From So What to Therefore

By Lou Crist

Article published on: November 20, 2025 in the July – December 2025 Semiannual Collection

Read Time: < 7 mins

This article was originally published on November 20, 2025, by From The Green Notebook at https://fromthegreennotebook.com/2025/11/20/from-so-what-to-therefore/ and is reprinted here with their permission.

This is part II of a two-part series for intelligence officers. Read part I at https://mipb.ikn.army.mil/issues/jul-dec-2025/think-like-a-commander/.

Have you ever been told, “Just give me the ‘so what’!” I saw this over and over again as an OC/T, watching commanders frustratingly critique their S2s during mission analysis briefs in time-constrained environments. The issue is not limited to intelligence briefs; however, Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE), if not managed well, often overwhelms and obscures what matters to the commander. Yet the call for relevance did not teach relevance, and it did not help me understand what the commander was asking.

An intelligence officer is an operator who understands the intelligence needs of the unit.
-Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 2, Intelligence 1997

Relevance Is Not Universal

The phrase “So What” is common in command discussions, but it often does more harm than good. Its meaning depends entirely on context. Having served in infantry, armor, aviation, field artillery, airborne, and logistics units, I learned that each formation defines relevance differently. Field artillery officers want to know how the enemy detects and targets them. Airborne commanders care about drop zones, air defense, and counterattack forces. Logistics leaders focus on sustainment routes and threats to movement. Each community has its own version of “So What,” which means that without shared understanding, the question itself can confuse more than clarify.

Rather than fixating on “So What,” I found it more useful to think in terms of “What, So What, and Therefore.” What is happening, why does it matter to my unit, and what should we do about it? Situation, problem, and solution. The “So What” is important, but stopping there leaves the analysis unfinished. The true value of intelligence comes from turning understanding into action, moving from the descriptive to the prescriptive, from awareness to decision.

The What: Building the Foundation of Understanding

The “What” forms the base of the pyramid, the foundation of understanding. It establishes the facts before assessment begins. For intelligence officers, it corresponds to the first three steps of IPOE: terrain, weather, enemy composition, strength, and capabilities. During planning, these are essential elements. During execution, the “What” is often represented by incident trackers and templated graphics. Unfortunately, many S2s stop there. They brief data instead of analysis, and when that happens, they inevitably hear the frustrated “Give me the So What.” The issue is rarely effort; it is often education. Most MI captains are generalists. They graduate from standardized courses and are scattered across diverse formations, often with limited familiarity with that unit’s mission or how to make intelligence relevant. Under stress, they revert to what they know: basic IPOE. Without mentorship, they are unlikely to progress from information to insight. Commanders should remember Hanlon’s Razor: never attribute to malice what can be explained by ignorance or inexperience. Demanding the “So What” without teaching what matters will only result in more noise. Teaching takes time, but it pays dividends in combat power.

IPOE is a box, not a cage. It is a checklist to ensure thoroughness, but it can trap analysts in process over purpose. The four steps of IPOE should build toward a single goal: enabling the commander’s decision. Too often, we become lost in the details of terrain, weather, and equipment, only to forget what the enemy is trying to achieve. Doctrine should serve understanding, not replace it. In a time constrained environment, good intelligence officers know what to prioritize and what to set aside. At the top of the IPOE pyramid sits predictive analysis, the golden point that transforms data into decisions. Everything below it should be a means to that end.

The So What: Making Meaning from the Fight

The “So What” or basic relevance, represents the shift from the facts to what the enemy will do in relation to friendly forces. It corresponds to IPOE step four and the creation of enemy courses of action and decision support matrices. A good “So What” produces anticipation. When the commander begins directing the S3 during your brief, you are driving operations. That is progress, but it is not the summit. For years I thought the pinnacle for an S2 was effectively imparting an understanding of the enemy to the commander. I now believe the true role is to think like the commander and become an intellectual partner in defeating the enemy. Understanding is not the end state. Driving the fight is.

To find the “So What,” junior intelligence officers must begin by studying their unit. Learn its mission, its training focus, and its doctrine. Read the Army’s publications. Understand where your commander’s attention lies: two levels down for training, one level up for context. Know what questions your commander will ask before they are voiced. At the battalion level, that usually means understanding the company and platoon fight. The S2 is the bridge between the larger intelligence community and the tactical edge. Make intelligence relevant by making it actionable at that level.

The Therefore: Turning Insight into Action

The final step is the “Therefore.” This is where intelligence transitions from description to prescription, from information to operational art. It is the step most often avoided, either out of caution or lack of confidence. S2s hesitate to recommend action because they fear being wrong or overstepping. Yet the commander is required to decide under uncertainty. A well reasoned recommendation, even if imperfect, reduces risk and saves decision time. Without a “Therefore,” the intelligence officer has simply presented an elaborate problem and walked away. The commander will always retain the responsibility to decide, but the S2 must share the responsibility to think. Intelligence without recommendation is awareness without action.

For the S2, the key is to work backward from the “Therefore.” Every product, every graphic, every brief should trace its purpose to that end. Ask why you are producing it. Does it drive operations, or is it simply interesting? In garrison, make the threat real to your commander. In training, make the fight real to your Soldiers. In combat, make your analysis count by shaping what the unit does next. If it does not influence a decision, it is probably not worth saying.

Objections & Intent

Some might argue that the intelligence warfighting function exists to support operations and that the S2 is not the commander, and they would be doctrinally correct. Others might contend that they do not have time to be both the S3 and the S2, and they would also be right. Yet it remains true that an intelligence officer who confines themself to description, fails to understand friendly maneuver, and offers no recommendation on how to defeat the enemy is an ineffective S2. The intent of this paper is to encourage intelligence officers to think and act as operators, intellectual partners who share responsibility with their commanders for visualizing, understanding, and defeating the enemy.

Commanders and S2s should climb this pyramid together. Commanders must mentor their S2s, helping them understand what drives decisions. S2s must educate themselves on both enemy and friendly doctrine and constantly ask what comes next. The S2 who ends every assessment with a “Therefore” becomes a trusted agent in the fight. Intelligence that stops at “So What” merely informs. Intelligence that reaches “Therefore” drives operations.