisms aside, this book provides a wealth of useful information about the workings of leadership and the Army during its occupation of the Rhineland. Despite the complex and changing nature of the postwar landscape, the narrative is easy to read. It is of value to anyone interested in American military governance, U.S. Army life, or European history during the first half of the twentieth century.

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