A Team Room Discussion on the SOF-Space-Cyber Triad
By Capt. Michael Lami and Capt. Brett Benedict
Article published on:
December 11, 2025 in the 2025 e-Edition of Special Warfare
Read Time:
< 10 mins
The Special Operations Forces (SOF)-Space-Cyber Triad marks a critical
evolution in how U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) prepare for
strategic competition, crisis, and conflict.
01
It is a practical concept that weaves space-based capabilities, cyber
effects, and deep-sensing platforms into Detachment-level operations. The
emphasis is not on developing bespoke technology for its own sake, but to
extend the operational reach, survivability, and decision-making agility
of forward Detachments. This is not a theoretical effort. Transformation
is already underway across the force.
02
Yet, whenever the Regiment evolves, we must also pause to ask why it is
changing and toward what end. ARSOF’s strength has always rested on its
human-centric foundation, particularly its ability to conduct
unconventional warfare at the ODA-level (Operational Detachment-Alpha) in
its most basic, irreplaceable form.
03
The task is clear: pursue technological advancement without compromising
the core activities that make ARSOF Detachments invaluable.
04
The Wars We Imagine vs. The Wars We Keep Fighting
SOF-space-cyber convergence lies at the intersection of two contrasting
yet influential views of modern warfare. Works like
Ghost Fleet envision near-future wars dominated by satellite
denial, devastating cyberattacks, artificial intelligence, and armed
autonomous systems. Much of what these novels portray is already unfolding
on the modern battlefield. Our adversaries share a similar vision–China
invests heavily in "intelligentized warfare," combining artificial
intelligence, big data analytics, and persistent sensing to achieve a
decision advantage.
05
Meanwhile, Russia employs sophisticated hybrid approaches by integrating
cyberwarfare, information operations, and proxies alongside conventional
forces to blur the lines between peace and war.
06
History, however, offers a sobering counterpoint. Drawing on nearly 600
cases of ground combat from 1942 to 2022, Ben Connable’s
Ground Combat: Puncturing the Myths of Modern War shows that
modern conflict remains dominated by infantry, armor, and artillery.
07
Despite the appearance of “technological transformation,” tactical
outcomes continue to hinge on the same uncertain, friction-laden, and
human-centriccontests of will that have defined ground combat for
generations.
08
Regardless of how we envision the next fight, one truth remains: the
contested spaces behind enemy lines where ARSOF Detachments must thrive
have not disappeared. The deep fight has just become significantly more
challenging due to advances in detection and sensing. However, persistent
surveillance and full-spectrum sensing are not absolute. The idea that "if
you turn something on, you’re dead" has become a dangerous training maxim
for Detachments that could have devastating implications if taken as an
absolute truth. Even in places like Taiwan, neither China nor Russia can
achieve perfect 24/7 satellite coverage.
ODAs must exploit maneuver windows in contested deep areas to enable the
joint force; exquisite technology helps, but it will not do the job alone.
09
As innovation accelerates, Detachments now face a dilemma: modernize
without overestimating technology’s ability to solve the enduring human
demands of special operations.
Technology, Modernization, and Risk Aversion
The Army Transformation Initiative recognizes that modern Detachments
cannot simply bolt new capabilities onto existing problem sets.
10
They must fundamentally reshape how they analyze, decide, and act in
contested environments. Technological integration positions SOF
Detachments as critical nodes—bridges where advanced sensing, cyber
effects, and space-enabled communications merge with ARSOF’s traditional
core tasks.
11
However, modernization brings with it a temptation: risk aversion.
12
Military organizations often respond to new technology by investing in
standoff capabilities that promise distance, precision, and control. While
these tools provide real advantages, overreliance on them creates a false
sense of security and risks distancing Detachments from the face-to-face
engagement essential to unconventional warfare and strategic battlefield
effects.
The more we rely on advanced systems that replace human presence, the more
we potentially erode what sets ODAs apart: being human-forward, adept at
navigating ambiguity, and lethal in the gaps and seams others ignore.
13
Detachments must not fall victim to overreliance on emerging technologies,
both in training and operations. ARSOF's identity continues to reside in
its unique ability to operate in politically sensitive and denied
environments along the conflict continuum, moving deep behind enemy lines,
working by, with, and through partner forces, and ensuring Commanders have
options for joint forcible entries and deep fires.
Cutting-edge technology should enable calculated risk-taking, not risk
avoidance. Detachments must continue to view standoff technology as one
option in a larger toolkit, prioritizing ways of delivering lethal effects
alongside our partner forces wherever possible.
Preserving Human-Centric Warfare at the Detachment Level
The challenge is immediate and practical. Detachments today already face
zero-sum training decisions between emerging technological skills and
fundamental human competencies. This reality demands disciplined risk
assumption: accepting that some training will be sacrificed to preserve
lethality in the core activities that make ODAs unique. Commanders must
not only prioritize training tasks but also explicitly communicate what
will not be trained, based on comprehensive, threat-informed assessments
of the current operational environment.
Detachments must accept less-than-perfect proficiency with emerging
systems to preserve their comparative advantage. The alternative, which
dilutes human-centric training to accommodate every technological
advancement, represents far greater risk.
Building this proficiency requires immediate access to resources,
infrastructure, and authorities for effective home-station training.
Combat Training Centers (CTCs) are invaluable proving grounds for
developing tactics, techniques, and procedures, and for integrating ARSOF
detachments into large-scale combat operations. However, CTC rotations
alone are insufficient.
To build lasting proficiency in space, cyber, and sensing integration,
units of action urgently need persistent access to realistic scenarios and
training environments at the local level. Equally important, they need
ample opportunities to develop judgment about when these capabilities
enhance mission success, and when they risk undermining trust and rapport
with partner forces.
In resource-constrained environments, Detachments must find creative
solutions to meet training objectives, ensuring that imperfect training
environments are not the enemy of a good solution. Effective training
requires disciplined experimentation and psychologically safe environments
that reward calculated risk-taking as Detachments learn to exploit the
gaps and seams of contested terrain.
14
Accordingly, the best reps are in home-station training with cutting-edge
systems—building muscle memory and the judgment to employ them
selectively. This also allows ODAs to balance their time and resources
against other core tasks that make ARSOF unparalleled in lethality.
Rounds Complete
The SOF-Space-Cyber Triad is not a break from ARSOF’s past. It is a
necessary step in its evolution. Space, cyber, and deep sensing
technologies expand the Regiment’s reach, resilience, and decision
advantage. However, they cannot replace the trust, adaptability, and
cultural fluency that only ODAs provide. Preserving unconventional warfare
as the Regiment’s foundation ensures that technology enhances rather than
erodes the human-centric values that make ARSOF unique.
Our advantage has never been tied to having the most sophisticated
systems. It lies in our ability to operate in contact, adapt under
pressure, and capitalize on opportunities others miss. ODAs must embrace
technology as a tool that sharpens our edge, not one that redefines our
identity.
Authors’ Note: Capt. Michael Lami and Capt. Brett Benedict are
active-duty Special Forces Officers. Michael is currently pursuing an MA
in Organizational Leadership and Learning at George Washington
University, and Brett is at Georgetown University pursuing an MA in
Security Studies. The views, opinions, and analysis expressed are the
authors' own and do not represent the position of the U.S. Military
Academy, the U.S. Army, or the Department of War.
References
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