Irregular Warfare

A Case for Parity in Priority

By CW4 Patrick Schorn

January 1, 2024 | Warrant Officer Journal, January-March 2024 Edition

Read Time: < 11 mins

The Biden administration’s current National Security Strategy demonstrates a clear shift from the previous administration by drawing distinctions between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. Whereas the previous N.S.S. equated the two nations as an interchangeable threat, the current policy notes delineation. It “will prioritize maintaining an enduring competitive edge over the P.R.C. while constraining a still profoundly dangerous Russia” (White House, 2022, p. 23). The subsequent 2022 National Defense Strategy provides the Ways with which the Department of Defense will support these policies, only mentions Irregular Warfare twice, and continues the precedence of the previous administration by releasing an updated Irregular Warfare Annex as opposed to fully integrating the elements into the base document. By separating the two documents and their intent, DoD delineates its force planning construct and the associated resourcing prioritized by the Department and its components, relegating Irregular Warfare to a secondary status. Irregular warfare remains the best alternative to the strategic overmatch doctrine by providing low-visibility operational options, reducing the risk of rapid conflict escalation, and sustaining competition with state adversaries.

While the United States military struggles to view Conventional and Irregular Warfare in parity, our peer and near-peer adversaries have recognized the utility of operations below the threshold of warfare and exploited the liberal world order with it. This can be seen with the successful use of Little Green Men in Crimea, Wagner group operations in Africa, and non-state-funded proxy militias’ proliferation across the Middle East. The paradigm is further quantified by noting that the United States has been involved in five conventional conflicts and over fifty irregular or low-intensity armed actions (Elsa and Weed, 2014, pgs 88-107). Morris notes that these non-conventional deployments were “designed to achieve objectives absent declared war, and fall in an operational space between peace and war” (Morris et al., 2019, p. 8). Additionally, a recent RAND Corporation report similarly argues that gray-zone strategies below the threshold of U.S. military response will be a significant challenge for the United States in the next 10 to 15 years (Cohen and Morgan, 2020, pgs 39.46). Army Futures Command notes that “aggressive and active competition, rather than kinetic warfare, dominates the US-China relationship with proxy wars and influence efforts competition more likely than large-scale conventional warfare” (Army Futures Command, n.d., p. 7). These elements frame a global operational environment and changing warfare characterized by strategic competition and asymmetrical requirements that Special Operational Forces are trained, manned, and equipped to operate in and provide the Joint Force capability it is unprepared to support.

The Argument for Irregular Warfare

The argument for Irregular Warfare begins with broad and ill-determined doctrinal vernacular that establishes a consistent misunderstanding of, and therefore, inappropriate preparation to nest its capability within strategic planning. Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum, describes “competition” as actions taken by states and non-state actors “to protect and advance their interests” (JCS, 2019, p. v). These actions generally occur before hostilities and occur to set favorable conditions or as shaping the environment to support actions following the start of conflict. Irregular warfare is the accompanying actions that arise in conflict under the threshold of visibility that overt warfare occupies. While Joint doctrine defines Traditional Warfare as “a violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions and alliances of nation-states” (JCS, 2017, p. x), it defines Irregular Warfare with a broad brush as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over relevant population(s)” (JVS, 2021, p 63).

One only needs to study the Chinese “Unrestricted Warfare” principle to grasp how our peer adversary employs these principles fully. This doctrine articulates China’s inclination for and emphasis on Irregular Warfare over traditional warfare, stating, “When carrying out war with these people, there is no declaration of war, no fixed battlefield, no face-to-face fighting and killing, and in the majority of situations, there will be no gunpowder smoke, gunfire, and spilling of blood” (Laing, 1999, p. 134). While the regime continues to expand its conventional military formations, it has historically favored non-kinetic, low-visibility options that allow it to obtain its goals without overt attribution and the need for diplomatic intervention that could negatively impact world opinion and economic viability. Considering this, the United States will not be able to deter Chinese aggression with a conventional defense structure entirely and will need strategies and capabilities that address their irregular threat.

Our adversaries will continue to use their Irregular Warfare capabilities to shape the environment, counter the interests of the United States and their allies, and set favorable conditions for their conventional forces if conflict arises. These actions will occur as far below the threshold of visibility as possible to ensure plausible deniability or, more likely, misattribution that helps drive information operations. Section 1202 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act: Support of Special Operations for Irregular Warfare provides USSOF with the tools to counter these activities and set favorable conditions for theater commanders. The provisional authority permits USSOF to recruit, train, equip, and pay salaries for foreign militaries, paramilitaries, and individuals to support U.S. Irregular Warfare operations (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, 2017, § 1202(a)). The statute allows USSOF to effectively counter peer adversaries By, With, and Through surrogates discreetly to achieve national goals and requirements while providing decision-makers the space to use other elements of national power to ensure influence. However, while the authority bridges a capability gap during Irregular Warfare, it does not cover times of overt warfare, and “despite the consistent use of unconventional warfare as part of larger conventional campaigns over the last 60 years, there is currently no specific authority which would allow S.O.F. to train and equip an irregular force during a “traditional armed conflict” against another nation-state” (Rich et al., n.d., p. 540).

Additionally, as the Division becomes the maneuver element in multi-domain operations and strategic planners look to support the N.D.S. requirement for large-scale combat operations using an overmatch doctrine, it is not realistic to assume that these formations will be capable of supporting both LSCO preparations and Irregular Warfare operations in steady state. To this end, USSOF is already positioned to carry these requirements either unilaterally or through partnered operations. These elements can be effectively integrated into a theater army’s conventional military formation to compete against peer threat gray zone and asymmetrical activities. This is a critical capability USSOF must continue to remain concerned about as they are highly reliant upon conventional force as a supporting structure and mission demands placed upon the relatively small elements can, and will, quickly outpace their capacity to meet requirements. Security Force Assistance Brigades are an excellent example of comparative conventional force elements that provide critical overt overlap through train, advise, assist, enable, and accompany S.F.A. operations with allied and partner nations.

Our adversaries continue to recognize and leverage the United States’ aversion to escalation of force and are often surprised when we respond with our full military capability. This is generally due to a lack of contingency plans outside long-range strikes that provide equitable options between no response and full-scale military action. This places the adversary in a position where they can continue to conduct operations below the threshold of response indefinitely with a low degree of concern of response. This sets conditions to a point where U.S. military response can cause a larger-than-proportional escalation from an adversary unprepared for kinetic U.S. reprisals. “With U.S. conventional forces reduced in size, China—and, to a lesser extent, Russia—will narrow the qualitative gap and might calculate that the United States lacks sufficient capacity to respond effectively. China and Russia, however, likely will prefer to achieve their objectives “on the chea.” (Morgan & Cohen, 2020). Irregular Warfare provides decision-makers options that are established, prepared, and proportional to adversarial gray zone operations. Consistently developing this infrastructure below the threshold of visibility at the very least, maintains parity with our adversaries, sets conditions well in advance to respond to the unexpected, and provides alternatives that minimize escalatory cycles. When nested within a holistic, whole-of-government plan, Irregular Warfare components provide a low-visibility or clandestine “M” to the DIME paradigm.

Special Operations Forces, particularly U.S. Army Special Forces, are a critical component of the Competition Continuum as they maintain persistent engagement globally through the Joint Combined Exchange Training, or JCET program. In 2022, this Title Ten, U.S.C. Section 2011 authority provided $55m that supported 149 S.F. Operational Detachment – Alpha deployments to train global partners. These highly cost-effective deployments often overlap annually with the same countries and become the “partner of choice” exchanges for these militaries. As the training comes at little to no cost to the host nation, they provide the U.S. Embassy and its diplomats substantial collateral and leverage with their associated host government. The long-term benefit to the program is that junior officers attending the training and building relationships with their USSOF partners often quickly rise through their ranks and become favorable to U.S. military partnership as they progress into positions of power. This program, along with larger scale exercises and programs such as U.S.C. Section 333 Build Partner Capacity, allows the theater CCDR to tailor his competition planning to counter peer adversary inputs. Lastly, close associations with host nation military through persistent engagement provide a current understanding of the operational environment as every member of an ODA becomes a passive sensor to atmospherics while deployed.

The Way Ahead - Recommendations

Doctrine. Fully integrate Irregular Warfare into the National Defense Strategy and nest it within the priority of large-scale combat operations. Provide USSOCOM (Joint) and USASOC (Army) distinct guidance that shifts or delineates Irregular Warfare S.O.F. priorities within their portfolios.

Organization / Training. Establish an institution that coordinates and implements derivative concepts and doctrine of the Irregular Warfare Center within the U.S. government and is nested within the National Security Council to ensure whole-of-government connectivity. Rebuild an Asymmetrical Warfare Group-like organization focused on Irregular Warfare and dedicated to operational advisory support to U.S. Army forces. Provide for experimental force design that is specifically tailored to provide support to and execute Irregular Warfare in austere or denied areas. Require the integration of Irregular Warfare into all service Professional Military Education institutions. Ensure training integrates ethics and rule of land warfare to counter negative narratives associated with Irregular Warfare secondary to its use by authoritarian regimes to secure their national interests. Realign Irregular Warfare training programs focused on the emerging peer-adversary threat capability, while reducing the counterterrorism priorities of that past two decades.

Material / Facilities. Reconstitute the Rapid Equipping Force to provide rapid fielding of current and emerging technologies to support Irregular Warfare requirements and expedite RDT&E of requisite capabilities to counter peer adversaries. Reinstitute USSOCOM plans for Regional S.O.F. Coordination Centers within each TSOC to supplement ARSOF JCET exchanges and extend competition through persistent host-nation interaction.

U.S. Army Photo by Sergeant Jake Cox

Conclusions

Secretary Robert Gates characterized the DoD’s aversion to Irregular Warfare in his 2015 memoir as the “military services’ preoccupation with planning, equipping, and training for future major wars with other nation-states while assigning lesser priority to current conflicts and all other forms of conflict, such as irregular or asymmetric war” (Gates, 2015). Additionally, RAND notes that “current political and budgetary constraints will likely complicate U.S. efforts to develop and implement a fully resourced National Security Strategy for some years to come. Considering these constraints and a challenging strategic environment, Army S.O.F. may constitute an effective and cost-sensitive capability” (Robinson et al., 2018, p av.).

Irregular Warfare remains the best alternative to the strategic overmatch doctrine in an era of continually constrained resourcing, manning shortages, and regional conflicts. It provides decision-makers and strategic planners with low-visibility operational options, allowing holistic whole-of-government elements to nest within. The doctrine reduces the risk of rapid escalation of force by bridging the gap between no response and maximum military reactions while sustaining a steady state of pressure on adversaries using asymmetrical force options. Lastly, it provides options to sustain competition with nation-states below the threshold of violence by inducing costs and incurring dilemmas with which they must react.

Cantwell notes, “In the strategic environment, a dichotomy exists between irregular and traditional warfare that is central to the understanding of the future of warfare. Irregular warfare involves drones, artificial intelligence, cyber, and special operations, and traditional warfare is appropriate to prepare for large-scale ground combat. Army Special Operations Forces provide the Army with critical capability for irregular warfare, and the roles, functions, and tasks of a theater army set the conditions for success in large-scale combat operations. The effective integration of Army Special Operations Forces with the theater army allows the Army to focus on irregular and traditional war simultaneously” (Cantwell & Magula, 2023, p. 16). Ultimately, the degradation of our competitive edge demand, manning shortages, and reduced resourcing will force the United States to employ Irregular Warfare as the norm and not the exception while preparing for and paying the cost of the possibility of traditional warfare with peer adversaries.

References