No Substitute for Boots on the Ground

An Infantry Battalion’s Value Proposition for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

By MAJ Zackery R. Spear

June 25, 2026 | Infantry, Summer 2026 Edition

Read Time: < 13 mins

Soldiers in the 2nd Mobile Brigade, 25th Infantry Division move their Infantry Squad Vehicles as part of a ground assault convoy during Salaknib 25 at Camp Dela Cruz, Philippines, on 18 June 2025. (Photo by SPC Aiden O’Marra)

Big missiles, big decks, fifth‑generation fighters, and heavy bombers monopolize attention in the Indo‑Pacific. They are lethal, limited, exquisite, and expensive. But in the region’s littorals — where restrictive terrain, dispersed geography, and dense human landscapes define the fight — what endures is a light infantry battalion’s ability to persist, see, sense, strike, maneuver, protect, and sustain in ways large, high‑tech systems cannot. The democratization of precision strike within the emergent reconnaissance‑strike regime makes these battalions even more, not less, central to U.S. Indo‑Pacific Command’s success.1Maritime history — from Guadalcanal to the Falklands — shows that control ultimately turns on what disciplined infantry can seize, secure, and deny ashore.2

When adversary anti‑access systems push large ships and aircraft outside threat rings, decision advantage shifts to formations that can stay forward, distribute risk, and translate intent into timely action. Here, the infantry battalion provides an enduring command‑and‑control (C2) node. Small, mobile command posts riding a resilient integrated tactical network — hopping among satellite, cellular, and mesh networks — push decisions to the tactical edge without broadcasting a large electromagnetic signature.3During my time as a battalion and brigade operations officer, we employed these capabilities from dispersed locations, including aboard ships, to maintain tempo and survivability. Lightweight, squad‑carrying Infantry Squad Vehicles (ISVs) further shrink the footprint required to move and disperse.4In the Indo‑Pacific, centralized control risks irrelevance; distributed battalions operating under commander’s intent enable decentralized execution to maximize tempo across a contested archipelagic environment.

This forward posture is only meaningful with allies and partners — the Indo‑Pacific’s strategic advantage.5Most regional militaries are land‑centric; their forces and capabilities are anchored ashore.6Soldiers on the ground foster trust, reinforcing relationships that enable access and basing for strategic forward posture that no fly‑over or port visit can replicate. Presence also carries outsized informational effects on a battleground that is equally about narratives. Shoulder‑to‑shoulder with allies and partners, a light infantry battalion is the physical manifestation of our national commitment, enabling integrated and impactful information operations.7Historically, the deployment of U.S. troops to West Berlin during the Cold War served as a powerful symbol of American resolve, deterring Soviet aggression. Similarly, modern U.S. training missions, such as the discreet expansion of U.S. troop presence on Taiwan, carry outsized informational effects — reassuring partners and deterring adversaries with the most tangible currency of commitment: people who remain when ships and aircraft rotate home.8

Infantry battalions also leverage presence to act as pervasive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. “Every Soldier is a sensor” is more than a slogan; it is a theater requirement: daily patrols, engagement with local populations, and reconnaissance through jungle, mountains, and urban clutter produce the ground truth that standoff sensors often miss. Layered atop this human overwatch is a new and growing constellation of small unmanned systems. The U.S. Army’s transformation initiatives are equipping battalions with drones capable of providing full‑motion video and other sensor data.9Lessons from Ukraine are clear: Ubiquitous tactical reconnaissance, first‑person view (FPV) drone strikes, and drone‑corrected fires extend a battalion’s reach to dozens of kilometers, fusing sensing with shooting at unprecedented speed and scale.10With accelerated drone fielding, light infantry battalions tied into the joint fires network can provide Indo‑Pacific Command instant, targetable data from the forward edge, enabling it to see, sense, and strike throughout the littorals.11

A Soldier employs a small unmanned aerial system during Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center Rotation 26-01. (Photo courtesy of the 25th Infantry Division)

This evolving tactical reconnaissance‑strike complex is why a light infantry battalion is poised to become one of the most consequential fires assets in the theater — the number one capability Admiral Samuel Paparo treasures from the Army.12Multi‑Domain Task Forces provide an exquisite operational targeting and theater fires backbone, but infantry battalions can flood the littorals with cheaper, attritable strike capacity — FPV drones, medium bombers, Javelins, and Stingers for near‑range interdiction, with longer‑range loitering munitions to attrit high‑value targets — preserving the magazine depth of scarce, exquisite missiles.13This value is something Indo‑Pacific Command inherently recognizes given its “hellscape” concept.14However, it will not be able to divorce its requirement for unmanned systems from a dependence on the distributed mass of units that can hide, maintain, launch, and reconstitute those systems under fire. Dispersed infantry elements in restrictive coastal terrain can also counter special operations forces infiltrations and deny sea control at the edge of territorial waters (22 kilometers) or into exclusive economic zones (370 kilometers). Historical parallels include the Battle of Guadalcanal during World War II, where U.S. infantry units, supported by naval and air assets, successfully denied Japanese forces control of the island. Similarly, modern infantry battalions, equipped with precision‑strike drones and small missiles, can complicate adversary risk calculus by increasing the volume, range, and dispersion of fire support.

Critically, Marine Corps concepts directly align with this approach. As stand‑in forces, Marine littoral regiments aim to persist inside weapons engagement zones, sense the environment, close kill chains, and create decision advantage for the joint force.15Forward Army light infantry battalions provide a complement: increasing stand‑in land nodes alongside Marines, extending sensing networks ashore, securing and protecting expeditionary advanced bases, and reinforcing the lodgments that enable joint maritime operations. Marines will win battles, but the Army is the force of protraction, complementing with endurance to win wars. In practice, Army and Marine units should plan and operate as a single littoral team under joint task force constructs — common C2, shared sensor grids, coordinated deception, and mutually supporting surface connectors and aviation lift — to turn disaggregated island positions into a coherent maritime kill web.

Similarly, like the Marines, Army infantry units maintain movement and maneuver as a signature contribution and offer U.S. Indo‑Pacific Command an area control multi‑tool. The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force and its Dong Feng‑21D anti‑ship missiles can deny access but cannot hold ground or provide sea control. Likewise, U.S. fighters, bombers, and aircraft carriers are no replacement for boots on the ground when it comes to controlling the land in the Indo‑Pacific. These capabilities offer area denial but not control. World War II’s island campaigns in the Solomons and New Guinea, the Korean War’s Inchon‑Seoul operation, and the British fight across the Falklands all demonstrate a common rule: Victory in a maritime theater depends on land forces seizing, defending, and sustaining lodgments that enable the rest of the joint force.16As GEN Charles Flynn noted, “There will always be a requirement for the Army to defend or impose will where people live, on the land.”17In today’s Indo‑Pacific, light infantry battalions bring small‑unit mastery and the mobility to hop by rotary wing, surface craft, or commercial lift among austere airstrips, beaches, or landing zones, then fan out by foot or in ISVs to secure key terrain, ports, airfields, and coastal chokepoints.

That said, the distances to cross in the Indo‑Pacific are vast. If forces are not postured forward at the onset of conflict, Army light infantry battalions will be highly dependent on the joint force for strategic lift by sea or air. Nevertheless, Army watercraft, including logistics support vessels and LCU‑2000s, can support organic maritime movement in the first island chain, while combat rubber raiding craft enable local covert insertions and riverine/coastal resupply.18However, the Army should accelerate acquisition of the maneuver support vessel‑light, at scale, to more efficiently shuttle people, equipment, fuel, and munitions between strategic sealift, sanctuary harbors, austere beaches, and unimproved ports. Separately, Army aviation, using CH‑47s and UH‑60s, can support long‑range air assaults. Though it is at its best when supported by joint assets like the Navy’s expeditionary sea base vessel. As a brigade operations officer during Balikatan 23, my unit executed a multi‑nodal joint and combined long‑range air assault using joint rotary‑wing assets and an expeditionary sea base for island hopping north of Luzon.19

With maneuver comes protection. Ports, airfields, fuel farms, ground terminals, and logistics hubs are the arteries of power projection; all are on land and all require security. The same goes for exquisite theater fires assets like the Mid‑Range Capability.20Light infantry battalions provide patrols, counter‑reconnaissance, perimeter defense, and quick reaction forces that protect joint capabilities from sabotage, special‑purpose raids, and low‑signature drone attacks. Dispersion also confers survivability — they are hard to find and too numerous to justify million‑dollar missiles. Properly equipped, battalions can flip the cost‑exchange ratio, conserving high‑end interceptors for cruise missiles and aircraft while using attritable and non‑kinetic systems against attritable threats — a lesson reinforced daily over Ukraine.21

Finally, sustainment is where the light infantry battalion punches above its weight. Ships and fighters demand ports and airfields brimming with fuelers, maintainers, and specialized parts. Light infantry battalions train to live austere, self‑sustain for days, and operate with lean signatures. Prepositioned stocks, local sourcing, over‑the‑shore resupply by small craft, and commercial off‑the‑shelf parts for ISVs extend endurance at modest cost.22As uncrewed logistics mature — from quadcopter drops to rocket‑delivered resupply — the light infantry battalion’s endurance stretches even further, addressing a critical vulnerability in a theater where distant sea lanes and contested air corridors are the norm.23

Supporting the light infantry’s tactical‑reconnaissance strike complex is also an exercise in cost savings. Armed correctly, an infantry battalion could bring drones like the Shahed‑136 to the fight.24From Luzon, Philippines, they could put at risk ships in the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, Chinese mainland ports, Hainan Island, and radars and equipment on the Spratlys. These loitering munitions cost $35,000 on average.25Even with a 10‑percent strike ratio, that is five times cheaper than a Naval Strike Missile.26Conversely, a modern light infantry battalion, properly trained, can defend against those same loitering munitions with $1,000 FPV drones, far more sustainable than using a Patriot Advanced Capability‑3 interceptor at over $3 million or a National Advanced Surface‑to‑Air Missile System Air Intercept Missile 9‑X variant at slightly over $1 million.27

Overall, timeless truths remain: People live on land, and wars are decided where they live. But the character of war is shifting. The democratization of precision‑strike, pervasive overhead seeing and sensing, highly networked and distributed long‑range fires, and contested information and cyber domains change how we need to fight. The modern light infantry battalion sits at the nexus. It ties allies to U.S. strategy, converts data to decisive action at the edge, delivers affordable combat power, and protects critical nodes, all with a minimal tail. To enable it, the Army needs to partner with the Indo‑Pacific Command to accelerate the adoption and fielding of emerging technology for its light infantry battalions, including the network, mobility, and tactical reconnaissance‑strike capabilities it has already begun identifying. It also needs to man them for reconnaissance‑strike battle, and organize and train them with specific emphasis on the joint littoral fight of the future.28

A Soldier assigned to 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), observes as an Infantry Squad Vehicle is backed into a CH-47 Chinook for a Long-range, large-scale air assault on 5 May 2025. (Photo by SGT Kelvin Johnson Jr.)

Historical precedent underscores the thesis. Guadalcanal was won by starving, stubborn infantry holding a rough airstrip that enabled sea and air control to follow.29Inchon’s brilliance only mattered because Soldiers and Marines fought through Seoul to reopen the lodgment.30The Falklands campaign turned on light infantry grinding across bog and ridge to eject a superior force from the high ground overlooking littoral approaches.31Ukraine’s battlefields now show that a light infantry battalion can see, sense, strike, and survive in ways unthinkable a decade ago — if manned, trained, equipped, and empowered to do so.32When our big ships and fancy fighters have to hold outside the threat ring, the modern light infantry battalion can persist — seeing, sensing, striking, moving, protecting, and enduring — enabling the joint force to prevail.

Notes