IBCS Paradigm Shifts

Decoupling Components and Crews

By LTC Joshua Urness

Article published on: November 1, 2024 in the Air Defense Artillery Journal E-Edition

Read Time: < 11 mins

Intro

The Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS) represents a revolutionary shift in Air and Missile Defense (AMD) operations. IBCS unbinds Command and Control (C2) nodes from sensors and effectors, offering a modular, scalable approach to Air Defense. To fully leverage the capabilities of IBCS, air defenders must adopt a new mindset that embraces weapon system flexibility and adaptability. This article introduces the foundational elements of IBCS and offers insights into how commanders and personnel can optimize its capabilities. Future articles expand on the broader implications of IBCS, including its role in the Integrated Fire Control Network (IFCN), its use across different phases of operations, and its integration into joint defense frameworks, and accompany previously published articles about the IBCS Paradigm Shift.¹ And IBCS gunnery.²

Framing the IBCS Paradigm Shift

IBCS changes the fundamental assumptions that air defenders use to plan, prepare, execute, and assess AMD. Changing assumptions does not necessarily mean changing our approach, but failing to leverage new capabilities in the next fight is professional negligence. IBCS is more resilient to electronic warfare and communications denied and degraded operational environments (OEs) seen or expected in current and future conflicts. The system logic and communications backbone enable never-before-achievable modularity and distribution essential to survivability on the modern battlefield. The burgeoning integration of sensor and effector types opens the possibility of true mission tailoring, enabling greater engagement efficiencies throughout the depth of the battlefield.

With the IBCS conceptual context and the baseline explanation of materiel and personnel in this article, readers should begin to consider questions like “What is a minimum engagement package?” or “What equipment do I need, and where, to accomplish the mission?” and “how many personnel of which type do I need to accomplish the mission?” The answers to these questions in theaters like the Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East may look very different but will be equally transformative. Failing to cognitively modernize as we implement the IBCS weapon system will doom us to fighting the old ways, with the new capabilities, in the future war.

Components of an IBCS-Adapted Patriot Battery

The initial phase of IBCS fielding focuses on adapting Patriot units to operate within the IBCS ecosystem. A typical IBCS-enabled Patriot battery consists of five key components:

• Headquarters: Consists of headquarters platoon members with Joint-Battle Command Platform (JBCP) and access to IBCS-enabled communications equipment.
• Operations System Group: Consists of the vehicle-mounted S-280 shelter and the Interactive Collaborative Environment (ICE). The S-280 Shelter is also called the Engagement Operations Center (EOC). The S-280 and ICE enable engagement operations and integration with the IBCS task force (TF) through the IFCN and Joint Force through the Fires Gateway-based Multi-Tadil Network. The ICE is in an air beam tent supported by the Environmental Control Unit (ECU; power generation and air conditioning), which contains IBCS servers and operator workstations and can also be remoted into an external space or building. The S-280 possesses an onboard relay capability, meaning it does not require an external relay unless the increased length of the external relay mast is necessary based on geography. The ICE can connect to the IFCN through the S-280.
• Sensor System Group: Consists of organized or task-organized sensors and their supporting equipment (adaptation equipment, power generation) within the fire unit. Adapted Patriot battery Sensor System Groups (pre-Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor [LTAMDS] fielding) consist of the Patriot Radar (RS), Electronic Power Plant (EPP), and Radar Interface Unit (RIU), which is a modified Engagement Control Station (ECS). Additionally, Sensor System Groups could consist of adapted Sentinel Radars (Sentinel radars require hardware modifications not included in the adapted Patriot fielding but can be allocated based on operational needs) and other sensors, as available.
• Launcher System Group: Consists of organized or task-organized effectors, such as Patriot Launchers (modified to support IBCS) and Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) launchers. The IBCS fielding consists of upgrading M903 launchers to M903A2 launchers. M903A2 launchers are commonly referred to as Link-on-ELES, or LoE LS.
• Relay System Group: Consists of equipment necessary to establish and sustain the IFCN, primarily based on radios hosted on IBCS relays.

Equipment Employment Options

IBCS equipment integration through the IFCN enables tailorable and reconfigurable capability employment decoupled from C2 nodes. Operations System Group capability controls adapted sensors and effectors through relays, which integrate the equipment across the task force into one single IFCN. Therefore, the only tactical site requirement is a relay or S-280 that connects to the IFCN.

IBCS-enabled forces could occupy sites with a single S-280 or establish the ICE. The ICE includes a larger workspace large enough for a doctrinal IBCS crew, whereas the S-280 is similar to the size of an ECS. The S-280 possesses onboard IFCN components identical to the relay, except the mast does not elevate as high.

With the IFCN interface as the constraint, IBCS adapted Patriot capability could deploy much differently from contemporary Patriot forces. Adapted Patriot units could deploy as independent Sensor System Groups or Launcher System Groups with their required relays to augment or complement already established IBCS Task Forces. Similarly, Operations System Groups could deploy only with sensors or launchers or as a complete fire unit capability. Commanders must understand the risks and limitations associated with each type of force package and the holistic impact on unit readiness, measured in unit status reporting.

Sentinel radars can be adapted to integrate into an IBCS task force. However, Sentinels are not part of the current Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (AIAMD) force design. Adapted Patriot IBCS fielding will not include Sentinel adaptation (not listed in the component site figure). Sentinels can augment each Patriot radar location or add to remote sites like Patriot radars. Sentinel low-to-medium altitude coverage complements the Patriot radar coverage or extends an IBCS task force radar coverage on the other side of masked terrain (early engagement, defense in depth) or locations outside Patriot radar coverage (mutual support).

Variations of IBCS-Enabled Tactical Sites

IBCS provides a net-centric, scalable approach to air defense, allowing these components to be deployed independently or together, depending on operational needs. By decoupling sensors, launchers, and command systems, IBCS enables more flexible and adaptive defensive configurations.

Crew Manning

As IBCS introduces more complex and modular operational capabilities, the structure and roles of the engagement crew must evolve. Unlike the previous, more centralized system, where a small crew managed a limited number of sensors and launchers, IBCS enables crews to control multiple sensors and effectors over a broader area. Additionally, relay crewmembers responsible for emplacing and sustaining the IFCN occupy sites throughout a fire unit or task force area of operations, increasing network management time requirements. As a result of the increased workload and demand for specialization, the IBCS engagement operations crew comprises five baseline crew members. Each fire unit is authorized three crews. Crewmember roles consist of the following by mission occupational specialty (MOS):

• Fire Control Officer: Responsible for the overall operations of the EOC, internal and external communications, coordination, and engagement. This role is similar to the Patriot Tactical Control Officer or Tactical Director role. It is typically performed by a MOS 14A Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Officer or 140K Air and Missile Defense Systems Tactician.
• Engagement Manager: responsible for the monitoring, evaluating, reporting, and engaging of directed tracks and status of task force engagement capability through interaction with the weapons operator. This person is typically MOS 14E, Patriot Fire Control Enhanced Operator/Maintainer.
• Surveillance Manager: Responsible for monitoring the air picture and ensuring proper air picture correlation with the Joint Data Network, coordinates with the sensor operator to ensure accurate tactical air picture transmitted through the IFCN. This person is typically MOS 14H, Air Defense Enhanced Early Warning System Operator.
• Sensor Operator: Responsible for monitoring and controlling unit sensors and supporting the Surveillance Manager as required. This person is typically a MOS 14E, Patriot Fire Control Enhanced Operator/Maintainer.
• Weapons Operator: Responsible for monitoring and controlling the unit launcher and interceptor operational states and works with the engagement manager as directed. This person is typically a MOS 14T, Patriot Launching Station Enhanced Operator/Maintainer.

The S-280 shelter is smaller than the ICE tent and supports a more mobile but less comprehensive engagement operations technical capability and crew size. Crews should train to conduct operations and engagements in the S-280 because the S-280 can integrate with other entities on the IFCN while ICE occupation and establishment occur. Once the ICE emplaces, crews can transition operations to the ICE. Alternatively, if operations within the ICE are disrupted or degraded, crews can return to the S-280.

IBCS engagement operations roles are critical for the increased complexity of operations that come with IBCS. With the ability to deploy across a greater span of control and handle more remote sites, crew members must be prepared to manage a more comprehensive array of tasks.

Component Management – Putting It All Together

One of the defining features of IBCS is the flexibility it offers in force composition and employment. While force design sets crew composition and size for training readiness, commanders should train to fight in rapidly changing operational environments. Commanders can scale the number of EOCs and vary crew mixes based on the Army Strategic Context—whether during competition, crisis, or armed conflict (FM 3-0):

• Competition below Armed Conflict: During low-intensity competition, IBCS-enabled forces may centralize operations in a single EOC, with fewer crews and more reliance on relays. The system can still operate effectively in this reduced footprint, increasing efficiency without compromising capability. The number of crews or operator composition could reflect task force capabilities. For example, EOCs managing more launchers or launcher hot crews may add additional Weapon Operators to their crew or follow a similar logic with Sensor Operators. One Sensor Operator could be responsible for Patriot radars, and the other could be responsible for Sentinels.
• Crisis: Task forces can quickly scale up as tensions rise, adding more EOCs and remote sensor or effector sites. Commanders can adjust crew composition based on the changing intensity of operations, ensuring that forces remain agile and responsive.
• Armed Conflict: IBCS allows task forces to deploy multiple EOCs tailored to specific battlefield requirements in armed conflict. Crew structure is highly customizable, with the flexibility to increase the number of weapons operators or sensor managers based on operational needs. This adaptability ensures that task forces can handle diverse and dynamic threats. Task Force Commanders determine the number of engagement operations EOCs based on battlefield framework and forces available, e.g., establish sector-based responsibilities regardless of the balance of effectors/sensors.

Crew structure and composition are flexible based on the situation and accepted risk. Task force span of control and the number or types of remote sites, i.e., effector, sensor, or mixed informs risk. Task Forces with more effectors will likely add more weapons operators to crewmember positions, e.g., one operator for every four remote-effector sites. Task Forces with more sensors will likely add more sensor operators to crewmember positions, e.g., one sentinel and one Patriot sensor manager. Crew structure is entirely customizable but limited by the capacity of the number of workstations in either the S-280 shelter or the ICE.

Sustaining and Operating Tactical Sites

The expanded and decentralized footprint significantly increases sustainment and logistics demands, which could be its own separate article. IBCS force design includes a significant increase in sustainment personnel and equipment, accompanying an even more substantial addition of signal personnel. However, the design does not include security personnel authorized in the Patriot design or increased launcher or radar personnel.

As a Task Force scales and contracts relative to OE intensity or demands, Commanders develop plans to operate and support the increased numbers of sites. Commanders leverage efficiencies possible through multiple beyond-line-of-site IFCN pathways, which enable the colocation of weapon system components with other forces. While this method assists with security and sustainment, Commanders should develop plans to manage launcher, sensor, and maintenance crews using a “hot crew” methodology. Hot crews may deploy from a centralized location or stay in an area in the middle of a site cluster. Multiple hot crew types move together to sites to increase survivability and provide mass. EOC crews manage hot crews through fielded line-of-site and satellite communications capabilities. EOC crews expand to meet the demands of increased weapon system components when needed.

Sometimes relay sites operate remotely without additional sensors or effectors to bolster the IFCN and increase the robustness of the mesh network capability. Additionally, some tactical sites may be disbursed in clusters and relay-only sites could be used to connect the clusters to build a larger IFCN. In such situations, planners should consider support relationships to the relay teams and relays. One concept, in addition to those discussed regarding sustainment above, is to divide task force areas of operations (AO) into sections with responsibilities assigned to senior commanders in each AO. Clarification of that responsibility simplifies security and sustainment and coordination requirements across the task force.

Conclusion

IBCS is not just a technological upgrade but a paradigm shift in how air defense systems fight. IBCS enables air defenders to deploy more agile, scalable, and adaptable weapon systems by decoupling sensors, launchers, and command structures. This flexibility is crucial for meeting the evolving challenges of modern warfare, where the ability to reconfigure forces and integrate diverse components quickly is essential for mission success. The future of ADA lies in the ability to tailor forces dynamically to meet the specific needs of any given strategic context, and IBCS is the key to unlocking that potential.

Air defenders must modernize how they think about using ADA weapon systems. IBCS enables Patriot units to achieve survivability through modularity and the ability to distribute sensors and effectors across the battlefield with the IFCN decoupled from C2. The net-centric nature of IBCS enables the integration of components and personnel in a mission-tailored, OE-responsive manner. The operationalization of this capability through the creative employment and grouping of the components and crewmembers in defense plans is a defining characteristic of the paradigm shift.

Endnotes