How a Strike Platoon Fights

Early Observations

By CPT Matthew Stanford and 1LT Cammack Shepler

July 1, 2026 | Infantry, Summer 2026 Edition

Read Time: < 12 mins

In March 2025, Comanche Troop, 1st Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, reorganized to incorporate a “strike” platoon that was equipped and manned to wage unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and multidomain operations at the tactical level. Observations of the Russo-Ukrainian War

• specifically the emergence of a new evolution of warfare

• drove the development of the strike platoon concept. Four key realities created the conditions that drove Comanche to experiment with a strike-platoon structure:

1. Comanche, along with other troops, experienced manning constraints;

2. The proximity to the Russo-Ukrainian War provided a glimpse into the current requirements of modern warfare;

3. Rapid technological advancement and the proliferation

   of UAS capabilities effectively mitigated prior shortfalls; and

4. Transformation in contact provided us with the flexibility to “tinker” with and right-size formations for the ever-evolving foe on today’s large-scale combat operations (LSCO) battlefield.

These observations drove Comanche Troop’s ability to transition into an organization capable of competing on the battlefield of 2025 and beyond.

Organization and Structure

Despite its designation as a rifle platoon, the Strike Platoon operates with the minimum personnel required for mission capability while maximizing combat effectiveness.

To improve its effectiveness, Comanche Troop redistributed personnel to round out two fully manned line platoons, while maintaining a third platoon (Strike Platoon) with more diverse capabilities, which included mortars, small UAS (sUAS), and eventually countersUAS. In just 10 days, the unit finalized its task organization, received approval to reorganize, and became operational. During this period, the team reorganized property, confirmed accountability, and adjusted manning assignments to ensure Strike Platoon had the right personnel to begin operations.

Other significant material changes in the troop included moving Infantry Carrier Vehicle-Dragoons (ICV-D) from the Strike Platoon to the line platoons to offer them more direct fire capability, as well as adding fire support and a command post so the platoon could operate in a more decentralized manner. With this structure, the Strike Platoon consisted of one organic sUAS squad, one tactical control (TACON) mortar squad, two organic Infantry Carrier Vehicle-Javelins (ICV-J), two TACON Mortar Carrier Vehicles (MCVs), one organic ICV (Command Post), and one TACON Fire Support Vehicle (FSV) (see Figure 1).

One squad leader and eight UAS operators make up the UAS squad, which is divided into two teams capable of independent operations. Each team combines intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets with strike capabilities, focusing on Purpose-Built Attritable Systems (PBAS). The unit leadership chose operators who demonstrated both interest and aptitude in UAS operations.

Every trooper in the Strike Platoon team carries an individual weapon. The sUAS operator carries an M4 as his primary weapon, along with a special-purpose backpack that both protects and transports the drone, ground control station (GCS), goggles, and long-range antenna. The sUAS sustainer carries an M4 with the M320 attached, an additional drone, and spare parts to conduct field-expedient repairs. Lastly, the sUAS security team carries an M249 to provide suppression to enable the element to break contact if necessary. The intent is to never place the Strike teams in a position where they are decisively engaged with the enemy.

The 2CR UAS platoon leads UAS operator training, which consists of three days of classroom instruction, one week of flight simulator training, and two weeks of live flight time. UAS operators also spend an additional week learning to construct UAS systems using carbon fiber or 3D-printed parts.

Strike Platoon’s organic equipment involves multiple PBAS first-person view (FPV) and ISR drones. To operate the PBAS FPV drones, an operator must have a GCS, viewing goggles or laptop, and an extended-range antenna to provide more stand-off from the target. The troop operates two drones to support infantry maneuvers and conduct FPV strikes. The PBAS FPV provides another precision strike asset, especially when paired with ISR UAS. FPV drones should be considered ammunition, not property book equipment, because their 3D-printed construction makes them fragile and designed for single use.

Strike Platoon Purpose

Strike Platoon’s mission is to conduct offensive and defensive UAS strikes against enemy forces to allow the troop greater freedom of maneuver. The platoon is critical to setting conditions through effects-based operations as well as enabling troop- and squadron-level maneuver.

Deliberate Attack Battle Drill

After 45 days of initial reorganization and training, Strike Platoon participated in its first live-training scenario in Hohenfels, Germany. In late March 2025, we observed two Soldiers (a SGT and PFC) operating as a UAS opposing force (OPFOR) attached to Cherokee Company, 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, against cadets from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS), who were conducting an area defense of an urban area. Three UAS conducted a coordinated attack on the defensive positions, identifying machine-gun positions and the company command post (CP) on rooftops and then detonating or dropping simulated munitions to destroy them.

Observers on the lane assessed a mass casualty (MASCAL) event and rendered the CP and the machine guns out of commission. This eliminated the company’s command-and-control capabilities and reduced its coverage of high-speed avenues of approach. Three drones decisively engaged the entire company of cadets, effectively keeping them out of the direct firefight. All elements were either firing into the sky or seeking overhead shelter. The UAS attack lasted 15 minutes, immediately followed by indirect fire. Following the end of the fire mission, the dismounts from Cherokee attacked the village from positions on the hill in the north. After the UAS attack severely weakened the cadets, the infantry quickly overwhelmed them.

A PFC and SGT, leveraging their training from the 2CR UAS program completed two and a half weeks prior, executed this coordinated and complex attack. These results confirmed that UAS training can rapidly produce capable and lethal FPV operators.

In addition to building the fundamental building blocks of combined arms maneuver between sUAS and ground forces, Comanche Troop developed a UAS battle drill for an attack on a fixed site. The battle drill consists of seven steps:

1. The attack begins with UAS observation and identification of the enemy position and targets for indirect fire (IDF), as well as providing information to refine the plan of the attack.

2. The UAS then observes fires on identified enemy positions using the troop-organic MCVs.

3. Achieving IDF suppression will trigger an attack employing FPV drones and munitions-dropper drones. Transitioning from IDF to UAS suppression will cause fires to cease, and the mounted and dismounted support-by-fire elements will move into position, maximizing the effect of echeloned fires. UAS suppression allows maneuver elements to be much closer to the enemy due to limited risk estimate distances (REDs).

4. The support-by-fire (SBF) elements begin suppression, and the UAS operators will continue to attack until the commander orders them to cease.

5. On order, the assault element will initiate fire and begin

   its attack from its last covered and concealed position.

6. As the attack continues, the SBF elements shift or lift fires, and then the assault element secures the objective until they achieve the desired effect on enemy forces or terrain.

7. The UAS assets will continue to monitor the battlespace to identify and strike enemy forces to degrade enemy counterattack. (See Figure 3)

Strike Platoon in Reconnaissance and Movements to Contact

In early April 2025, Comanche Troop provided OPFOR support for 4th Squadron, 2CR’s situational training exercise (STX) at the Hohenfels Training Area. Comanche Troop teamed up with Quickstrike Troop from 4/2CR to create an sUAS-enabled battalion tactical group (BTG) reconnaissance company for this exercise. Their mission during this period was simple: Conduct reconnaissance to identify seams in 4/2CR’s screen.

For this mission, Strike Platoon split into two teams, attaching them to the other line platoons in the troop and equipping them with two 3D-printed FPV drones for the OPFOR mission. Each line platoon received one PBAS FPV drone and a team of operators.

From the starting point (SP) to vehicle drop-off (VDO), the mission resembled a standard movement to contact. Limited functionality, flight time, and durability prevented us from using the PBAS FPV drones for reconnaissance. Once the Strike teams detected possible enemy contact, they launched their FPV drones to identify the threat and strike if engagement criteria allowed.

The engagement criteria for the Strike teams were a force no larger than one enemy Stryker and no more than one enemy squad. Engagement criteria were determined by the limited PBAS FPV magazine depth, and at the time, only one FPV sUAS was available per the two rifle platoons. With more drones, a greater number of vehicles could be engaged simultaneously.

During the initial day of OPFOR operations, Comanche Troop eliminated two enemy Strykers with FPV drones. During both engagements, they employed FPV UAS to initiate a hasty platoon attack. On the platoon leader’s order, the UAS conducted a strike immediately following fire from the SBF and assault elements. The FPV strike would typically force the dismounts out of the vehicle, resulting in their elimination by direct fire weapons systems. Both engagements began with the Comanche elements undetected and from a range of no more than 150 meters.

Engine noise and a lack of light easily revealed enemy positions. With Skydio drones, Strike could have confirmed enemy identification and location before committing the platoon, even without meeting the standard engagement criteria.

This portion of the exercise validated the theory that FPV drones are an incredibly effective initiation method for an attack against a mounted enemy and provide an element with enhanced capabilities for identifying and seeking out targets of opportunity. Many enemy forces were unsure of how to react to UAS contact and would hesitate, allowing the OPFOR platoons the critical initiative and element of surprise to quickly eliminate them.

Strike Platoon in the Defense

Comanche Troop conducted platoon-level defensive STX, the so-called “dig or die,” which stressed the importance of constructing dug-in fighting positions to increase survivability in today’s LSCO environment. The two rifle platoons constructed defensive positions following a block of instruction on engagement area development. Strike Platoon split up its FPV sUAS teams and attached them to each rifle platoon. As an attached team, they were employed to conduct reconnaissance of dead space and avenues of approach. During the engagement area development process, platoons also identified where they might theoretically pre-position drones during the defense to observe the enemy or take off quickly to conduct a strike against an approaching enemy force. In this context, Strike elements could position an FPV UAS along a road, camouflaged like an improvised explosive device, and strike as soon as they identify an enemy force meeting the engagement criteria.

Following the STX, each rifle platoon conducted one attack and one defense iteration against the other. Each engagement featured attacking and defending forces equipped with an FPV drone. In the defense, the FPV strikes were devastating to the offense. The defending UAS operators quickly identified and eliminated offensive SBF positions within seconds of initiation. FPV strikes quickly eliminated bunched-up squads maneuvering toward the breach point. UAS covered the gap between the risk estimate distance limit of artillery and the range of direct fire weapons systems in the defense so that attacking forces would have been completely combat ineffective before even reaching the breach.

In the offense against a dug-in enemy, the FPV drones were equally lethal. We conducted FPV strikes at the drones’ maximum range on identified enemy key weapon system positions and mounted battle positions, severely limiting the defense’s firepower before they could engage with direct-fire weapons. FPV drones could then pursue and strike the defending force as it retrograded to subsequent battle positions.

Way Forward

Comanche Troop will remain focused on four primary objectives:

1. Retraining our lessons learned during platoon STX and live-fire exercise (LFX) while sharing our knowledge across a wide audience;

2. Validate Strike Platoon effects-based maneuver during troop LFX and Saber Junction 25;

3. Expand the magazine depth of PBAS and S/MRR to maximize capability and lethality; and

4. Continue to develop over-the-horizon capability and hardware for PBAS FPV.

Strike Platoon will use lessons learned from its troop STX to refine its tactics, techniques, and procedures for these upcoming events. During the planning process, Strike leadership will create detailed engagement criteria for the FPV operators and identify optimal locations to pre-position drones or operators. Until then, the most important priority for Strike will be resourcing. While still lethal, Strike was far from performing at its full potential as an asset for the troop. Strike Platoon needs more drones, more repair parts, and more tools. Strike has competent UAS operators and builders who need the proper resources to operate optimally.

Conclusion

The use of the Strike Platoon in the offense allows the troop greater flexibility in the echelonment of fires and suppression of the enemy before dismounted assault. The Royal Military Academy and STX exercises proved that a small, autonomous force of UAS operators could suppress a much larger element and cause devastating battlefield effects with organic capabilities and equipment.

Exercising mission command and empowering junior leaders to operate decentralized are crucial for the effectiveness of the Strike concept. It is important to ensure subordinates understand the commander’s intent, engagement criteria, high-value targets, desired end state, etc., for Strike Platoon to be able to operate decentralized in an electronic warfare and communications-contested environment. FPV operators often operate alone or in small teams away from direct platoon leadership. Most FPV engagements are optimal only within a brief window of enemy vulnerability, and waiting for authorization from higher leadership would spoil the opportunity. FPV operators need detailed, clear, and specific engagement criteria so that they can exercise the disciplined initiative to conduct strikes within their platoon leader’s or commander’s intent. The elements of mission command become even more critical when a junior enlisted UAS operator is wielding one of the platoon’s most casualty-producing assets outside of direct leadership or oversight. FPV drones fundamentally change the nature of combined arms warfare and give a significant advantage to small, stealthy, disciplined teams over mounted formations. Leadership needs to equip these small teams with the right information to maximize their effectiveness against the enemy.