Hold Capacity
The Key to Conserve Combat Power
By LTC Vern E. Campigotto, MAJ Richard K. Skinner, CPT Hannah Dalke, CPT Gabriel M. Lizama
Article published on: in the 2026
E-Edition of Pulse of Army Medicine
Read Time: < 10 mins
Abstract
The 62d Medical Brigade tested an innovative, nondoctrinal approach to expanding patientholding capacity
during Bayonet Focus 25 at Yakima Training Center. Faced with a division-level gap in the ability to
monitor and retain Soldiers for up to 72 hours before return-to-duty decisions, the 575th Medical
Company (Area Support) and the 28th Intermediate Care Ward combined capabilities to augment a Role 2
with an additional 40-bed holding capacity. This hybrid construct enabled 19 of 23 evacuated Soldiers to
return to duty, patients who otherwise would have been removed from the exercise. The effort highlighted
challenges in mobility, communications, power generation, sustainment, and command relationships, while
demonstrating the value of integrating intermediate nursing care forward. The article argues that
deliberate use of this MC(AS)/ICW model, especially when paired with surgical capability, could
significantly enhance prolonged care, reduce unnecessary evacuations, and preserve combat power in
large-scale combat operations.
Medical is not important until it is important, and medical seems to always be important for exercises,
missions, and deployments because of the critical role it plays in returning Soldiers to duty. Exercises
allow medical units to identify gaps and vulnerabilities and develop solutions for them in real-time. The
62d Medical Brigade (MED BDE) participated in the 7th Infantry Division’s (7ID) training exercise, Bayonet
Focus 25 (BF25), from 08-22 May 2025 at Yakima Training Center (YTC), Washington. The training participants
were the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 56th Multifunctional Medical Battalion (56th MMB), 575th
Medical Company (Area Support)(MC(AS)) assigned to 56th MMB, and 28th Intermediate Care Ward (ICW) assigned
to 147th Field Hospital (FH), 29th Hospital Center (HC). The lessons learned from the exercise will aid in
understanding, visualizing, and describing the unconventional augmentation of patient hold capacity to a
Role 2, facilitating rapid return to duty in large scale combat operations.
The Army Futures Command Concept for Medical 2028 predicts future operational environments with limited
freedom of maneuver to enable evacuation of casualties and the reconstitution of those evacuees. The
pamphlet emphasizes that “returning an ill, injured, or wounded Soldier to duty as far forward as possible
will be essential to conserve combat power.” Warfighter exercises estimate that, on average, 10,000 of
50,000 casualties will be returned to duty. Medical capabilities available today are not the issue for
returning Soldiers to duty far forward; the problem is the capacity to accommodate the high rate of
casualties projected in a LSCO conflict.
A Role 2 is the most far-forward medical element with the capability to hold patients for a short period of
time. It is designed to provide at least 72 hours of patient hold capability for Soldiers returning to duty,
awaiting evacuation to the next higher role of care, or recovering from surgery performed by an attached
Forward Surgical Resuscitation Team (FRSD). A Brigade Support Medical Company (BSMC) assigned to a Brigade
Combat Team has a 20 patient hold capacity, while an area support medical company (ASMC) has a 40 patient
hold capacity. In large scale combat operations, the capability gap for a Role 2 will be the limited hold
capacity, which affects its ability to prioritize and rapidly return non-critical patients to the fight as
far forward as possible.
A non-doctrinal solution to this critical capability gap is augmenting the Role 2 with a hospital
augmentation detachment, specifically a 60-bed intermediate care ward. The detachment is designed to augment
a 32-bed field hospital with three 20 bed wards, providing intermediate nursing care and additional patient
administration and nutrition capabilities. When operating at full capacity, the augmentation detachment
attached to an area support Role 2 increases hold capacity from 40 to 100 patients (a 150% increase) for a
72-hour period. The 575th MC(AS) and 28th ICW tested this proof of concept at Bayonet Focus 25 in an austere
environment at the Yakima Training Center.
During the division exercise, 62d MED BDE and 7ID recognized a critical gap in its ability to hold and
monitor Soldiers who had been evacuated, treated, and discharged from Yakima Memorial Hospital but still
required up to 72 hours of observation before a likely return-to-duty decision. The 2-2 SBCT Mayor Cell could
only retain patients for less than 24 hours and lacked the capability to provide continued assessment or
follow-up care. As a result, patients were routinely evacuated back to Joint Base Lewis-McChord on daily
shuttles, removing them from the exercise entirely. In the first week alone, the Mayor Cell transported
thirteen Soldiers back to JBLM, ending their participation for the duration of the event.
To address this shortfall, the 7ID Surgeon Cell, working closely with the 2-2 SBCT Mayor Cell and the 56th
MMB, integrated the 575th MCAS treatment capability and the 28th ICW’s 40-bed holding capacity into the
medical concept of support. This approach added essential medical assessment, intermediate care, and
monitoring functions designed to maximize rapid return-to-duty outcomes. The enhanced process closed the
capability gap and enabled the Role 2 and ICW to return 19 of 23 Soldiers to duty within 72 hours, Soldiers
who previously would have been evacuated back to home station. The process not only reduced the burden on
the 2-2 SBCT Mayor Cell but also created a reliable pathway for timely, medically sound return-to-duty
decisions, ensuring Soldiers could rejoin their units and continue contributing to the exercise.
Although the 575th MC(AS) and 28th ICW delivered important medical capabilities during BF25, their
employment in a combined role for a division-level exercise fell outside doctrinal norms. The two units
belong to different parent organizations within the 62d MED BDE, had never trained together, and entered
the exercise with only a limited shared understanding of how their capabilities would integrate. Significant
differences in their MTOE structures further complicated coordination. The 575th MC(AS) is built to be fully
self-sustaining, with the organic lift required to move all personnel and equipment. In contrast, the 28th
ICW faced challenges due to limited vehicle density and reliance on material-handling equipment for
movement. Despite these constraints, both units successfully deployed all required equipment to support the
mission. Additional shortfalls emerged in communication and power generation capabilities, highlighting
areas for improvement in future joint employment.
The 28th ICW is structured to augment a 32-bed field hospital and normally operates under that hospital’s
established communication and power-generation systems. During BF25, the ICW was limited to its organic
radios both during convoy operations and while functioning at YTC. The team mitigated these constraints by
employing CLMR radios in the lead and trail vehicles and replicating that configuration across both command
posts once established, enabling reliable communication for patient movement and reception throughout the
exercise.
Power generation was sufficient for the combined footprint; however, the 28th ICW does not possess its own
Environmental Control Units to maintain appropriate temperatures for real-world patients awaiting
return-to-duty. The 575th MC(AS) closed this gap by providing climate control through its Generator ECU
Trailer, ensuring safe heating and cooling as needed. As this capability continues to mature, both units
will need to develop a more deliberate power distribution plan with built-in redundancy to support command
posts, medical equipment, and ECU requirements.
During BF25 planning, the 575th MC(AS) and 28th ICW were not originally included as part of the training
audience, yet their nondoctrinal employment created a valuable opportunity for both units to collaborate and
build a shared understanding of how their combined capabilities could enhance medical care in an austere
environment. Rehearsals and scripted MASCAL events facilitated by HHD, 56th MMB proved essential in shaping
a workable concept for integrating these units to improve return-to-duty outcomes. By identifying
operational requirements early and exchanging unit SOPs, the teams were able to validate systems and
processes before receiving any real-world patients. This synchronization allowed them to align nonorganic
capabilities and determine which assets would provide the greatest benefit if deployed together. The result
was measurable improvement in patientcare efficiency, bed capacity, inpatient treatment, and casualty
preparation for onward movement. Looking ahead to large-scale combat operations, this combined capability,
if deliberately employed, would significantly strengthen prolonged care for serious but non-ICU-level
medical cases, reducing unnecessary evacuations and preserving combat power forward.
As the exercise progressed, both units encountered additional friction points that will require deliberate
refinement for future employment. The presence of two parallel command teams without a clearly defined
command-and-control relationship created ambiguity in decision-making, underscoring the need to formally
establish command authority and support relationships between the 575th MC(AS) and 28th ICW. Sustainment
oversight, particularly Class VIII management, also emerged as a challenge, highlighting the need to
streamline ordering, resupply, and distribution processes. The ICW’s requirement for a more expansive
pharmaceutical inventory than the MC(AS) can organically support further complicated sustainment planning.
Evacuation criteria for higher roles of care remained another unresolved issue. Without surgical capability,
the combined element could only retain patients who were not seriously injured, requiring clear triggers for
when casualties must be evacuated to the next echelon. Integrating a Forward Resuscitation Surgical
Detachment with the Role 2 and the hybrid MC(AS)/ICW construct would enable surgical intervention forward,
allow postoperative patients to convalesce in the ICW for extended periods, and increase the likelihood of
returning Soldiers to duty, which will ultimately preserve combat power in a large-scale combat environment.
For medical mission command, the 56th MMB headquarters played a central role in planning, coordinating, and
integrating the MCAS/ICW concept into the 7ID medical support plan for real-world return-to-duty operations.
The battalion staff maintained oversight by synchronizing with the 2-2 SBCT Mayor Cell and the 7ID Surgeon
Cell to track patient flow into the MCAS/ICW footprint, update dispositions, and enforce the Medical Rules
of Engagement to ensure only those requiring 72 hours or less of post-hospital assessment were sent forward
for evaluation. Responsibility for patient administrative movement remained with the mayor cell and 7ID’s
organic units, as the MCAS did not have the capacity to manage those administrative transportation
requirements.
The preservation of combat power depends heavily on sufficient holding capacity, and unconventional
employment of medical capabilities may be essential to achieving decision advantage. In large-scale combat
operations, the six core principles of the Army Health System—conformity, continuity, control,
proximity, flexibility, and mobility—form the foundation of an effective and adaptable plan
that enables rapid return to duty and sustains fighting strength. To meet this requirement, AHS planners
must be integrated early in the planning process to develop running estimates and courses of action that
deliberately support combat power at decisive points. Continuing to refine and validate the concept of ICW
augmentation to a Role 2 during future iterations of Bayonet Focus will help reinforce the principle of
conformity and further mature this capability for LSCO.
Continuity of care will be strained in LSCO due to inevitable delays in evacuation, requiring planners to
anticipate these gaps and determine how to employ or replicate higher-level medical capabilities forward to
reduce disruption. Casualties assessed as return-to-duty still require consistent monitoring and support
until formally released. When paired with a Role 2, the ICW helps close this gap by providing intermediate
nursing care, patient administration, and nutrition services that maintain continuity of care for
RTD-eligible Soldiers. Proximity is equally important; colocating the Role 2 and ICW enables rapid
evaluation and return of large numbers of casualties, directly contributing to sustained combat power. As
operations shift from brigade-centric to division-centric frameworks, positioning this nondoctrinal
capability within the division support area gives divisions a forward medical asset capable of preserving
combat power and exploiting decision points throughout the fight.
As the Army prepares for large-scale combat operations, this concept demonstrates how existing medical
capabilities can be combined in innovative ways to strengthen Army Health Service Support for the
warfighter. Future conflict with near-peer adversaries will generate high casualty volumes and higher
mortality risk than seen over the past two decades in the CENTCOM theater, making forward medical capacity
and prolonged care more critical than ever. A deliberately designed, nondoctrinal construct, integrating the
MC(AS), ICW, and FRSD, offers a modular, expeditionary package capable of delivering prolonged care, medical
treatment, limited surgical intervention, and recovery time far forward, reducing the need to evacuate
Soldiers out of theater. Embracing these adaptive approaches positions the Army Medical Department to
provide more agile, expeditionary AHS support in LSCO and to rapidly return medically cleared Soldiers to
the fight, preserving combat power when it matters most.
Notes
1. Army Futures Command Concept for Medical 2028, AFC Pam 71-20-12 (4 March 2026), pg. 36, C-5. https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2022/04/25/ac4ef855/medical-concept-2028-final-unclas.pdf
2. Remondelli, Mason H.; Remick, Kyle N. MD; Shackelford, Stacy A. MD; Gurney, Jennifer M. MD; Pamplin,
Jeremy C.; Polk, Travis M. MD; Potter, Benjamin K. MD; Holt, Danielle B. MD. Journal of Trauma and Acute
Care Surgery 95(2S):p S180-S184, August 2023. | DOI: 10.1097/ TA.0000000000004063