



# THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE AND THE APEX OF OPERATIONAL ART AND DESIGN

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## The Battle of the Bulge and the Apex of Operations Art and Design

In December 1944, the Battle of the Bulge, fought in the frigid Ardennes Mountains between Belgium and Luxembourg, became firmly established in military history. The battle, which lasted from 16 December 1944 to 25 January 1945,<sup>1</sup> marked Adolf Hitler's final major World War II offensive on the Western Front.<sup>2</sup> Initially taken by surprise, American forces withstood the brunt of the German attack and eventually managed to halt the German advance, forcing a withdrawal. When the battle is analyzed through the lens of operational art (OA) and design, it is clear that, despite early German successes, critical flaws in planning and implementation led to Germany's defeat.

The U.S. Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) played a vital role in the Allied strategy during intense combat by effectively integrating resources, objectives, methods, and risk management. The collective efforts of 2,097 CWS officers and 26,909 CWS enlisted personnel were pivotal in fortifying American defenses against chemical warfare. The Soldiers excelled at additional tasks, garnering support from commanders who acknowledged their indispensable role in wartime readiness.<sup>3</sup> This CWS involvement transcended traditional limitations through the integration of tactical expertise within a complex and unpredictable theater of war. The determination of those who were committed to overcoming unexpected challenges and the multifaceted nature of warfare were highlighted during this period. This article analyzes the Battle of the Bulge by applying OA and design and considering the ends, ways, means, and risks of the operation.

### Understanding the Intricacies of OA and Design

The strategic method that commanders and staffs use to create campaigns and operations that integrate ends, ways, and means to organize and employ military forces is known as OA.<sup>4</sup> Joint force commanders apply OA through judgment, decision making, and adaptation to the evolving operational environment (OE). The application of OA in planning helps develop insight into the issues at hand; it reduces the ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex OE.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, joint force commanders and their staffs facilitate unified action by setting objectives, establishing priorities, and assigning tasks to subordinate forces, allowing for acknowledgment of the operating processes, capabilities, objectives, and priorities of interagency partners and other interorganizational participants.<sup>6</sup> OA embodies the strategic concepts and visions of commanders and their staffs; operational design translates these conceptual ideas and thoughts into practi-

cal vigor, thereby moving toward the desired end state.

Operational design is the cornerstone that shapes the planning process; it provides an analytical outline that commanders and planners can use to dissect and grasp the OE. The critical elements of operational design include the desired end state and conditions, centers of gravity, decisive points, lines of operation, operational reach, direct and indirect approach, culmination, timing and tempo, operational pause, and risk.<sup>7</sup> Operational design helps guide the application of OA, beginning with a definition of the problem and the development of an operational approach to solve it. The campaign subsequently begins to take shape as the following critical questions are addressed: What, how, and with what risks will resources be distributed, priorities be established, and military objectives be achieved?<sup>8</sup> Joint force commanders and staffs consider factors such as the OE, enemy capabilities, and friendly force limitations throughout the design process. This framework, meticulously shaped by the commander's strategic insight, infuses the abstract mastery of OA.<sup>9</sup> Bridging the realms of OA and design is pivotal to understanding the end state set for the Battle of the Bulge.

### Decoding Strategic Ends

At its core, the Battle of the Bulge was a clash of military strategic ends and objectives, as two great adversaries competed for tactical control within the rugged terrain of the Ardennes. The Ardennes Offensive was Hitler's last desperate attempt to force an end to the war in Europe on favorable terms.<sup>10</sup> The German offensive aimed to drive a wedge through Allied lines, seize vital supply routes, and hasten the end of the war. Hitler planned to drive through the Ardennes to capture Antwerp, Belgium, with the desired strategic end state of splitting the Allied armies. That outcome would isolate British forces in the north while cutting off vital supply lines to U.S. formations farther south. Hitler hoped that such a dramatic blow would shatter the Allied cohesion and will to continue fighting, allowing Germany to regroup and convince the Western Allies to negotiate peace, as occurred after the massive 1918 German spring offensives during World War I.<sup>11</sup> To achieve this goal, the Germans identified key road junctions and Belgian towns (such as St. Vith and Bastogne) as decisive points for capture.<sup>12</sup> Seizing these key locations would allow German forces to rapidly advance to the west, toward Antwerp, along several attack routes through the rugged Ardennes. Hitler believed that Germany could force a decisive operational victory if the German forces could quickly reach Antwerp—before Allied reactions solidified.<sup>13</sup>

On the opposing front, the desired strategic end state involved holding the German offensive and preserving the Western Allies' drive forward. The Western Allies viewed Germany as militarily defeated; their goal was to press on,

into the heart of the German forces, while avoiding any significant setbacks.<sup>14</sup> Objectives included halting the relentless German offensive, reclaiming lost ground, and pushing the unified forces of Nazi Germany (*Wehrmacht*) back to their original position.<sup>15</sup> Preventing the capture of Antwerp, a key port and supply hub that was coveted by the Germans, was critical to the Western Allies' plan. The Allies simultaneously aimed to inflict substantial damage on the German forces, strategically weakening the capacity of their army, navy, and air force to sustain the fight.<sup>16</sup>

The strengths of the Allies were the unity and combined combat power of American, British, and other coalition forces. The Allied forces faced the arduous challenges of halting the enemy advance and preserving their hard-earned gains. The center of gravity encompassed the town of Bastogne, Belgium, strategically positioned on the main road to Antwerp. The significance of Bastogne lay in its potential to either resist German occupation or become the linchpin that enabled a crucial supply line to Antwerp. Hitler planned to shatter this potential.<sup>17</sup>

### Applying an Operational Approach of Wits and Ways

As Hitler's plan unfolded, paving the way for disruption, CWS concurrently implemented a strategic blend of offensive and defensive measures that would impact the outcome of the battle. By using protective equipment to combat the harsh conditions; devising ingenious methods of warfare; and deploying smoke screens, flame throwers, and chemical agents, chemical warfare turned the tide.<sup>18</sup> It stood as a testament to the power of strategic ingenuity.

During wartime, managing the demands of scarce resources, supply allocation, and tactical planning proved time-consuming. Time limitations also posed challenges for gas warfare training.<sup>19</sup> Despite these complexities, CWS provided smoke generator units to screen troop movements, white phosphorus grenades for signaling and screening, and flame throwers and incendiary grenades to destroy enemy equipment and fortifications.<sup>20</sup> These capabilities directly enabled critical Allied operations. For example, in December 1944, the 86th Chemical Mortar Battalion, Camp Campbell, Kentucky, displayed its strengths and combat effectiveness by contributing to defense efforts alongside various infantry divisions, including the 75th Infantry Division, the 82d Airborne Division, and the 7th Armored Division, located at St. Vith. The 86th Chemical Mortar Battalion provided white phosphorous smoke rounds, which created chaos among enemy forces. With the enemy overwhelmed and disoriented, its forces started to retreat—thanks to the coordinated efforts of the 86th and the supporting divisions.<sup>21</sup>

Although the use of chemical weapons was limited during the Battle of the Bulge, the threat of chemical weapons remained throughout the conflict. CWS supplied bulk smoke pots to create concealment for river crossings, helping Allied forces maintain the momentum. Smoke generator teams tirelessly worked in frigid weather conditions to provide concealment whenever and wherever needed.<sup>22</sup> Through these diverse applications, CWS chemical units directly contributed

to the Allied effort that led to the defeat of Germany. The innovative use of chemical smokescreens by CWS exemplified tactical genius and paved the way for strategic maneuvers that would prove crucial in tilting the balance of the conflict. This ingenuity set the stage for the subsequent strategic operations that would lead to a turning point in the battle.

### Leveraging Strategic Means

In the bitter chill and relentless combat of the battle, CWS, alongside Allied forces, mastered the art of deception through smoke—a strategic veil meticulously deployed from an arsenal of agents embedded in hand grenades, rifle grenades, artillery shells, and smoke pots. The battlefield, covered in haze, became a stage where troops were transformed into shadows and supply lines were obstructed. American forces commanded the skies with large-scale smoke screens created by mechanical smoke generators, blurring the lines between the air and land domains. The smoke shield masked the Allies from the piercing eyes of the enemy, but also produced a fog that confused and disrupted enemy plans.<sup>23</sup> The capabilities of the smoke generator teams safeguarded the lives of countless Soldiers and Allied forces.

Despite the capabilities and ingenuity of the smoke generator teams and the clever tactics of the Allies, the Germans quickly recognized that the pace of these smoke operations was unsustainable. Therefore the Germans assembled a powerful strike force with which to achieve surprise and breakthrough in the Ardennes in the opening days of the Battle of the Bulge. More than 200,000 troops, 2,000 artillery, and 450 tanks and assault guns were amassed for the German offensive.<sup>24</sup> Many of the assault units had extensive combat experience. The Germans also stockpiled significant fuel and ammunition reserves for the initial attack. However, they needed to accurately assess their capacity to support and sustain a prolonged offensive and match strategic ends with means. Their goal of rapidly advancing to Antwerp and splitting Allied forces could have been more ambitious, if not for the depleted state of Germany in late 1944.<sup>25</sup> At that time, the Germans lacked the fuel, transport, and logistics capacity to support an extended mobile campaign deep into Allied territory and the German offensive quickly outran its operating systems. Mechanized assault units raced ahead of infantry support and lost momentum when tanks ran low on fuel or broke down. In addition, narrow roads in the Ardennes limited maneuverability, allowing U.S. forces to hinder the German advances by establishing roadblocks and destroying bridges. The German Air Force, *Luftwaffe*, was unable to gain air superiority, enabling Allied aircraft to damage German armor, trucks, and supply lines.<sup>26</sup> Allied air operations disrupted German efforts to maintain open roads and deliver sufficient ammunition and fuel to the frontline.

The mismatch between ambitious operational reach and inadequate sustainment quickly caught up to the Germans. The rapid Allied response and strong counterattacks overwhelmed the German forces, which could not support the intensity of combat operations. Once the Allies countered the initial surprise attack, the Germans lacked the resources and operational freedom to advance to the Rhine River—let

alone to Antwerp.<sup>27</sup> This situation highlighted the need for Germany to align its means with its attempted ways and ends. While more modest offensive goals may have been achievable, Hitler's desire for a decisive victory proved to be unrealistic. The overextension into the Battle of the Bulge would become a defining moment in the assessment of Germany's wartime strategy.

## Maneuvering Through the Risks

The miscalculation associated with Germany's wartime strategy led to the Ardennes offensive, which was accompanied by significant operational risk—a jeopardy to irreplaceable armored units and national credibility. The armored division of the German army moved into combat without adequate logistical support, risking destruction if the advance came to a halt.<sup>28</sup> The lack of necessary resources and operational freedom meant that German forces would need help to sustain an advance to Antwerp while facing certain Allied counterattacks. The possible failure of the offensive also put the legitimacy and control of the Nazi regime at risk. Allied advantages in mobility, firepower, and air supremacy ultimately diminished the chances of a decisive German victory. A rational analysis demonstrates that the dangers of the battle far exceeded the potential benefits.

CWS also faced serious risks during the German offensive. Harsh weather conditions negatively impacted the speed of deployment of troops and equipment. In addition, without support, CWS teams faced isolation until reinforcements arrived and resupply occurred.<sup>29</sup> The quick counteraction by committed CWS units, compounded by a shortage of munitions, could have led to severe losses. Limitations of the CWS increased the danger that mechanized forces faced when undertaking such a bold counterattack so late in the war.

Ultimately, the unnecessary strategic risk that Germany took during the Battle of the Bulge also jeopardized essential U.S. CWS units. The chances of achieving decisive success were minimal, which increased the probability of a catastrophic failure of Nazi ambitions and the remaining armored forces. Both Germany as a nation and CWS as a crucial branch of the U.S. military faced existential risks in the Ardennes gamble.

## Conclusion

An OA and design analysis reveals strategic deficiencies in Germany's last significant offensive on the Western Front during World War II. Although achieving initial tactical surprise provided some success, the inability of the Germans to maintain momentum meant that their operational reach outpaced their capabilities. A thorough and accurate assessment of their forces as well as those of their enemy might have led the Germans to a more viable strategy. Meanwhile, the Allied coalition demonstrated resilience and adaptability in responding to the unexpected German attack. Key CWS capabilities effectively obscured movements and strategically shaped the battlespace to support Allied counteroffensive maneuvers. The intricacies of OA and design illustrate why the German strategy and Hitler's campaign to conquer Europe failed.

## Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>Roger Cirillo, *Ardennes-Alsace: The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II*, The U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2019, <[https://www.history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-26/CMH\\_Pub\\_72-26\(75th-Anniversary\).pdf](https://www.history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-26/CMH_Pub_72-26(75th-Anniversary).pdf)>, accessed on 17 September 2024.

<sup>2</sup>Hugh M. Cole, *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, Office of the Chief of Military History, 5 May 2010.

<sup>3</sup>Brooks E. Kleber and Dale Birdsell, *The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1966.

<sup>4</sup>Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Planning*, 1 December 2020.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations*, 18 June 2022.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3105.01B, *Joint Risk Analysis Methodology*, 22 December 2023.

<sup>9</sup>JP 3-0.

<sup>10</sup>Cole.

<sup>11</sup>William K. Goolrick and Ogden Tanner, *The Battle of the Bulge (World War II)*, Time-Life Education, 1 January 1977.

<sup>12</sup>Cirillo.

<sup>13</sup>Goolrick.

<sup>14</sup>Cole.

<sup>15</sup>Donald M. Goldstein et al., *Nuts! The Battle of the Bulge: The Story and Photographs*, Brassey's Inc., 1994.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup>Kleber and Birdsell.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup>*The 86th Chemical Mortar Battalion Presents Its Battle History*, U.S. Army, 1946, <[https://digicom.bpl.lib.me.us/www\\_reg\\_his/83/](https://digicom.bpl.lib.me.us/www_reg_his/83/)>, accessed on 17 September 2024.

<sup>22</sup>Kleber and Birdsell.

<sup>23</sup>Leo P. Brophy et al., *The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988.

<sup>24</sup>Cirillo.

<sup>25</sup>Cole.

<sup>26</sup>Diane T. Putney, *ULTRA and the Army Air Forces in World War II: An Interview With Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court Lewis F. Powell, Jr.*, Office of Air Force History, 1987.

<sup>27</sup>Goldstein.

<sup>28</sup>Cirillo.

<sup>29</sup>Kleber and Birdsell.

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