Leadership in a 700-Series Battalion

By Colonel James King

Article published on: April 1, 2026 in the January-June 2026 Edition of Military Intelligence

Read Time: < 10 mins

Introduction

Every battalion command is unique. However, the 700-series battalions—U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command units that execute specialized military intelligence (MI) missions— are distinct in their own right. These battalions provide theater-level support to interagency partners and, in general, do not train in the same way as units focused on combat operations. There are very few places in the Army where a leader must balance the needs of the service, their Soldiers, and an interagency partner. I compiled these leadership lessons while commanding the 717th MI Battalion (Alamo Station), the Army Service component to a National Security Agency (NSA) Cryptologic Center. While these lessons were specific to my battalion command, many of them apply to other echelons as well. With the focus rightfully on our tactical formations, we often forget about leadership in MI professional writing. I hope that this will inspire others to share their own lessons from this rewarding yet challenging part of the MI experience.

The Balancing Act

The first and probably most important thing to understand about leading a formation supporting the NSA is that the organizations will pull you in two different directions. It is like walking a tight rope high above the city while two people pull your balance bar in opposite directions, hoping you will fall on their side. The Army and the NSA both have requirements for your time; they are rarely the same.

The Army expects Soldiers to conduct physical training, maintain Medical Protection System (also known as MEDPROS) proficiency, conduct sergeant’s time training, and execute Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development, training. Units must ensure human resource metrics are at 100 percent, maintain tactical proficiency, and fulfill the requirements of higher Army headquarters. In our case, this meant training for and executing quarterly 4-mile formation runs and 6-mile ruck marches. Language-dependent Soldiers can also add several hundred hours of language maintenance to the list. To top it all off, there are always boards, ceremonies, and professional military education courses that add to expectations and cumulative training time.

The NSA expects Soldiers to be at their seats and on mission uninterrupted. In some cases, this means working shifts and weekends. The individual running missions does not care whether Soldiers are behind on unit tasks, such as annual antiterrorism training, or that they are late because they had to take part in the unit’s height and weight checks. All they see are military members who are not doing the work needed. If this occurs often enough, the mission leader will label the Soldiers as unreliable and start looking to units of the other service components, which have fewer requirements from their parent organizations, for support.

This is the battlefield of the 700-series battalions, finding a way to be a good subordinate to two commanders: the Army commander and the site commander. The 717th MI Battalion found success by establishing a structured, organized daily schedule that codified key recurring elements, such as physical training windows, core work hours, and availability for Army administrative tasks, ensuring consistency and predictability across operations. It offered stability for Soldiers and mission leaders regarding daily expectations. The mission leaders welcomed it, and we quickly saw an improvement in the Army’s reputation.

Use Training Days for Army Training

The 717th MI Battalion usually has 1 day a month to use for unit activities. The other services often use their unit activities day for administrative or classroom training. However, for the Army, this is the best opportunity to conduct warrior tasks, skills that every Soldier, no matter what unit they are in, must know: shoot, move, communicate, medicate. The battalion leadership team told the Soldiers of Alamo Station that we would not let them fall behind their peers. That meant multiple M4 rifle ranges each year, “buddy aid” skills (we were fortunate to have the 68W, Combat Medic Specialist, institutional training course nearby to help with some realistic training), land navigation, and other tactical tasks. Each training day was demanding, with long hours. The payoff: almost all of the battalion’s Soldiers who attended the Basic Leader Course graduated on the Commandant’s List or earned a graduation award. When they leave the battalion, they will be trusted leaders wherever they go.

Understand Command Support Relationships

Know your unit’s command support relationships and double-check to ensure your understanding is doctrinally correct. From the moment I arrived at Alamo Station, I understood that the NSA had operational control (OPCON) over the 717th MI Battalion while the 470th MI Brigade maintained administrative control (ADCON). My predecessor highlighted this, and the brigade briefed it on every organization chart. This relationship seemed right, and it was. As I came to find out, however, this was not a completely accurate understanding of the command support relationship, which eventually led to conflict.

As a leader, you must get out on the floor and interact with your Soldiers in their environment

The problems began when the 470th MI Brigade began to impose training requirements, such as the quarterly 6-mile ruck marches. ADCON authority provides “direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and support.¹ It does not expressly provide the responsibility for training the subordinate.

Having reviewed the doctrine, one of the 717th MI Battalion’s company commanders challenged the ability of the 470th MI Brigade to levy training requirements if they were merely our ADCON headquarters. He had a point: if, in fact, that was the brigade’s only relationship with us, then they could not levy training requirements.

I went back to doctrine to find the answer. What I found was that we had been wrong from the beginning. The 470th MI Brigade was not our ADCON headquarters. They were our parent unit, our organic higher headquarters. Doctrine assigns the parent unit responsibility for training subordinate units. They had every right to require us to conduct quarterly 6-mile ruck marches. If we had done the doctrinal research earlier, it would have saved several months of consternation.

Presence is Key

When LTG Hale commanded the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, he would talk with new commanders during the MI Pre-Command Course about engaged leadership. He frequently used the phrase “presence is key.” He set that example by being present at as many events as possible— including the vicious games of jungle ball he set up between his staff and the classes, which I’m fairly sure no class ever won. It was obvious to the students that the importance of being present was the most valuable lesson he could give.

Today’s Army is different from what it was when I was a young private 30 years ago in the Washington Army National Guard. Back then, I did not want to encounter the platoon leader and had no idea who the battalion or brigade commanders were. In 6 years, I never met any of these leaders, and to me, that was okay. But times have changed, and Soldiers today want their leaders to interact with them. They want their commanders to know who they are. More contact with leadership is always a top comment in the command climate surveys.

As a leader, you must get out on the floor and interact with your Soldiers in their environment. Learn what they do and where they do it. Show interest in the things they like. Talk to them about the mementos on their desks or the significance of their badge lanyards. Nothing builds trust more than a 5-minute conversation on why Han shot first, LSU’s chances this season, which Harry Potter spell you would like to master, or which Pokémon is the best. Even if you have no idea what any of that means, you can still show that you care just by asking.

Being present also allows the other services and civilian leadership to see you. It gives you a chance to hear from different voices about how your Soldiers are doing. This can also provide opportunities for you to solve problems you may not hear about when talking only to the directors.

Understand Working with Civilians

Civilians are not Soldiers. If you have worked in an organization with a large civilian workforce, you understand the importance of that sentence. Many leaders have failed by treating their civilian workforce the same way they treat their Soldiers. No matter your leadership style, you will need to adapt it when working with and for civilian leaders.

You must understand the personality of each civilian with whom you work. You cannot box them into groups like you can with Soldiers (i.e., by rank or military occupational specialty). Regardless of their pay grade or skill, they are independent actors. You must understand the scope of their job and not ask them to work outside of it. Unless you can pay them overtime, they cannot work late or odd hours like a Soldier.

A good starting point is to understand if they have served in the military. It is great if they have; you will have some common ground, although that ground may no longer be very “common,” depending on how long ago they served. It is okay if they have not served. Take the time to talk with them about why the Soldiers are doing tasks that might take them away from their work. You would be amazed at how far a good explanation of the military’s distinct culture and customs will go for someone without that frame of reference.

Understand Working with Other Services

Anonymous Soldier: Sir, the Air Force gets to use an umbrella while wearing OCPs [operational camouflage pattern]. Why can’t we?

Most service members do not experience joint assignments until they are senior leaders. They typically spend their early years immersed in their specific service’s culture. However, as you are learning, a 700-series unit is different. In these units, Soldiers work alongside Sailors, Airmen, and Marines—often as the only Soldier on a team. This exposes them to diverse service cultures. You and your subordinate leaders must proactively educate junior Soldiers on sister-service regulations, such as those regarding umbrellas. Without this context, perceived unfairness in standards can lead to unnecessary resentment within the ranks.

Find the Things That Bring the Team Together

700-series Soldiers typically do not rotate to the National Training Center. They do not deploy. They do not even spend the night in the field. In the broader Army, these activities serve as valuable team-building events where shared hardships forge the identity of a formation. As a 700-series leader, however, you do not have the option of these traditional cohesion- building tools. You lack a collective tactical mission; instead, in many cases, you will lead Soldiers who operate independently with limited interaction with other Soldiers.

So, how do you build team cohesion? You must find something outside the mission to bring your Soldiers together. As an example, I used our unit’s 50th anniversary as that team-building exercise. In July 1974, the Daughters of the Republic of Texas authorized the 717th MI Battalion to adopt the name “Alamo Station.” While the unit designation changed several times over the years, the name Alamo Station has endured. We spent the year finding ways to celebrate the organization’s anniversary, culminating in the San Antonio Mayor proclaiming July 17th (7/17) as Alamo Station Day, celebrated with a battalion-level ball.

Have a Good In-Processing Program

One of the most frustrating aspects of being a commander of a 700-series unit is the site access process. Sometimes it takes only a few weeks to receive access, but sometimes it takes years. You read that right: years. The Alamo Station record is over 700 days.

A small body of the 717th MI Battalion, called Alamo Forge, maintained a presence outside the wire and ran the in-processing program. This organization was not on the unit table of distribution and allowances, which meant I was taking people off mission to staff it, but it was important. Alamo Forge received inbound Soldiers upon their arrival at the unit. Led by a small team of noncommissioned officers, the organization helped new Soldiers navigate in-processing (no easy task, as it occurred on the other side of San Antonio at Fort Sam Houston) and assisted with starting their access paperwork.

Every month, the battalion scheduled an Alamo Forge week. During this time, new Soldiers received a welcome brief from unit leaders, the brigade commander and me; visited a historically significant part of San Antonio to learn about the local culture; and conducted a leadership reaction course and a team-building ruck march that culminated with a group barbecue. These things helped build a first shared experience amongst new co-workers.

Once new Soldiers completed in-processing and obtained access, they transferred to their companies. Alamo Forge’s goal was to provide companies with Soldiers who had all administrative issues resolved before starting work on their respective missions. This process took a huge burden off the companies and allowed Soldiers to focus on the training requirements of their new roles.

Do Not be Afraid to Test the Formation

During the annual training guidance brief, the 470th MI Brigade Commander issued a clear directive: “Each battalion will conduct a validation exercise. It will be up to the battalions to create what that looks like.” This mandate, however, presents a unique challenge for 700-series formations. How does a unit commander effectively validate readiness when their Soldiers are under the individual OPCON of a Combat Support Agency? When the mission is executed at the individual level within a joint agency structure, traditional collective training models must be reimagined.

Our solution was to think tactically and evaluate our ability to execute a training day. As mentioned previously, the 700-series battalion has 1 day a month where the Soldiers are excused from mission and are available for unit activities. At Alamo Station, we used those days to focus on warrior tasks. We decided to validate our ability to plan, prepare, and execute multiple geographically dispersed training events on a single training day.

This was a big test for the leadership of the formation. We had conducted many training days as a team before, but none required the same level of planning and detail as this exercise. During the planning phase, we intended to conduct a full-up, step-by-step military decision-making process (MDMP) session with enough rigor that an observer-controller/ trainer at the National Training Center would approve. That was no easy task.

The only member of the staff with any MDMP experience was the battalion’s personnel staff officer (S-1)—and I must note here that the battalion’s signal staff officer (S-6) was a private first class who had never heard of MDMP. My executive officer coordinated the execution of each step, and I used the back briefs as teaching moments to help develop the staff’s understanding of key aspects of the process. In the end, the staff came together and created a high-quality operations order with all annexes and appendices. Surprisingly, the most professional of these was produced by the S-6, who never thought he would have to do anything like that.

The preparation phase began with a rehearsal of concept (ROC) drill, which was another thing the staff had never done. We walked through the plan, arranging icons on a big terrain map, while working through contingencies and medical evacuation plans. A full rehearsal followed the ROC drill the month before execution. We set up a makeshift battalion tactical operations center (TOC) and “battle tracked” the execution of two training events across Fort Sam Houston. This allowed us to fine-tune our reporting requirements and practice tracking troop movements.

Execution day came a month later. After initial accountability at Camp Bullis, the companies conducted 6-mile ruck marches along two different routes, while the staff established the TOC and began tracking the companies’ movements. After the ruck march, the companies began the training events: one on the M4 rifle range and the other on the land navigation course. Near lunchtime, the staff coordinated bus movements to switch the companies’ locations while the TOC continued tracking. By the end of the day, the battalion staff had executed a professional event that trained over 300 Soldiers on two vital tactical skills. This is what stepping outside your comfort zone can accomplish.

Conclusion

This is obviously not an all-encompassing list of my leadership lessons—nor would it be feasible to make it one. Hopefully, however, it will get the mental gears grinding. The bottom line is this: be present, understand your formation and its environment, and be willing to step out of your comfort zone. You never know what amazing things you can accomplish.

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