Throwback Thursday

On the third Thursday of each month, our team will publish an article aimed at fostering awareness among our Air Defense Soldiers about the rich legacy and heritage of our branch. These articles will take various forms, predominantly featuring reprints from former branch journals. Accompanying each posting, a member of our community will provide a narrative explaining the selection’s relevance and its significance to today’s readers.

In addition, we will feature current articles that delve into the illustrious history of our branch. We invite you to contribute to this endeavor by submitting articles that align with this purpose. As I have often emphasized, engaging in study, research and writing about our profession not only enhances your personal standing, but also enriches the broader narrative of our branch and the U.S. Army.

David A. Christensen
Air Defense Artillery Branch Historian

Foreword

The article below starts a series in which archived journals are revived with the purpose of inspiring esprit de corps and fostering professional discourse.

This article was originally published in the January-Febrary 1951 addition of the Antiaircraft Journal. Colonel Robert W. Hain, commander of the 15th AAA Battalion, provides a compelling account of the unit’s actions during the Korean War. His firsthand insights detail the endeavors and unwavering courage of the battalion, especially during the battles at the Chosin Reservoir. The journal entry encapsulates the roles and action of the 15th AAA under LTC Hain’s leadership, offering valuable lessons learned in military strategy and antiaircraft operations.

I chose this piece based on the 74th anniversary of the Battle of Chosin Reservoir. It begin late 27 November and went well into the morning hours of 28 November 1950. Thanksgiving this year is on 28 November and as we take a knee to give thanks, let us remember the Soldiers of Delta Battery, 15th AAA AW Battalion and all the Soldiers around the world today conducting the Air Defense Artillery mission.

This article was republished by
Brandy J. Albin
Air Defense Artillery Knowledge Management Advisor

Antiaircraft With The 7th Division

By Colonel Robert W. Hain, Arty

Article published on: November 1, 2024 in the Air Defense Artillery Journal: E-Edition

Read Time: < 25 mins

Col. Hain with members of the 15th AW Bn. at Hungnam.

In outlining the employment of automatic weapons with an infantry division in combat, more specifically the adventures of the 15th AAA AW Battalion (SP) in Korea as part of the 7th Infantry Division, I should like to point out that due to the nature of operations in this area, such employment should not be construed as being recommended for future campaigns necessarily. In other words, take it with two grains of salt, even if it is the latest word from the front.

To begin, those of us in the AAA should breathe a silent prayer of thanks to the foresight of those who were responsible for carrying out the expansion program of the AAA back in 1948. They made it possible to have trained units ready for use in this present war. The AAA units shipped to Korea had the jump on a lot of people, and the training which my battalion had at Fort Bliss and Fort Lewis has really paid off in every way.

After our arrival in Japan in August and prior to our joining the 7th Infantry Division, we spent a week at the Katakai Firing Range by courtesy of the 40th AAA Brigade. During this time, we fired at towed sleeves and RCAT planes, and although we have not fired a round since then at an airplane, it was excellent practice, and the 60-mile road march to and from the range helped get a few of the bugs out of our vehicles. Following this, we joined the division and proceeded to load out for the amphibious attack on the Inchon area. Due to the shortage of shipping, we were forced to leave 1½ firing batteries in Japan for later shipment on turn-around vessels. This was not good, but there was nothing we could do.

I might say that Inchon is not the best place in the world at which to make an amphibious assault; as a matter of fact, it is one of the worst. That is probably why it succeeded so well. It took us about three days to get all of our tracks, half-tracks, and trucks ashore. As soon as this was done, Divarty attached Battery B (Captain Ransom B. Cubbage) to the 31st Infantry Regiment, which was then engaged in operations south of Suwon. Battery B made an excellent showing in this fighting. They fired ground support missions in support of the infantry, sent out M16s and M19s as parts of patrols, executed “reconnaissance by fire” missions, and even engaged in some hand-to-hand combat with the Reds.

Sgt. N. F. Osbourne and members of his M-19 crew. The first unit to reach the Yalu River.

This battery racked up a score of 300 to 400 dead Reds in this fighting, expending about 2,500 rounds of 40mm and 175,000 rounds of caliber .50 ammunition, plus normal amounts of carbine, submachine gun, and pistol ammunition, and hand grenades. The infantry loved it.

The ground support missions fired by Battery B were the normal direct-fire assignments covering the advance of infantry against enemy positions dug in around key terrain features. The M19s were useful in this because their HE shells could be laid right into foxholes and the like, and no annoyance was forthcoming from places so covered. The M16s had a field day against the Reds in one of their “banzai” type counterattacks. No infantry in the open can stand up against the 2,200 rounds per minute pouring out of the quadruple .50 mounts. The word must have gotten around, as there was no more of this kind of monkey business tried by the Reds. The usual make-up of patrols in the 31st Infantry sector consisted of a tank or two, an M-19 and an M-16, plus some infantry in trucks. These were dispatched frequently in order to maintain contact with the enemy, for reconnaissance, and the like. On a number of occasions, Red T-34 tanks were encountered. The rapid firing of the 40mm guns on the M-19 permitted our crews to open up on the enemy tank and cover it with fire while our own tank crew got on target with their 90mm gun.

This was very effective, and in each case, the T-34 was destroyed. Now, the M-19 is definitely not a heavy tank nor even a medium tank, and it is not a good antitank weapon if matched against a tank whose crew is on the ball. However, it works this way: The instant an enemy tank is spotted, the M-19 trains its guns on target and opens fire. This requires only a couple of seconds. Two hundred rounds per minute are poured onto that tank, knocking out its periscopes, damaging its tracks, and creating a terrific din that must be enough to make the tank’s crew think that all hell has hit them. This makes them lose a few seconds trying to find out who is shooting at them; if they stick their heads out of the turret to take a look, they lose their heads. Meanwhile, our tank has drawn a bead on the T-34 and commences firing. Result: dead T-34. It is obvious that this teamwork requires that the M-19 crew be absolutely alert, the guns be ready to fire, and ammo ready boxes be open. The M-19 must fire before the enemy tank can train its gun on us. One round out of the enemy tank gun would usually mean the end of our mission. But the way we did it down at Suwon worked fine, and there is no reason why it can’t be repeated. This type of work is rough on the nerves of the M-19 crews, so rotation is necessary at frequent intervals. In this type of mission, the M-16 takes care of any Red infantry personnel who happen to be at the scene, especially on the flanks.

Capt. McClymont (with Chinese Tommy gun) and Lt. C. P. Chapman, Sfc. R. M. Stacer, Cpl. J. R. Dorsey, Pfc. R. L. Olson, Cpl. C. V. Auger and Pfc. C. F. Merica. All participated in the Chosin Reservoir action.

On one occasion, one of our M-19s turned in a good example of “reconnaissance by fire.” To his front, the M-19 commander noticed a fairly large strawstack. Knowing that North Koreans sometimes hide in strawstacks, he put a few rounds of HE into it, and the straw was set afire. In a few seconds, the stack was blazing merrily, and it soon became apparent that there was more to the strawstack than straw. The falling ashes uncovered a nice T-34 tank, which was dispensed with in short order by one of our mediums. In other instances, our M-16s and M-19s would, at the request of the infantry commander, sweep hillsides, woods, and other places in an effort to uncover enemy locations. It is believed that some such employment of our weapons was not too well justified in that ammunition was wasted. The infantry has the natural tendency to let artillery and automatic weapons do as much of the work as possible. This is fine, but in some situations, ammunition resupply will be so difficult that economy in ammunition expenditure must be practiced.

M-16s of Battery C (Captain Ray J. McManus) were employed south of Seoul on roadblock missions in an area where few infantry could be placed due to the more pressing need elsewhere. Our troops in this locality made good use of their time by combing nearby villages and rooting out Red soldiers and Communist leaders. We have 400 ROKs attached to the battalion, and some of those with Battery C had lived in the area where the roadblock was located. As a result, we were able to turn in a number of prisoners due to the knowledge on the part of the ROKs as to who the Communists were.

The mention of the ROKs brings up the subject of their use. We have used them to provide close-in defense of the weapons and of bivouac areas. Whenever we stop in a town for a few days, the ROKs go into the community and bring out North Korean soldiers who are hiding there, with local Communist leaders they are able to ferret out. They are also used in patrols, and are brave little fighters despite their lack of sufficient training. Our first man to be killed in combat was a ROK who was shot through the heart while attempting to take a sniper in a Korean house. It is a problem trying to transport the ROKs on long moves because we either have to shuttle them or borrow trucks; they are “chow-hounds” and eat us out of house and home, and they have other shortcomings, but all in all they are a big help and it has been quite an experience working with them. They are not dumb by any manner of means. I was amused by the remark of the interpreter in Headquarters Battery, one Kim by name. He noted that I smoke a brand of cigarette that does not quite rank in the top three. He said, “Hmm. Number One Boy smoke number ten cigarette.”

Weapons and personnel of the 15th AA AW Battalion (SP) were present near Osan-ni when leading elements of the 1st Cavalry Division, coming up from the south, made contact with the 7th Infantry Division. Shortly afterward, we received orders to move by road to Pusan for another amphibious operation. This 330-mile move was difficult because of the poor roads, dust, and the fact that near Hamchang the road crossed a steep mountain on which a large body of North Korean soldiers was engaged in harassing our column. Battery A (Captain John C. Hiles) was sent ahead and supported the 17th Infantry in the attack against these Reds while the Division artillery crossed the mountain. The difficult terrain did not lend itself to use of our weapons in the best manner, but Battery A was able to find positions here and there from which they delivered fire support. After making several stops to the south for gasoline, we arrived in Pusan and bivouacked at K-1 airfield about 18 miles northwest of the city. We spent the next two days working on our vehicles, drawing and issuing winter clothing, and the like. In mid-October we loaded our troops and material aboard ships, and after a sojourn in Pusan harbor, sailed for North Korea where we made another amphibious landing, this time near Iwon. There we collected our vehicles as they came ashore and prepared for the next move.

Our first orders at Iwon directed us to attach the M-16s of Batteries A and D (D commanded by Capt. James R. McClymont) to the 17th and 31st Infantry Regiments, respectively. A day or so later the M-16s of Battery C were attached to the 32nd Infantry Regiment. At the same time, the M-19s of Battery C were put into positions to provide AAA defense for the Iwon beachhead, relieving elements of the 50th AAA AW Bn (SP). The M-16s mentioned above moved out with the infantry, headed for the Manchurian border. The roads in northeast Korea are very narrow, steep and winding, and they follow the north-south river valleys almost exclusively; this makes operations of any kind extremely difficult and troops are, of necessity, road bound in the majority of cases. High, rugged mountains flank the corridors and vehicles cannot operate off the roads except in limited degree.

After a few days at Iwon, the remainder of the battalion moved to Pukchong and set up AAA and ground defenses around that city to protect the Division Rear. Shortly afterwards, the M-19s of Batteries A and C moved out to join the infantry. On 12 November the weather joined forces with the enemy; it snowed all morning and by night the temperature had dropped to below zero. This sudden change in temperature caused hardship to everyone, and the extreme cold lasted for two days before it eased up.

Winter lubricants for vehicles have not, at the time of this writing, reached troops in this area and it is necessary to warm vehicles up at frequent intervals to prevent their being deadlined. At this time our batteries with the infantry are moving north in widely separated valleys, and they hope to reach the border soon. Battery A reported that they had had some minor action and had killed a few Reds, but it appears that there are few enemy to be found. We are all hoping that the Korean war will soon end and that we can return to some more likable place. We have no idea as to where that might be, nor do we know whether we shall remain with the 7th Infantry Division. Suffice it to say, however, that we have found it very pleasant to work with the 7th Division, both with the infantry and the Division Artillery. We hope that we have done them some good.

COMMENTS RECEIVED LATER*

The essence of the success of AAA AW in support of the infantry is found in its fire power. This fire power is tremendous, but it leads us straight into a serious problem—that of ammunition resupply. There is the hooker. With your self-propelled battery attached to an infantry regiment or to a field artillery battalion, the problem of ammunition resupply belongs, technically speaking, to the supported unit. That is all very well, but those folks have problems of their own. They will try, but over these narrow, icy and winding roads one cannot pass the buck completely. There were times when our batteries got into scraps which ate up the ammo like water going over Niagara Falls. Resupply became critical. In the fighting last October, our Battery B was firing ammunition so fast that the available capacity for hauling was insufficient; so the Battalion supply section had to draw 2½-ton trucks and trailers from normal tasks and turn them over to the battery. M-39s (Armored Utility Vehicles) were used to get the ammo across the rice paddies. Inasmuch as these are command vehicles, the platoon and battery commanders were handicapped for the time being. For the mud and rice-paddy country, an ammunition carrier that can not only traverse deep mud, but also be able to go long distances over rough roads when the battalion moves, is necessary.

The action at Chosin (Changjin) Reservoir in North Korea in which Battery D, 15th AAA AW Battalion (SP) fought alongside the infantry and field artillery against overwhelming numbers of Chinese who had surrounded them was an excellent example of the effectiveness of the M-16 and the M-19, but it also demonstrated that two basic loads of ammunition do not last long in sustained firing. The battery carried that amount with them. The Chinese attacks were heavy and determined, and while the ammo lasted our men killed hundreds of the enemy. Air drops were attempted but they were not particularly successful. However, no other method of resupplying the weapons was open to us. It was most fortunate that the battery had taken two basic loads with them.

During operations near the Manchurian border, at temperatures as low as 25 or 30 degrees below zero, in mountainous terrain, on roads coated with snow and ice, three of our batteries found that mere existence was a task that taxed their facilities to the utmost; fortunately the amount of ammunition expended did not put a heavy strain on anyone. The M-39 is not a good vehicle for hauling anything in ice and snow.

The M-16 (half-track with quadruple caliber .50 machine guns) is a fine weapon. For use with the infantry division, however, we need a full-tracked carriage to go anywhere that the M-19 can go. Protection against small arms fire must be given the cannoneers; on the M-16 these two men are easy pickings for enemy riflemen while loading and operating the machine guns. Provision must also be made for carrying ammunition chests on the turret or elsewhere on the vehicle so as to make them readily available to the gun crew.

The M-19 (M-24 light tank chassis mounting twin 40mm cannon) is an excellent weapon. The carriage is somewhat underpowered, however, and we have found that the gasoline tank capacity is too small. Other vehicles in the battalion can go much farther before having to refuel.

The M-39 has plenty of power and range. It has not worked out well as a command vehicle, due to difficulties in operating radios. The vehicle is very noisy and this interferes with good reception while on the move. The tracks stir up great clouds of dust that settle on everything in the vehicle. We have had trouble in using the intercom; drivers dislike it intensely because in order that conversations be heard, the volume has to be turned up to such a point that the sound hurts the driver’s ears. The steel tracks slip and slide badly in snow and ice. It is very difficult to secure spare parts for the M-39.

It would be fine for officers of all self-propelled automatic weapons battalions to attend the Infantry School for several months to indoctrinate them in infantry tactics. By the same token, infantry officers should be given a course in the proper employment of our weapons in close support of the infantry. Of course, we are learning here, and would like very much to present our experiences in more detail, but unfortunately we are busy fighting. How about sending a team of experienced officers and NCOs over here from the AAA & GM School to put these things down on paper for us? That same team could bring along a great deal of information that we in the field would like to receive. It would work out to the best advantage of all.

*Colonel Hain’s article includes reports received in three separate letters.

Epilogue

The battle of Chosine Reservoir, fought from November 27 to December 13, 1950, was a significant engagement during the Korean War. Approximately 30,000 UN forces, mainly Army and Marines, faced off against around 120,000 Chinese forces. The battle was marked by freezing conditions, with both sides suffering heavy casualties. The UN Forces has 1,029 killed, 4,894 missing, and 4,582 wounded. The Red Chinese forces had 7,3024 killed and 14,062 wounded. Despite being heavily out numbered, the UN forces managed to break out of the encirclement and conduct a fighting withdrawl to the port of Hungnam.

The following summation is from the book East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950. Captain James R. McClymont described the night of November 27, 1950, as deceptively quiet. In the early morning hours of November 28, the eerie silence was shattered by the sound of mortar fire. McClymont, reacting swiftly, called up the 1st Platoon bunker, only to hear Warrant Officer Junior Grade Roscoe M. Calcote report intense small arms and mortar fire on their position.

Without hesitation, McClymont leaped onto an M19 gun, unleashing a torrent of fire on the advancing Chinese troops. He commanded his other positions to fire automatic twin 40MM high-explosive rounds, lighting up the night with fierce retaliation. When the enemy fire finally subsided, McClymont tried contacting the 1st Platoon bunker again—no response.

Gathering a detail of his men, McClymont moved through the cold, treacherous terrain toward the 1st Platoon’s position. As daylight broke, the devastating reality became clear: the 1st Platoon had been overrun. Determined, McClymont and his team cleared the area of enemy soldiers and assessed the battlefield. The sight was harrowing—two officers and four enlisted men lay dead. Only one officer and six enlisted men had survived the onslaught.

Among the fallen was WOJG Calcote, a true hero in his final moments. He was found with a sidearm in one hand, the other hand tragically missing. Surviving soldiers recounted how Calcote had bravely thrown back enemy grenades until one exploded in his hand. Despite his grievous injuries, he continued to fight with his sidearm until he was killed.

Calcote’s extraordinary valor did not go unrecognized; he was posthumously awarded the Silver Star for his heroic actions that night. However, his body has never been recovered due to the heavy enemy presence. Warrant Officer Junior Grade Calcote became the first Air Defense Warrant Officer to receive a valor award, his legacy etched in the annals of military history.

Appleman, Roy E. East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950.Texas A&M University Press, 1987.