Intelligence Challenges Under the C2 Fix Construct

By CW2 Jonathan I. Thompson

Article published on: December 18, 2025 in the Winter 2024-2025 Issue of Infantry

Read Time: < 9 mins

The command team from 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Mobile Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), conduct battlefield circulation during hasty defense and vehicle drop off operations during Operation Lethal Eagle 24.1. (Photo by SFC Joseph Truesdale)

S-2 Current Operations (CUOPS)

A brigade S-2’s CUOPS section is responsible for tracking enemy locations, conducting update briefs to the brigade commander, intelligence processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) as well as providing intelligence support to situational awareness and disseminating products. Minimal personnel (3-4 Soldiers) are required for CUOPS to achieve the S-2’s essential tasks while limiting our electromagnetic signature and conducting operations on the move or at the halt. For the 2nd Mobile Brigade Combat Team (MBCT), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the recommended personnel includes 1x 35A – Military Intelligence officer (major), 1x 35Z5O – intelligence NCO, 1x 35F3O – intelligence analyst, and 1x 35F1O – intelligence analyst, split between two 12-hour shifts. CUOPS is not the ideal place for a new analyst, so choosing an experienced 35F1O will ensure success. However, training requirements for CUOPS will be more system focused than analytical, such as One System Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT), Mounted Mission Command (MMC), Mounted Family of Computer Systems (MFoCS) - Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P), and PRC-158 training. A communications security (COMSEC) custodian in CUOPS will be critical to success during pre-execution and initial setup to quickly establish communication with division and battalions.

In addition, CUOPS has to conduct PED using the OSRVT to positively identify targets for fires to process, which removes one analyst from daily operations. In 2/101 MBCT, the S-2 is working with the Program Executive Office Command, Control, Communications – Tactical (PEO C3T) team to determine pertinent targeting data, such as target type and name, military grid reference system (MGRS) location, and whether its mobile or static. However, intelligence and fires functions are difficult to synchronize due to the intelligence handover line (IHL)/coordinated fire line (CFL) not aligning and a less deliberate targeting process. Human sensors such as scouts will be heavily utilized to fill gaps in the detection and assessment phase of targeting due to the limitations of multi-functional reconnaissance company (MFRC) assets.

A Soldier with 2/101 MBCT participates in a combined arms rehearsal for a large-scale, long-range air assault as part of OLE 24.1 on 22 April 2024. (Photo by SFC Joseph Truesdale)

The dissemination of intelligence products to battalions is simple through unclassified channels, but battalion commanders must trust unclassified intelligence to conduct operations. The division G-2 open-source intelligence (OSINT) cell should feed brigade/battalion S-2s to ensure verified intelligence is available on unclassified networks. Also, allowing the brigade S-2 to have an OSINT mission could allow analysts to utilize creditable websites to analyze information. The recommended personnel for an OSINT mission would be 2x 35F (1x CUOPS, 1x Plans) to enable continuous production at the halt or on the move.

S-2 Plans

The S-2 plans section is responsible for conducting mission analysis, course-of-action (COA) development, COA analysis, orders production, collection management, and intelligence support to targeting. The remaining personnel in the S-2 should occupy the plans section due to the preponderance of work occurring there. For 2/101 MBCT, the recommended personnel are 2x 35A (O3), 1x 350F (W2), 3x 35F1O at minimum. The assistant S-2 at the MFRC will become the collection manager (CM) during field training exercises and deployments. In addition, consolidating the 1x 12Y4O and 1x 35G1O at the division level will allow additional analysts to occupy those slots. For new intelligence analysts, the plans section is the best location for them to continue development as an analyst. A training glidepath for these Soldiers will be more analytical and focused on intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE); this would include on-the-job training (OJT), the All-Source Production Course, and the All-Source Operations Course to establish a baseline for success. For the targeting working group (TWG), the brigade intelligence support element (BISE) chief and CM, at a minimum, should attend to brief enemy situation and align collection assets to named areas of interest (NAIs).

From the S-2 plans perspective, integration of MFRC assets has been challenging for a few reasons. Prior to Operation Lethal Eagle (OLE) 24.1, the CM possessed minimal knowledge of new unmanned aerial system (UAS) capabilities being fielded, making it difficult to allocate assets to NAIs for collection. The data sheets for the assets were available; however, these minimally informed the brigade S-2. The recommended solution is for brigade S-2 personnel to conduct familiarization training with the new assets to assist the CM and understand brigade organic capabilities. Also, longer range UAS assets are limited to the Carrier H6 electronic fuel injection (EFI), making it difficult to conduct battle damage assessments (BDA) and less survivable in large-scale combat operations (LSCO). For 2/101, we plan to have UAS or robots make contact with enemy forces before Soldiers, which may be unrealistic. Moving further from the forward line of own troops (FLOT), human sensors will be more valuable for collection, even though it poses a higher risk. To reduce risk, a possible solution would be to utilize human sensors during critical events, such as enemy decision points and culminating points of battle to determine follow-on operations.

UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters from 5th Battalion, 101st Combat Aviation Brigade sling load Infantry Squad Vehicles during OLE 24.1 on 24 April 2024. (Photo by SFC Joshua Tverberg)

Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency (PACE) (Division to Brigade)

Currently, the division G-2 primarily operates on the Secret Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) which makes it difficult to share products to lower echelons. Inherently, this creates an issue for intelligence support to situational awareness and targeting due to lower echelons primarily using Secure but Unclassified-Encrypted (SBU-E) and Nonclassified Internet Protocol Router (NIPR). To rectify this issue, brigade and battalion must possess an MFoCS to receive SIPR products via data packages and overlays on MMC. Division G-2 did not account for getting products to SBU-E prior to OLE 24.1. A possible solution is for the division G-2 to acquire MMC SBU-E tablets to maintain the common intelligence picture (CIP) and streamline products being distributed to lower echelons, as well as to conduct bottom-up refinement.

Furthermore, the division G-2 is hesitant to act as the battlespace owner for intelligence, which adds to brigade S-2 intelligence requirements. Without a direct support Military Intelligence company (MICO), the G-2 should be responsible for providing a CIP, targeting data, general support for collection to the main effort. Also, brigade S-2 intelligence requirements have not changed despite having 10 percent of its normal manning. Division G-2 and the intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) battalion should consolidate geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) and assign teams to support each brigade.

Brigade S-2 Issues

Collectively, the brigade S-2 section did not thoroughly plan for the multitude of friction points that arose during OLE 24.1. Conducting OSRVT training with the 101st Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) would have identified some issues, such as line-of-sight (LOS) challenges and possessing the correct keys to access feeds. The lack of training on MMC SBU-E and MFoCS slowed us down when building products and distributing them out in a timely manner. Due to minimal space in the M1097 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), practicing a load plan prior to operations will ensure all equipment can fit and workspaces are adequate.