Revisiting the Special Operations Imperatives for Future Irregular Warfare Conflicts

By Dr. Daniel W. Ross, DM, MS, NRP, 1st Special Warfare Training Group

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1000/182

The Special Operations Imperatives have been an essential yet little-understood and often forgotten aspect of U.S. Army special operations forces (ARSOF) organizational culture and doctrine for over three decades. These Imperatives loomed somewhat obscurely in minds of ARSOF leaders during the continuous irregular war against violent extremist organizations known as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Over time, the Imperatives became a well-established foundation for assisting ARSOF leaders with planning, designing, and executing special operations in concert and integrated with other forces, interagency partners, and foreign organizations during these irregular warfare operations and activities. ⁰¹ Nevertheless, this important aspect of the ARSOF ethos requires sustained evaluation and discourse to ensure the intent and priorities continue to align with the overarching operational and strategic environment faced by today’s military.

In the post-GWOT environment, great power competition has reemerged as the primary national security challenge for the United States. Regardless, Irregular Warfare must remain an enduring mission and core competency across the entire joint force—not just special operations forces (SOF). ⁰² The successful integration of U.S. Army conventional forces and ARSOF remains a paramount factor for the joint force to achieve unified action, fight and win the nation’s wars, and protect national interests. ⁰³ The conversation surrounding Irregular Warfare has continued to evolve following the perceived end of the GWOT; this rejuvenated focus opened many new avenues to explore how ARSOF fights above and below the threshold of armed conflict.

With the focus now on institutionalizing Irregular Warfare across both conventional and special operations forces, there is merit in revisiting the Special Operations Imperatives and how they not only influence the future of ARSOF, but also how they balance—and perhaps overlap—with the conventional Army imperatives. The renewed emphasis on the Special Operations Imperatives has become apparent on account of the publication of Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, in October 2022, where the greater U.S. Army introduced a new set of imperatives for multidomain operations to assist all echelons of Army forces to accomplish missions, defeat enemy forces, and meet objectives. With this development in mind, it is incumbent upon the ARSOF community to invigorate the conversation concerning the role and influence of both the Army and the Special Operations Imperatives given the contemporary national security challenges the United States faces and the fluctuating character of warfare.

Continuing the Conversation

In a recently published doctoral dissertation entitled, A Phenomenological Study of U.S. Army Special Forces Senior Noncommissioned Officer Leadership Strategies during the Global War on Terror, ⁰⁴ the author explored the leadership and management strategies that U.S. Army Special Forces senior noncommissioned officers used to be successful during the GWOT. The results and findings of this study were enlightening, as various themes elucidated practical leadership and management strategies that the Special Forces Regiment—a vital component of the ARSOF enterprise—can implement across all operational domains. The data from the study provided insight into two decades of leadership experiences and suggested a set of findings for the next generation of Special Forces leaders seeking imperatives to guide successful special operations activities in future irregular and conventional warfare.

The subject dissertation revealed the significance of the Special Operations Imperatives and their relevant application in future conduct of Irregular Warfare and large-scale combat operations. The following discussion addresses the overarching purpose for revisiting the importance of the Special Operations Imperatives to ARSOF doctrine and the implications of the U.S. Army’s recently introduced imperatives in FM 3-0, Operations.

Remembering the SOFTEXT Anchor Imperatives

The Special Operations Imperatives entered ARSOF organizational culture 34 years ago and have changed relatively little ever since. Despite their age and recognition in Army special operations doctrine, they lack understanding and utilization across ARSOF. In their current form, the Special Operations Imperatives can be found in ADP 3-05, Special Operations. They represent the fundamental rules that guide how ARSOF leaders approach the design, planning, and conduct of special operations missions. These Imperatives inform how ARSOF leaders think about their tasks, missions, and operations to aid critical decision-making processes. ⁰⁵

The Special Operations Imperatives have permeated ARSOF’s collective consciousness and have been referred to as the “ARSOF Imperatives” or merely the “SOF Imperatives” in previous doctrinal publications such as FM 3-05 (2006) and FM 3-18 (2014). From a historical standpoint, Army Doctrine Publication 305 included minor edits to the wording and intended utility of some Special Operations Imperatives. For example, “Facilitate interagency activities,” was changed to “Facilitate interorganizational cooperation,” and “Consider long-term effects,” became “Anticipate long-term effects.” Moreover, “Ensure legitimacy and credibility of special operations” was streamlined into “Ensure legitimacy, credibility, and trust” and “Anticipate and control psychological effects” evolved into “Anticipate psychological effects and the impact of information.”

Slight deviations notwithstanding, the intent of the Special Operations Imperatives remains to serve as a foundation upon which ARSOF leaders plan, design, and execute a wide array of special operations with other Army units, joint forces, and allied and interagency partners. Possibly the most prominent Special Operations Imperative in ARSOF organizational culture involves understanding one’s operational environment. Understanding the operational environment entails a detailed synthesis of a myriad of factors, including political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure, and physical environment influences.

Imperatives two and three dictate that leaders must understand the political implications that exist concerning ARSOF actions within a country, as well as the interagency or interorganizational coordination and collaboration that must exist to support common national security goals. The fourth Imperative helps ARSOF leaders understand the proportionality of force and how to engage threats in a discriminant manner to minimize unwanted second- and third-order effects. Dovetailing from the fourth Imperative, the fifth highlights how ARSOF leaders must always be forward looking to anticipate the long-term effects of their actions. Proportionality and forward thinking allow for the sixth and seventh Imperatives to guide leaders in ways to ensure credibility, trust, and legitimacy, and to understand the potential psychological effects or impact of information due to the execution of special operations activities in a region.

Part of ensuring U.S. legitimacy, credibility, and trust hinges on the ARSOF leader’s ability to execute the eighth Imperative by operating with and through foreign partners. Imperative nine expresses the necessity for adaptability and flexibility in ARSOF operations; ARSOF leaders always need to develop multiple courses of action. Moreover, Imperative 10 states the importance of long-term engagement and the development of relationships to ensure the continued success of U.S. national security interests. The final two Imperatives speak to how ARSOF leaders must apply intelligence operations and procedures and adequately balance the need for security with the need to execute special operations activities.

To remain pertinent and optimally applied, the Special Operations Imperatives require constant, careful analysis to ensure relevance in contemporary operational and strategic environments. This means finding ways to integrate effectively with the tenets and imperatives set forth by the U.S. Army.

Future SO Imperatives—Army Special Operations Perspective

The importance of a renewed focus on the Special Operations Imperatives emerged since the publication of FM 3-0, Operations, in October 2022, where the greater U.S. Army introduced imperatives for multidomain operations as actions Army forces must take to defeat enemy forces and achieve objectives at acceptable cost. They are informed by the operational environment and the characteristics of the most capable threats Army forces can encounter. Specifically, including central aspects of the Special Operations Imperatives in the first
FM 3-0 imperative, “See yourself, see the enemy, and understand the operational environment,” reinforces the relevance of the ARSOF community in the grander scheme of future U.S. Army operations and strategy. Moreover, the Army’s imperative to see, sense and understand the operational provides operational linkage between the Special Operations and Army Imperatives. This nexus secures a shared understanding in the planning and conduct of multidomain operations for Army conventional and special operations forces.

In their current form, the Special Operations Imperatives provided a solid foundation for guiding modern special operations. Nonetheless, the Special Operations Imperatives need not resist change and should continue to adapt alongside continuous progress and development concerning modern warfare. Furthermore, continuing the conversation through meaningful research within the ARSOF community can help guide the future evolution of the Special Operations Imperatives.

For example, during the recent study concerning U.S. Army Special Forces senior noncommissioned officers’ leadership strategies during the GWOT, ⁰⁶ one of the interview questions posed to the cohort of Special Forces senior noncommissioned officers’ leaders specifically explored the Special Operations Imperatives aspect of ARSOF organizational culture. The question asked participants to discuss their view on what the Special Operations Imperatives meant to senior SF leaders during the GWOT. Interestingly, three of the Special Operations Imperatives appeared equally prominent in the responses to this question. Most of the study participants discussed the first, second, and fifth Special Operations Imperatives in relation to senior Special Forces leadership during the GWOT. Thus, the major themes that arose from that question included—

• Understand the operational environment.
• Recognize political implications.
• Consider long-term effects.

Many study participants spoke to the importance of understanding the operational environment as an ARSOF leader. The participants alluded to this Imperative being of primary importance in past and future conflicts. Furthermore, participants discussed how this Imperative remains a foundational aspect of the ARSOF community’s identity and organizational culture. These Imperative guide leaders and assists them in making sound decisions, and these sound decisions, in the end, help strengthen the credibility of ARSOF. Overall, these leaders referred to the first Special Operations Imperative as critical to their successful leadership and management strategies throughout their careers.

Many of the interviewed participants spoke about the importance of recognizing political implications as a leader. Some of these leaders believed that ARSOF failed to recognize political implications during the GWOT. They noted that ARSOF leaders at times looked very narrowly at tactical situations without understanding whether those efforts would meet the overarching intent.

Other vital points that arose concerning the second Special Operations Imperative related to its importance in a leader’s decision-making process and how a lack of application can lead to detrimental outcomes. One leader noted that many of the failures that received the most scrutiny over the past two decades of conflict occurred due to a failure to understand the political implications of a mission, operation, or line of effort.

These ARSOF leaders also highlighted the importance of the fifth Special Operations Imperative. Many participants discussed how the consideration of long-term effects remains paramount to an ARSOF leader’s decision-making process. The data further suggested that participants believed that many problems during the GWOT arose due to witting or unwitting neglect of the higher-order effects of a decision. The data indicated that a better understanding of long-term effects in the decision-making process of special operations leaders could lead to better success in how ARSOF fights and enables the Army and joint force across the competition continuum.

Interestingly, some senior leaders in the study also highlighted a handful of the Special Operations Imperatives that did not provide significant value in the conduct of previous operations, possibly require revision, or are duplicative based on the recently published Army imperatives. Overall, most of those interviewed conveyed that the list of Imperatives is too long to receive meaningful buy-in from ARSOF stakeholders. They discussed how the Special Operations Imperatives (12) make for a great poster in hallways and team rooms, but they are difficult to memorize and still do not seem to hold as prominent a role as, to use an example, the concise list of
SOF Truths (5).

Additionally, a few of the interviewed leaders indicated that Imperative Nine, “Develop multiple options” was redundant, self-explanatory, and unnecessary. Developing multiple options, contingencies, adaptability, and flexibility are concepts so ingrained in ARSOF culture that leaders felt this Imperative could be combined with another or revised. Also, some senior leaders discussed how Imperative 11, “Provide sufficient intelligence,” could be made more robust by reemphasizing the need to receive and generate sufficient intelligence rather than merely provide sufficient intelligence. Finally, many of the senior leaders interviewed stated that Imperative 12, “Balance security and synchronization,” had no relevance because of the ambiguity behind the intended meaning; they felt that most individuals in the ARSOF community could not define this Imperative if asked. These identified Special Operations Imperatives potentially indicate the necessity for further conversations on the evolution of ARSOF’s prescribed key operational requirements in conjunction with the overarching Army imperatives.

Conclusions

The three Special Operations Imperatives that rose to the top of the data while conducting the study on U.S. Army Special Forces senior noncommissioned officers’ leadership strategies during the GWOT provide intriguing discussion points for their renewed relevancy of Special Operations Imperatives and the implications of the recent release of Army imperatives in FM 3-0. Given the potential for overlap and redundancy of Army and Special Operations Imperatives, there is ample justification to relook the next generation of SO Imperatives destined for FM 3-05, Special Operations. While the purpose of this study was not to rewrite, reorder or replace the SO Imperatives, there is ample evidence to suggest that the time is right to relook the entire list of twelve, assess their utility for future SOF, and eliminate redundancy with the Army Imperatives.

The language across these definitions speaks to the importance of current and future ARSOF leaders understanding their operational environments, recognizing the political implications of these efforts, and strongly considering all long-term effects of their decisions. A renewed focus on these three Special Operations Imperatives can help ARSOF leaders be successful in the conduct of operations and activities in support of the Army and the joint force. Furthermore, constant longitudinal analysis of the Special Operations Imperatives as operational environments shift over time can lead to a beneficial evolution of ARSOF’s prescribed key operational requirements in conjunction with the recently developed Army imperatives.

The advent of explicit Army Imperatives—exhibiting some notable similarity with the current Special Operations Imperatives—indicates an inflection point for ARSOF. Furthermore, constructive criticism concerning some of the other Special Operations Imperatives highlights the potential to streamline, combine, or carefully revise future renditions more in line with Army imperatives. This conversation on the Special Operations Imperatives will continue to be important in anticipation of the release of an updated FM 3-05 later this year. The future of the Special Operations Imperatives would benefit significantly from closer examination to reveal those imperatives crucial and memorable to the conduct of special operations and similarly well suited for integration with the Army imperatives.

The expected updates to the Special Operations Imperatives could potentially have wide-sweeping effects that set the tone for the future of ARSOF as the organization seeks to find balance with the Army’s imperatives.

Notes