

Tracy also demonstrates that talent management, a problem that the military grapples with today, was just as much of a problem for PSYOP during the wars. He presents numerous accounts of PSYOP soldiers complaining about incoming soldiers having no training in psychological operations. Even when schools were established for psychological operations training, PSYOP units did not receive trained personnel to fill their rosters. A report from the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company stated that “an attempt to obtain trained and available personnel from the pool of Psywar School enlisted graduates, not one of whom has ever been assigned, failed” (162). Furthermore, there was a lack of knowledge about PSYOP within other training units. This may have contributed to issues with moving PSYOP school graduates to PSYOP units. As one soldier recounted about basic training, “The cadre [had] never hear[d] of the [1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group], and [did]n’t understand the functions of bon-bon troopers from high-level outfits” (174).


The last major recurring theme in *Victory Through Influence* is how the U.S. Army organized PSYOP units from war to war. The organization varied from theater to theater within wars, and Tracy somewhat tediously lays out the mishmash of radio broadcasting and leaflet groups, mobile radio broadcasting companies, loudspeaker and leaflet companies, and reproduction companies. Keeping track of the various PSYOP organizations was an unenjoyable aspect of the book, and a few organizational charts would have been helpful in making things clearer.

Another minor difficulty the reader will encounter is the presentation of different theaters within each war. Each chapter focuses on a specific theater from the beginning of the particular war being discussed to its end, which means that when switching to another theater within the same war, the reader is taken back to the start of that war. This can make for tedious reading, especially in the Korean War chapters. Nevertheless, the overall presentation makes sense, even if it could have benefited from better transitions.

Overall, Tracy does an excellent job of using primary sources to demonstrate how PSYOP developed as a capability across three wars. By showing both how the capability developed and how it was or

was not retained, Tracy provides a history of the PSYOP capability that gives readers a chance to apply the lessons of history to today’s circumstances. A careful reader could draw parallels between the development and adoption of PSYOP and the development and adoption of emerging technologies in recent decades. Should it take three wars before the military understands that a capability is worthy of retention?

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THE FRONTIERSMEN WHO COULDN'T SHOOT STRAIGHT: THE ARMY VS. THE PIONEERS, 1815–1845

BY GREGORY MICHNO

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REVIEW BY ALEXANDER M. HUMES

In his work on American pioneers between 1815 and 1845, Gregory Michno examines myths, particularly those related to White settlers and the Army. A scholar on the American West and warfare in that region, Michno presents an Army led by officers who increasingly were devotees of the Enlightenment and its principles, as opposed to the frontiersmen, who existed to obtain as much personal wealth as possible.

Michno’s central focus is to change the popular perception of frontiersmen as self-sufficient, virtuous citizens who cleared a wilderness for civilization. He writes that “while historians may have seen behind Oz’s curtain, the majority of Americans still cherish the smoke and mirrors” when it comes to their memory of settlers (4). Michno acknowledges that it appears he “only focused on the negative” but argues that “to swing the pendulum back toward the middle, the unflattering and scandalous need exposure” (6). Rather than structure his argument chronologically, Michno arranges

it by theme. He dedicates each chapter to an area of pioneers' actions, often where they did whatever was necessary to obtain land and wealth, including lying, stealing, and resorting to violence. Michno uses examples from the South and the North to show that these actions were not limited to a particular region.

Fraud is one of the major tools Michno claims frontiersmen used. They lied to gain lands or money. They also used force to achieve their goals. A militia force's massacre in 1818 of a Chehaw village (an event Michno compares to the 1864 Sand Creek Massacre) is one of many instances of violence chronicled in support of his argument that White civilians were responsible for most of the violence on the American frontier.

Michno also targets the myth of self-sufficiency, arguing that pioneers received federal financial support. Among his examples, Michno points to postearthquake relief in the 1810s, militia members being reimbursed for expenses while in the service, and relief for those affected by the War of 1812 and the Seminole Wars as proof of a long history of the federal government providing aid.

When Michno examines the U.S. Army, it is often in the role of those who sought to keep the peace but ultimately were powerless against the pioneers' political power. Rather than judging the regulars as "a legion of Indian-killers," he presents them as more professional and better soldiers than militia and volunteer units (6). He also shows a philosophical difference between the two groups. Although the Army of the 1810s initially followed local passions, including espousing a hatred of American Indians and sympathy "toward the frontiersmen," the Whig-influenced regular officer corps became "more tolerant of the Indians' dilemma and less patient with the aggressive frontier whites" by the mid-1820s (86). Popularly elected militia and volunteer officers represented the Romantic era and populism, two of the movements Michno believes ended the progress of the Enlightenment.

Michno portrays the Army as a force attempting to restrain White settlers and enforce federal laws and regulations regarding land use and American Indians. For most of the book's first half, the Army interacted with the pioneers while trying to enforce federal laws, escorting American Indians during Indian removal, or during conflicts such as the Seminole Wars. As

he writes about officer professionalization after the War of 1812, Michno touches on the same subject area as Samuel Watson, referencing his two-volume work on professionalization. Michno traces the change in Army policy toward American Indians, but his focus remains on frontiersmen during this study.

Direct confrontation between the settlers and the Army occurs during the book's second half. Officers and soldiers attempted to stop frontiersmen physically in some instances, often facing civil charges and lawsuits for their efforts. The largest example is late in the book when Michno chronicles filibustering (unauthorized military expeditions to seize territory) efforts in Canada and the Army's efforts to stop cross-border movements.

Ultimately, as other works on Indian Removal and local-federal relations during Westward expansion argue, White settlers won because of their political power. In Michno's argument, Army officers recognized they would receive no support from their superiors against criminal charges and lawsuits when they attempted to remove trespassers or forcibly stop pioneers who preyed on all persons in the area. Facing this lack of support, these officers made a conscious decision to stop enforcing federal rules. The influx of volunteer officers during the Mexican War and after led the Army to embody a racialized view of American Indians during the post-Civil War Indian Wars.

Michno concludes with an examination of how frontiersmen are remembered today. He points to Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis and instances within popular culture and the historical field in which such a point of view remained through the twentieth century to today. He examines whether the settlers' violent nature continues to shape American society.

Michno joins other historians in tracing the development and changes to a professional regular Army, though he focuses more on the pioneers' actions, with the Army as a secondary character. *The Frontiersmen Who Couldn't Shoot Straight* is best read alongside Samuel Watson, Robert Utley, Durwood Ball, Sherry Smith, and Robert Wooster, whose research on the military and the frontier analyzes military-settler relations in addition to military-Indian relations. The works of these historians address the Army's attempts to control frontiersmen to varying degrees, with Wooster's *The*

American Military Frontiers and *The United States Army and the Making of America* having the greatest combination of timespan covered and focus on the Army as agents of federal power. Scholars have an opportunity to build on the work of Michno and these other historians with a monograph focused on the Army's efforts to enforce federal laws on the White settler population between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Suggested readers for *The Frontiersmen Who Couldn't Shoot Straight* include students of the development of the Army during westward expansion (especially between the War of 1812 and the Mexican War), officer interactions with and opinions of White pioneers and American Indians, Indian Removal, and the comparison between regular forces and militia and volunteers. As Michno's primary focus in this work is addressing popular memory, *The Frontiersmen Who Couldn't Shoot Straight* also would benefit those studying historical memory, why historical memories are formed collectively, and how they change over time.

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