Deep Reconnaissance
The Need for Long-Range Reconnaissance and Surveillance in LSCO
By 1SG Kyle C. Ward
| Infantry, Summer 2026 Edition
Read Time: < 9 mins
A forward observer with the Long Range Surveillance Section, 81st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, Washington National Guard, observes a vehicle during a training exercise at Yakima Training Center, WA, on 20 July 2025.
(Photo by SSG Alec Dionne)
The U.S. Army’s current emphasis on technologically advanced assets, while important, risks creating significant vulnerabilities in future conflicts. A robust human intelligence capability is indispensable, particularly in contested environments. Throughout military history, the Army has repeatedly recognized the value of long-range surveillance (LRS) only to see these capabilities diminished over time. However, the increasing complexity of modern warfare demands a renewed commitment to LRS. Traditional intelligence-gathering methods are becoming less effective due to the proliferation of electronic warfare tactics and the inherent challenges of operating in contested spaces. LRS offers unique advantages — deep reconnaissance beyond the range of standard sensors and, crucially, human-centered intelligence — providing vital situational awareness in difficult terrain. Integrating these capabilities with advancing technologies and specialized training will empower commanders to effectively navigate near-peer conflicts.
The Evolving Landscape of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
For much of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, military operations increasingly relied on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. This was particularly true during counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, where persistent surveillance and rapid target identification were paramount. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) revolutionized the COIN environment. Platforms like the Reaper and Predator, equipped with advanced sensor systems enhanced battlefield awareness and enabled precise strikes against adversaries.1This technological leap forward undeniably improved operational effectiveness.
A Historical Foundation: From Rogers’ Rangers to the Alamo Scouts
The principles of modern LRS have historical roots stretching back centuries. During the French and Indian War, Major Robert Rogers’ Rangers exemplified the value of accurate intelligence, operating as small, independent teams tasked with observation, reporting, and disruption behind enemy lines.2Their success hinged on skills like tracking, camouflage, and wilderness survival while emphasizing stealth and observation. Though the Ranger model evolved, the need for specialized scouting continued, with the U.S. Army employing skilled trackers, often Native Americans, during the 19th century Indian Wars.3A dedicated long-range reconnaissance capability re-emerged during World War II with the establishment of the Alamo Scouts in 1944, who provided crucial pre-landing intelligence on enemy defenses and terrain in the Pacific, demonstrating the operational impact of specialized long-range reconnaissance patrol (LRRP) units.4
Formalizing the Concept in Korea and Vietnam
The challenging terrain of the Korean War (1950-1953) exposed the limitations of conventional reconnaissance, creating a need for more adaptable intelligence-gathering methods. This spurred experimentation with LRRP concepts, which ultimately led to the establishment of formal LRRP units during the Vietnam War (1955-1975).5LRRP teams of five to six Soldiers (not special forces), infiltrated enemy territory to collect critical intelligence on troop movements, base locations, and supply routes, such as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, relying on stealth, observation, and secure communication to avoid engagement.6
The Shift to Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) and Emerging Threats
However, the operational environment is changing. The rise of peer and near-peer adversaries necessitates a departure from the ISR paradigms developed during COIN operations. These adversaries possess advanced capabilities to degrade traditional ISR systems, diminishing their effectiveness.7The United States is now entering a new phase of conflict, where adversaries are increasingly contesting our traditional advantages in areas like air, land, sea, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. This shift demands a reevaluation of traditional ISR methodologies and a move toward more resilient and adaptable systems. While technology-centric ISR proved effective in past conflicts, it now faces limitations in the face of advanced electronic warfare and the complexities of modern battlefields.
The Vulnerability of Traditional ISR
Modern military operations are increasingly vulnerable to degraded ISR capabilities due to the advanced electronic warfare capabilities of near-peer adversaries. These adversaries can disrupt, degrade, and deny the effectiveness of conventional ISR systems operating within contested electro-magnetic spectrums. As noted in a March 2025 Live Science article, traditional ISR systems face significant vulnerabilities, which include susceptibility to interference like jamming and spoofing, as well as cyberattacks.8These can degrade performance and create intelligence gaps — particularly in challenging environments like contested airspace or adverse weather. The rapidly changing nature of modern conflict also demands flexibility, often requiring ISR assets to be re-tasked mid-mission. While necessary, this can leave other areas temporarily unmonitored. Finally, the potential for capture of these sophisticated systems by an adversary represents a serious risk of sensitive technology compromise, as recently highlighted during a deployment to the National Training Center. As a first sergeant with 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment, our reliance on a reconnaissance troop for early warning and situational understanding severely impacted an operation when that troop was unexpectedly repurposed, creating a critical intelligence void. The battalion struggled to accurately assess enemy composition, disposition, and strength until we positioned a scout platoon forward. The most impactful intelligence did not come from technological sensors but from several scout observation posts positioned forward of the reconnaissance squadron; human reports significantly affected decision-making within the companies and at the battalion level. This experience underscored a vital lesson: We can no longer rely solely on technology to determine the enemy’s course of action.
The United States is now entering a new phase of conflict, where adversaries are increasingly contesting our traditional advantages... This shift demands a reevaluation of traditional ISR methodologies and a move toward more resilient and adaptable systems.
Addressing the Gap: The Importance of Human Intelligence
Conventional sensors and platforms often lack the necessary reach and persistence to provide adequate situational awareness in the vast, dynamic, and dispersed operational environments characteristic of near-peer conflict. The depth and breadth of modern battlefields demand ISR capabilities that can penetrate deeply into contested areas and provide continuous, wide-area surveillance. Traditional platforms often lack the range, endurance, and survivability to meet these demands, leaving forces vulnerable to enemy maneuver and deception. Reliance on purely technical intelligence in electronically contested or denied environments creates a critical gap in situational awareness, particularly regarding enemy composition, disposition, intent, and subtle activities. Advances in sensor technology, widespread air defense networks, and competition for control of the electromagnetic spectrum limit U.S. operational freedom.9The focus on technology-centric ISR has often overlooked the importance of human observation and contextual understanding. In LSCO, where the battlespace is dynamic and unpredictable, human intelligence provides crucial insights that technology alone cannot replicate.
Strategic Integration and Re-establishment of LRS Teams
To counter the degradation of traditional ISR capabilities, strategically integrating long-range surveillance and reconnaissance personnel is essential. This approach acknowledges the limitations of solely technology-driven ISR in contested environments and leverages the adaptability and contextual understanding of human expertise. Augmenting, and replacing conventional systems with LRS capabilities when necessary, supports critical situational awareness and extends operational reach. In his 2018 article “Deep Maneuver,” Jack D. Kem defined deep operations as “extending operations in time, space, and purpose to gain an advantage over enemy forces and capabilities before adversaries can use their capabilities against friendly forces.”10 The inherent flexibility of LRS teams provides a critical advantage in rapidly evolving operational environments. Re-establishing LRS teams proficient in infiltration and advanced communication is crucial for conducting deep reconnaissance in LSCO.11 These teams provide real-time, precise intelligence that surpasses the limitations of standard sensors, extending operational reach beyond traditional sensor ranges.
Prioritizing Human-Centric Intelligence
Prioritizing human-centric intelligence gathering and utilizing the unique abilities of LRS personnel is paramount for maintaining a decisive advantage in modern warfare. This approach addresses the vulnerabilities exposed by advanced electronic warfare, emphasizing the irreplaceable value of human observation and analysis in challenging environments. Reintegrating LRS teams, with their capacity for deep reconnaissance and real-time intelligence delivery, ensures persistent and adaptable intelligence crucial for effective decision-making in contested environments. This human-centric approach fosters a deeper understanding of the battlespace beyond the scope of technological solutions.
Conclusion
The evolution of military operations, particularly the shift to LSCO, underscores the critical need for adaptable and resilient ISR capabilities. Historically, reliance on electro-centric ISR provided advantages, but the emergence of near-peer adver-saries with advanced electronic warfare capabilities exposed the vulnerabilities of sole technology-driven approaches. The current challenge lies in the degradation of traditional ISR systems within contested electromagnetic spectrums, the limited reach and persistence of conventional sensors, and the gap in situational awareness created by overreliance on technical intelligence. To address these challenges, a strategic shift towards integrating human expertise into the ISR architecture is essential. Re-establishing long-range surveillance and reconnaissance teams, capable of conducting deep reconnaissance and providing real-time intelligence, offers a crucial solution. By prioritizing human-centric intelligence gathering, forces can overcome the limitations of technology-centric ISR and maintain a decisive advantage in modern warfare. Reintegrating LRS teams, with their specialized skills and adaptability, ensures persistent and actionable intelligence, crucial for effective decision-making in the dynamic and contested environments of contemporary military operations. This approach recognizes the irreplaceable value of human observation and analysis, enhancing situational awareness and operational effectiveness in the face of evolving threats.
Notes
1. Lt Col Louis F. Dupuy Jr., “Achieving an Optimal Medium Altitude UAV Force Balance of COIN Operations,” (Master’s thesis, Air War College, Air University, 2009), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA540097.pdf.
2. Robert Rogers, “28 Rules of Ranging,” originally published 1759.
3. “Army Scouts 1866-1890,” National Museum of the American Indian website, n.d., https://americanindian.si.edu/why-we-serve/topics/army-scouts-1866-1890/.
4. “Alamo Scouts,” Army Historical Foundation, n.d., https://armyhistory.org/the-alamo-scouts/.
5. Austin G. Long, “First War Syndrome: Military Culture, Professionalization, and Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” (PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010), https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/60214.
6. Ibid.
7. “Department of Defense Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy,” October 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/29/2002525927/-1/-1/0/ELECTROMAGNETIC_SPECTRUM_SUPERIORITY_STRATEGY.PDF.
8. Josh Dinner, “China Now Has a ‘Kill Mesh’ in Orbit, Space Force Vice Chief Says,” Live Science, 29 March 2025, https://www.livescience.com/space/space-exploration/china-now-has-a-kill-mesh-in-orbit-space-force-vice-chief-says.
9. MAJ Colin M. Sattler, “Aviation Artificial Intelligence: How Will It Fare in Multi-Domain Environment?” (Master’s thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2018), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/tr/AD1071307.
10. Jack D. Kem, PhD, “Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations,” Military Review, September- October 2018, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2018/Deep-Maneuver/.
11. Field Manual 3-55.93, Long Range Surveillance Operations, June 2009, https://archive.org/details/fm-3-55.93-long-range-surveilance-operations-2009.