Austere Challenge 24

Lessons Learned from the 97th Military Police Battalion in WFX 24-03

By Major Noel Whitten

Article published on: January 1, 2026 in the Military Police 2026 E-Edition

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U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to 3rd Infantry Division move equipment into a building during Austere Challenge 24 at Forward Operating Site Bolesławiec, Poland. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Summer Keiser)

The contents of this article do not represent the official views of, nor are they endorsed by, the U.S. Army, the Department of War, or the U.S. government. This article was edited with the assistance of AI tools, and subsequently reviewed and edited by relevant Department of War (DOW) personnel to ensure accuracy, clarity, and compliance with DOW policies and guidance.

Many organizations initially hesitate to participate in division or corps warfighter exercises (WFXs), often believing they are too consumed by daily operations to manage the rigorous training required. However, when the 97th Military Police Battalion had the opportunity to participate in WFX 24-03 (referred to as Austere Challenge 24 [AC24] throughout) with the 1st Infantry Division (1ID) and V Corps, they created an outsized impact on training proficiency compared to other training events.

The training progression included individual digital training, staff academics, and two command post exercises (CPXs) prior to AC24. However, the battalion did not prioritize training all facets of command post (CP) operations, such as organic communications and basic fieldcraft, because the battalion CP was constrained to the mission training complex (MTC) tactical operations center (TOC) pad. Throughout the exercise, the Guardian Battalion created lessons learned for future WFX participation and tactical employment, providing a framework for other military police organizations to develop WFX training.

The Value of WFX Participation

A WFX offers a multiechelon training environment that a military police battalion or brigade cannot replicate, enabling training opportunities from headquarters staff down to the company level. Resources are abundant, providing battalions access to upper tactical internet (T/I), fully staffed adjacent and higher units, and a simulated warfighting environment. Other than the cost of fuel, the training is funded by other organizations.

As a military police battalion, there is some flexibility in the extent of participation in a WFX. Sometimes, a battalion provides a select group of leaders to support a response cell or bolster the provost marshal cell of the division. More often, military police battalions are not called upon to participate at all—resulting in missed training opportunities.

Training Progression

The training progression of the 97th Military Police Battalion spanned eight months, following a standard training glidepath as outlined in Training Circular (TC) 6-0, Training the Command and Control Warfighting Function. The battalion conducted Command and Control Training Tables (C2TT) I–V prior to integrating into the CPX progression of the division due to the initial offset training cycles of the two organizations. ¹

Training objectives for this phase included individual CP system proficiency, validating the CP, developing a common operating picture, and producing military decision making process (MDMP) products. Individual training focused on Joint Battle Command–Platform (JBC-P) and Command Post Computing Environment (CPCE) operator and maintainer courses conducted by local troop schools. The intent was to ensure that each staff section had at least two Soldiers trained on each system, with the planning and operations section (S-3) requiring four trained Soldiers.

Simultaneously, staff officers-in-charge (OICs), noncommissioned officers-in-charge (NCOICs), and current operations (CUOPS) personnel attended staff academics. These sessions, conducted in three 2-hour blocks, included classroom instruction by MTC staff and focused discussions led by the battalion executive officer (XO) and S-3.

The final training events for the battalion prior to integrating into the division included a 5-day CP validation and CPX I. During CP validation, the CP layout and equipment status were verified. CPX I certified the battalion through Table V of the C2TT. The battalion then integrated into the division’s CPX III, a 10-day exercise where the unit conducted Tables VI–IX. Training objectives for this phase included CUOPS rehearsals, Battle Simulator Work Station (BSWS) operations, and integration with the maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) and the rear command post of the division.

The culminating training event was the 15-day WFX, which validated the headquarters through Table X. In total, the battalion used 36 training days to progress from relative inexperience to a trained and validated headquarters.

Challenges and Missed Opportunities

As with any training, the battalion had to balance training progressions with daily operations, resulting in some missed opportunities. During the training window, the battalion staff assisted in the redeployment of two companies, oversaw two changes of command, executed a change of responsibility, and prepared for the inactivation of subordinate units. These missions required the battalion to maintain a robust staff in the rear, which split duties leading into AC24.

Due to the static nature of the exercise and the battalion’s direct link to the MTC, opportunities to train and use organic communications (frequency modulation [FM], high frequency [HF], tactical satellite [TACSAT], and JBC-P) were missed. Additionally, tasks associated with maintaining equipment and communications security (COMSEC) were not fully exercised. Staff were able to commute to the exercise site due to the location and shift structure of the CP, negating the need to build fieldcraft proficiency.

Soldiers from the 323rd Military Intelligence Battalion pose for a photo during exercise Austere Challenge 24 in Wiesbaden, Germany. (U.S. Army photo by Cpt. Aaron Smith)

Administrative and Tactical Lessons Learned

On the administrative side, the battalion identified best practices to enhance WFX participation. Company commanders and XOs were trained as BSWS operators to oversee Soldiers tasked with moving digital units across the battlefield. These leaders acted as digital company commanders, entrusted to make decisions without relying on direct battalion oversight. They also developed a plan to prioritize size, activity, location, uniform, time, and equipment (SALUTE) reports and created a reporting format to track squad actions. While this format may not be realistic in an operational environment, it was critical for successful BSWS operations.

The staff also learned to treat simulation constraints with realism. When answers were unavailable or reports conflicted, they had to hunt for the truth or provide the commander with their best estimation.

Tactically, the exercise exposed staff to the fast-paced, 24-hour division operational cycle. Leaders emphasized the importance of mastering basics, such as building overlays to standard and conducting CP rehearsals. These rehearsals, led by battle captains and noncommissioned officers, enabled the battalion to execute essential tasks such as clearing ground and calling for fire. This resulted in multiple successful engagements in the rear area.

The mission analysis and running estimates of the battalion matured significantly during the exercise. A breakthrough occurred when the staff began conducting estimates from the enemy’s perspective. For example, the signal section (S-6) analyzed communications dead zones and overlaid them with known enemy communications equipment limitations, identifying areas where enemy command nodes might operate. This analysis led to the deliberate targeting and elimination of all enemy command nodes in the rear area.

Recommendations for Future WFX Participation

Because military police battalions are rarely involved in division and corps exercises, their staffs often lack experience operating with subordinate military police headquarters. This can result in overly directive or insufficient planning at the platoon or squad level. Military police battalion staffs must use initiative to pull information from higher headquarters and push battalion initiatives to shape outcomes.

The staff must also understand how their commander visualizes the operation. The staff struggled to provide the commander with a clear operational picture early in the exercise, preventing the commander from anticipating future requirements. As briefing products and techniques improved, the commander was able to provide direct guidance to the staff and subordinates while advising the MEB and the Deputy Commanding General–Sustainment on the rear area security situation.

Finally, a capable liaison officer (LNO) is an invaluable asset. The battalion identified a company XO to serve as the LNO, demonstrating how a good LNO can enhance coordination across multiple echelons.

Four Soldiers collaborate in support of exercise Austere Challenge 24 in Wiesbaden, Germany. (U.S. Army photo by Cpt. Aaron Smith)

Final Thoughts

While AC24 marked the first and last time that the 97th Military Police Battalion participated in a WFX exercise, the experience provides a valuable blueprint for how military police units can meaningfully integrate into division-level operations. As the U.S. Army Military Police Corps force structure changes, opportunities exist to enhance military police battalion capabilities. Equipping these units with upper T/I and increasing the number of base stations and JBC-P TOC kits could significantly improve their survivability and effectiveness.

The AC24 exercise stands out as the most valuable military police training experience I have participated in. It will shape a more adaptive, capable, and informed staff poised for future success.

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